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ted by Chris DiBona, Danese 
Mark Stone With a Foreword by Kim Polese 




THE CONTINUING 

EVOLUTION 



O REILLY 



open sources 2.0 



XX 





open sources 2.0 

Edited by Chris DiBona Danese Cooper Mark Stone 



IHE CONTINUING 
EVOLUTION 

XX 
XX 



O REILLY* 

Beijing Cambridge Koln London Paris Sebastopol Taipei Tokyo 



Open Sources 2.0: The Continuing Evolution 

Edited by Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone 

Copyright 2006 Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone. All rights reserved. 
Printed in the United States of America. 

Published by O Reilly Media, Inc., 1005 Gravenstein Highway North, Sebastopol, CA 95472. 

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Printing History: 

October 2005: First Edition. 



The O Reilly logo is a registered trademark of O Reilly Media, Inc. Open Sources 2.0 and related trade 
dress are trademarks of O Reilly Media, Inc. 

The essays in Open Sources 2.0are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- 
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Street, Fifth Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105, visit http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/, 
or see Appendix B. 

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While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the publisher, editors, and authors 
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contained herein. 



^ This book uses RepKover? a durable and flexible lay-flat binding. 



ISBN: 0-596-00802-3 



XX 








Table of Contents 



Foreword: Source Is Everything ix 

Kim Polese 

Acknowledgments xiii 

List of Contributors xv 

Introduction xxv 

Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone 

SECTION 1 . Open Source: Competition and Evolution 1 

1. The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 3 

Mitchell Baker 

2. Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 21 

Chris DiBona 

3. A Tale of Two Standards 37 

Jeremy Allison 

4. Open Source and Security 57 

Ben Laurie 

5. Dual Licensing 71 

Michael Olson 

6. Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 91 

Ian Murdock 



7. Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models 

for a Disruptive Development Process 103 

Matthew N. Asay 

8. Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models 

in Context 121 

Stephen R. Walli 

9. Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 137 

Russ Nelson 

10. Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 149 

Wendy Seltzer 

11. Libre Software in Europe 161 

Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona 
Gregorio Robles 

12. OSS in India 189 

Alolita Sharma and 
Robert Adkins 

13. When China Dances with OSS 197 

Boon-Lock Yeo, Louisa Liu, and Sunil Saxena 

14. How Much Freedom Do You Want? 211 

Bruno Souza 

SECTION 2 . Beyond Open Source: Collaboration and Community 229 

15. Making a New World 231 

Doc Searls 

16. The Open Source Paradigm Shift 253 

Tim O Reilly 

17. Extending Open Source Principles Beyond Software Development. . . 273 

Pamela Jones 

18. Open Source Biology 281 

Andrew Hessel 

19. Everything Is Known 297 

ugene Kim 

20. The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 307 

Larry Sanger 

21. Open Beyond Software 339 

SonaliK. Shah 

22. Patterns of Governance in Open Source 361 

Steven Weber 

23. Communicating Many to Many 373 

Jeff Bates and Mark Stone 



vi xx Table of Contents 



SECTION 3 . Appendixes 397 

A. The Open Source Definition 399 

B. Referenced Open Source Licenses 401 

C. Columns from Slashdot 417 

Index. . . 423 



Table of Contents ** vn 



XX 
XX 



Foreword: Source Is Everything 



The software industry has always been caught between two perspectives: one 
anchored in supply, the other in demand. To the market s supply side (the vendors), 
commodities and "commoditization" have always been threats. To the demand side 
(the customers), commodities have always been useful. 

The latter view is winning, thanks to open source. And we re only beginning to dis 
cover how much larger the market will be, now that it s filling with useful open 
source commodities. These commodities, in most cases, have little or no sale value, 
but are useful for building countless other businesses. The combined revenues of 
those businesses will far exceed revenues of companies that make their money sell 
ing software. 

Use value precedes sale value in every market category. Think about it. Agriculture 
started with gardening. Textiles started with weaving and knitting. Meat packing 
started with herding. Construction started with hut building. 

What did the software industry start with? In a word, programming. As Eric S. Raymond 
said in the first chapter of the original Open Sources, "In the beginning were the Real Pro 
grammers." To Raymond, real programming was both legacy and destiny a source that 
began with "guys in polyester shirts, writing in machine and assembler and FORTRAN," 
and ran through Unix programming and the free software movement, to arrive at "Linux 
development and mainstreaming of the Internet." 



That latter phrase captured where the industry was when Open Sources was pub 
lished in January 1999. The Internet, Raymond noted, "has even brought hacker cul 
ture to the beginnings of mainstream respectability and political clout." 

A half-decade later, open source has grown far beyond the mainstream. It has 
become the bedrock over which the mainstream flows. Today it is hard to find a For 
tune 500 company with an IT infrastructure that does not depend, in some funda 
mental way, on open source software. 

The Internet mainstreamed programming by putting every programmer zero dis 
tance from every other programmer in the world. Supported by this extreme conve 
nience the demand side began supplying itself in a global way. "Real Programmers" 
were back in power. This time, however, real programmers were a legion, not a mere 
handful, and the tools they needed could be found on any PC, not just on the infra 
structure inside large organizations. 

Today power comes from everybody who creates anything that s useful to anybody 
and that any other programmer can improve. 

Today there are hundreds of thousands of hackers, perhaps millions. Whatever the 
number, many more will soon arrive from Asia, South America, Africa, and other for 
merly Net-less places all over the world. 

The technology sector s industrial age the one in which manufacturers built plat 
forms for silos in which customers and users were trapped will, in retrospect, 
appear to be an early growing stage: a necessary but temporary step toward a healthy 
and mature marketplace. 

Let s give credit where it s due: developing software and hardware in the early days of 
the computing industry was like settling Mars. Every company had to build its own air 
tight habitat, from the ground up. Making hardware and compatible software inside 
your own habitat was hard enough. Trying to become interoperable with anybody 
else s environment was nearly unthinkable. Even within large companies like IBM, 
whole systems were incompatible with whole other systems. Remember Systems 34, 
36, and 38, which used twin-ax cabling while IBM mainframes used co-ax? 

All these closed habitats naturally fell in to fighting. The press supported the battling- 
vendor view of the marketplace, which became a form of entertainment, dramatized 
via continuous coverage of the vendor wars. 

The Net obviates the need to build closed habitats. You don t need to make your own 
bedrock anymore. Open source commodities provide all the base infrastructural 
building materials you need, and then some. 

Naturally, the old supply side felt threatened by that. For a while. 



Foreword: Source Is Everything 



Then the demand side (the programmers) inside those silos began using open source 
to build solutions to all kinds of problems. Today IBM, Novell, HP, Sun nearly 
every big platform and silo company other than Microsoft have shifted their prod 
uct strategies to take advantage of abundant open source commodities in the market 
place. They also contribute, in most cases, to the development projects that continue 
to produce those commodities. While the decisions to "go open source" were made 
at the tops of those companies, in every case they also involved ratification of deci 
sions already made by the companies own engineers. 

You can still build platforms today, of course, but for practical considerations, it only 
makes sense to build them on top of open source infrastructure. Amazon and Google 
are familiar platform businesses (one for retailing, the other for advertising), built on 
cheap or free open source building materials. 

The portfolio of open source building materials now runs to 100,000 or more prod 
ucts, each the project of a hacker or community of hackers, each producing goods, 
the primary purpose of which is to be useful, not just to sell. Because that software is 
useful, and most of it doesn t have a proprietary agenda, whole market categories can 
be opened where once only proprietary platforms and silos grew. 

Take the private branch exchange (PBX) telephone business. In the old days, which 
are now starting to end, companies had to choose corporate phone systems from 
Toshiba, Panasonic, NEC, Nortel, and other manufacturers of closed proprietary 
platforms and silos. Then a small device maker, Digium, released Asterisk, an open 
source PBX. In addition to a vigorous development community, Asterisk attracted 
countless varieties of businesses made possible by its wide-open use value. In the 
long run, far more money will surely be made because of Asterisk than could ever 
have been made by selling Asterisk or even by selling the proprietary PBXes that 
Asterisk now obsoletes. 

So, thanks to open source, the software market is finally growing up. It is becoming 
mature. Its healthy new ecosystem is made possible by countless commodities, grow 
ing more numerous every day. 

There is an important difference, however, between open source commodities and 
those derived from raw materials (like wood or steel) that is harvested or mined. It s 
a difference that will make the new, mature, software marketplace incalculably large. 

The difference is this: open source commodities are produced by creative and 
resourceful human minds. Not by geology, biology, and botany. This means there is 
neither a limit to the number of open source products, nor a limit to the number of 
improvements. 



Foreword: Source Is Everything 



Yet every one of those open source projects is concerned mostly with the improve 
ment of their own products. While they care about how those products interoperate 
with other products, they can t begin to account for all the combined possibilities 
where interoperation is required. That means there is room for businesses to test, 
certify, and support combinations of open source products. 

That s what attracted me into the vast and growing new marketplace opened by a 
growing abundance of open source building materials. Like many industry veterans, 
I didn t see that opportunity until I moved my point of view from the supply side 
that felt threatened to the demand side that felt empowered. 

And I m hardly alone. 

Some will say we re at the beginning of another boom or worse, another bubble. 
Those views are both limited and misleading. Open source has changed the world 
of software into one in which raw materials are literally limitless. Every mature 
industry such as construction, automobiles, computing hardware has experi 
enced hyper-accelerated growth resulting from commoditization of its core build 
ing blocks. But the impact on the software industry has the potential to be far more 
profound, because software is so malleable, so easily shared now, and so increas 
ingly ubiquitous in everyday life. 

So, while open source software, and the commoditization it brings to the software 
industry, may seem a threat today, it is actually ushering in a wave of enormous 
innovation and productivity the impact of which has already reached far beyond 
this industry. 

It comes down to one simple truth: we humans naturally desire to improve our own 
world through building useful tools. In sharing those tools, we ve learned that the 
world around us gets better too. So the idea of open source is as old as civilization 
itself. And our very modern industry is finally realizing the power contained in this 
simple fact: the first source for everything we make is ourselves. 

KIM POLESE, CEO, SPIKESOURCE 



xii X Foreword: Source Is Everything 



XX 
XX 



Acknowledgments 



Chris DiBona: Like its predecessor, the publication of Open Sources 2.0 represents 
the work of dozens of people both inside and outside of O Reilly. It was my pleasure 
and privilege to work with Mark Stone again, and Danese Cooper was invaluable to 
the creation of the book. The inspiration behind the international section was hers, 
and she should be called out for that. In the first Open Sources I noted that Mark had 
said that "a book could be written about how this book was written." And while this 
one s creation was hardly as dramatic, it was no less challenging. 

Special thanks to Mike Hendrickson, our O Reilly editor, who made it almost too easy. 
Thanks to Tim, Rael, and Nat for the books, conferences and knowledge that your 
company has crammed into my brain. Keep up the great work! Additionally, thanks to 
the folks at Google who allowed me the spare cycles to produce the book so, thanks 
Bill Coughran! I d also like to extend my love to Denise and Neil Kruse, my parents 
Bennie and Cynthia, and especially my sister Trish we miss you. 

Finally, in the last Open Sources, I dedicated it to my patient girlfriend Christine, and 
now I dedicate this book and all my life s works to my wife Christine and our daugh 
ter Frannie. I love you more than I can say. 

Danese Cooper: Thanks to my family Joey, Adi, Zoe & Marie who have put up 
with lots of absences as I ve traveled the world meeting open source people. Thanks 
also to my friends, especially Brian Behlendorf and Tim O Reilly, and to all essay 
writers for agreeing that there should be an update on Open Sources. Thanks to my 
employers at Sun, and now Intel, for giving me space to work on the book, and to 

X nil 



my colleagues at the Open Source Initiative for including me in the work. And 
finally, thanks to my co-editors, Chris and Mark, who had all the experience from 
creating the first book and generously shared it. 

Mark Stone: This book is dedicated to my wife Karen and my son Alex; may your 
future always be open. Looking at the list of contributors here, I realize the three of 
us really do stand on the shoulders of giants and are privileged to facilitate what 
they have created. Several people at O Reilly deserve special praise: Tim O Reilly, 
for having the vision to recognize that the time was right for this book; Mike Hen- 
drickson, who waited so patiently for the final manuscript; and Jamie Peppard, 
Marlowe Shaeffer, Audrey Doyle, and Rob Romano, who had the difficult produc 
tion task of turning a wide range of formats and styles into a unified whole. My co- 
editors, Chris and Danese, have been invaluable and inspiring colleagues through 
out this whole process. Finally, I d like to thank xeno42, elcoronel, and beret for 
the example they set and the education they ve given me; you guys live the ideal 
every day that the rest of us can only talk about. 



xiv X Acknowledgments 







List of Contributors 



Danese Cooper has a 15-year history in the software industry, and has long been an 
advocate for transparent development methodologies. Danese worked for six years at 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. on the inception and growth of the various open source 
projects sponsored by Sun (including OpenOffice.org, java.net, and blogs.sun.com). 
She was Sun s chief open source evangelist and founded Sun s Open Source Pro 
grams Office. She has unique experience implementing open source projects from 
within a large proprietary company. She joined the Open Source Initiative (OSI) 
board in December 2001 and currently serves as secretary and treasurer. As of March 
2005, Danese is with Intel to advise on open source projects, investment, and sup 
port. She speaks internationally on open source and licensing issues. 

Chris DiBona is the open source programs manager for Mountain View, California- 
based Google, Inc. Before joining Google, Chris was an editor/author for the popular 
online web site, Slashdot. He is an internationally known advocate of open source 
software and related methodologies. Along with Mark Stone and Sam Ockman, he 
edited the original Open Sources. He writes for many publications and speaks interna 
tionally on software development and digital rights issues. His home page and blog 
can be found at http://dibona.com. 

Mark Stone has made a career of studying collaborative communities. As a univer 
sity professor with a Ph.D. in philosophy of science, he has studied and published on 
the disruptive community conditions that create scientific revolutions. More recent 



work has involved the open source community, as editor for Morgan Kaufmann Pub 
lishers covering operating systems and web technology, then as executive editor for 
open source topics at O Reilly, and as the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Linux Tech 
nology. While at O Reilly he co-edited, with Chris DiBona and Sam Ockman, the 
seminal Open Sources in 1999. For the last six years he has worked with various dot 
coms on tools and practices for collaboration and online community building, 
including as part of the executive team managing top-tier technology sites such as 
Slashdot (3.5 million page views per day served), and SourceForge.net (1 million 
registered users). As director of product development for ManyOne Networks, he is 
currently working on the next evolution of online community, leveraging 3D envi 
ronments and new tools for knowledge management. Mark holds a Ph.D. in philoso 
phy of science from the University of Rochester, and earned his B.A. in philosophy 
from the University of Maryland. Mark can be reached at mark.stone@gmail.com. 

Robert Adkins is cofounder of Technetra, a Silicon Valley software company which 
implements and deploys large-scale software projects specializing in open source 
solutions. Robert has more than 20 years of experience in the information technol 
ogy industry, having led products and services groups at Apple Computer, IBM, BBN 
Communications, and Litton/PRC. He has an M.S. in computer science from Johns 
Hopkins University. He has published in many technology magazines and journals 
including Linux Journal, LINUX For You, the Journal of the ACM, and Government 
Computer News and speaks frequently at international technology events. Robert can 
be reached at radkins@technetra.com. 

Jeremy Allison is one of the lead developers on the Samba Team, a group of program 
mers developing an open source Windows-compatible file and print server product for 
Unix systems. Developed over the Internet in a distributed manner similar to the Linux 
operating system, Samba is used by multinational corporations and educational estab 
lishments worldwide. Jeremy handles the coordination of Samba development efforts 
worldwide and acts as a corporate liaison to companies using the Samba code commer 
cially. He works for Novell, which funds him to work full time on improving Samba 
and solving the problems of Windows and Linux interoperability. 

Matt Asay has been involved with open source since 1999, and has made a fetish of 
understanding novel ways to monetize open source software. To this end, Matt 
founded the Open Source Business Conference as a place to aggregate and cluster 
people much more intelligent than he to figure out promising open source business 
strategies; cofounded Novell s Linux Business Office and helped to kick-start the 
company s growing Linux business; served as an entrepreneur-in-residence at 
Thomas Weisel Venture Partners, dedicated to finding and developing open source 
investment opportunities; and ran embedded Linux startup Lineo, a network and 
communications business, until its acquisition by Motorola in 2002. Matt speaks and 
publishes frequently on open source business strategy, and consults frequently for 
several open source startups and venture capital firms. 

xvi X List of Contributors 



Matt is currently the general manager at Volantis Systems, where he manages the 
company s growing business with content providers (like eBay, Disney, and Yahoo!). 
He is applying the lessons of open source to the fragmented mobile world, hoping it 
will yield the same standardization and opportunity in mobile/embedded that open 
source did for the server world. 

Matt holds a J.D. from Stanford, where he worked with Professor Larry Lessig on 
analyzing the GPL and other open source licenses. 

Mitchell Baker has been the general manager of the Mozilla project (officially known 
as its Chief Lizard Wrangler) since 1999. The Mozilla project strives to create great 
software and maintain choice and innovation in key Internet client applications, such 
as its flagship Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla Thunderbird products. It is one of the larg 
est open source software development projects in existence. The Mozilla project 
combines dedicated volunteers, a set of paid contributors, and its own flavor of engi 
neering management. 

With the formation of the Mozilla Foundation in 2003, Mitchell also took on the role 
of president of the Mozilla Foundation. Mitchell is also a board member of the Open 
Source Applications Foundation, which is developing a new-style personal informa 
tion manager, known as Chandler. 

Jeff Bates brings many years of strategic management and editorial leadership to the 
Open Source Technology Group (OSTG). As vice president of editorial operations 
and executive editor of Slashdot, Jeff is responsible for setting strategy and integra 
tion for the company s business development partnerships and for driving new site 
and product development, and for fun he helps manage strategic story editing and 
placement for the leading proprietary news site, Slashdot. While at Slashdot, Jeff has 
been responsible for the site winning several industry awards including a Webby 
People s Voice Award for Community, as well as Yahoo ! s "Top 100" Best of the 
Internet Award. Slashdot has also been cited by The Washington Post, Brill s Content, 
TIME, USA Today, Rolling Stone, and other industry-leading publications as one of the 
most innovative and important sites for the technical community. 

Jeff has spoken at numerous academic institutions and industry-leading conferences 
and events, including MIT, LinuxWorld, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Northern 
Michigan University, Sun Developers Group, the Asian Open Source Symposium, 
Conference of Australian Linux Users, O Reilly s p2p Conference, and the University 
of Michigan. He s also a member of the Open Source Advisory Panel for the U.S. gov 
ernment. Jeff holds a bachelor s degree in history from Hope College. 

Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona teaches and conducts research at the Universidad Rey 
Juan Carlos, Mostoles (Spain). He started to work in the promotion of libre software 
in 1991. Since then, he has carried on several activities in this area, including orga 
nizing seminars and courses and participating in working groups on libre software, 



in Spain and throughout the rest of Europe. Currently he collaborates with several 
libre software projects (including Debian) and associations, writes in several media 
about topics related to libre software, and consults for companies and public admin 
istrations on issues related to their strategy on these topics. His research interests 
include libre software engineering, and in particular, quantitative measures of libre 
software development and distributed tools for collaboration in libre software 
projects. In this area, he has published several papers, and is participating in some 
international research projects (visit http://libresoft.urjc.es for more information). He is 
also one of the promoters of the idea of a European masters program on libre soft 
ware, and has specific interest in education in that area. On the personal side, he 
enjoys living, sleeping, and staying with his family (and not in that order). 

Andrew Hessel is a biologist and programmer who has worked at the interface of 
industry and academia to facilitate scientific initiatives, usually in the area of genom- 
ics. He is fascinated by the functional similarities between electronic and biological 
systems, and the lessons that can be learned by comparing them. Andrew lives in 
Toronto, Canada, with his wife Stephanie, and works to advance collaborative breast 
cancer research and therapeutic development. 

Pamela Jones is the founder of Groklaw (http://www.grofelaw.net), an experiment in 
applying open source principles to the field of legal research. Groklaw is also an 
independent journalistic voice, covering legal news stories from the point of view of 
the Free and Open Source (FOSS) community. Groklaw is also an anti-FUD web site. 
It has focused heavily on the SCO litigation, because the community is, after all, 
while not a direct party to any of the lawsuits, directly interested in and affected by 
the outcome, since it is their code and their community that is under attack. For that 
reason, Pamela found it is both natural and appropriate that Groklaw try to contrib 
ute to a positive outcome. 

Eugene Kim is the cofounder and principal of Blue Oxen Associates, a think tank 
and consultancy focused on improving collaboration. He has developed collabora 
tive strategies for a number of organizations, focusing especially on interorganiza- 
tional collaboration and collaborative learning. His research centers around identify 
ing patterns of collaboration across different domains (with a special focus on open 
source communities) and on improving the interoperability of collaborative tools. 
Previously, Eugene worked closely with computer pioneer Doug Engelbart, who cur 
rently serves on the Blue Oxen Associates advisory board. He received his A.B. in his 
tory and science from Harvard University. 

Ben Laurie is a founding director of the Apache Software Foundation, a founder and 
core team member of OpenSSL, the author of Apache-SSL, director of security for 
The Bunker Secure Hosting Ltd.l, coauthor of Apache: The Definitive Guide, and a fre 
quent writer of articles and papers on security, cryptography, and anonymity. You 
can find his web page at http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html. 

xvin X List of Contributors 



Louisa Liu is business development manager of the Channel Software Operation 
(CSO) in Intel China Ltd. She is responsible for strategic business development in 
China supporting the CSO. Louisa earned bachelor and master s degrees with hon 
ors in computer science from Fudan University and Tongji University. 

Ian Murdock is cofounder, chairman, and chief strategist for Progeny. He is cen 
trally involved in defining Progeny s technology and business strategies, and in estab 
lishing and maintaining key relationships with customers and partners. Ian has more 
than 10 years of experience in the software industry. He played an instrumental role 
in the transition of Linux from hobby project to mainstream technology by creating 
Debian, one of the first Linux-based operating systems, called distributions. Ian led 
Debian from its inception in 1993 to 1996, building it from an idea to a worldwide 
organization of more than 100 people in less than three years. 

Today Debian is one of the most popular Linux platforms in the world, with mil 
lions of users worldwide. Debian is also widely considered one of the most success 
ful and influential open source projects ever launched: more than 1,000 volunteers 
in all parts of the world are currently involved in Debian development, and the 
founding document of the open source movement itself was originally a Debian posi 
tion statement. 

An Indiana native, Ian holds a B.S. in computer science from Purdue University and 
was a founding director of Linux International and the Open Source Initiative. 

Russ Nelson is a computer programmer and a founding board member of the Open 
Source Initiative. He is best known for his packet driver collection, begun while at 
Clarkson University in 1988. He started Crynwr Software to support his open source 
software, Freemacs (currently used by FreeDOS) and Painter s Apprentice (a Mac 
Paint clone), and went full time with the packet driver collection in 1991. He has 
been making a living from open source support ever since then. His politics are both 
left and right of center, as he is a pacifist Quaker and a member of the Libertarian 
Party of the United States. 

Michael Olson is president and chief executive officer of Sleepycat Software. 
Michael, one of the original authors of Berkeley DB, is a technology industry veteran 
with more than 20 years of experience in engineering, marketing, sales, and business 
management. He was named president and CEO of Sleepycat in 2001 after serving as 
vice president of sales and marketing. Prior to Sleepycat, he served in technical and 
business management positions at database vendors Britton Lee, Illustra, and Infor 
mix. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in computer science from the University of Cal 
ifornia at Berkeley. 

Tim O Reilly is founder and CEO of O Reilly Media, thought by many to be the best 
computer-book publisher in the world. In addition to publishing pioneering books 
such as Ed Krol s The Whole Internet User s Guide &> Catalog (selected by the New York 



List of Contributors X xix 



Public Library as one of the most significant books of the 20th century), O Reilly Media 
has also been a pioneer in the popularization of the Internet. O Reilly s Global Network 
Navigator site (GNN, which was sold to America Online in September 1995) was the 
first web portal and the first true commercial site on the World Wide Web. 

O Reilly Media continues to pioneer new content developments on the Web via its 
O Reilly Network affiliate, which also manages sites such as Perl.com and XML.com. 
O Reilly s conference arm hosts the popular Perl Conference, the Open Source Soft 
ware Convention, and the O Reilly Emerging Technology Conference. 

Tim has been an activist for Internet standards and for open source software. He has 
led successful public relations campaigns on behalf of key Internet technologies, 
helping to block Microsoft s 1996 limits on TCP/IP in NT Workstation, organizing 
the "summit" of key free software leaders where the term open source was first widely 
agreed upon, and, more recently, organizing a series of protests against frivolous soft 
ware patents. Tim received Infoworld s Industry Achievement Award in 1998 for his 
advocacy on behalf of the open source community. 

Tim graduated from Harvard College in 1975 with a B.A. cum laude in classics. His 
honors thesis explored the tension between mysticism and logic in Plato s dialogs. 

Gregorio Robles is a teaching assistant and a Ph.D. candidate at the Universidad Rey 
Juan Carlos in Madrid, Spain. His research work is centered in the empirical study of 
libre software development from a software engineering point of view. He has 
authored or coauthored many papers that were presented at both academic and com 
munity conferences, and has developed or collaborated in the design of programs to 
automate the analysis of libre software. He has also been involved in the seminal 
European Union FLOSS study and survey on libre software developers, the CALIBRE 
coordinated action to foster libre software development in Europe, and the FLOSS- 
World study which looks at libre software development worldwide, all of them 
financed by the European Commissions 1ST program. 

Larry Sanger was the chief organizer/architect of the Wikipedia encyclopedia project 
in its first year, as well as of the now-moribund Nupedia encyclopedia project. Since 
2000 he has thought and written about the best ways to develop a collaboratively 
built online encyclopedia. He is now working on that problem, among others, for the 
ambitious Digital Universe project as its director of distributed content programs. His 
Ph.D. (2000) from Ohio State University is in philosophy, with concentrations in 
epistemology and early modern philosophy, and his B.A. in philosophy is from Reed 
College in Portland, Oregon. He taught a wide range of philosophy courses off and 
on between 1992 and 2005 for Ohio State University and nearby institutions. He 
also plays Irish traditional music on the fiddle and has taught that too, off and on 
since 1997. 



xx * * List of Contributors 



Sunil Saxena is senior principal architect in the Software and Solutions Group (SSG) 
at Intel Corporation. SSG is responsible for operating system enabling on Intel archi 
tecture products. Sunil received his Ph.D. in computer science from the University of 
Waterloo and received his B. Tech. in electrical engineering from Indian Institute of 
Technology, Delhi, in 1975. 

Doc Searls is a writer and speaker on topics that arise where technology and busi 
ness meet. He is the senior editor of Linux Journal, the premier Linux monthly and 
one of the world s leading technology magazines. He also runs the new Doc Searls IT 
Garage, an online journal published by Linux Journal s parent company, SSC. He is 
coauthor of The Cluetrain Manifesto: The End of Business as Usual, a New York Times, 
Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Borders Books, and Amazon.com bestseller. (It was 
Amazon s #1 sales and marketing bestseller for 13 months and sells around the world 
in nine languages.) He also writes the Doc Searls weblog. J.D. Lasica of Annenberg s 
Online Journalism Review calls Doc "one of the deep thinkers in the blog movement." 
Doc s blog is consistently listed among the top few blogs, out of millions, by Techno- 
rati, Blogstreet, and others. 

Wendy Seltzer is an attorney and special projects coordinator with the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, where she specializes in intellectual property and free speech 
issues. In the fall of 2005, she will be at Brooklyn Law School as a visiting professor 
of law. As a fellow with Harvard s Berkman Center for Internet <Sr Society, Wendy 
founded and leads the Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, helping Internet users to 
understand their rights in response to cease-and-desist threats. Prior to joining EFF, 
Wendy taught Internet law as an adjunct professor at St. John s University School of 
Law and practiced intellectual property and technology litigation with Kramer Levin 
in New York. Wendy speaks frequently on copyright, trademark, open source, and 
the public interest online. She has an A.B. from Harvard College and a J.D. from Har 
vard Law School, and occasionally takes a break from legal code to program (Perl). 

Sonali K. Shah is an assistant professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham- 
paign. Her research focuses on the creation and maintenance of novel organizing 
innovation communities that support innovation development and diffusion. She 
studies innovation communities in fields as diverse as open source software, sports 
equipment, and medical products. A second stream of work examines the processes 
underlying the formation of new industries and product markets. Previously she 
worked at Morgan Stanley & Co. and McKinsey & Co. She holds degrees in biomed- 
ical engineering, finance, and management. She is a graduate of the University of 
Pennsylvania and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

Alolita Sharma is cofounder and CEO of Technetra, a Silicon Valley software com 
pany which implements and deploys large-scale software projects specializing in 
open source solutions. Alolita has more than 14 years of experience in the informa 
tion technology industry, having engineered and led services groups at IBM, MCI 



List of Contributors X xxi 



Worldcom, Intelsat, and SWIFT. While pursuing the Ph.D. program in computer sci 
ence at George Washington University (GWU), she concentrated on networking, 
security, and parallel computing. She received an M.S. in computer science also from 
GWU. She speaks at technology forums and has published in many technology mag 
azines and journals including Linux Journal, Linux Gazette, and is a monthly colum 
nist for India s only open source magazine, LINUX For You. She is a proponent of 
Linux and open source software in India. Alolita can be reached at as@technetra.com. 

Bruno Souza is a senior consultant at Summa Technologies. He helps large compa 
nies to successfully use and develop open source products and projects. Bruno is 
president of Soujava, Brazil s largest Java User Group, where he has led the group s 
Javali Project, an ambitious umbrella project that hosts 10 large open source projects. 
Javali, which includes a project to create an open source Java runtime, is targeted to 
bring software development into Brazil s open source discussions. Bruno also co- 
authored Soujava s Open Source Manifest, which discusses open source and open 
standards as the way to correctly apply and succeed with open source in Brazil. The 
document positively influenced the adoption of open source in Brazil. Bruno is a 
member of the Management Board ofjava.net, one of the largest open source hosting 
sites for Java developers, where he leads the World Wide Java User Group Commu 
nity, is an activist for the creation of open source-compatible implementation of Java 
standards, and is an active participant in several Java open source projects. 

Stephen R. Walli has worked in the IT industry since 1980 as both customer and 
vendor. He is presently the vice president of Open Source Development Strategy for 
Optaros. Stephen is responsible for architecting and managing Optaros s relation 
ships with the open source community. Most recently, Stephen was a business devel 
opment manager at Microsoft on the Windows Platform team, where he operated in 
the space between community development, standards, and intellectual property 
concerns. While at Microsoft, he also worked on the Rotor project (Shared Source 
CLR), and started as the product unit manager for Interix in Services for Unix. 

Prior to Microsoft, Stephen was the vice president of R&D and a founder at Softway 
Systems, Inc., a venture-backed startup that developed the Interix environment to re- 
host Unix applications on Windows NT. Stephen has also worked as an indepen 
dent consultant for X/Open, SunSoft, UNISYS, and the Canadian government. He 
was once a development manager at Mortice Kern Systems, and a systems analyst at 
Electronic Data Systems. 

Stephen was a longtime participant and officer at the IEEE and ISO POSIX standards 
groups, representing both USENIX and EurOpen (E.U.U.G.), and has been a regular 
speaker and writer on open systems standards since 1991. 

He blogs at http://stephesblog.blogs.com, and occasionally podcasts from http.7/ 
stephenrwalli.users.blogmatrtK.com/poacasts. 



xxii * C List of Contributors 



Steven Weber, a specialist in international relations, is an associate with the Berke 
ley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE) and the International Com 
puter Science Institute, and affiliated faculty of the Energy and Resources Group. His 
areas of special interest include international politics, and the political economy of 
knowledge-intensive industries. 

Steven went to medical school at Stanford and then earned his Ph.D. in the political 
science department at Stanford. In 1992, he served as special consultant to the presi 
dent of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London. He has 
held academic fellowships with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is a member of the Global Business 
Network in Emeryville, California, and actively consults with government agencies 
on foreign policy issues, risk analysis, strategy, and forecasting. 

Boon-Lock Yeo is currently director of the ICSC (Intel China Software Center) of the 
SSG (Software and Solutions Group) in Intel China Ltd. He received his Ph.D. in 
electrical engineering from Princeton University and a BSEE from Purdue University. 
He received an IEEE Transactions Best Paper Award in 1996, has published more 
than 40 technical papers, and holds 25 U.S. patents. 



List of Contributors * * XXHI 



XX 
XX 



Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, 
and Mark Stone 



Introduction 



Midnight comes to the Nevada desert, and nothing is visible but a line of taillights 
ahead and a line of headlights behind. 

"You ll see the lights from Gerlach first, and then Black Rock City," the driver says to 
the passenger. They drive another 20 minutes in silence before the highway crests a 
ridge line. On the horizon, the blackness is broken by a band of multicolored light. 

"Is that Gerlach?" the passenger asks. 

"No." The driver points to a small, dim cluster of yellow lights in the middle dis 
tance. "That s Gerlach. Way out there, those lights are Black Rock City. We re still 
about an hour away." 

The passenger ponders this for a moment, then asks, "An hour? How big is it?" 

"For one week each year, Black Rock City is the fourth largest city in Nevada. Popu 
lation 30,000, give or take." 

Gerlach rolls by, with its one bar, one gas station, and one motel. The caravan of cars 
bunches up after Gerlach. Then they turn off the highway, rumbling over the packed 
mud playa of the Black Rock Desert. Lights, neon, and thousands of RVs spread out 
before them. Music and drums especially drums can be heard in the distance. At 
the gate they re approached by someone who looks like a transplant from Mardi 
Gras: face paint, bright-colored suit, and a carnival hat. He checks their tickets and 
flashes them a big grin. 



XXV 



"Welcome to Burning Man! 



When the original Open Sources was published in 1999, it served mainly as an affir 
mation that open source existed. The book brought together the leading voices in 
open source, demonstrating that we were a community, that we were indeed a move 
ment to be taken seriously. To put that time in context: 

Microsoft had, only a year earlier, leaked the "Halloween Memo," its first semi- 
public acknowledgment that open source was a competitive threat. 

IBM had provided some initial backing for Apache, but had yet to announce its 
$1 billion Linux initiative. 

Linux was in only the 2.2 stage of kernel development. 

SourceForge.net was a relatively new site with only a few hundred projects 
hosted. 

The mainstream press could not separate rising interest in open source from dot-corn 
bubble hype. The media took the surface ideas of Eric Raymond s The Cathedral & the 
Bazaar and created a caricature of legions of hobbyist programmers distributed 
across the globe, competing against the technology Goliaths of the day. That picture 
bore no more resemblance to reality than the tale of King Arthur does to the histori 
cal Middle Ages. Yet like any good mythology, it serves as a useful point of depar 
ture for understanding the real history from which it arose. 

Today open source is an accepted fact of business life, with many companies engaged 
in core open source business models (Sleepycat, MySQL) or significant hybrid models 
blending open source and proprietary software (IBM, Novell, Red Hat). Many compa 
nies have striven to incorporate open source development into their range of software 
development practices even Microsoft has projects hosted on SourceForge.net. How 
much do we really understand about the dynamics of open source software develop 
ment or the communities that stand behind those projects? 

The essays presented in this volume take a major step forward in our understanding 
since 1999, when the original Open Sources was published. 



Burning Man is approaching its 20th anniversary. Conceived and inspired by Larry 
Harvey, it began in 1986 as a gathering of dozens of participants at Baker Beach in 
San Francisco. The centerpiece of the event was then, as it is now, the construction 
of a wooden effigy of a man, which is burned in celebration. 

Celebration of what? The answer to that question may differ for every participant. 



xxvi ** Introduction 



The event was originally timed with the summer solstice it s now held the week 
leading up to Labor Day and has always had a pagan, tribal feel to it. Participants 
began bringing their own art projects, many of which were also burned in celebra 
tion at the climax of the event. By 1990 the gathering numbered in the hundreds, 
and even the unusually tolerant San Francisco police made it clear that the event 
needed to find another venue. 

Burning Man then moved to its current location the Black Rock Desert an empty 
stretch of Nevada desert on federal Bureau of Land Management land, roughly two 
hours north of Reno. The extreme remoteness and the harsh environment have become 
an indelible part of the event. To be there, you have to really want to be there. 



Mitchell Baker makes clear in her essay that part of the strength of the Firefox commu 
nity is its size. Thousands of people have contributed to Firefox, a community of con 
tributors larger than the core project leaders can really envision. Firefox seems very 
much like one of those mythical "legion of programmers" projects that comes to mind 
when people think of the metaphor suggested by Eric Raymond s The Cathedral & the 
Bazaar. 

Yet the open source development model remains the most enigmatic aspect of the 
open source community. One striking and unexpected outcome of the years since 
the original Open Sources is how little technology companies have been able to lever 
age the open source development process. Projects such as Linux and Apache have 
had world-changing success, yet no commercial software company has been able to 
replicate this development process for its own products or its own success. AOL, for 
example, has never figured out how to integrate the Mozilla/Firefox developer com 
munity into its product development process. Sun has struggled to open up both 
Java and Solaris, and the jury is very much out on the success of those projects. 

Read the essays here by Chris DiBona and Jeremy Allison and you will see how little 
proprietary software development differs from open source software development. 
The differences their essays suggest are subtle: an emphasis on knowledge reuse, not 
just code reuse; a recognition that open standards matter; and that architecture needs 
to be created with openness in mind. Why, though, are these and other open source 
lessons so hard for commercial companies to use? 

The real paradox is as old as Fred Brooks classic, The Mythical Man-Month. In this 
work, Brooks formulates what has become known as Brooks Law: that while the 
amount of programming work completed increases linearly as the number of pro 
grammers increases, the complexity of a project increases as the square of the num 
ber of programmers. The result is that large programming teams fail to reduce the 
time to project completion. The rationale is that the number of communication inter 
faces, which is roughly equivalent to the amount of coordination effort the project 
requires, increases geometrically as more people are added to the project. 



Introduction X xxvn 



Brooks Law appears to set a fundamental limit on the optimal size of programming 
teams and a rather small limit at that. Empirical evidence supports Brooks Law. 
For example, since its inception SourceForge.net has maintained very close to a 10:1 
ratio of registered users to registered projects, suggesting that open source develop 
ment projects seldom have more than 10 active developers. 

What are we to make, then, of the thousands of Firefox contributors? The key is to 
recognize that they are not a homogeneous mass of contributors, and Firefox is not a 
monolithic piece of software. In fact, the design is highly modular, enabling small 
teams to work on separate components of the code without interfering with each 
other. By far the most common characteristic open source projects have is a highly 
modular design. That design architecture is more a choice of social engineering than 
technical engineering, however. In the original Open Sources, Linus Torvalds com 
mented that he started with a monolithic kernel design for Linux because he knew it 
would provide higher performance. Only later was Linux s distinctive system of load 
able kernel modules developed, and it was developed as much out of a project man 
agement need as anything else. Could Apache provide higher performance as a 
purely monolithic piece of code? Probably. But the development process would 
become unmanageable. The original release of Mozilla suffered terribly because it 
was a monolithic piece of code. Firefox is the result of years of rearchitecting to 
achieve a modular, and thus manageable, design architecture. 

Once it s clear that programming teams must necessarily be small, and that modular 
ity is driven by communication and management needs more than by engineering 
needs, the structure of the open source community makes a lot more sense. The 
"bazaar" looks less like a bustling, homogenous mass and more like a structured 
community. More than anything, it resembles a tribe. 

In fact, there is very little of Brooks Law that is unique to software development. Any 
creative, collaborative knowledge enterprise faces the same constraints, and as a 
result, many collaborative communities adopt the same tribal structure. 



Traditionally Black Rock City is laid out in a half-circle, with a grid of "streets," some 
of which form the spokes of the wheel, and others of which form concentric rings 
spreading from the center. At the very center is the Man, 40 feet of elegantly assem 
bled wood, awaiting his night of conflagration at the end of the weeklong event. 

A "burner" approaches a small tent encampment at the corner of 7 O clock and Justice. 
Out of the back of a pickup truck, two men from the encampment haul bags of sand 
and large rocks painted in black-light colors. They place the rocks inside a wooden 
sandbox and pour sand into it. Above them, a hand-painted sign reads "Reflections in 
Sand." 

"So, what s your project?" asks the passerby. 



XXVIII 



One of the men looks up, squinting under the relentless desert sun. "We re making a 
Zen garden," he replies. He gestures toward a black light and generator lying nearby 
next to a couple of small, handmade wooden rakes. "Only this will be one you can 
enjoy at night." 

"Where are you guys from?" 

"San Francisco." 

"You drove 350 miles to bring sand to the desert? Cool." 

Burning Man is a participatory event. According to its mission statement (http:// 
\vww.bumingmanxom/whatisburningman/about_burningman/mission.html): 

Our intention is to generate society that connects each individual to his or her 
creative powers, to participation in community, to the larger realm of civic life, 
and to the even greater world of nature that exists beyond society. 

While not everyone who comes brings an art project, the expectation is that projects 
will be interactive in nature and that no one is there simply to observe. All are there 
to participate. Burning Man has no "audience." While the event is not a political 
gathering, many projects have a definite message connecting to that "larger realm of 
civic life," and to encourage this, each year Burning Man has an overall theme. 
Recent themes have included "The Vault of Heaven," "Beyond Belief," and "The 
Floating World." 

Several other ideas underpin the spirit of Burning Man. Black Rock City LLC has had 
a delicate relationship with the Bureau of Land Management over the years, striving 
to show that the event is a positive part of the area. A key part of this is Burning 
Man s "leave no trace" philosophy. Art projects are not permanent, but are designed 
to be temporary, something can be removed or destroyed at the end of the event 
without leaving trash behind. Volunteers spend weeks after each event restoring the 
Black Rock Desert to its pre-event conditions. The "leave no trace" policy is not just a 
practical matter, though: it is also a good philosophical fit with the civic aspect of the 
event and with the fragile sense of the temporary that has been at the heart of the 
event since the first Burn. 

Burning Man is also basically a nocturnal event. At roughly 6,000 feet elevation, the 
Black Rock Desert air is thin and dry. Daytime temperatures can hover around 100 
degrees, so dehydration is the most common condition treated at the infirmary. As 
the sun goes down each day, people pause at whatever they are doing, look toward 
the craggy western hills, and cheer. Drums begin to beat. Music begins to play. Black 
Rock City comes alive. 

Temporary, participatory, and nocturnal: those are the key elements of a Burning 
Man art project. 



XXIX 



As puzzling as how open source projects organize themselves is why. To the casual 
outside observer, it appears that open source developers spend enormous amounts of 
time developing software that, in the end, they are simply going to give away with 
out the prospect of compensation in return. While open source certainly has an 
altruistic side, altruism is neither the only nor the most important motivation. 

First, one must realize that many open source projects started out of a developer s 
desire to solve an immediate problem. Linux was born of Linus Torvalds desire to 
have a development platform on his PC at home. Apache came together from a group 
of people who had been relying on the NCSC web server and wanted to continue its 
development after NCSC stopped maintaining it. 

Read Sonali Shah s essay, and you ll understand that the pattern here extends far 
beyond software development. Many consumer communities have come together 
collaboratively to innovate the products they consume, often when producers fail to 
produce innovation on their own. Software companies created just such a stagnant 
environment, out of which Linux and the rest of open source software was born. In 
this sense, the initial catalyst was quite selfish: developers wanted the software that 
companies were unwilling or unable to produce, so open source developers created it 
to "scratch their own itches." 

What started from largely selfish motivations has evolved into something quite com 
plex. In Steve Weber s essay, we get a clear analysis of just how complex the gover 
nance structures and processes of this community have become, as well as an intrigu 
ing view of where these enabling governance structures might foster collaborative 
communities in other endeavors. Andrew Hessel provides in his essay a very tangi 
ble example of where open source ideas are taking hold in an entirely new realm. 

Lurking in the background, though, is still a question of motivation. If the inspiration 
for Linux was a selfish one, why make the choice to give the result away, and further 
more to do so under open source terms? How does selfishness become altruism? 

The apparent paradox rests on the assumption that acts of charity necessarily con 
flict with acts of self-interest. From the point of view of a modern market economy, it 
often appears that charity and self-interest do conflict. What drives the open source 
developer, however, is clearly self-interest even if it is based on an older notion of 
self-interest not easily captured by modern market economics. 

The answer to the paradox lies in the reputation game played within the open source 
community. After all, monetary compensation is only a means to an end; it is a 
means of providing survival resources. Yet monetary compensation is not the only 
means to that end. While open source luminaries such as Linus Torvalds and Brian 
Behlendorf may not have the personal wealth of fortunate dot-commers, neither will 
ever lack for gainful employment. They have sufficient reputations based on their 
open source accomplishments to always be able to earn a living from their expertise. 



XXX 



Consider another fact: the largest age group among open source hackers is college 
students and graduate students: those under 25 for whom gainful employment is not 
an immediate issue, but one that certainly looms in their thoughts and plans. Because 
they are students, we can assume that they have the immediate survival resources 
needed for one to become a student in the first place. However, we can also assume 
that those survival resources are finite. Securing future survival resources is very 
much a part of the agenda of a student, indeed one of the main reasons for becom 
ing a student in the first place. While a degree may provide a measure of that future 
security, a degree is not the exclusive means to that end: reputation as a creator of 
good code may provide that future security as well as or better than a degree. 

Once this separation is made between monetary compensation and survival 
resources, we can see that there are historical precedents for this kind of behavior, 
and that there is a social model that loosely fits that of open source hacker culture. In 
Western civilization, we can look to medieval Europe, when nomadic groups like the 
Franks and the Vikings had settled into the agrarian-based feudal system. The mature 
feudal system of the 13th and 14th centuries has some interesting and instructive 
social structures; we ll focus on the concept of chivalry. 

The good knight adhered to a code of behavior that transcended the laws of any par 
ticular kingdom and encouraged an attitude with some similarities to the attitude of 
today s hacker: a knight should be humble and should regard himself at the service 
of others, yet he would be judged by his prowess at his trade and would succeed to 
the extent that he could spread the reputation of his prowess. 

Behind shield and visor, and upon adopting a particular set of heraldic emblems, a 
knight took on a kind of persona, creating a public identity that might be quite dif 
ferent from his private identity. There were regular events for testing and publicizing 
one s prowess at arms, such as the tournament or the hunt. There were orders of 
knighthood again, often transcending the boundaries of kingdoms that would 
certify one s prowess. To belong to such an order was an honor; to be of sufficient 
repute to be able to found an order and have other knights flock to it, was perhaps 
the greatest measure of success in the chivalric reputation game. 

While a knight was pan of the nobility, knighthood was a terrible burden financially. A 
suit of armor cost, relative to the medieval standard of living, the equivalent of a brand- 
new Mercedes today. Horses were expensive, and a knight was expected to have sev 
eral. In addition, a knight had to maintain an entourage of squires, pages, and men-at- 
arms. He also officially owed 40 days of service to his feudal lord each campaign sea 
son, 40 days that in reality could often drag into several months. A landed knight with 
a small manor could easily spend any excess capital just to maintain his position; a 
landless knight, or knight errant, would likely live in perpetual debt. 



Introduction * * xxxi 



What motivation, then, would a young man in the Middle Ages have to aspire to 
knighthood? Did one live according to the code of chivalry out of pure selflessness, 
and a desire to serve others? Or was there some more pragmatic force at work? To a 
knight of repute, money was not really important. His lord, or anyone else interested 
in retaining his services, would see that his needs were met, that he had survival 
resources. To flourish, a skilled squire aspiring to knighthood need only hone his 
skills and act to establish and further his reputation. 

This attitude and this kind of behavior seem quite similar to that of the young stu 
dent who is an aspiring hacker. While academia, and academic computer science, is 
a reputation game of its own, what is fascinating about computer science is that there 
is a large body of practitioners that refuse to play this particular reputation game. To 
this latter group, an education really is just a means to an end, and the end is to 
develop the skills necessary to create good code. Some may go far enough to pick up 
a university degree, but many do not, and the degree is clearly secondary to the abil 
ity to code. In other words, one can build a reputation without having to acquire the 
academic pedigree. It is not simply a distaste for academia that fosters this kind of 
behavior. The hacker who is more interested in picking up skills than in picking up a 
degree is often the same hacker who is unwilling to be tied down to a steady job, 
preferring to move from assignment to assignment as a freelancer and consultant. 
These are the knights errant of the open source movement. 

In reality, the medieval knight errant was essentially a mercenary, hardly the noble 
figure portrayed by Malory or Chaucer. The fact that these soldiers were mercenaries 
made chivalry no less important. A mercenary captain had to be trustworthy; his 
word of honor alone was a binding contract. Otherwise, he simply was not employ 
able. These men lived by the chivalric code. What they found was that that code 
alone assured them survival resources. A skilled and honorable mercenary captain 
was never without employment and never lacked for resources. 

Chivalry and pragmatism are not conflicting goals, but that pragmatism can indeed 
be served by chivalry. The mercenary captain lacked money, land, and all other tan 
gible resources. He had only one form of collateral: his reputation. That reputation 
could be maintained only if his behavior was seen to be genuinely honorable. Chiv 
alry, then, was a necessity: it was an essential ingredient in building the only avail 
able collateral that could be parlayed into survival resources. 

From this analogy, we can learn several lessons about today s hackers. First, the open 
source gift culture need not be seen as strictly, or even predominantly, altruistic. 
Pragmatism and altruism are not mutually exclusive. Today s hackers, like the 
knights errant and mercenaries of old, can and do trade in the coin of reputation as a 
means of achieving survival resources. 



xxxn X Introduction 



Second, as a culture matures, the pragmatism becomes more apparent. This was true 
in the Middle Ages. In the high Middle Ages, the era of the crusades, the knight 
errant made a flamboyant pretext of making a gift of his skills and services; one has 
to look below the surface to see a rational exchange of skills for resources in such gift 
acts. By the late Middle Ages, though honor and reputation were still essential, when 
a nobleman retained the services of a mercenary captain, the transaction was explic 
itly and without apology for the mutual benefit of nobleman and captain. 

We see this same trend among today s hackers. While reputation alone has always 
provided survival resources for some, the trend to switch the meme about their activ 
ity from "Free Software" to "Open Source" reflected a maturing shift from altruistic 
pretext to honest pragmatism. 

Today we see a symbiotic balance between the chivalric open source hackers and the 
companies that employ them. In fact, this development is foreshadowed in the events 
Eugene Kim describes in his essay, which concerns the development of the first com 
mercial compilers. Even in the 1950s it was possible for a company such as IBM to see 
the advantages of transforming a competitive relationship into a collaborative one. 

Today a number of prominent open source developers are employed at major tech 
nology teams. Novell transformed itself in a matter of months into a major player in 
the enterprise open source space through the acquisition of Ximian and SuSE. Of 
contributors to this volume, Jeremy Allison works for HP, and Chris DiBona works 
for Google. Neither works at an open source company per se, but both have an 
understanding that it is in their employer s interest that they be allowed time and 
resources to continue working on open source projects. Other contributors here, 
such as Ian Murdock (the "ian" of "debian"), Michael Olson, and Stephen Walli, are 
involved in more purely open source business models. 



Burning Man is, in some sense, a commercial operation. There is a significant admis 
sion charge for the event (more than $200), and the event is run by a limited liabil 
ity corporation. The corporation s main purpose, however, is to sustainably manage 
the event. There is a permit to obtain from the Bureau of Land Management every 
year. There is insurance for the event. There is preparation before and cleanup after 
the event, as well as basic infrastructure, such as sanitation services, that must be 
provided every year. Finally, there is a small paid staff responsible for everything 
from event promotion and organization to informal lobbying efforts with the Depart 
ment of the Interior, Washoe County, and the state of Nevada. 

Once inside the gates, however, participants are forbidden from engaging in mone 
tary commerce. The primary form of commerce is barter. In the spirit of the event, 
barter is as much a pretext for participation as an exchange of goods. It may take the 
form of a scavenger hunt, where admission to an art project requires a ticket stamped 



Introduction *C xxxm 



by several other art projects. It may take the form of a raid by the "Viking Longship" 
art car, which "pillages" camps but always leaves some small gift behind. Or it may 
be in the form of a quiet bar on a back street of Black Rock City that asks only some 
small trinket from the day s events as the price of a drink. 

Unfettered from monetary exchange, however, most denizens of Burning Man gravi 
tate toward a gift economy. Acts of giving range from the mundane to the extravagant: 
the accordion player who serenades those in the porta-potty line with his renditions of 
AC/DC; the massage therapist volunteering her services; the water-gun brigade, spray 
ing people down for a moment of cool relief from the midday sun; or the man who 
brings along a week s supply of dry ice so he can serve cold ice cream every day. 



One of the most ironic developments since the publication of the original Open 
Sources has been the rapid adoption of open source business models by technology 
companies. 

In 1999, the consensus view of the business community was that giving away intel 
lectual property for free was a poor basis for doing business. At that point, Michael 
Olson and Sleepycat Software had been quietly pursuing their dual licensing model 
for Berkeley DB for three years. Now several open source database companies are 
pursuing similar models. 

Sleepycat s approach is an example of the more general business dynamics at work 
behind open source. One of the key effects is commoditization, discussed in different 
aspects in essays by Matt Asay, Ian Murdock, and Stephen Walli. Commoditizing a 
complement to one s core business serves to enhance that business. It brings down the 
cost of entry for customers, thus expanding the potential market size for the core busi 
ness. The key is to have a complementary core that can be monetized. Sleepycat 
achieves this through dual licensing, charging for a proprietary license for customers 
who are unwilling or unable to open their own source. Novell achieves this through a 
hybrid business model, with a service business and a proprietary software business fur 
ther up the "application stack" from its commoditized Linux business. 

Commoditization is not the only benefit. Open source business models lower the 
cost of both sales and marketing. The common fear with any free product is that 
"you get what you pay for." With open source, however, the source code is entirely 
open to inspection so that there are no hidden surprises. Further, the source code 
can be freely redistributed. Several market effects result from this. First, those most 
likely to avail themselves of open source are those with the greatest understanding of 
its benefits namely other software developers who actually have the skill and desire 
to examine source code. Second, the distribution model creates a user community of 
like-minded enthusiasts without intervention or incurred marketing costs by the 



XXXIV 



originating company. Finally, that user base will, at some point, approach the origi 
nating company with a request for additional features, services, or complementary 
software. In other words, by its very nature, open source has very low marketing 
costs that create an inbound sales channel of prequalified leads. 

Open source software companies that exploit this dynamic can thus maintain lower 
overall operating costs, consequently passing on lower prices while still maintaining 
healthy profit margins. All of this accelerates the commoditization process, making a 
well-established open source software product quite difficult to compete against. 

Yet these very business advantages inherent in open source bring us to another 
aspect of the same paradox: why is it so difficult for companies to leverage open 
source as a development model, rather than as a business or marketing model? Con 
sider Sleepycat s dual licensing scheme. The model works only if Sleepycat holds full 
copyright to all of the software in Berkeley DB. Otherwise, it is not permitted to offer 
the second, proprietary license in addition to the open source license. If it must have 
all rights to the software, though, that means that the software must essentially be 
developed in-house. Sleepycat does its own development instead of leveraging out 
side, open source development. 

Perhaps Russ Nelson offers a purer example of an open source business model, one 
where he both develops open source software and leverages the open source devel 
opments of others. The complimentary values Russ Nelson offers are his reputation 
and his expertise, both carefully maintained over the years. The resulting business 
may not be a large one, but it is one where he alone is the master of his own destiny. 
* * * 

Burning Man certainly has the feel of an organic, grass-roots movement. Certainly 
that grass-roots element is part of the dynamic that makes the Burning Man commu 
nity what it is. But simply thinking of "grass roots" makes it too easy to overlook 
what a complex community structure Burning Man has and requires. 

First, there is the structure of Black Rock City itself. Maintaining order in Black Rock 
City is primarily the responsibility of the Black Rock Rangers. They describe themselves 
as a "non-confrontational mediating agency" (see http://www.rangers.org). They are all vol 
unteers, and they have no official authority. They pay admission like everyone else; 
rangering is not a way around the admission price. Further, each ranger is required to 
attend training prior to the event, and each ranger must enter the ranger program with 
the sponsorship of another ranger as mentor. While the rangers occasionally call in 
actual law enforcement, for the most part the rangers are accorded tremendous respect. 

Black Rock City has many of the elements of any other city of 30,000. There is a 
radio station, some years several. There is a DMV (Department of Mutant Vehicles); 
you cannot drive around within Black Rock City or the playa beyond without regis 
tering with the DMV. There is an airport; dozens of attendees routinely fly in for 



xxxv 



Burning Man. And of course, there is a newspaper, the Black Rock Gazette, published 
six times during each Burning Man event. 

Residential areas of Black Rock City have structure as well. Look at a map of Black 
Rock City when you arrive at Burning Man, and you ll see a number of areas along 
the inner circle marked as Theme Camps or Villages. These are areas that are both 
residential and interactive, involving a large number of people working on a com 
mon art project where the residential area itself is the art project. 

The inner circle faces toward the Man, and beyond on the playa is the Burning Man 
"gallery" of art installations. Here is where the larger projects are constructed and the 
larger group events are played out. Typically, there will be an opera and several other 
stage performances. Weddings are common. 

For several years, there was a project called Solaria. It was a scale model of the solar 
system, where not only the distances between objects were proportional, but also the 
size of those objects relative to distance was proportional. Each object was a light 
source, with the sun represented by a small lamp about the size of a bowling ball. On 
that scale, Pluto could be reached only by a three-mile bike ride across the playa. Not 
even the Smithsonian can put on an exhibit of that scale. 



No one has grasped the power of commoditization as quickly as developing nations. 
This is an international arena with general concern over globalization, anxiety about 
domination by American corporations, and fear of Microsoft s monopoly in particu 
lar. Open source has given developing nations a bargaining chip to pressure technol 
ogy companies, especially Microsoft, on price. The natural response has indeed been 
a lowering of prices in countries ranging from Brazil to India. 

Yet the significance of open source goes far beyond commoditization and price pres 
sure. Read the essays here from Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona and Gregorio Robles, Alol- 
ita Sharma and Robert Adkins, and Boon-Lock Yeo, Louisa Liu, and Sunil Saxena, and 
you see that open source is really about controlling one s technology destiny. Outside 
the United States, people find it odd that we use the same word,/ree, to mean two very 
different things: with no cost or liberated. The open source community has adopted the 
slogans "free as in beer" versus "free as in speech" to draw attention to the difference. 
Commoditization is all about "free as in beer;" what developing nations care about the 
most is "free as in speech." 

Open source provides greater intellectual property control than proprietary software that 
one does not own. Developing nations want control over the intellectual property on 
which their technology infrastructure depends. What emerges is a different sense of 
ownership from the traditional market economy sense of ownership, one that speaks not 
just to the motivations of policymakers in developing nations, but to the motivations of 
open source developers as well. Think again of chivalry and of our feudal heritage. 



xxxvi 



In a feudal system, a farmer could not own land, nor the harvest from that land. Serfs 
were indentured to the land and were entitled to only a portion of their harvest after 
paying their taxes to the feudal overlord and landowner. 

Technology workers today face an analogous form of servitude. It is almost universal 
practice at technology companies to confront new employees with a hiring agree 
ment that says, among other things, that any and all code and inventions created by 
the employee while in the employ of the company belong to the company; all copy 
rights and patents resulting from these creations must be transferred to the com 
pany. Technology workers may reap the fruits of their creative labor only under 
terms dictated by the company. Our modern notions of intellectual property and 
ownership of it are based on this relationship: that it is fundamentally companies, 
not individuals, that own intellectual property, and that individuals create new intel 
lectual property primarily in the service of companies. 

If open source hackers have one common attitude that ties them together into a com 
munity, it is the rejection of this notion of intellectual property. The conventional out 
siders view is to say that open source software is not owned. It is fear of the lack of 
accountability associated with this perceived lack of ownership that makes many com 
panies reluctant to deploy open source software for mission-critical functions. 

In fact, this conventional view is deeply mistaken. To understand why, we must 
make a distinction between "ownership" and "stewardship." Ownership is something 
that is fully transferable from one owner to another without loss of value. Money, 
and many (though not all) material objects, are examples of entities that can be sim 
ply owned. Stewardship, on the other hand, applies when something undergoes 
change, when it evolves, or when it has some kind of life cycle. In this case, some 
thing has value only if it is cared for in such a way as to sustain the life cycle. In an 
agrarian society, animals are a prime example of something requiring stewardship. 
Skills are required, and effort must be put forth, to maintain a herd. Transferring the 
herd to someone who lacks those skills or is unable to put forth the effort dimin 
ishes the value of the herd. In other words, only a good steward can realize the full 
value of that which is stewarded. 

Historically, land has been, and continues to be, at the center of contention between 
these two notions of ownership. For example, Native Americans considered them 
selves stewards of the land, and thus fell victim to the European notion of landown- 
ership. Today the battle between environmentalists and certain corporations is over 
exactly these two conflicting senses of ownership. Andrew Hessel s essay points to a 
brewing conflict in these senses of ownership with the biotech industry. 

In the technology sector, open source developers believe that software requires stew 
ardship. The standard employment contract and the proprietary software it engen 
ders preclude stewardship. Open source software, however, by its very nature 



encourages stewardship. Again, the motivation here is not altruism or charity. To an 
open source developer, stewarding software is the best way to see that the software 
evolves and improves, and hence it s just pragmatism to take a stance toward intel 
lectual property that assures that software will be stewarded. 

The proof is in the longevity of open source software projects and the stewards who 
tend them. Linus Torvalds is still at the head of the Linux kernel "tribe" more than a 
decade after the first public release of Linux. Eric Allman has guided Sendmail for more 
than 20 years. Larry Wall is still the guiding vision behind Perl, again after more than 
20 years. In these and many more cases, a common core group stood behind the soft 
ware for far longer than most proprietary software enjoys the benefits of a common 
development team. It is this the dynamics of stewardship far more than the "legions 
of programmers" that accounts for the success of open source software. 

Further, it is this dynamic of stewardship that fosters the social network around open 
source software that is based on the reputation game. Having committed themselves 
to what they regard as the most pragmatic approach to intellectual property, open 
source hackers have then adopted the professional and social structure needed to 
support that approach to intellectual property. It isn t altruism. It s chivalry, a far 
subtler and more pragmatic thing. 
* * * 

The Burning Man event lasts for one week each year. Contained within that event is 
the remarkable community of Black Rock City. Yet it would be a mistake to assume 
that the community exists for only one week a year. The complex structure and intri 
cate hierarchy that is the Burning Man community could not adapt, evolve, and sus 
tain itself if it were not a year-round phenomenon. 

That is the deeper truth not obvious to the casual observer: Burning Man is a perma 
nent worldwide community whose members are connected to and engaged with each 
other continuously. Art projects that are on exhibit at Burning Man will often be 
shown at smaller gatherings in places such as San Francisco. Burners gather for regu 
lar social events throughout the year to talk about past events and plan for next year. 
When Washoe County or the Bureau of Land Management considers a change that 
may affect the permit for Burning Man, word travels through the community like 
wildfire, and burners show up in force to make their cases and state their views. 

It s no accident that the growth of Burning Man parallels the growth of the Internet. 
The Burning Man web site is an impressive knowledge archive about the event and 
the community, providing a wealth of information and resources for anyone trying to 
understand Burning Man and learn how to get involved. The "Jack Rabbit Speaks" 
mailing list provides an announcement forum that goes out to the whole of the Burn 
ing Man community, but there are dozens of other mailing lists that tie together 
smaller communities within. Some of these are organized by geographical proximity, 



XXXVIH x> Introduction 



but many more are organized by common interest. A theme camp will often have a 
mailing list for its members. The Black Rock Rangers have their own web site, and 
their own mailing lists. 

What the Internet has done is to free us from the constraints of geography in terms of 
whom we connect to, whom we share common interests with, and whom we form 
community with. The power of intentional community is abundantly clear in the 
open source movement, where developers from around the world can collaborate on 
software of common interest. Yet the larger lesson is that the power of collaboration 
and the power of community exhibited in open source have relatively little to do 
with software development. 

We begin to see the lasting significance of open source only when we see that it is 
one instance of a general pattern of online, collaborative community. Even a very 
physical, tangible event like Burning Man is crucially dependent on this larger sense 
of community. If we look closely, we see that this pattern of collaboration is begin 
ning to manifest itself in many other places beyond open source. 

We see this strikingly in Eugene Kim s essay, contrasting an early example of soft 
ware collaboration with the grass-roots collaboration that emerged around the 
Ground Zero cleanup. We see this in the power of consumer-driven innovation that 
Sonali Shah explores. We see it in the sense of community behind Slashdot, 
described by Jeff Bates and Mark Stone, and the spontaneous movement that became 
Groklaw, described by Pamela Jones. And we see a compelling attempt to distill the 
most general patterns of these communities in Steve Weber s essay. 

The simplest elements are these: 

Recognizing that one has common cause with people who might otherwise have 
competing or divergent interests 

Acknowledging that small teams working on a component of a problem are the 
only scalable way to tackle large problems 

Improving solutions iteratively through a sense of stewardship, ecosystem, and 
evolution, rather than a sense of property and ownership 

Taken together, these principles suggest an organizational structure that is at once 
novel and familiar. These intentional communities form hierarchically, but it is a hier 
archy based on achievement and reputation rather than power, money, or authority. 
Communication flows easily up and down the hierarchy, but decision-making flows 
from the top down. "Everyone gets a voice, but not everyone gets a vote" (see Bates and 
Stone). The resulting organization is more tribal than democratic. 



XXXIX 



Each night when the two burners return to camp in the hours before dawn, "Reflec 
tions in Sand" has changed shape. Some new pattern has been carefully raked into 
the black-lit sand, and though they never see the visitors, the evidence of their pas 
sage and participation is there. 

The last evening is the night of the Burn. All day the Man has been laid down flat as 
he is prepped. At sunset he is raised up again. While all week his arms have been 
down at his side, now they are raised high above his head. This is the signal for the 
ceremony to begin. 

A ring of lights surrounds the Man, and the rangers walk the perimeter to ensure 
everyone keeps their distance. For hours, within the ring of lights, drummers, 
firedancers, and musicians perform. Pagan rituals from 1,000 years ago must not 
have looked so different. When at last the Man ignites, flames shooting 50 feet or 
more into the night sky, there is awed silence. Pieces begin to fall off, and he begins 
to tremble, as only guy wires hold him in place. The trembling increases, and at last 
the whole Man collapses into a burning mound. At that moment the crowd rushes 
the center in a wild, swirling dance that brings them as close to the flames as heat 
will permit. 

Now when the two burners return to their camp, they find the sand has been raked 
again, into one last new pattern. And something more; there, in the very center of the 
little Zen garden, someone has left a bottle of water. One of them reaches in to 
retrieve the bottle and pulls off the lid. 

"You going to drink that?" asks the other. 

"Of course. Out here, water is the most precious gift of all." 

An hour later their camp is packed. The black-light-painted rocks go back with 
them, the sand has been scattered, and the wooden frame and rakes have been 
heaped onto their neighborhood burn pile. They drive toward the gate, and the 
attendant waves them down. 

"Heading out?" asks the attendant. 

"Yeah, back to San Francisco," replies the driver. 

"This your first time here?" 

The passenger answers, "It is for me." 

The attendant gives a knowing smile and waves them through. "See you next year. 
Welcome to the tribe!" 



XX 
XX 



SECTION 1 



Open Source: 
Competition and 
Evolution 



In Section 1, we present essays tied directly to the history and development of open source soft 
ware. These essays can be loosely grouped into three categories: 

Essays on the software development process (Baker, DiBona, Allison, and Laurie) 

Essays on business competition and open source (Olson, Murdock, Asay, Walli, and 
Nelson) 

Essays on policy issues related to open source (Seltzer; Gonzalez-Barahona; 
Sharma and Adkins; Yeo, Liu, and Saxena; and Souza) 

The essays on the development process provide a natural extension from the original Open Sources. 
These essays explore the community and process that open source developers comprise, and explore 
the subtle similarities and differences between open source and proprietary development. 

With the original publication of Open Sources in 1999, the idea of an open source business model 
was something of a novelty. Today, we see in these essays, that open source, both in its licensing 
structure and in the commoditizing effect of its distribution model, has become a powerful tool in 
the hands of businesses large and small. 

One critical aspect of the business dynamics behind open source is the desire to avoid vendor 
lock-in through proprietary software, and to control one s own technology destiny. While these 
issues matter to businesses, they have become fundamental policy issues in Europe and develop 
ing nations. Control of technology resources in the coming decades will likely matter as much as 
control of natural resources has in the last century. Avoiding monopoly by a single company, or 
hegemony by a single nation, has become a paramount policy objective. Increasingly, open source 
is becoming the means of achieving that objective. 





b CHAPTER 1 

Mitchell Baker 




The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



The Mozilla project was launched on March 31, 1998. On this date, the source code 
for the Netscape Communicator product was made publicly available under an open 
source license, the "Mozilla Organization" was founded to guide the project, and 
development of the codebase began to move from a proprietary model into an open 
model coupled with commercial involvement and management practices. 

Of these three elements, the release of the source code is discussed in Open Sources. 
In summary, the source code was prepared for public release by removing all code 
that Netscape didn t have the right to license under an open source license, and then 
replacing those pieces necessary for the code to compile and run. At the same time, a 
new open source license the Mozilla Public License was written, reviewed, and 
accepted by the open source community, including the Open Source Initiative (http:// 
www.opensource.org). The other two topics the story ofmozilla.org and the develop 
ment of the Mozilla project are the subject of this essay. The creation of the Mozilla 
Public License is generally an untold story, but it occurred during the time covered 
by the original Open Sources book and isn t discussed in detail here. 

Each of these three activities was a step into the unknown. Basic development princi 
pals of the open source model ("running code speaks," peer review, leadership based 
on technical merit) were known. But the combination of open source techniques 
with an active, focused commercial management structure was uncharted territory. 
The shift of authority from a commercial management structure to a separate organi 
zation was new, and presented many management challenges. The development of 



project management techniques and tools that could be shared by multiple commer 
cial development teams and a volunteer community was new. Development of a 
large, complex end-user application in the open source space was new. 

Of course, the Mozilla project was not the first open source project with commercial 
involvement. Cygnus, many of the Linux distributors, and Sendmail were all compa 
nies involved with open source development, and the Apache project was develop 
ing experience in coordinating open source development where some of the contrib 
utors were paid by their employers. But none of these projects provided more than a 
rough set of guidelines for how the Mozilla project might operate. The Mozilla 
project was unusual, and at the time perhaps unique, in the way project leadership 
interacted closely with both commercial teams (project managers, people managers, 
and engineers) and individual contributors. 

Not all open source projects are interested in commercial project management and 
people management issues, but for us it was always a given. Today other projects are 
thinking about these issues as the development and use of open source software 
increase. Given our history, size, and scope, the Mozilla project remains a trendsetter in 
this arena. 

Founding of the Mozilla Organization: Obvious for Developers, a 
Bold Step for Management 

The Mozilla project originally grew out of Netscape Communications Corporation 
and its Netscape Communicator product. In early 1998, the Netscape management 
team made the decision to continue development of Netscape s flagship product, 
Netscape Communicator, through an open source development model. At the time, 
Netscape Communicator and Microsoft s Internet Explorer browser were locked in a 
fierce competitive battle often referred to as the "browser wars." Netscape s goal was 
to seed a broad-based development effort within the software development commu 
nity to produce future browser products as a shared resource. 

At its inception, the Mozilla project faced some paradoxes. First, the only people 
familiar enough with the code to participate actively in its development were 
Netscape employees. Those employees were still expected to work within the man 
agement system and practices that Netscape had developed in its proprietary days. 
There was no volunteer community. And yet, even at that early time, it was clear that 
the long-term success of the project required a broad constituency of people and 
companies working jointly on the project. It was not enough to have open source 
code (code available under an open source license). The project needed an open 
development process, and this required authority over the code s development to be 
based on technical merit and distributed outside Netscape. The question was how to 
get there from here. 



* C The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



One thing was clear: the success of the project depended on it being a real open 
source project. In other words, the project needed to have technical legitimacy and 
development decisions would need to be guided by technical considerations. This 
was intuitively clear to the group of Netscape employees who were familiar with 
open source, eager to help move the Mozilla code into the open source world and 
who ultimately became the founding members of the Mozilla Organization. This 
group made the need clear to Netscape management, which was receptive to trying 
to do the right thing. 

When the Mozilla project was officially launched, Netscape executive management 
therefore took some bold steps. First, they officially anointed "mozilla.org" as the 
steward of the codebase and leader of the project. I say officially because it s quite 
possible that a group like mozilla.org would have developed even if Netscape hadn t 
officially helped to create one. But this step was important, as it allowed mozilla.org 
to focus on building the project rather than on proving the necessity of its role. 

The creation of mozilla.org was a significant step that set the tenor of the project s 
development. It meant that the development of the Mozilla codebase was to be 
guided by something other than Netscape s own product and revenue plans, and also 
that Netscape management would need to give up control. This may seem like an obvi 
ous statement in an open source world, but it is one of the most difficult problems in 
moving from a proprietary to an open system. It is particularly difficult when the 
commercial vendor is actively trying to ship a product and the code has not yet 
reached a good, solid state that can serve as the basis of that product. 

Some have said that the Mozilla project was not a true open source project during this 
time because Netscape employees contributed so much to the project and Netscape 
management was so involved for so long. It s possible this is true. But I believe that 
Netscape management lived in an intensely uncomfortable setting as control of the 
project moved from their hands into those of mozilla.org. And since I personally was 
the fulcrum for stresses between the project leadership and the Netscape management 
team, I ll warrant that Netscape management felt it was living in a real open source 
project. In 1999, Netscape Communications Corp. was acquired by America Online 
(AOL). This resulted in many changes, but the relationship between mozilla.org and 
the Netscape browser development group continued as before. For quite a while, we 
used the term Netscape/AOL to describe the Netscape browser development group after 
the AOL acquisition, and I ll use that phrase for the rest of this chapter. 

The members of the Mozilla Organization are known as "mozilla.org staff." The original 
members of the 1998 launch were Netscape employees who had a vision for an open 
source Mozilla project and a determination to see it succeed. The most media-genie of 
these founders was Jamie Zawinski, who left the project after a year. But the most con 
sistent and long-term contributor has been Brendan Eich, who was a founding member 
of mozilla.org and remains the technical and philosophical leader of the project to this 



Founding of the Mozilla Organization: Obvious for Developers, a Bold Step for Management 



day. Over time, the percentage of mozilla.org staff employed by Netscape decreased 
steadily. Today, the mozilla.org staff does not have any Netscape/AOL employees. 

After the Mozilla project was launched, mozilla.org staff members began the process 
of changing development styles from a proprietary to an open source model. The 
early steps were logistical: establish public communications channels such as mail 
ing lists and newsgroups; establish a public system for viewing and tracking bugs. A 
harder task was changing habits. For example, the existence of public communica 
tions channels was not enough. Old habits die hard, and there was a tendency for 
people to use the methods they had always used. This was complicated by the fact 
that Netscape as a company still had confidential data about itself and its business 
partners that couldn t go into public forums. So, it was not possible to eliminate all 
private channels. Eventually we changed the names of any remaining private mailing 
lists to something long and awkward that required conscious thought to use. This 
gave Netscape/AOL employees a way to disseminate confidential data when neces 
sary, but made public disclosure the easiest path. 

Even as basic a step as public communications in an open source project can be diffi 
cult for some management teams to accept. In a system that is public by default, 
everyone needs to learn what information must remain confidential, and to remem 
ber this while working. At first it s a big effort to work in public and some people see 
it as overhead. Then as the project progresses and the public interaction provides 
increasing value, the need to keep something private is seen as a burden. This is cer 
tainly the case for the Mozilla project today, where the only private development 
information we solicit are bugs which could have an impact on the security features 
of our products. We ve set up a system for treating these bugs privately, and the sys 
tem has overhead. We bear it in the security context because security is critical, but 
we avoid it in other contexts. 

We also set up a public bug and issue-tracking system. This is commonplace today, but 
was innovative at the time. We made the bug-tracking system an open source project 
under the Mozilla umbrella, and today Bugzilla is a successful project in its own right 
(http://www.bugzilla.org). We also set up a continuous build system and web frontend 
(http://tinderbox. mozilla.org/showbuilds.cgi). This means that we have an automated pro 
cess that builds and rebuilds the software continuously on multiple platforms to see if 
and when a new piece of code causes the software not to build. Then came a period of 
learning to "work in the fishbowl." Some people adapt easily to having all their work vis 
ible, and others struggle. Many simply walk down the hallway to talk with a buddy, and 
then forget to tell everyone else. This period takes some time and effort. 

Updating the Codebase 

About six months into the project, it became clear that the codebase was in need of 
updating. By late 1998, the inherited code was several generations old, had been 
patched over and over, and actually hindered ongoing innovation. Old and fragile, it 



^ C The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



looked backward toward the beginning of the Web, rather than forward to the new 
technologies a modern browser would need to support. So, in late 1998, a painful deci 
sion was made to rewrite the layout engine, a critical and complex core component. 

This decision changed the scope of the project dramatically. The initial project was 
an incremental upgrade from the Netscape Communicator 4.x product line to a pro 
posed 5.x product line. Moving to the new layout engine (known as Gecko) meant 
that the incremental model was gone; the Mozilla project would need to develop a 
complex new layout engine and then build a new browser application on top of it. 
And things got harder from there. As the new layout engine began to mature, it 
became clear that other significant parts of the codebase would also need rewriting. 
The development process turned out to be a lot like a remodeling project where fix 
ing one problem leads to another. Then came the long, slow grind to producing 
something useful (Mozilla 1.0 in June 2002) and finally something great (Mozilla 
Firefox in November 2004). 

During this time, many proclaimed us dead, a failure. What those people didn t see 
was the passion and commitment of the contributors to the project, including the 
Netscape employees. The contributors knew that they were developing good technol 
ogy. They knew they had a shot at building a great browser and mail client. And they 
knew it mattered. The Web matters. Browsers matter. Much of the world decided 
that the days of browser innovation were over. Some mourned the loss of choice, and 
many didn t realize the dangers of accessing the World Wide Web only through a 
single access point. But the contributors to the Mozilla project realized both the dan 
ger and the potential for something innovative. They persevered. The prominence of 
Netscape often obscured the efforts and dedication of the individuals themselves. 
Yes, many contributors were paid by Netscape. Of these, many contributed far 
beyond the requirements of a job, doing extra work to make the product "theirs" and 
to make sure they were proud of it. Meanwhile, the individual volunteers provided 
critical expertise and contributions across the codebase. 

During this period, almost all the code in the Mozilla browser and email client was 
rewritten. The focus was a modern layout engine, and a set of technologies designed to 
make the promise of cross-platform development a reality for the Web. We created a 
cross-platform component model (XPCOM),a cross-platform XML-based UI language 
known as XUL (pronounced zool\ a new toolkit using XUL, and a set of cross-platform 
applications themselves. Developing these was a long process, but we felt that it was 
important to have technology that would help us move forward. The power of these 
technologies has been demonstrated through our new products: Mozilla Firefox and 
Mozilla Thunderbird, in which we were able to build award-winning cross-platform 
applications quickly on top of mature, preexisting infrastructure. 



Founding of the Mozilla Organization: Obvious for Developers, a Bold Step for Management 



*.* 

XX 



A Disciplined Methodology 

Along the way, the Mozilla projects developed a highly disciplined method of distrib 
uted software development. Many people think that open source development is nec 
essarily chaotic. Or they wonder about the quality of the code because anyone can 
create a patch and offer it for inclusion in the source base. Open source need not be 
chaotic, and the Mozilla project is not. For every piece of code checked into the 
Mozilla products, we track: 

Who checked it in 

When it was checked in (to the minute) 

What problem it was trying to address 

The complete history of the issue (bug) the code was trying to address 

Who did the code review (often two levels of review) 

Whether the next build of the software was broken on any of our main platforms 

Whether the code affected our performance metrics, by platform 

Build and optional log comments 

A comparison with the previous version of the code. 

This information is available at any time; it does not require an expert to find or 
assemble the data. It is available online, in real time, through a web interface; all one 
needs is a web browser (http://tinderbox.moz.illa.org/showbuilds.cgi). We do this so that 
many contributors can work on the same codebase simultaneously and know what s 
going on. We do this so that the source code "tree" stays healthy, and we address 
problems before more new code makes them worse. We also have policies determin 
ing who gets access to the CVS tree, what s required before code can be checked in, 
what to do when the tree doesn t compile and run, how authority is delegated to 
those with expertise, and so on. 

Building an Open Source Project 

The process of building software proceeded simultaneously with building a vibrant 
open source project. The creation of mozilla.org had gone hand in hand with the rec 
ognition that Netscape management would need to give up a great deal of control over 
the development process. Now it was time to figure out how to make the transfer. I 
describe in this section two of the most significant topics we addressed control over 
the source code repository and control of the designated releases in some detail, for I 
believe this shows how the Mozilla project came of age. 

Implementing a transfer of control from Netscape management to mozilla.org caused 
a number of strains. Mozilla.org staff could have proceeded in opposition to 
Netscape. Indeed, we thought about it many times. However, Netscape was a large 



* * The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



and valued contributor, whose involvement and work product remained very impor 
tant for the project. So, we spent a great deal of energy figuring out techniques that 
addressed the concerns a commercial entity like Netscape brings to a project and 
simultaneously building a strong open source community. 

Having control of the source code repository may seem like an obvious requirement 
for an open source project, but there were many sensitivities in our case. For exam 
ple, the Mozilla project has processes to make sure that code is of good quality before 
it is checked in. This is often the case in open source projects, and many contribu 
tors understand that their code needs to meet project standards. However, this is not 
always the case in commercial settings. Often the employment decision is what mat 
ters. If someone is an employee, his code goes into the project he was hired to work 
on. Instituting code review for everyone, even people employed to contribute code, 
can be a surprise for new employees and for their managers. Suddenly the decision of 
what code goes into the source repository is not made by managers for a particular 
person through the employment process. Instead, the decision is made by engineers 
who review the code itself rather than the person s credibility or employment status. 
And the code review is not optional or auxiliary; code cannot be checked into the 
tree until an appropriate reviewer has given formal approval. 

We instituted code review as a prerequisite to check-in relatively early in the process 
without too much controversy. Sometime later we implemented a second layer of review 
which we ended up calling "super-review." Super-review is an "integration review" or 
"plumbing review." Does the code conform to coding guidelines? Does it use the some 
what tricky XPCOM in appropriate places and not elsewhere? Does it conform to the 
overall architectural goals? Does it avoid needlessly diminishing modularity? 

We instituted the super-review requirement because we felt we had to. The Mozilla 
codebase is large and complex, and we were worried about overall code quality. We 
needed to increase our confidence that the code we were accepting into the tree would 
solve the immediate problem, and still leave us enough flexibility for future develop 
ment. Implementing the super-review was very painful for everyone involved. It was 
painful for the identified super-reviewers. Being a super-reviewer is actually a lousy 
job who wants to review yet more code instead of writing it oneself? And of course, 
the super-reviewers were well regarded and had plenty of work to do themselves. They 
took on the super-review job not because they wanted to, but because they believed it 
was important to making Mozilla the project we wanted it to be. Super-review was also 
painful for the contributing engineers. Adding another layer of review to the pre-check- 
in requirements was seen as "yet more bureaucracy" by some. 

There were many requests for absolute, guaranteed turnaround times for super- 
review. Engineers and managers complained they could not schedule work accu 
rately due to the unknown lags caused by waiting for super-review. And yet, the 
super-reviewers had to balance review of code with writing their own. And since they 

Founding of the Mozilla Organization: Obvious for Developers, a Bold Step for Management * J 3 



were well regarded, their code was acutely needed. I was unwilling to agree to rigid 
turnaround times for super-review, believing that doing so would put the work of 
key contributors at risk. We eventually agreed on a timeframe for an initial response 
from the super-reviewer, which would contain some estimated time for full review. 

Another issue was determining who has "write-access" to the source code repository. 
This was extremely sensitive. In a commercial setting, it is often the case that when 
people are hired they are given access to the part of the source code repository to 
which they are expected to contribute. In open source settings, one typically earns 
access by making valuable contributions. Moving the open source standard of "earn the 
right to touch the tree" to employees who need to contribute code to do their job can 
be difficult. In particular, the rationale for why this is necessary can be hard to explain 
in a commercial setting when all the code an employee writes must be reviewed and 
super-reviewed before it can be checked in. The question comes up: assume Employee 
X is hired. She writes code, and it passes review and super-review. Why on earth can 
that employee not go through the mechanical task of actually checking the code in? I 
was never able to provide a complete answer to this question. I know that open source 
projects regularly vet people before allowing access to the source code repository. And I 
know it would be very odd for a management chain in a company to make the deci 
sion about CVS access. So it s clear that this "is just not done." But I was not able to 
explain clearly how someone could do damage by having CVS access if all of her code 
was reviewed and approved before check-in, even though the technical leadership of 
the project felt very strongly about this. The idea of automatic access for employees had 
an emotional response because open source projects rely on peer review and technical 
leadership, and I shared this. But the key engineers were adamant that the quality of 
the code would suffer through automatic access, even though our pre-check-in code 
review requirements are quite stringent. 

It was an awkward setting to institute a policy for which I couldn t give a crisp reply 
to the various management teams affected. (I ve been responsible for policy for 
mozilla.org since 1999, so it was my job to write the policy, describe it to manage 
ment, and address the concerns and complaints that might come up.) And the possi 
bility existed that management groups would be surprised, distressed, or outraged 
that such a policy would be instituted without a clear answer as to why the code 
quality wasn t adequately protected. Nevertheless, we instituted this policy in 2001. 

A second area where shifting control to mozilla.org was highly sensitive concerned 
control of the milestone releases. By "owning the releases," I mean several things: 
first, defining and implementing a planned milestone schedule; second, defining and 
implementing a process for getting a release into shipping condition; and finally, 
identifying and shipping the release. 

When the Mozilla project was launched, the planning and release schedule was deter 
mined and implemented by Netscape employees contributing to the project, but not 



10 x* The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



directly by mozilla.org staff. We worked on changing this for quite some time before 
we had proven ourselves trustworthy enough for Netscape to give up control. This may 
seem laughable how can a so-called "open source" project not control its own 
releases? But it s important to remember that Netscape was under enormous pressure 
to release a product, and giving up control of the process by which releases are made is 
extremely uncomfortable. Mozilla.org was new and unproven. And of course, manag 
ing a software project with hundreds of people working on it is not easy in any setting. 

Control of these aspects moved formally from the Netscape management to the 
mozilla.org staff following the release of the Netscape 6 browser. This shift had been 
discussed for some time but still involved a leap of faith for those who had previ 
ously exercised decision-making power. 

This was a tempestuous time; mozilla.org staff had influence, but not control. We 
thought many times about whether we needed to create a fork in order to affect such 
a shift in control. Each time, the mozilla.org staff decided that Netscape s contribu 
tions were far too important to the project and outweighed the desire for open source 
purity or credibility. I suspect that the Netscape management team must have had 
similar discussions, weighing a fork and the ability to manage their releases as they 
felt best with the value gained from the open source project. In the end, we all hung 
in and mozilla.org staff became the official keeper of our releases after Netscape 6. 

Owning our releases did not mean that we ignored Netscape. Netscape remained the 
largest single contributor, and its pool of talented and dedicated engineers was bog 
gling. Netscape was also the largest single distributor of Mozilla-based products. 
Managing the project without taking Netscape s needs into account would have been 
stupid. By this time, Netscape didn t exercise control as it once had, but its leader 
ship role in the project was greater than some might have liked. Mozilla.org staff con 
tinued to hear from the community that we were Netscape stooges and there wasn t a 
"real" open source project. However, to my mind, Netscape s role was now deter 
mined by classic open source principles: leadership and influence through the qual 
ity of one s contribution. Of course, this involves an acceptance of the role of a cor 
porate entity in an open source project, which made some uncomfortable. 

Mozilla.org was able to own our releases well, in part because we had developed an 
active, effective quality assurance (QA) community. Over the years, I ve learned how 
few people intuitively grasp the importance of the QA effort (and I suspect, how 
important QA will be to other projects of similar scope). Both of our major efforts 
web browsing and email live in an extremely complex world. The Web is very 
diverse, and people use our software in a boggling array of environments and in 
wildly different ways. Hiring a QA team as full-time testers is part of a solution, but it 
is not the complete answer. I m becoming more and more convinced that it may well 
be impossible to hire a QA team big enough and diverse enough to do thorough test 
ing of a product like a web browser. 

Founding of the Mozilla Organization: Obvious for Developers, a Bold Step for Management * 11 



By 1999, it had become apparent that an active community of people was interested in 
contributing to our testing and QA effort. Christine Beagle joined us to lead an effort at 
mozilla.org to make this group cohesive, figure out ways to give the group some author 
ity, and encourage them to step forward. The response to a bit of attention and apprecia 
tion directed at this nascent community was astounding. One mark of success is that 
shortly thereafter, we hired one of the more active and organized of these folks as our 
community QA lead. This person was Asa Dotzler, who has been a key figure in the 
project ever since, still coordinates QA activities, and is extremely active in managing 
our release process. With Asa s coordination, we began to see a set of people doing more 
organized testing of our products. This provided enormous value. The testers also did 
things such as look at all the bugs assigned to a particular engineer, verify that the bugs 
were legitimate, check to see if the bug existed on all platforms, create test cases, and 
then verify fixes across our main platforms. These efforts saved enormous amounts of 
time for the engineers trying to write the code to fix the bugs. I ve learned that this type 
of work often gets little respect, but we value it highly and find these contributors to be 
extremely important to our project. Many of these efforts were coordinated through 
mozillaZine, an independent webzine dedicated to the Mozilla project that was founded 
by Chris Nelson in September 1998 (http://www.mozillazine.org). 

Massive community testing remains important today. We provide Release Candi 
dates for our major product releases precisely so we can get 50,000-100,000 down 
loads from our key community and get a good reach on quality. 

Young Adulthood the Mozilla Foundation 

The idea of an independent legal organization to guide the Mozilla project had been 
discussed when the project was first launched in 1998. However, it was decided that 
the time was not quite right. At the time, there were no models for setting up such an 
organization and figuring out how it would be governed, who would participate, and 
so on. There was enough unknown and far too much work in getting the code ready, 
the project launched, and a browser developed to take on things we didn t abso 
lutely have to do. Eventually we decided that the right time to create an independent 
Mozilla Foundation would be when a critical mass of people was interested in sup 
porting a foundation. That critical mass would need to include a significant set of 
volunteers and a set of companies interested enough to fund browser developer and 
distribute Mozilla-based technology. 

That critical mass began to develop with the release of Mozilla 1.0. Mozilla 1.0 
showed that we could produce a good product, that the Mozilla releases where deter 
mined by Mozilla rather than by Netscape, and that the project had a positive future. 
At least one critical corporate participant came to us and told us that 1.0 proved our 
viability and that they were very interested in helping form and support an indepen 
dent Mozilla Foundation. 



12 X The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



Following the release of Mozilla 1.0, I spent a fair amount of time thinking about 
what an independent Mozilla Foundation would look like, how we might put it 
together, how many employees we would need, which companies would likely pro 
vide support, and how to finance employees in the early years. I had help from a set 
of mozilla.org staff members. In addition, I had the good fortune of hooking up with 
Mitch Kapor, who had recently joined the open source world with the launch of the 
Open Source Applications Foundation (http://www.osa/oundation.org). Mitch was an 
immense help in thinking through various possible structures for the Mozilla Foun 
dation and is an unsung hero in getting the Mozilla Foundation launched. 

In the spring of 2003, the stars aligned. Mozilla.org staff was ready, the project had 
developed a critical mass, and we had some corporate support. In addtion, AOL decided 
it was ready to help spin out the Mozilla project. This was an important element for 
mozilla.org staff. Of course, we could have launched a project without AOL s support 
that s the nature of open source but the mozilla.org staff felt that AOL s support was 
important to the launch of an independent Mozilla project. We hoped that the use of the 
Mozilla trademarks would be transferred to a new organization, along with a set of 
machines. We wanted to be able to hire a group of people, some of whom were current 
AOL employees, without bad feelings. We felt it was very important to the project s sta 
bility to have a smooth transition from AOL to a successor. We also knew we needed to 
hire people to keep the project running well, and that it would take us time to find 
ongoing funding sources. So, the seed funding that AOL provided was another critical 
factor. Through July, I worked to reach agreement with AOL on how the Mozilla Foun 
dation would be launched. Once again, Mitch Kapor provided invaluable assistance in 
helping to get the arrangements with AOL worked out. 

On July 14, 2003, the Mozilla Foundation was launched as an independent non 
profit organization. AOL contributed $2 million in seed funding for the Mozilla 
trademarks, the Mozilla Public License, the machines we were using to host the web 
site and other infrastructure, and the efforts of a transition team to help create a 
smooth handoff. We knew we had some additional funding from IBM and Sun, and 
Mitch Kapor donated $150,000 for each of the first two years. Based on this, Bren 
dan Eich and I decided, with the help of Chris Hoffman and Mitch, to aim for an ini 
tial group of 10 employees. 

The initial group was divided among (i) those focused on the projectwide resources 
(technical leadership, infrastructure, tools, web site management, builds, releases, 
QA), (ii) those focused on the codebase itself (Firefox, Thunderbird, Gecko, the 
DOM, and JavaScript) and (iii) a couple of people focused on all the other things the 
project and the Mozilla Foundation needed to be successful, including relationships 
with commercial contributors and other organizations, legal structure, trademarks, 
finances, and so on. Mitch Kapor offered to extend his organization for providing 
back-office services payroll, benefits, accounting, donation processing, and human 



Young Adulthood the Mozilla Foundation * C 13 



resources to the Mozilla Foundation on very gracious terms, which has been a great 
boon. Securing high-quality services in these areas for the Mozilla Foundation had 
always been of concern to me and this has been a phenomenal solution for us. 

This resulted in a group that was small for the scope of the project, but still big for a 
nonprofit open source project to support. We chose this route because we believed that 
the project was unlikely to reach its potential without a core group of at least this size. 
We felt this was the minimum size for critical mass for several reasons, including these: 

The World Wide Web isn t finished. 

It changes all the time. New content types develop, new technologies develop, 
and new possibilities emerge. If the browser doesn t continue to develop, the 
consumer s ability to enjoy these enhancements stagnates. 

Browsers and email clients aren t done yet. 

There s a whole range of innovative ideas that interact with browsers and email 
clients. For example, RSS readers can be nicely integrated with both browsers 
and email. In addition, the underlying components on which the actual end-user 
applications are built require constant development. 

Speed matters. 

We need good Internet clients now. Having a core set of people able to devote 
full-time attention to this makes a big difference in accomplishing things quickly. 

The size and scope of the project requires it. 

Just keeping track of what s going on in the Mozilla project takes time. About 80 
people actively check into the CVS repository each month, and of course, many 
more active participants don t have CVS access. We also have a high level of 
involvement with commercial entities and with Mozilla development teams at com 
mercial entities. Providing the technical leadership and coordination for this large a 
group is a big job, even with a set of full-time employees. Doing so without a set of 
people available full time (or more than full time) would be beyond daunting. 

The founding in July was followed by a hectic startup period through the fall. We 
assembled the team of employees. We found office space at an affordable rate, thanks 
again to friends of the Mozilla project who extended a helping hand. We moved our 
equipment from AOL to our co-location facility and our offices. We knew it was 
important that enterprises and other institutions got a good picture of the Mozilla 
Foundation and grew confident that we are not a naive, flaky group, so we spent a 
chunk of time talking with these groups. 

We decided that a serious focus on the end user needed to be added to our traditional 
focus on developers. Product development continued at a fast clip through this period. 



14 X The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



Firefox and Thunderbird 

As if forming the Foundation, moving employees, and establishing and supporting 
ourselves wasn t enough, we also began a determined transition from the application 
known as Mozilla or the Mozilla Application Suite, or by its codename, Seamonkey, 
to our new products: Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla Thunderbird. 

We knew that our future lay with the new applications. The integrated Mozilla 
Application Suite is a fine product that many love. But the integration caused diffi 
culties, the UI had been built by accretion and had been added to over the years, and 
we knew we wanted updated, standalone browsing and mail applications. Given our 
limited resources, we had to place a bet, and we did. 

The Mozilla Foundation hired the lead Firefox and Thunderbird developers, Ben 
Goodger and Scott McGregor. We talked with Ben and Scott about providing assis 
tance to the community of people working on the Mozilla Application Suite. We con 
tinued with our releases of the Mozilla Application Suite, including improvements to 
the core components, performance, stability, and security, and coordinating feature 
work done by our community. But we did not hire people focused on the Mozilla 
Application Suite. 

Both Firefox and Thunderbird were in the early stages of development when we 
made this decision. Indeed, Thunderbird had not even seen its 0.1 release when the 
Foundation was launched. Despite this, we knew that the then-current state of Thun 
derbird could probably have supported an 0.1 or 0.2, or maybe even an 0.3 label. 
This was borne out when we were contacted over the summer by a Fortune 100 
company wanting information about Thunderbird. The company had already done a 
significant amount of due diligence and had realized that Thunderbird was the best 
option. They wondered if the Foundation would be interested in speeding develop 
ment of certain enterprise features if we had some additional funding to do so. As a 
result, Thunderbird has had a rich set of enterprise features from its early days. It 
lacks an integrated calendar, but the Mozilla calendar project was reinvigorated and 
an integrated calendar project launched in the fall of 2004. 

Firefox was further along the development path, but still quite young. It wasn t even 
called Firefox at that time; it was called Firebird, the second of two early names 
which we abandoned due to trademark issues. The application-eventually-known-as- 
Firefox was at the 0.5 stage, quite usable, but not a polished end-user application. 
The development goal had always been a strict focus on the end-user experience 
above all else. This continued, and Bart Decrem drove the end-user focus through 
out all aspects of the Foundation s operations. Firefox began to be noticed in 2004 
with the 0.6 release. It quickly began to capture the interest of much of our devel 
oper community. There were still millions of contented users of the Mozilla Applica 
tion Suite, but the momentum had clearly begun shifting to Firefox. 



Young Adulthood the Mozilla Foundation * J 15 



In February 2004, we found a public posting by a visual designer named Steve Gar- 
rity, describing what Firefox needed for its icons, logos, and visual identity in gen 
eral. The content of the post was excellent. Better yet, Steve seemed to have both 
knowledge of and an interest in tackling these problems, instead of simply complain 
ing or pointing out problems. We asked him if he d like to take the lead for a bit and 
show us what could be done. He said yes, and the Visual Identity Team was created. 
Both Firefox and Thunderbird took a giant step toward becoming sophisticated, pol 
ished end-user applications. By the 0.8 release of Firefox in June 2004, the momen 
tum for Firefox was growing dramatically. Firefox was already an impressive prod 
uct, offering features new to most users. 

In addition, the Internet experience had become extremely painful. Malicious actors 
were everywhere. The Web was infested with viruses and security exploits, seemingly 
uncontrollable pop-up windows appeared almost everywhere, and distracting, band 
width-chewing ads appeared long before desired web content. The browser, a piece of 
software many had come to take for granted, suddenly mattered. The browser is the 
mechanism through which one s computer one s hard drive with its critical and pri 
vate data-connects to the wild, wild world of the Web. A modem, high-quality 
browser is necessary to keep this connection from being increasingly painful and even 
dangerous. The Mozilla Foundation had a great browser in Mozilla Firefox, and people 
began to notice. By mid-2004 we began to see that the types of people who were inter 
ested in Mozilla Firefox were expanding. We began getting messages from people who 
clearly were neither early adopters nor even particularly savvy. So, we knew we were 
making a difference. And we knew that the difference was important enough for more 
people than ever before to pay attention. People who tned Firefox loved it. Around the 
0.9 timeframe Qune 2004), a groundswell began building. 

The summer of 2004 was an even more painful time on the Web. A series of viruses 
and security issues caused enormous inconvenience and concern. Internet Explorer was 
a vector for many attacks. These problems caused consumers to pay more attention to 
their browser. They helped people realize why an alternative browser is so important to 
the health of the Internet and one s ability to interact comfortably with the Web. Secu 
rity is a very difficult problem. A browser must be open to the content of the Web 

that s the whole point. At the same time, it can t be too open. A browser needs to have a 
series of defenses to help filter out bad content. No browser can be perfect, and that 
includes Firefox. We know that we will be making security changes and improvements 
in our products on a continual basis, and we hope that others do as well. 

We saw significant adoption of Firefox 0.9 through the summer and fall of 2004 
almost 8 million people came to get a product that hadn t reached its 1.0 status yet. 
Mozilla Thunderbird adoption was also proceeding well, though not at the same fan 
tastic rates. On the marketing side, Spread Firefox was launched in September 2004. 
This was a community marketing effort, perhaps the first of its kind. We knew that 



IB * * The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



the great strength of the Mozilla project is the community of people dedicated to 
making it successful. We also knew that we would not have a traditional "market 
ing" or "PR" effort, spending large amounts of money on media events. And the mail 
we were receiving made it clear that people were excited about Firefox and wanted to 
help their friends and family switch. 

The result was www.spreadfirefox.com, the home of a fervent evangelism community 
focused on increasing Firefox adoption. The most famous Spread Firefox campaign 
to date has been the New York Times campaign, which was proposed and initiated by 
a community member. This started out as a 10-day campaign to get 2,500 people to 
contribute funds to buy a full page ad in the New York Times supporting Firefox. 
Ten days was the wrong timeframe 2,500 people signed up in the first two days. 
We kept the campaign open for 10 days anyway and ended up with 10,000 choos 
ing to participate. We had promised that contributors names would be in the ad and 
would be legible, so we enlarged the ad and made it a full two-page ad. It ran on 
December 16, 2004. A while later I came to work to find two young men standing 
outside our door. The door is glass and we had taped the NYT ad to the door so that 
it was visible from the outside. The two young men looked lost, but one wore a Fire- 
fox T-shirt. So, as I reached the door to go in, I asked, "Can I help you find some 
thing?" The men were rather shy, looking at their feet and mumbling, "We just 
wanted to see the Mozilla Foundation. We re only in town for a few days and had to 
see it." Then one of them straightened up, looked me in the eye, jabbed his finger at 
the New York Times ad, and said proudly, "And there s my name, right there!" Some 
times I think people believe I m exaggerating when I describe how passionate con 
sumers are after they ve tried Firefox, but it s actually hard to overstate the excite 
ment that Firefox has generated. 

Getting Firefox and Thunderbird to a 1.0 status and shipped was a very intense 
period. We knew we had great products in the works, but we had to finish them. We 
also had to get a set of related activities completed. These included revamping our 
web site, developing our communications plan, working with the Spread Firefox 
community, improving our localization process and working with the various local 
ization communities, figuring out our search relationships, working with our affili 
ates Mozilla Europe and Mozilla Japan on the international aspects of the launch, 
and so on. The ferocious dedication of everyone involved was required. I cannot 
stress enough the commitment of the Mozilla community. On Sunday, November 7, 
I logged onto IRC at about 8:00 A.M.., which is early for me and for most of the 
Mountain View-based staff. I was bombarded with questions from our localization 
communities in Europe and Asia. Some were up early, many were up very, very late, 
and all were trying to figure out how to manage their schedules over the next 48 
hours to be available whenever needed to get their localized versions finished, 
approved and shipped as part of the 1.0 release. 



Young Adulthood the Mozilla Foundation 



Mozilla Firefox 1.0 and Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0 were released on November 9, 2004. 
To say they have been well received is an understatement. Firefox 1.0 was downloaded 
from our mirror site about 2 million times in the first two days alone, and has plunged 
on at an average rate of almost 250,000 downloads per day since then. As of mid-April 
2005, the number of downloads that we can track is very close to 50 million. On the 
usage side, Firefox has gained worldwide market share at a rate of nearly 1% per 
month from November to April. As of April 2005, surveys are beginning to show 
Mozilla browsers at or above 10% market share. Among technically focused sites, the 
market share of Mozilla products ranges up to much higher numbers. 

It s extremely difficult to gain this sort of market share on the desktop in the face of a 
competitive product that people get when they buy a computer. The fact that Mozilla 
Firefox has done so is a reflection of a great product, a huge need, a fervent commu 
nity, and the power of the Internet. 

Many people have wondered whether open source development can produce great 
end-user applications. One school of thought says that open source developers can 
produce infrastructure and products that other developers like, but not applications 
aimed at the general end user. Mozilla Firefox and Thunderbird demonstrate that 
open source software can indeed produce great end-user products. I believe that we 
are only at the beginning, and we will see a range of innovative end-user products 
come from the open source world in the coming years. 

The Future 

The mission of the Mozilla project is to promote choice and innovation on the Web 
by creating great end-user offerings. We focus on innovation because the Web is still 
young we ve seen only the beginnings of its potential. That potential can be stifled 
if we don t have innovative work done on the client side. 

We focus on choice because this allows people to have greater control over their 
Internet experience. This control over our life on the Web increases in importance 
each year, as more and more critical functions such as banking, health care, insur 
ance, and commerce are done over the Web. A monoculture is rarely a healthy ecol 
ogy. A single effective choice in browsers and email clients is dangerous, both to con 
sumers and to the health of the Web itself. 

Firefox in particular has shown that consumers will pay attention to a product that 
provides an alternative, and that the Mozilla project can create such a product. We 
have a number of challenges ahead of us. We need to continue to release products 
that people love. We have a set of responsibilities that come with the user base, 
adoption rate, and increased visibility of the project. Conditions will change, and we 
will need to adapt. These are challenges, but certainly no greater than those we have 
faced to date. These are the challenges that result from the project s achievements. 



18 X The Mozilla Project: Past and Future 



We have great talent, a powerful and creative community, a well-earned place in the 
Internet ecosystem, a growing user base, and, at long last, a legal home for the 
Mozilla project in the Mozilla Foundation. 

As we go forward, there is no change in the mission of the project. Our basic 
approach of combining open source DNA with involvement by commercial entities 
will continue. The Mozilla Foundation has grown some and may grow some more, 
and we expect to continue working closely with a set of companies that are inter 
ested in developing and distributing Mozilla technology. The increasing acceptance 
of open source software by the commercial world opens up greater possibilities for 
collaboration. The emergence of web-based services provided through the browser 
also encourages business models for the service provider other than charging for each 
copy of software provided. This allows more entities to contribute to our project. 
Our focus on distributed development, technical excellence, and welcoming new 
participants will continue. The need for a vibrant, creative community of people 
focused on the Web will not change. 

I expect the Mozilla project will continue to be a trendsetter in a number of arenas: 
development of open source end-user products, combining volunteer and commer 
cial activity in an open source project, maintaining a critical mass of people as 
employees of the Mozilla Foundation, and funding that set of employees plus com 
munity marketing and adoption programs. We aren t the only ones doing these 
things, and we continue to learn and benefit enormously from the open source 
projects. We hope to contribute ever more in return. 



19 





b CHAPTER 2 

Chris DiBona 




Open Source and Proprietary 
Software Development 



In this chapter, I present a perspective on the similarities, differences, and interac 
tions between open source and proprietary software development. 

Proprietary Versus Open Source? 

Before you go any further, throw off any notion that the proprietary developer is some 
how a different person from the open source developer. It is uncommon for a member 
of the open source developer community to do only open source for a living. Only the 
most prominent, or loaded, members of the open source community come close to 
having this kind of freedom. It is indeed rare to find a developer who develops only 
with proprietary tools and libraries. Even Visual C++ and C# developers benefit from a 
great variety of code and libraries that are free for use in their programs. 1 

My career has focused on open source development for the last 10 years, and I m 
constantly pleasantly surprised by how open source development and proprietary 
resemble each other. I believe this is because proprietary developers are educated by 
the adventures of their slightly crazy open source cousins, but I also know that open 
source developers have learned just as much from proprietary developers. 



1 Traditionally, one difference between open source and proprietary development teams has been 
that open source teams are, in general, geographically quite dispersed. However, in this age of 
outsourced, offshored, and distributed development, even proprietary development has 
become highly dispersed geographically. 



Don t read this as an attempt to muddy the difference between proprietary and open 
source programs. They are different, sometimes very much so. However, they come 
from the same people, and they re using a lot of the same methods and tools. It is the 
licenses and the ideals behind open source programs that make them remarkable, 
different, and revolutionary. 

The Example Culture 

A lot of people, when talking about open source software development, say that open 
source developers enjoy a great productivity gain from code reuse. This is true, but 
in my experience all developers, not just open source developers, benefit from the 
existence of free-of-charge standard libraries and code snippets. For decades, propri 
etary developers have had a great variety of prepackaged libraries to choose from, but 
these proprietary libraries haven t taken root in the same way that freely usable, open 
libraries have. 2 

Code reuse? Knowledge reuse! 

In Linus Torvalds essay from the first Open Sources, he talked about how the rise of 
open code was delivering on the promise of reuse touted by proponents of the Java 
programming language specifically and object-oriented programming in general. 

That said, it has been my experience that there is a point at which software develop 
ers will go out of their way to avoid reusing code from other projects. In some shops, 
they call it "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome, and some companies are famous for 
it. But even those shops use standard kernels, libraries, and compilers. The real diffi 
culty here is in figuring out where the NIH line lies. Although the answer is different 
for every single programmer and team, all still can (and still do) learn from the open 
code out there, which is a unique advantage of open code. While both open and pro 
prietary code can be reused in a wide range of circumstances, open code enables 
something further: knowledge reuse. By examining the code itself, the developer can 
learn how a particular problem is solved, and often how that solution is an instance 
of a general solution type. It is this kind of reuse that Linus applauded and that the 
NIH developer misses. 

Then why not simply use other people s code? There are a number of factors to con 
sider before code is incorporated, and these must be understood before one can 
understand the role that Free Software has had in development. 



This will likely inspire many to cite their favorite commercial library. A full survey of libraries, 
both commercial and open source, would be required to validate this statement properly. This 
is an educated assumption on my part, as when commercial libraries manage to gain any son of 
prominence, open source developers tend to fill the gap, thus overshadowing the commercial 
project. 



22 * C Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 




Speed of development 

There are very real barriers to using other people s code. You have to examine how to 
interface with said code, and you need to review the code to make sure it meets your 
standards for security, license, style, and correctness. You also need to integrate it 
into your version control and build system. 

None of these problems is insurmountable, but they have to be worth surmounting. 
To wit: if all I need is a routine to do something simple, such as iterate through an 
array of numbers and perform some simple operation on them, using someone else s 
software would be a waste of time. 

When developing, I like to use large libraries only when I either don t want to deal 
with a technology, or I don t fully understand it and don t feel qualified to imple 
ment it. For a recent project, I was pulling newsfeeds from weblogs and performing a 
kind of natural English language processing on it. I thought that using a tool called a 
"stemmer" to normalize the data would make my later analysis more accurate. 

Implementing the routines to download and process feeds could have taken a month 
or two, and this is exactly the kind of development I don t like to do. To properly 
implement a stemmer, I d likely have to get my graduate degree and then write it 
which would impact my deadline a bit so I downloaded programmer-friendly 
libraries that did each of these tasks. The stemmer was available under the Berkeley 
Software License, and the feed parser was available under the Python Software 
License, both of which are very easy to deal with and do not require any onerous 
post-incorporation duties. I was thus able to save time and have better code. 

That said, some things I m very interested in developing myself. Since I was doing 
this project as an excuse to learn a natural-language processing algorithm, which was 
interesting to me, I wanted to write that part of the program myself. I was (and am) 
also fascinated with a problem I think I ll have in storing the results such that I can 
quickly retrieve them from a database. I haven t solved that problem as of this writ 
ing, but I don t necessarily want to use other people s code for that. I have read some 
code and examples in textbooks and online that will help me with the former, but 
the storage problem is mine, for now. 

This gives you an idea where the line was for me in this particular project, but oth 
ers have the same reticence for other, subtler reasons. 

A particularly difficult codebase 

What makes software difficult to add to your code? Sometimes the code is simply in 
the wrong language. Maybe you are using Perl and want to tie some code into a C or 
Python module. That s not always so easy. Maybe the code was really developed on 
only one platform say, an Intel machine and you want it to work on your iBook, 
which runs on a PowerPC processor. 



Proprietary Versus Open Source? X 23 



The problems with using other people s code can be legion. Maybe their routines 
were implemented assuming a machine with a lot of memory or processor cache, 
making it perform poorly or, worse, unpredictably, 3 on your target platform. Maybe 
the software was developed for an earlier version of your programming language, so 
a lot of features you would have implemented with a standard library call are instead 
implemented from scratch, thus reducing future maintainability. 

Problems arise with canned libraries as they get older. For instance, the aforemen 
tioned feed parser library is useful because its author, Mark Pilgrim, is very good at 
keeping it up to date with the 13 "standards" that lie behind that "xml" button on 
your favorite blog or web site. If the library were to fall into disuse, or Mark were to 
stop working on it and no one else picked up the work, I d likely change to a differ 
ent library or choose to maintain it myself. 

There is another reason to not use someone else s code, and it will look amazingly 
petty to all but the programmers reading this. 

Technically speaking, this: 

int myfunction(int a) 

{ 

printf("My Function %d\n",a); 

} 
is the same as this: 

int myfunction(int a) { 

printf("My Function %d\n",a); 

} 

which is the same as this: 

int myfunction(int a){ printf("My Function %d\n",a);} 
and this: 

int myfunction(int a){ 

printf("My Function %d\n",a); 
} 

They compile to the same result on any given compiler. 

I could go on, but I won t. The point is that, depending on the programmer or dic 
tated company style, each of these is wrong, evil, bad, or awful, or perhaps one is 
acceptable. Not all programmers and companies care about style, but many (one 
might argue the smartest) do. The ones that do care actively dislike the ones that 
don t and do not want to use their code. Should they have to touch the offending 



3 This might seem strange, but programmers are OK with the odd performance hit sometimes. 
Unpredictable results lead to crashed programs, however. This is not good, no matter what 
you ve been told. 

24 * * Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



library, they will inevitably have to make it "readable." Whether you call this refac- 
toring or prettifying or whatever, it can drive a programmer away from a hunk of 
code, unless it really brings something fantastic along with it. 

"My Goodness," you might consider asking, "are programmers delicate, petty crea 
tures?" No, there are some very good reasons to have consistent code style. It aids in 
debugging. Some say it reduces bugs (I d agree). It makes code navigation much faster 
and makes it easier for people to write tools to generate and manipulate code than they 
might otherwise. There are other reasons too, but I don t want to get too arcane. Some 
languages, such as Python, have very rigid appearance rules, as appearance can dictate 
how a variable can be used. Style may appear to be a trivial concern, but it isn t. 

Comfort 

Maybe you just want to do it yourself. Businesspeople in the industry who have grown 
up around open source often comment that duplication of effort, or "reinventing the 
wheel," is not time well spent. I rarely hear this from programmers. When people hear 
about KDE and GNOME, or Linux and BSD, or even more esoteric arguments about 
which window manager to use, inevitably someone will chime in, "Obviously, they had 
a lot of time on their hands. Otherwise, why would they have started from scratch?" 

The implication is that the programmers have somehow wasted time. When I choose 
to reimplement some technology or program, I know what I m doing, and even if it 
is a "waste" of time or duplication of effort, I think of it as practice. And when I can 
enjoy the luxury of implementing from scratch, I really like the results, because 
they re all mine and what I ve developed works exactly the way I want it to. 

But Why So Many of the Same Things? 

Business, of course, is interested in productive developers, and productive developers 
don t rewrite things, right? No, not necessarily. People rewrite code all the time. The 
more-informed companies recognize that this type of thing is often inevitable, and the 
best and most resourceful encourage this kind of mental knife sharpening, because it 
leads to better developers and better code. Given the time, programmers often prefer to 
leam from other people s code without actually using the code, and if open source ends 
up as one big repository of example code, I call that a success. 

Also, computers change. Computers, languages, compilers, and operating systems 
change so quickly that a periodic rewrite of some code becomes vital, from a perfor 
mance perspective. To take advantage of the newest processors, architectures, and 
other advancements, a recompile will certainly be required and will likely expose 
issues with your code (architecture changes lead to this directly). 4 



For example, you write a program on your handy laptop, you compile it, and it runs great. Later, 
you run it on your fabulous dual Opteron server. It crashes because you assumed an integer was 32 
bits and the Opteron (running a 64-bit OS like Linux, of course) has 64-bit integers. This is a basic 
error that comes up in a lot of different ways during 32-64 bit transitions. 



25 



But people are using libraries, code, and examples from open source code, copying 
them into their codebases rapidly. Certainly this happens. Don t let my counter cases 
fool you. It is a rare codebase that doesn t involve some open source software, 
whether it is merely in the form of a standard library or a widget library, or is full of 
the stuff. This is by design; if every program had to write every instruction down to 
the operating system, or the machine itself, there would be no programs. The itera 
tive building process, programs on top of libraries on top of the operating system, is 
so productive that I can t imagine someone ignoring it. Even for the smallest embed 
ded systems, designers are using the GNU compilers to create great programs for 
their devices: compile, flash, and go. 

Libraries, System Calls, and Widgets 

Here we begin to see how open source ideals have changed proprietary development. 
When proprietary software developers create a program, they may use free software, 
created or derived libraries, widget libraries, and tools. This includes developers target 
ing proprietary operating systems such as Windows and OS X. Developers creating 
software, whether for OS X, Unix/Linux, or Windows, commonly use free tools to do 
so. They almost always use free libraries in the creation of their programs and often use 
free user interface elements during the creation of their systems. 

Some might think I m indulging in some mission creep for free software here, 
assigning a larger role to it than it maybe should enjoy. I m not. I ll take it even fur 
ther: if there hadn t been free tools like the GNU compiler collection, the industry 
would have been forced to create and release them. Otherwise, the computer 
industry as we know it would not exist and would certainly not be as large as it is 
right now. This is not to imply that companies somehow owe something to the free 
software community. However, companies do help out when they can reap a long- 
term benefit. IBM understands this, as do Novell, Google (my employer), and 
many others. Even Microsoft uses and releases code under a variety of licenses, 
including the GPL (its Unix services for Windows) and BSD (Wix), but Microsoft is 
conflicted both internally and externally, so it s not as easy for it to embrace open 
source. 

Am I saying that without free tools, the compiler would try to charge a per-pro- 
gram fee? No, I think that if free tools hadn t arrived and commoditized the com 
piler, other competitive concerns would have kept the price of software develop 
ment tools accessible and cheap. That said, I think free tools played a big part. Free 
and open source software changed expectations. Microsoft and Intel make no 
attempts to prevent developers from using their compilers to create free software or 
software that is counter to their corporate goals. Client licenses, a common fixture 
in the email/workflow market, are unheard of for mainstream development tools. 



2B X Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



If there is one thing about free software that is downright scary to proprietary devel 
opment shops, it may be this: software that is licensed per client almost always 
comes under attack from free software. This is forcing in the software industry a shift 
away from such per-client licenses in all but the most specialized verticals for 
instance, the software that runs an MR1 machine, or air traffic control software, both 
of which are so specialized as to not count, because every client is custom. The grand 
irony here is that in some industries, such a high cost is attached to developing soft 
ware that some are forming very open source-looking consortiums to solve common 
software development problems. 

Distributed Development 

Distributed development is more than just a fad or even a trend. Organizations and 
companies large and small are using diverse, globally distributed teams to develop 
their software. The free software development movement showed the world how to 
develop internationally. Well before SourceForge.net became a site that every pro 
grammer had heard of, projects working together over the Internet or far-flung con 
nected corporate networks developed much of the software that we use today. 

In fact, the tools they developed to do that are now considered the baseline standard for 
developerd everywhere. What company in its right mind doesn t mandate that its pro 
grammers use some form of version control and bug tracking? I ask this rhetorically, 
but for a long time in the software business, you couldn t make this assumption. Small 
development shops would back up their data, for sure, but that s not version control. 

Distributed development is about more than just version control. It s also about com 
munications and bug tracking and distribution of the end result of software. 

Understanding Version Control 

Programming is an inherently incremental process. Code, then build, then test. 
Repeat. Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate. 5 Each step requires the developer to save 
the program and run it through a compiler or interpreter. After enough of these 
cycles, the program can do a new thing or an old thing better, and the developer 
checks the code into a repository, preferably not on his machine. Then the reposi 
tory can be backed up or saved on a hierarchical storage system. Then, should a 
developer s workstation crash, the worst case is that the only work lost is that done 
since the last check-in. 



This sentence is famous for being printed on punch cards, an early way of providing computers 
with data. If they were folded, spindled, or mutilated, they jammed the readers which makes 
one speculate what the punch card programmer used for version control. The answer is right 
there in front of you: as the cards went through revisions, they swapped out cards and retained 
the old, original cards. 



Distributed Development * 27 



What is actually stored from check-in to check-in is the difference from one version to 
the next. Consider a 100-line program, in which three lines in a program read: 

for (i=i; i < l; i++) { 

printf("Hello WorldVn"); 
} 

and one link needs to be changed to: 

for (i=l; i < 100; i++) { 

printf( "Hello to a vast collection of worlds !\n"); 
} 

which would then be checked back in. The system would note that only one line had 
changed and store only the difference between the two files. This way, we avoid 
wasting storage on what is mostly the same data. 

The value of having these iterations can t be overstated. Having a previously known, 
working (or even broken) copy can help in the event of an editing problem, or when 
you re trying to track down a bug that simply wasn t there a revision ago. In desper 
ate cases, you can revert to a previous version and start from there. This is like the 
undo option in your favorite word processor, but one that persists from day to day. 

Version control isn t used just in development. I know of IT shops and people who 
keep entire configuration directories (/etc) in version control to protect against editing 
typos and to help with the rapid setup of new systems. Some people like to keep their 
home directory in a version control system for the ultimate in document protection. 
There is even a wiki project that sits on top of the Subversion version control system. 

Additionally, good version control systems allow for branching say, for a develop 
ment and a release branch. The most popular version control system that many open 
source projects use is CVS. 

CVS 

CVS, the concurrent versioning system, allows developers all over the world to work 
on a local copy of a codebase, going through the familiar "code, build, test" cycles, 
and check in the differences. CVS is the old standby of version control, much in the 
same way RCS/SCCS was before it. There are clients for every development environ 
ment and it is a rare professional developer who hasn t been exposed to it. 

Since it is easy to use and install and it enjoys wide vendor support, CVS continues 
to be used all over the world and is the dominant version control platform. 

Subversion 

Only the rise of Subversion has brought real competition to the free version control 
space. With a much more advanced data store than CVS and with clients available for 
all platforms, Subversion (SVN) is also very good at dealing with binary data and 



28 X Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



branching. Both are things that CVS isn t very good at. SVN is also very efficient to use 
remotely, and CVS is not; CVS was designed for local users and remote use was tacked 
on later. Additionally, SVN supports a variety of access control methods, supporting 
any authentication scheme that Apache does (Subversion is an Apache project), which 
includes LDAP, SMB, or any the developers wish to roll for themselves. 

What About SourceSafe? 

SourceSafe isn t really version control. Local version control, whether CVS or Source 
Safe, is just backup, requiring a level of hardware reliability that simply doesn t exist 
on a desktop. Since SourceSafe is not designed to be used remotely, you take the life 
of your codebase in your hands when you use it. There are some SourceSafe remot- 
ing programs out there if you must use SourceSafe, but I can t recommend them so 
long as decent, free SVN and CVS plug-ins exist for Visual Studio. 

The Special Case of BitKeeper 

BitKeeper, which was written by Larry McVoy, was chosen by Linus Torvalds to use 
for version control for the Linux kernel. For the Linux kernel, BitKeeper was a very 
good choice, given the kinds of problems that arise with Linux kernel development. 
Written for distributed development, BitKeeper is very good at managing multiple 
repositories and multiple incoming patch streams. 

Why is this important? With most version control systems, all your repositories are 
slaves of one master and resolving differences between different slaves and masters 
can be very difficult. 

The only "problem" with the kernel team s use of BitKeeper was that BitKeeper was 
not a free software program, although it was available for the use of free software 
developers at no charge. I say was because Larry McVoy recently decided to pull the 
free version, thus making it impossible for Linux kernel developers to work on the 
program without paying a large fee. 6 

A great number of developers lamented the use of a proprietary tool for free software 
development, and the movement off BitKeeper, while disruptive, is a welcome change. 

BitKeeper is a tool designed with the open source software model in mind. It has 
found success among large proprietary development houses specifically because the 
problems that faced the kernel team in 2001 are the same ones that increasingly face 
proprietary development shops. All of these teams, not just those working on open 
source development projects, now face multiple, far-flung teams that are engaged in 
collaborative development and struggle to do it effectively. 



6 The kernel team is in the process of moving off of BitKeeper as of this writing. 



Distributed Development *C 23 



Collaborative Development 

You have a developer in Tokyo, a team in Bangalore, a team in Zurich, and a shop in 
Seattle, all working on the same codebase. How can you possibly keep the develop 
ment train from coming off the rails? Communication! 

IRC/IM/Email 

One might imagine that only now, with the advent of IM and VoIP, can developers 
keep up with each other. In fact, developers have stayed in touch in something 
approximating real time since the early days of Unix, when they began to have a 
great variety of communications tools to use. 7 Early on, two developers on the same 
machine used the Write or Talk Unix programs, which allowed for a simple 
exchange of text between users. This grew into Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and then 
Instant Messenger (IM). 

Email itself plays the most important role in development. It is the base packet of 
persistent knowledge that distributed developer teams have. Wikis are also taking 
hold as repositories of information. 

VoIP 

Strangely (to nondevelopers) voice simply hasn t caught on as a terrific tool for ongoing 
developer communications. While a regular conference call is useful for keeping every 
one moving in the same direction, the idea of vocal input while developing would drive 
many coders away screaming. The phone isn t evil, but maintaining an uninterruptible 
flow can be very important to developer productivity. Phones also do not create a logfile 
or other transcript that can be referred to later. Don t take my experiences for gospel 
here. Read the book Peopleware 8 for more information about this. Everywhere I ve ever 
worked, the one constant has been developers wearing headphones, but listening to 
music, not other developers yammering in their ears. 

SourceForge 

The online site SourceForge.net is the largest concentration of open source projects 
and code on the planet. SourceForge boasts some 100,000 projects and 1 million 
registered developers, and people use its integrated version control, project web 
hosting, file release mechanism, bug control, and mailing lists to write a vast amount 
of software. Pulling together these features on a free platform for open source devel 
opers proved to be a revolutionary concept. Before, people were left implementing 
this themselves with Bugzilla (a bug-tracking mechanism) and CVS or some other 
version control/bug-tracking facilities. 



7 In fact, the Unix "write" command allowed hackers in the 1970s to communicate in a fashion 
not so different from IM. 

8 Tom Demarco and Timothy Lister, Peopleware (New York, NY: Dorset House Publishing 
Company, 1999). 



30 * * Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



SourceForge represents, for a lot of people, the next stage in developer environ 
ments. VA Software, the company that runs SourceForge through its Open Source 
Technology Group (OSTG) subsidiary, sells this sort of solution into the enterprise, 
as does the Brisbane, California-based Collab.net. 

Software Distribution 

While free software developers know how to code, what about getting the code in 
front of the user? In the early days of the Free Software Foundation (FSF), the answer 
was to send out tapes and disks to users who wanted the tools, for a reasonable fee. 
Now that so many people have connections to the Internet, boxed software is begin 
ning to show its age, but software producers are really just now learning from open 
source how to distribute software in this way. 

Dependencies 

When you compile a piece of software, you sometimes end up relying on libraries that 
you must call from your program to do some task. If you try to run the program with 
out the expected complement of libraries, it cannot run or it may run poorly. Open 
source developers have created some very smart packaging and installation systems and 
filesystem methods that can make this a more tractable problem. Once they created 
these packaging systems and combined them with the Internet, they got online updat 
ing. The irony is that, in a lot of ways, Linux and Unix were schooled in this by Win 
dows. A common complaint regarding Linux when comparing it to Windows and OS X 
is that software can be very difficult to install. One could argue that Windows isn t all 
that easy to install either, but since Windows is preinstalled on most computers, this is 
an argument that often falls on deaf ears. 

I don t think Linux developers have learned to do installation well yet. There are some 
standouts, but for the most part, installation ease is still a work in progress. One thing 
free and proprietary share is the appreciation for and development of online updating 
systems. This is something Linux distributions get very right. In short, once Linux is 
installed on your machine, it can be very easy to keep it up to date. 

Online Updating/Installation 

Online updating is a terrific way of getting software onto your machines. More 
importantly, it is a terrific way to maintain a secure system over time. Since Linux 
distributions don t have to worry about software license ownership, it is very easy for 
the software to determine whether to download a patch or fix, and thus many Linux 
distributions have systems to facilitate this. Proprietary software development houses 
such as Microsoft are still trying to figure this out. It is a hard problem when you mix 
it with licensing concerns. Additionally, when it s done wrong, you can literally crash 
thousands, or in the case of Microsoft and Apple, millions of machines, so it is really 
critical to do well. That the Debian and Fedora Core Linux distributions do this at all 
is quite a feat. 

Software Distribution X 31 



Want a sticky issue? Do you trust your software vendor to allow it to automatically 
update your software? For some, this question is heard in these ways: 

Do you trust Microsoft to update your operating system? 

Do you trust a bunch of bearded Unix programmers to update your system? 

How you react to these questions has a lot to do with the realities of how difficult the 
problem is, how successful previous auto-updates have been in the past, and how 
trusting you are which brings up the subject of the next section. 

How Proprietary Software Development Has Changed Open Source 

Open source isn t magic, and developers aren t magicians. No developer is immune 
to security problems and bugs creeping into his code. 

Bugs/Security 

Free, open, proprietary, closed. . ..Bugs happen. I think open source means fewer bugs, 
and people have written tens of thousands of words explaining how they agree or dis 
agree with me. One thing I know I m right about is that both kinds of code have bugs. 
Bugs persist longer in closed codebases, and their closed nature keeps bugs persistent. 

If I may paraphrase Socrates, "An unexamined codebase is dead," and by dead I mean 
killed by the hostile environment that is viruses, worms, crackers, and Trojans. Like 
bugs, security flaws happen in both free and closed software. As a project matures, it 
must assemble a mantle of testing and quality assurance (QA) techniques that are 
vital to its ongoing health. I think open source development has learned much from 
the processes that proprietary software development houses have come up with to 
support their paying customers. 

Testing and QA 

As projects mature, so do the testing suites around them. This is a truism for free and 
for closed software codebases, but the research around this originated in commercial 
software/hardware and in academia, and open source software has been a ready con 
sumer of this information. The most popular talk I attended lately was in unit testing 
for Python at the O Reilly Open Source Conference. The room was packed, with peo 
ple sitting in the aisles. Testing is huge and is required for any project, free or not. 

Project Scaling 

Scaling is hard. Whether we re talking about development group size, bandwidth, 
space, or whatever, scaling any programming project is nontrivial. 

Software development has its limits. Product teams can t grow too fast or too large 
without one of two things happening either disintermediating technology or 
project ossification. Fred Brooks s seminal book, The Mythical Man-Month, covered 



32 * * Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



this in depth, and the existence of F/OSS development methodologies doesn t change 
that. In fact, the tools and changes free software has brought to prominence are all 
around disintermediation and disconnected collaboration. 

F/OSS isn t magic. It isn t breaking the speed of light. Most projects, with some nota 
ble exceptions, are composed of small teams, with one to three people doing the vast 
majority of the coding. If you care about project size, you would be well served by 
reading the findings of the Boston Consulting Group s study of open source software 
developers on SourceForge. This revealing study analyzes project metrics and moti 
vations. For one thing, you see that projects almost always comprise fewer than five 
active developers. Many projects have only one developer. 

So, what am I talking about when I say disintermediating technology? Look at it this 
way. Imagine that one person decides to create a cake from scratch. He d have to 
start with a cake mix and some milk and an egg, right? No! He d need chocolate, 
milk, flour, yeast, water, and the other ingredients, right? No! Just for the milk, he d 
need a cow, some food and water for the cow, a bench, a milk bottle, a chiller, a pas 
teurizer, a cap and a rag, some bag balm, and so on, right? Well, you re getting 
closer. The point is that we accept interfaces all the time, and the successful project 
finds these interfaces, formalizes them, and spreads the work out along these lines. 

We accept power at 120 volts at 60 hertz alternating current. We don t generate the 
power ourselves. We accept that we don t need to dig for oil, refine it, and pour the 
refined gas into our cars. We use interfaces with different systems all the time. Programs, 
too, have interfaces, and the success of a program is in how it manages these interfaces. 

Proprietary or not, a successful program is one that interfaces effectively between sys 
tems and teams working on these systems. Microsoft doesn t have 5,000 engineers 
working on Windows. It has them working on the kernel, the printing subsystem, 
the windowing system, the voice synthesis module, and other components. More 
importantly, it has groups that work on interfacing between the systems so that they 
(theoretically) work as a whole. Likewise for the Linux kernel; Linus interacts with a 
number of captains who control different subsystems, including networking, disk 
drives, memory, CPU support, and so on. Fractionation, when possible, is key, and 
when not possible, disastrous which is why groups working to integrate the whole 
and making sure the interfaces are appropriate can make all the difference in the suc 
cess or failure of a project. 

This interface management is something that free software has done very well. Many 
commercial developers would be well served to learn from open source s interface 
management practices. 



How Proprietary Software Development Has Changed Open Source 2 C 33 



Control 

Control is something customers and end users have never had over their code. You 
don t buy proprietary software, you rent it, and that rental can be rescinded at any time. 
If you read the end-user license agreements (EULAs) that accompany proprietary soft 
ware, you may be left with the feeling that you are not trusted and not liked all that 
much. For instance, in Microsoft Word s EULA, there is this charming note: 

You may not copy or post any templates available through Internet-based services 
on any network computer or broadcast it in any media. 

So, if you were to take a standard Microsoft Word template (which all templates are 
derived from) and make one that is suited to your business as, say, a publisher, you 
would be in violation of your EULA with Microsoft, and thus vulnerable to its lawfirm. 

Controlling your software destiny is something I consider extremely important. Take, 
for instance, my employer, Google. We are able to fix and change the Linux kernel to 
fit our very specific needs. Do we have to check with Linus or one of his lieutenants 
before, during, or after we change the network stack? No. If we were running NT on 
our machines, we would be unable to get such changes made, and were we to enter 
into a deal where Microsoft would incorporate our requested changes, we would in 
effect be informing a competitor of our development strategy. 

Another example is a recent service pack from Microsoft, which featured a firewall and 
antivirus package. This package, which is turned on by default after service pack installa 
tion, was aimed at stopping the viruses and Trojans endemic to the Windows experi 
ence. Funnily enough, it considered iTunes a virus and presented a fairly confusing mes 
sage asking the user to authorize the program s use of the network. 9 That Microsoft s own 
media player, which has common network access methods, wasn t impeded is telling. 

Your computer is not your own; you only borrow that which makes it useful, and 
when that is taken away, you are left with nothing but a toxic pile of heavy metals 
and aluminum. 

I think this is a subtle but important part of open source s popularity. Many people 
and companies are interested in controlling their own destiny, and Linux and other 
open source programs make this possible. 

Intellectual Property 

Free-software developers believe in intellectual property, probably more so than peo 
ple who never consider open source software. Developers creating open source have 
to believe, as the entire structure of the GPL, BSD, MPL, and other licenses depends 
on the existence of copyright to enforce the clever requirements of those licenses. 



iTunes has a nifty sharing mechanism whereby users stream music to other iTunes users over 
the network. It s pretty neat. 



34 * * Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 



When you hear people criticizing free-software developers as guiltless communists or 
pie-in-the-sky dreamers, it is worth remembering that without copyright, there can t 
be free software. 

Discussions concerning intellectual property and free software usually revolve 
around two issues: patents and trademark. Software can be patented, and things can 
be trademarked. Exactly how these intersect with free software is complex. Can a 
piece of software which is patented be released under the GPL and still hold to the 
letter of the license? Can a program name be trademarked and then released under 
the BSD and still be a meaningful release? Legal opinion and precedence thus far pro 
vide no definite answer. 

Open source developers are learning, though, paying attention to the current events 
around intellectual property and how it affects them. 

The reality of intellectual property is something modern developers are almost 
required to learn. Learning the laws concerning software is the way to protect them 
selves from those who might send the feds out to arrest them when they come to the 
United States. I know that sounds like I m typing this with tinfoil on my head, but I 
am not kidding. 10 

The problem with this learning process is that it does take time away from coding, 
which is not good and is a net loss for free software which may indeed have been 
the whole point. 

Some Final Words 

While open source software is about freedom and licenses, it is nonetheless true that 
open source costs less, under many circumstances, than proprietary software. This is 
an important aspect of free software. Additionally, it has to be cost competitive 
against other free products, just as software that costs money must compete against 
an open source/free offering. 



10 I wish I were, but I m not. It happened to Russian developer Dmitry Sklyarov, who intended to 
discuss his reverse engineering of the Adobe PDF file format at the DefCon developers 
conference in Las Vegas. Upon landing at McCarran International Airport, he was met by the 
FBI, which placed him under arrest under the auspices of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 
on behalf of Adobe Corporation. As a result, Linux kernel developers no longer have a 
substantial meeting in the United States, choosing instead to meet in Canada and Australia, two 
countries that do not have similar laws and rarely extradite for intellectual property-related 
crimes of this nature. Developers felt this was necessary because the Linux kernel uses code that 
was reverse engineered. Reverse engineering, by the way, is what made Dell, Phoenix, AMI, 
AMD, EMC, and a large number of other companies both possible and profitable. 



Some Final Words ** 35 



Free Things Are Still Cheaper Than Expensive Things 

When I say "competes against other free products," I m talking about pirated copies 
of Windows, Office, SQL Server, Oracle, and many others competing against Linux, 
OpenOffice, MySQL, Postgres, and other best-of-breed free software applications. 
These applications are doing very well in environments that have little regard, legally 
or culturally, for software licenses. 

Free things have a velocity all their own, and people forget that. I ll leave you with a 
little anecdote from when I was working for a large law firm in Washington, DC. I 
was still in college studying computer science, and I ran the law firm s email net 
work during the day. This was 1996 or so, and TCP/IP was clearly the big winner in 
the network format wars versus NetBIOS and SNA, to a degree that no one could 
have appreciated. I was in the elevator with one of the intellectual property attorneys 
at the firm a fairly technical guy when he said something like: "You know, if TCP/ 
IP had been properly protected and patented, we could have rigged it so that every 
packet cost money; they really missed the boat on that one." 

Where would the Internet be if this was true? I don t know, but I do know one thing: 
the Internet would not be running TCP/IP. So, enjoy the freedom of open source 
software. It is there for you! 



36 X Open Source and Proprietary Software Development 





t ^4 CHAPTER 3 
Jeremy Allison 



A Tale of Two Standards 



It was the best of protocols, it was the worst of protocols, it was the age of 
monopoly, it was the age of Free Software, it was the epoch of openness, it was 
the epoch of proprietary lock-in, it was the season of GNU, it was the season of 
Microsoft, it was the spring of Linux, it was the winter of Windows.... 

Samba is commonly used as the "glue" between the separate worlds of Unix and 
Windows, and because of that, Samba developers have to intimately understand the 
design and implementation decisions made in both systems. It is no surprise that 
Samba is considered one of the most difficult Free Software projects to understand 
and to join, outclassed in complexity only by the voodoo black art of Linux kernel 
development. Samba really isn t that hard, however, once you look at the different 
standards implemented in the two systems (although some of the decisions in Win 
dows can cause raised eyebrows). 

In developing Samba, we re creating a bridge between the most popular standards 
currently deployed in the computing world: the Unix/Linux standard of POSIX and 
the Microsoft-developed de facto standard of Win32. In this chapter, I will examine 
these two standards from an application programmer s perspective. In doing so, I 
thought it might be instructive to look at the reasons why each of them exists, what 
the intention for creating the particular standard might have been, and how well they 
have stood the test of time and the needs of programmers. A historical perspective is 
very important, as we look to the future and decide what standards we should 



encourage governments and businesses to support, and what effect this will have on 
the software landscape in the early 21st century. 

Standard: (noun) A flag, banner, or ensign, especially. An emblem or flag of an 
army, raised on a pole to indicate the rallying point in battle. 1 

The POSIX Standard 

POSIX was named (like many things in the Unix software world) by Richard Stallman. It 
stands for Portable Operating System Interface-X, meaning a portable definition of a 
Unix-like operating system API. The reason for the existence of the POSIX standard is 
interesting and lies in the history of the Unix family of operating systems. 

As is commonly known, Unix was created in 1969 at AT&T Bell Labs by Ken 
Thompson and Dennis Richie. Not originally designed for commercialization, the 
source code was shipped to universities around the world, most notably Berkeley in 
California. One of the world s first truly portable operating systems, Unix soon splin 
tered into many different versions as people modified the source code to meet their 
own requirements. Once companies like Sun Microsystems and the original, preliti- 
gious SCO (Santa Cruz Organization) began to commercialize Unix, the original 
Unix system call API remained the core of the Unix system, but each company added 
proprietary extensions to differentiate their own version of Unix. Thus began the first 
of the "Unix wars" (I m a veteran, but I don t get disability benefits for the scars they 
caused). For independent software vendors (ISVs), such proprietary variants were a 
nightmare. You couldn t assume that code that ran correctly on one Unix would even 
compile on another. 

During the late 1980s, in an attempt to create a common API for all Unix systems, 
and fix this problem, the POSIX set of standards was born. Because no one trusted 
any of the Unix vendors, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
shepherded the standards process and created the 1003 series of standards, known 
as POSIX. The POSIX standards cover much more than the operating system APIs, 
going into detail on system commands, shell scripting, and many other parts of what 
it means to be a Unix system. I m only going to discuss the programming API stan 
dard part of POSIX here because, as a programmer, that s really the only part of it I 
care about on a day-to-day basis. 

Few people have actually seen an official POSIX standard document, as the IEEE 
charges money for copies. Back before the Web became really popular, I bought one 
just to take a look at the real thing. It wasn t cheap (a few hundred dollars, as I 
recall). Amusingly enough, I don t think Linus Torvalds ever read or referred to it 
when he was creating Linux; he used other vendors references to it and manpage 
descriptions of what POSIX calls were supposed to do. 



1 http://www.dictionary.com. 



Reading the POSIX standard document, however, is very interesting. It reads like a 
legal document; every line of every section is numbered so that it can be referred to 
in other parts of the text. It s detailed. Really detailed. The reason for such detail is 
that it was designed to be a complete specification of how a Unix system has to 
behave when called from an application program. The secret is that it was meant to 
allow someone reading the specification to completely reimplement their own ver 
sion of a Unix operating system starting from scratch, with nothing more than the 
POSIX spec. The goal is that if someone writes an application that conforms to the 
POSIX specification, the resulting application can be compiled with no changes on 
any system that is POSIX compliant. There is even a POSIX conformance suite, 
which allows a system passing the tests to be officially branded a POSIX-compliant 
system. This was created to reduce costs in government and business procurement 
procedures. The idea was that you specified "POSIX compliant" in your software pur 
chasing requests, the cheapest system that had the branding could be selected, and it 
would satisfy the system requirement. 

This ended up being less useful than it sounds, given that Microsoft Windows NT 
has been branded POSIX compliant and generic Linux has not. 

Sounds wonderful, right? Unfortunately, reality intruded its ugly head somewhere 
along the way. Vendors didn t want to give up their proprietary advantages, so each 
pushed to get its particular implementation of a feature into POSIX. As all vendors 
don t have implementations of all parts of the standard, this means that many of the 
features in POSIX are optional usually just the one you need for your application. 
How can you tell if an implementation of POSIX has the feature you need? If you re 
lucky, you can test for it at compile time. 

The GNU project suffered from these "optional features" more than most proprietary 
software vendors because the GNU software is intended to be portable across as many 
systems as possible. To make their software portable across all the weird and wonder 
ful POSIX variants, the wonderful suite of programs known as GNU autoconf was cre 
ated. The GNU autoconf system allows you to test to see whether a feature exists or 
works correctly before you even compile the code, thus allowing an application pro 
grammer to degrade missing functionality gracefully (i.e., not fail at runtime). 

Unfortunately, not all features can be tested this way, as sometimes a standard can 
give too much flexibility, thus causing massive runtime headaches. One of the most 
instructive examples is in the pathconf ( ) call. The function prototype for 
pathconf ( ) looks like this : 

long pathconf (char *path, int name); 

Here, char *path is a pathname on the system and int name is a defined constant giv 
ing a configuration option you want to query. The constants causing problems are: 

_PC_NAME_MAX 
_PC_PATH_MAX 

The POSIX Standard X 39 



_PC_NAME_MAX queries for the maximum number of characters that can be used in a file 
name in a particular directory (specified by char *path) on the system. _PC_PATH_MAX 
queries for the maximum number of characters that can be used in a relative path from 
the particular directory. This seems fine until you consider how Unix filesystems are 
structured and put together. A typical Unix filesystem looks like Figure 3-1. 




/usr /home | 

r~ ~~i r~ ~n 

bin I Jeremy | chris 




Figure 3-1. Typical Unix filesystem 

Any of the directory nodes, such as /usr/bin or /mnt, could be a different filesystem 
type, not the standard Unix filesystem (maybe even network mounted). In Figure 3-1, 
the /mnt/msdos_dir path has been mounted from a partition containing an old MS- 
DOS-style FAT filesystem type. The maximum directory entry length on such a system 
is the old DOS 8.3 maximum of 1 1 characters. But below the Windows directory could 
be mounted a different filesystem type with different maximum name restrictions 
maybe an NFS mount from a different machine, for example, on the path /mnt/msdos_ 
dir/nfs_dir. Now the pathconf ( ) can accommodate these restrictions and tell your 
application about it if you remember to call it on every single possible path and path 
component your application might use! Hands up, all application programmers who actu 
ally do this.... Yes, I thought so. (You at the back, put your hand down. I know how 
you do things in the U.S. Star Wars missile defense program, but no one programs in 
ADA anymore, plus your tests never work, OK?) This is an example of something that 
looks good on paper but in practical terms almost no one would use in an actual appli 
cation. I know we don t in Samba, not even in the "rewritten from scratch with correct 
ness in mind" Samba4 implementation. 

Now let s look at an example of where POSIX gets it spectacularly wrong, and why 
this happens. 

First Implementation Past the Post 

Any application program dealing with multiple access to files has to deal with file 
locking. File locking has several potential strategies, ranging from the "lock this file 
for my exclusive use" method, to the "lock these 4 bytes at offset 23 as I m going to 
be reading from them soon" level of granularity. POSIX implements this kind of 



functionality via the fcntl( ) call, a sort of jack-of-all-trades for manipulating files 
(hence "fcntl - file control"). It s not important to know exactly how to program 
this call. Suffice it to say that a code fragment to set up such a byte range lock looks 
something like this: 

int fd = open("/path/to/file", 0_RDWR); 
Now, set up the struct flock structure to describe the kind of byte range lock we need: 

int ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &flock_struct); 

If ret is zero, we got the lock. Looks simple, right? The byte range lock we got on the 
region of the file is advisory. This means that other processes can ignore it and are 
not restricted in terms of reading or writing the byte range covered by the region 
(that s a difference from the Win32 way of doing things, in which locks are manda 
tory; if a lock is in place on a region, no other process can write to that region, even 
if it doesn t test for locks). An existing lock can be detected by another process doing 
its own fcntl ( ) call, asking to lock its own region of interest. Another useful feature 
is that once the file descriptor open on the file (int fd in the previous example) is 
closed, the lock is silently removed. This is perfectly acceptable and a rational way of 
specifying a file locking primitive; just what you d want. 

However, modern Unix processes are not single threaded. They commonly consist of 
a collection of separate threads of execution, separately scheduled by the kernel. 
Because the lock primitive has a per-process scope, this means that if separate 
threads in the same process ask for a lock over the same area, it won t conflict. In 
addition, because the number of lock requests by a single process over the same 
region is not recorded (according to the spec), you can lock the region 10 times, but 
you need to unlock it only once. This is sometimes what you want, but not always: 
consider a library routine that needs to access a region of a file but doesn t know if 
the calling processes have the file open. Even if an open file descriptor is passed into 
the library, the library code can t take any locks. It can never know if it is safe to 
unlock again without race conditions. 

This is an example of a POSIX interface not being future proofed against modern 
techniques such as threading. A simple amendment to the original primitive allow 
ing a user-defined "locking context" (like a process ID) to be entered in the struct 
flock structure used to define the lock would have fixed this problem, along with 
extra flags allowing the number of locks per context to be recorded if needed. 

But it gets worse. Consider the following code: 

int second_fd; 

int ret; 

struct flock lock; 

int fd = open( "/path/to/file", 0_RDWR); 



First Implementation Past the Post X 41 



/* Set up the "struct flock" structure to describe the 
kind of byte range lock we need. */ 

lock.ljtype = F_WRLCK; 
lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET; 
lock.l_start = 0; 
lock.l_len = 4; 
lock.l_pid = getpid( ); 

ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETLKw, &lock); 

/* Assume we got the lock above (ie. ret == o). */ 

/* Get a second file descriptor open on 
the original file. Assume this succeeds. */ 

second_fd = dup(fd); 

/* Now immediately close it again. */ 

ret = close(second_fd); 

What do you think the effect of this code on the lock created on the first file descrip 
tor should be (so long as the close ( ) call returns zero)? If you think it should be 
silently removed when the second file descriptor is closed, congratulations you 
have the same warped mind as the people who implemented the POSIX spec. Yes, 
that s correct. Any successful close ( ) call on any file descriptor referencing a file 
with locks will drop all the locks on that file, even if they were obtained on another, 
still-open file descriptor. 

Let me be clear: this behavior is never what you want. Even experienced programmers 
are surprised by this behavior, because it makes no sense. After I ve described this to 
Linux kernel hackers their responsse have been that of stunned silence, followed by 
"but why would it do that"? 2 

The reason is historical and in my opinion, reflects a flaw in the POSIX standards pro 
cess, one that hopefully won t be repeated in the future. By talking to longtime BSD 
hacker and POSIX standards committee member, Kirk McKusick (he of the BSD dae 
mon artwork), I finally tracked down why this insane behavior was standardized by the 
POSIX committee. As he recalls, AT&T took the current behavior to the standards 
committee as a proposal for byte range locking, as this was how their current code 



To discover if this functionality was actually correctly used by any application program or if 
anything really depended on it, Andrew Tridgell, the original author of Samba, once hacked the 
kernel on his Linux laptop to write a kernel debug message if ever this condition occurred. After 
a week of continuous use, he found one message logged. When he investigated, it turned out to 
be a bug in the exportf s NFS file exporting command, whereby a library routine was opening 
and closing the /etc /exports file that had been opened and locked by the main exportf s 
code. Obviously, the authors didn t expect it to do that either. 



42 x> A Tale of Two Standards 



implementation worked. The committee asked other ISVs if this was how locking 
should be done. The ISVs who cared about byte range locking were the large (at the 
time) database vendors, such as Oracle, Sybase, and Informix. All these companies did 
byte range locking within their own applications, and none of them depended on, or 
needed, the underlying operating system to provide locking services for them. So their 
unanimous answer was "we don t care." In the absence of any strong negative feedback 
on a proposal, the committee added it "as is" and took as the desired behavior the spe 
cifics of the first implementation, the brain-dead one from AT&T. 

The "first implementation past the post" style of standardization has saddled POSIX 
systems with one of the most broken locking implementations in computing history. 
My hope is that eventually Linux will provide a sane superset of this functionality 
that can be adopted by other Unixes and eventually find its way back into POSIX. 

OK, having dumped on POSIX enough, let s look at one of the things that POSIX 
really got right and that is an example worth following in the future. 

Future Proofing 

One of the great successes of POSIX is the ease in which it has adapted to the change 
from 32-bit to 64-bit computing. Many POSIX applications were able to move to a 64- 
bit environment with very little or no change, and the reason for that is abstract types. 

In contrast to the Win32 API (which even has a bit-size dependency in its very 
name), all of the POSIX interfaces are defined in terms of abstract datatypes. A file 
size in POSIX isn t described as a "32-bit integer" or even as a C-language type of 
unsigned int, but as the type off_t. What is off_t? The answer depends completely 
on the system implementation. On small or older systems, it is usually defined as a 
signed 32-bit integer (it s used as a seek position so that it can have a negative value), 
and on newer systems (Linux, for example) it s defined as a signed 64-bit integer. As 
long as applications are careful to cast integer types only to the correct off_t type 
and use these for file-size manipulation, the same application will work on both 
small and large POSIX systems. 

This wasn t done all at once, because most commercial Unix vendors have to provide 
binary compatibility to older applications running on newer systems, so POSIX had to 
cope with both 32-bit file-sized applications running alongside newer 64-bit-capable 
applications on the new 64-bit systems. The way to make this work was determined by 
the Large File Support working group, which finished its work during the mid-1990s. 

The transition to 64 bits was seen as a three-stage process. Stage one was the original 
old 32-bit applications; stage two was seen as a transitional stage, where new ver 
sions of the POSIX interfaces were introduced to allow newer applications to explic 
itly select 64-bit sizes, and stage three was where all the original POSIX interfaces 
default to 64-bit clean. 



Future Proofing 2* 43 



As is usual in POSIX, the selection of what features to support was made available 
using compile-time macro definitions that could be selected by the application 
writer. The macros used were: 

_LARGEFILE_SOURCE 

_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE 

_FILE_OFFSET_BITS 

If _LARGEFILE_SOURCE is defined, a few extra functions are made available to applica 
tions to fix the problems in some older interfaces, but the default file access is still 32 
bit. This corresponds to stage one, described earlier. 

If _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE is defined, a whole new set of interfaces is available to POSIX 
applications that can be explicitly selected for 64-bit file access. These interfaces 
explicitly allow 64-bit file access and have 64 coded into their names. So, open( ) 
becomes open64( ), lseek( ) becomes Iseek64( ), and a new abstract datatype called 
of f 64_t is created and used instead of the of f _t file-size datatype in such structures 
as struct stat64. This corresponds to stage two. 

_FILE_OFFSET_BITS represents stage three; this macro can be undefined or set to the val 
ues 32 or 64. If undefined or set to 32, it corresponds to stage one (_LARGEFILE_SOURCE). 
If set to 64, all the original interfaces such as open( ) and lseek( ) are transparently 
mapped to the 64-bit clean interfaces. This is the end stage of porting to 64 bits, where 
the underlying system is inherently 64 bit, and nothing special needs to be done to make 
an application 64-bit aware. On a native 64-bit system that has no older 32-bit binary 
support, this becomes the default. 

As you can see, if a 32-bit POSIX application had no embedded dependencies on file 
size, simply adding the compile-time flag -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 would allow a 
transparent port to a 64-bit system. There are few such applications, though, and 
Samba was not one of them. We had to go through the stage-two pain of using 64-bit 
interfaces explicitly (which we did around 1998) before we could track down all the 
bugs associated with moving to 64 bits. But we didn t have to rewrite completely, 
and I consider that a success of the underlying standard. 

This is an example of how the POSIX standard was farsighted enough to define some 
interfaces that were so portable and clean that they could survive a transition of 
underlying native CPU word length. Few other standards can make that claim. 

Wither POSIX? 

The POSIX standard has not been static; it has managed to evolve (although some 
would argue too slowly) over time. A major step forward was the establishment of 
the Single Unix Specification (SUS), which is a superset of POSIX developed in 1998 
and adopted by all the major Unix vendors and shepherded by the Unix standards 
body, "the Open Group." It was a great leap forward when this specification was 

44 xC A Tale of Two Standards 



finally made available for free on the Web from the Open Group web site at http:// 
www.unix.org. It certainly saved me from having to hunt down cheap POSIX specifi 
cations in secondhand bookshops in Mountain View, California. 

The expanded SUS now covers such issues as real-time programming, concurrent pro 
gramming via the POSIX thread (pthread) interfaces, and internationalization and 
localization, but unfortunately it does not cover file Access Control Lists (ACLs). Sadly, 
that specification was never fully agreed on, and so has never made it into the official 
documents. Interestingly enough, the SUS also doesn t cover the GUI elements, 
because the history of Unix as primarily a server operating system has meant that GUIs 
have never been given the priority necessary for Unix to become a desktop system. 

Looking at what happened with ACLs is instructive when considering the future of 
POSIX and the SUS. Because ACLs were sorely needed in real-world environments, 
individual Unix vendors, such as SGI, Sun, HP, and IBM, added them to their own 
Unix variants. But without a true standards document, they fell into their old evil 
ways and added them with different specifications. Then along came Linux.... 

Linux changed everything. In many ways, the old joke is true: Linux is the Unix 
defragmentation tool. 3 As Linux became more popular, programs originally written 
for other Unixes were first ported to it, and then after a while were written for it and 
then ported to other platforms. This happened to Samba. Sun s SunOS on a SPARC 
system was, at first, our primary user platform, but after five years or so we rapidly 
migrated to Linux on Intel x86 systems. We now develop almost exclusively on 
Linux, and from there port to other Unix systems. 

This means the Linux interfaces are starting to take over as the most important stan 
dards for Unix-like systems to follow, in some ways supplanting POSIX and the SUS. 
The ACL implementation for Linux was added into the system, at first via a patch by 
Andreas Griinbacher, held externally to the main kernel tree. Finally it was adopted 
by the main Linux vendors, SuSE (now Novell) and Red Hat, and has become part of 
the official kernel. Other free Unix systems such as FreeBSD quickly followed with 
their own implementation of the last draft of the POSIX ACL specification, and now 
there are desktop GUI and other application programs that use the Linux ACL inter 
faces. As this code is ported to other systems, the pressure is on them to conform to 
the Linux APIs, not to any standards document. Sun has announced that its Solaris 
10 on Intel release will run Linux applications "better than Linux" and will be fully 
compatible at the system call level with Linux applications. This means Sun must 
have mapped the Linux ACL interface onto the Solaris one. Is that a good thing? 

In a world where Linux is rapidly becoming the dominant version of Unix, does 
POSIX still have relevance, or should we just assume Linux is the new POSIX? 



3 This was inspired by novice system administrators coming to Unix from the Windows platform 
for the first time and asking "where is the system defragmentation tool?", the concept of a 
filesystem designed well enough not to need one being outside their experience. 

Wither POSIX? JJ 45 



The Win32 (Windows) Standard 

Win32 was named for an expansion of the older Microsoft Windows interface, 
renamed the Win 16 interface once Microsoft was shipping credible 32-bit systems. 1 
have a confession to make. In my career, I completely ignored the original 16-bit 
Windows on MS-DOS. At that time, I was already working on sane 32-bit systems 
(68000 based), and dealing with the original insane 8086 segmented architecture 
was too painful to contemplate. Win32 was Microsoft s attempt to move the older 
architecture beyond the limitations of MS-DOS and into something that could com 
pete with Unix systems and to a large extent Microsoft succeeded spectacularly. 

The original 16-bit Windows API added a common GUI on top of MS-DOS, and also 
abstracted out the lower-level MS-DOS interfaces so that application code had a 
much cleaner "C" interface to operating system services (not that MS-DOS provided 
many of those). The Win32 Windows API was actually the "application" level API 
(not the system call level; I ll discuss that in a moment) for a completely new operat 
ing system that would soon be known as Windows NT ("New Technology"). This 
new system was designed and implemented by Dave Cutler, the architect of Digital 
Equipment Corporation s VMS system, long a competitor to Unix. It does share some 
similarities with VMS. The interface choice for applications was very interesting, sit 
ting on top of a system call interface that looks like Figure 3-2. 




Figure 3-2. Architecture of the Win32 API 

The idea behind the Windows NT kernel was that it could host several "sub 
system" system call interfaces, providing completely different application behavior 
from the same underlying kernel. It was meant to be a completely customizable 
operating system, providing different kernel "personalities" any ISV might require. 
The DOS subsystem and the (not-shown) 16-bit Windows subsystem were essen 
tial, as they provided backward compatibility for applications running on MS-DOS 
and 16-bit Windows; the new operating system would have gathered little accep 
tance had it not been able to run all the old MS-DOS and Windows applications. 



46 



A Tale of Two Standards 



The OS/2 subsystem was designed to allow users of text mode OS/2 applications 
(which was at one time a Microsoft product) to port them to Windows NT. 

The two interesting subsystems are the original POSIX subsystem and the new Win32 
subsystem. The POSIX subsystem was added, as the POSIX standard had become very 
prevalent in procurement contracts. Many of these valuable contracts were available 
only to systems that passed the POSIX conformance tests. So Microsoft added a mini 
mal POSIX subsystem into the new Windows NT operating system. This original sub 
system was, I think it s fair to say, deliberately crippled to make it unuseful for real- 
world applications: applications using it had no network access and no GUI access, so 
although a POSIX-compliant system might be required in a procurement contract, 
there usually was no requirement that the applications running on that system also had 
to be POSIX compliant. This allowed new applications using the Microsoft-preferred 
Win32 subsystem to be used instead. All might not have been lost if Microsoft had 
documented the internal subsystem interface, allowing third-party ISVs to create their 
own Windows NT kernel subsystems, but Microsoft kept this valuable information to 
itself (there was an exception to this, which I ll discuss shortly). 

So, let s examine the Win32 standard API, the interface designed to run on top of the 
Win32 kernel subsystem. It would be logical to assume that, like the POSIX system 
calls, the calls defined in the Win32 API would closely map to kernel-level Win32 
subsystem system calls. But that would be incorrect. It turns out that, when released, 
the Win32 subsystem system call interface was completely undocumented. The calls 
made from the application-level Win32 API were translated, via various shared 
libraries (DLLs in Windows parlance) mainly the NTDLLDLL library into the real 
Win32 subsystem system calls. 

Why do this, one might ask? Well, the official reasoning is that it allows Microsoft to 
tune and modify the system call layer at will, improving performance and adding fea 
tures without being forced to provide backward compatibility application binary inter 
faces (or ABIs for short). The more nefarious reasoning is that it allows Microsoft appli 
cations to cheat, and call directly into the undocumented Win32 subsystem system call 
interface to provide services that competing applications cannot. Several Microsoft 
applications were subsequently discovered to be doing just that, of course. One must 
always remember that Microsoft is not just an operating system vendor, but also the 
primary vendor of applications that run on its platforms. These days, this is less of a 
problem, as there are several books that document this system call layer, and there are 
several applications that allow snooping on any Windows NT kernel calls made by 
applications, allowing any changes in this layer to be quickly discovered and pub 
lished. But it left a nasty taste in the mouths of many early Windows NT developers 
(myself included). 



The Win32 (Windows) Standard X 47 



The original Win32 application interface was, on the surface, very well documented 
and cheaply available in paper form (five books at only $20 each; a bargain com 
pared to a POSIX specification). Like most things in Windows, on the surface it looks 
great. It covers much more than POSIX tries to standardize, and so offers flexible 
interfaces for manipulating the GUI, graphics, sound, and pen computing, as well as 
all the standard system services such as file I/O, file locking, threading, and security. 
Then you start to program with it. If you re used to the POSIX specifications, you 
almost immediately notice something is different. The details are missing. It s fuzzy 
on the details. You notice it the first time you call an API at runtime, and it returns 
an error that s not listed anywhere in the API documentation. "That s funny...." you 
think. With POSIX, all possible errors are listed in the return codes section of the API 
call. In Win32, the errors are a "rough guide." 

The lack of detail is one of the reasons that the Wine project finds it difficult to cre 
ate a working implementation of the Win32 API on Linux. How do you know when 
it s done? Remember that Linus, with some help, was able to create a decent POSIX 
implementation within a few years. The poor Wine developers have been laboring at 
this for 12 years, and it s still not finished. There s always one more wrinkle, one 
more undocumented behavior that some critical application depends on. Reminds 
me of Samba somehow, and for very similar reasons. 

It s not entirely Microsoft s fault. It hasn t documented its API because it hasn t 
needed to. POSIX was documented in detail due to need: the need of the developers 
creating implementations of the standard. Microsoft knows that whatever it makes 
the API do in the next service pack, that s still the Win32 standard. "Wherever you 
go, there you are," so to speak. 

However, the Win32 design does some things very well; security, for instance. Secu 
rity isn t the number one thing people think of when considering Windows, but in 
the Win32 API, security is a very great concern. In Win32, every object can be 
secured, and a property called a Security Descriptor, which contains an ACL, can be 
attached to it. This means objects such as processes, files, directories, and even 
Windows can have ACLs attached. This is much cleaner than POSIX, in which only 
objects in the filesystem can have ACLs attached to them. 

So, let s look at a Win32 ACL. As in POSIX, all users and groups are identified by a 
unique identifier. On POSIX, it s a uid_t type for users, and a gid_t type for groups. 
In Win32, both are of type SID or security identifier. A process or thread in Win32 
has a token attached to it that lists the primary SID of the process owner and a list of 
secondary group SID entries this user belongs to. Like in POSIX, this is attached to a 
process at creation time and the owner can t modify it to give himself more privi 
leges. A Win32 ACL consists of a list of SID entries with an attached bit mask identi 
fying the operations this SID entry allows or denies. Sounds reasonable, right? But 
the devil is in the details (see Figure 3-3). 

48 X A Tale of Two Standards 



Win32 process token 
Owner: SID 

Group: SID1 
List: 



Win32 security desciptor 




Owner: SID 

Primary group: SID-A I 

Access control list: 

Deny:[f*]:<bitmask>: SID 8 
Allow: [P]:<bitmask>: SID C 
Allow: ff]:<bitmask>: SID D 



[f*] represents flags for this entry 



Figure 3-3. Win32 access control 



Each SID entry in an ACL can be an allow entry or a deny entry. Their order is impor 
tant. Reorder a list of entries and swap a deny entry with an allow entry, and the mean 
ing of the ACL can change completely. POSIX ACLs don t have that problem because 
the evaluation algorithm defines the order in which entries are examined. In addition, 
the flags defining the entry (marked as [f*] in Figure 3-3) control whether an entry is 
inherited when the ACL is attached to a "container object" (such as a directory in the 
filesystem) and may also affect other attributes of this particular entry. 

The bit mask enumerates the permissions that this entry allows or denies. But the 
permissions are (naturally) different, depending on what object the ACL is attached 
to. Let s look at the kinds of permissions available for a file object: 

DELETE 

Delete the object. 

READ_CONTROL 

Read the ACL on an object. 

WRITE_DAC 

Write the ACL on an object. 

FILE_READ_DATA 

Read from the file. 

FILE_READ ATTRIBUTES 
Read file metadata. 

FILE_READ_EA 

Read extended attributes (if the file has any). 

FILE_WRITE_DATA 
Write to the file. 

FILE_WRITE_EA 

Write extended attributes (if the file has any). 



The Win32 (Windows) Standard X 49 



FILE_EXECUTE 

Open for execute (why do we need the . EXE tag then?). 

SYNCHRONIZE 

A permission related to an open file handle, not the file. 

And this is one of the simpler kinds of permission-bearing objects in Win32. 

If the Win32 API treats security so seriously, why does Windows fail most security 
tests in the real world? The answer is that most applications ignore this wonderful, 
flexible security mechanism because it s just too hard to use just like the problem 
with the POSIX pathconf ( ) call. No one can use the security mechanism correctly; 
applications would degenerate into a mess. It doesn t help that Microsoft, having 
realized the APIs controlling security were too difficult to use, keeps adding func 
tions to simplify this mess, sometimes also adding new APIs with a new service pack. 
In addition, as Microsoft has moved in the "Active Directory" world, it has extended 
the underlying semantics of the security mechanism, adding new flags and behaviors. 

Try taking a look at the "file security dialog" in Windows 2000. It s incomprehensi 
ble. No one, especially a system administrator, can keep track of this level of detail 
across their files. Everyone just sets one default ACL on the root of a directory hierar 
chy and hopes for the best. Most administrators usually want to do two simple things 
with an ACL: allow group X but not user Y, and allow group X and also user Z. This 
is just about comprehensible with POSIX ACLs, although those are near the limit of 
complexity that people can deal with. The Win32 security system is orders of magni 
tude more complex than that; it s hopelessly overdesigned. Computer scientists love 
it, as it s possible to do elegant little proofs of how secure it is, but in the real world, 
it s simply too much to deal with effectively great idea, adding ACLs to every sys 
tem object, but a real shame about the execution. 

Just to spread the blame around, the networking "experts" who designed the latest ver 
sion of Sun s network filesystem, NFS version 4, fell in love with this security mecha 
nism and decided it would be a great idea to add it into the NFSv4 specification. They 
probably thought it would make interoperability with Windows easier. Of course, they 
didn t notice that Microsoft had been busily extending the security mechanism as Win 
dows has developed, so they standardized on an old version of the Windows ACL 
mechanism, as Microsoft documented it (not as it actually works). So now, the Unix 
world has to deal with this mess or rather, a new network filesystem with an ACL 
model that is almost, but not quite, compatible with Windows ACLs, and that is com 
pletely alien to anything currently found on Unix. I sometimes feel Unix programmers 
are their own worst enemies. 



SO X A Tale of Two Standards 



The Tar Pit: Backward Compatibility 

Now, as an example of where Win32 got things spectacularly wrong, 1 want to look at 
a horror from the past that unfortunately got added into the Win32 interfaces due to 
the MS-DOS heritage. My pet hate with Win32 is the idea of "share modes" on open 
files. In my opinion, this one single legacy design decision has probably done more 
than any other to hold back the development of cluster-aware network filesystems on 
Win32 systems. 

Under POSIX, an open( ) call is very simple. It takes a pathname to open, the way in 
which you want to access or create the file (read, write, or both with various create 
types), and a permission mask that gets applied to files you do create. Under Win32, 
the equivalent call, CreateFile( ), takes seven parameters, and the interactions among 
them can be ferociously complex. The parameter that causes all the trouble is the 
ShareMode parameter, which can take values of any of the following constants OR ed 
together: 

FILE_SHARE_READ 

Allow others to open for read. 

FILE_SHARE_WRITE 

Allow others to open for write. 

FILE_SHARE_NONE 

Don t allow any other opens. 

FILE_SHARE_DELETE 

Allow open for delete intent. 

To make these semantics work, any Windows kernel dealing with an open file has to 
know about every other application on the system that might have this file open. 
This was fine back in the single-machine MS-DOS days, when these semantics were 
first designed, but it is a complete disaster when dealing with a clustered filesystem in 
which a multitude of connected file servers may want to give remote access to the 
same file, even if they serve out the file read-only to applications. They have to con 
sult some kind of distributed lock management system to keep these MS-DOS-inher 
ited semantics working. While this can be done, it complicates the job enormously 
and means cluster communication on every CreateFile( ) and CloseHandle( ) Zcall. 

This is the bane of backward compatibility. This idea of "share modes" arbitrating what 
access concurrent applications can have to a file is the cause of many troubles on a 
Windows system. Ever wonder why Windows has a mechanism built in to allow an 
application to schedule a file to be moved, but only after a reboot? Share modes in 
action. Why are some files on a Windows server system impossible to back up due to 
"another program is currently using this file" errors? Share modes again. There is no 
security permission that can prevent a user from opening a file with, effectively, "deny 



The Tar Pit: Backward Compatibility * 51 



all" permissions. If you can open the file for read access, you can get a share mode on 
it, by design. Consider a network-shared copy of Microsoft Office. Any user must be 
able to open the file WINWORD.EXE (the binary file containing Microsoft Word) to exe 
cute it. Given these semantics, any user can open the file with READ_DATA access with 
the ShareMode parameter set to FILE_SHARE_NONE and thus block use of the file, even 
over the network. Imagine on a Unix system, being able to open the /etc/passwd file 
with a share mode and deny all other processes access. Watch the system slowly grind 
to a halt as the other processes get stuck in this tar pit.... 

World Domination, Fast 

I ve heaped enough opprobrium on Win32. Let s give it a break and consider some 
thing the designers really did get right, and one of the advantages it has over POSIX. 
I m talking about the early adoption of the Unicode standard in Win32. When 
Microsoft was creating Win32, one of the things it realized was that this couldn t just 
be another English-only, American- and European-centric standard. It had to be able to 
not only cope with, but also encourage, applications written in all world languages 
(never accuse Microsoft of thinking small in its domination of the computing world). 

Given those criteria, its adoption of Unicode as the native character set for all the sys 
tem calls in Win32 was a stroke of genius. Even though the Asian countries aren t 
particularly fond of Unicode, because it merges several character sets they consider 
separate into one set of code points, Unicode is the best way to cope with the 
requirements of internationalization and localization in application development. 

To allow older MS-DOS and Win 16 applications to run, the Win32 API is available 
in two different forms, selectable by a compiler #def ine of -DUNICODE (it also helps if 
you own the compiler market for Windows, as Microsoft does, as you can standard 
ize tricks like this). The older code-page-based applications call Win32 libraries that 
internally convert any string arguments to 16-bit Unicode and then call the real 
Win32 library interface, which, like the Windows NT kernel, is Unicode only. 

In addition, Win32 comes with a full set of library interfaces to split out the text 
messages an application may need to display into resource files so that ISVs can eas 
ily have them translated for a target market. This eases the internationalization and 
localization burdens considerably for vendors. 

What is more useful, but not as obvious, is that making the Win32 standard natively 
use Unicode meant developers were immediately confronted with the requirements 
of multilingual code development. Many applications written in English-speaking (or 
Western European eight-bit character set-compatible) countries are badly written, 
making the assumption that a character will always fit within one byte. The early ver 
sions of Samba definitely made that mistake and retrofitting multibyte character set 



52 *J A Tale of Two Standards 



handling into old code is a real bear to get right. 1 know, because 1 was the person 
who first had to work on this for Samba (later I got some much-needed help from 
Andrew), so I may be a little touchy on this subject. 

Whenever I did Win32 development, I immediately designed with non-English lan 
guages in mind, and wrote everything with the abstract type TCHAR (one of the few 
useful abstract types in Win32), which is selectable at compile time using the Uni 
code defined to be either wchar_t with Unicode turned on, or unsigned char with 
Unicode turned off. Getting yourself in the right multibyte character set mindset 
from the beginning eliminates a whole class of bugs that you get when having to con 
vert a quick "English-only" hacked-up program into something maintainable for dif 
ferent languages. POSIX has been catching up over the years with the iconv( ) func 
tionality to cope with character set conversions, and Sun designed gettext( ) 
interfaces for localization, but Win32 had it all right from the start. 

Wither Win32? 

As with POSIX, the Win32 standard has not remained static over time. Microsoft has 
continued to develop and extend it, and has the advantage that anything it publishes 
immediately becomes the "standard," as is the case with all single vendor-defined 
standards. 

However, Microsoft is attempting to deemphasize Win32 as it moves into its new .NET 
environment and the new world of "managed code." Managed code is code running 
under the control of an underlying virtual machine (called the Common Language 
Infrastructure, or CLI, in .NET) and can be made to prevent the direct memory access 
that is the normal mode of operation of an API designed for C coding, such as Win32 
or POSIX. Free Software is also making a push into this area, with the Mono project, 
which implements the Microsoft C# language and .NET-managed code environment 
on Linux and other POSIX systems. 

Even if Microsoft is as successful as it hopes to be in pushing ISV programmers to 
convert to .NET and managed code using its new C# language, the legacy of applica 
tions developed in C using the Win32 API will linger for decades to come. ISV pro 
grammers are an ornery lot, especially people who have mastered the Win32 API, 
due to its less-than-complete documentation. 

What seems to happen over the years is that experienced Win32 programmers gain a 
sort of folk knowledge about the Win32 APIs i.e., how they really work versus 
what the documentation says. I often hang out on Usenet Windows discussion 
groups, and the attitudes of the experienced Windows programmers are very inter 
esting: they usually hate telling novices how stuff works. It s almost as if having 
learning Windows is a badge of honor, and they don t want to make earning that too 
easy for the neophytes. They exude an air of "they must suffer as I did." 



Wither Win32? X 53 



As Microsoft becomes less interested in Win32 with the release of its new Longhorn Win 
dows client and the move to managed code, is it possible for Microsoft to lose control of 
it? The POSIX standard is so complete because it was designed to allow programmers 
reading the standards documents to re-create a POSIX system from scratch. The Win32 
standard is nowhere near as well documented as that. However, there is hope in the 
Wine project, which is attempting to re-create a version of the Win32 API that is binary 
compatible with Windows on Intel x86 systems. Wine is, in effect, a second implementa 
tion of the Win32 system, making it closer to a true vendor-independent standard. 
Efforts taking place at companies such as Code Weavers and Transgaming Technologies 
are very promising; I just finished playing the new Windows-only game Half -Life 2 on my 
desktop Linux system, using the Wine technology. This is a significant achievement for 
the Wine code and bodes well for the future. 

Choosing a Standard 

BETWEEN TWO EVILS, I ALWAYS LIKE TO TAKE THE ONE I VE NEVER TRIED BEFORE. 

Mae West 

So, what should we choose when examining what standards to support and develop 
applications for? What should we recommend to businesses and governments that 
are starting to look closely at the open source/free software options available? 

It s important that businesses and governments selecting standards-based products 
pay attention to open standards. No more of the Microsoft Word .DOC format stan 
dard (which suffers from the same problem as Win32 in terms of it being single-ven 
dor controlled). No de facto vendor standards, no matter how convenient. They need 
to select standards that are at the same level as POSIX namely, standards to the 
level that other implementations can be created from the documentation. It s simple 
to tell when a standard meets that criterion because other implementations of it exist. 

The interesting thing is that both POSIX and Win32 standards are now available on 
both systems. On Linux, we have the POSIX standard as native, and the Wine project 
provides a binary-compatible layer for compiled Win32 programs that can run many 
popular Win32 applications. Perhaps more interestingly for programmers, the Wine 
project also includes a Linux shared library, winelib, which allows Win32 applica 
tions to be built from source code form on POSIX systems. What you end up with is 
an application that looks like a native Windows application, but can be run on non- 
Intel platforms; something that early versions of Windows NT used to support, but 
now is restricted to x86-compatible processors. Taking your Win32 application and 
porting it using winelib is an easy way to get your feet wet in the POSIX world, 
although it won t look like a native Linux application (this may be a positive thing if 
your users are used to a Windows look and feel). 



54 



If you ve already gone the .NET and C# route, using the Mono project may enable 
your code to run on POSIX systems. 

On Windows, there is now a full POSIX subsystem, supported by Microsoft and avail 
able for free. Earlier 1 alluded to Microsoft s reluctance to release information on how to 
create new subsystems for the Windows NT kernel, but it turns out that earlier in its 
history Microsoft was not so careful. A small San Francisco-based company, Softway 
Systems, licensed the documentation and produced a product called OpenNT (later 
renamed Interix), which was a replacement for Microsoft s originally crippled POSIX 
subsystem. Unfortunately, OpenNT didn t sell very well; someone cruelly referred to it 
as having "all the application availability of Linux, with the stability of Windows." As 
the company was failing, Microsoft bought it (probably to bring the real gem of the 
Windows kernel subsystem interface knowledge back in-house) and used it to create 
its Services for Unix (SFU) product. SFU contains a full POSIX environment, with a 
software development kit allowing applications to be written that have access to net 
working and GUI APIs. The applications written under it run as full peers with the 
mature Win32 applications, and users can t tell the difference. 

Recently Mcrosoft made SFU available as a free download to all Windows users. I 
like to think the free availability of Samba had something to do with this, but maybe 
I m flattering the Samba team too much. As I like to say in my talks, "If you re into 
piloting Samba on Linux in your organization, you re paying too much for your 
Microsoft software." But what this means is that if you want to write a completely 
portable application, the one standard you can count on to be there and fully imple 
mented and supported on Windows, Linux, Solaris, Apple Mac OS X, HP-UX, AIX, 
IRIX, and all the other Unix systems out there is POSIX. 

So, if you ll excuse me, I m going to look at porting parts of Samba to Windows.... 



Choosing a Standard ^C 55 





t CHAPTER 4 

Ben Laurie 




Open Source and Security 



More than two years ago, in a fit of frustration over the state of open source security, 
I wrote my first and only blog entry 1 (for O Reilly s Developer Weblogs): 

June and July were bad months for free software. First Apache chunked encod 
ing vulnerability, 2 and just when we d finished patching that, we get the 
OpenSSH hole. 3 Both of these are pretty scary the first making every single 
web server potentially exploitable, and the second makes every remotely man 
aged machine vulnerable. 

But we survived that, only to be hit just days later with the BIND resolver prob 
lems. 4 Would it ever end? Well, there was a brief respite, but then, at the end of 
July, we had the OpenSSL buffer overflows. 5 

All of these were pretty agonising, but it seems we got through it mostly unscathed, 
by releasing patches widely as soon as possible. Of course, this is painful for users 
and vendors alike, having to scramble to patch systems before exploits become 
available. I know that pain only too well: at The Bunker, 6 we had to use every avail- 



1 http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/2004. 

2 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename. cgi?name=CVE-2002-0392. 

3 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2002-0639. 

4 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2002-0651 . 

5 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-biiticvename.cgi7name~CAN-2002-0656. 

6 Back in those days, The Bunker belonged to A.L. Digital Ltd., and it wasn t called The Bunker 
Secure Hosting. 





" 



able sysadmin for days on end to fix t he problems, which seemed to be arriving 
before we d had time to catch our breath from the previous one. 

But I also know the pain suffered by the discoverer of such problems, so I 
thought I d tell you a bit about that. First, I was involved in the Apache chunked 
encoding problem. That was pretty straightforward, because the vulnerability 
was released without any consultation with the Apache Software Foundation, a 
move I consider most ill advised, but it did at least simplify our options: we had 
to get a patch out as fast as possible. Even so, we thought we could take a little 
bit of time to produce a fix, since all we were looking at was a denial-of-service 
attack, and let s face it, Apache doesn t need bugs to suffer denial of service all 
this did was make it a little cheaper for the attacker to consume your resources. 

That is, until Gobbles 7 came out with the exploit for the problem. Now, this 
really is the worst possible position to be in. Not only is there an exploitable 
problem, but the first you know of it is when you see the exploit code. Then we 
really had to scramble. First we had to figure out how the exploit worked. I fig 
ured that out by attacking myself and running Apache under gdb. I have to say 
that the attack was rather marvelously cunning, and for a while I forgot the 
urgency of the problem while I unravelled its inner workings. Having worked 
that out, we were in a position to finally fix the problem, and also, perhaps more 
importantly, more generically prevent the problem from occurring again 
through a different route. Once we had done that, it was just a matter of writing 
the advisory, releasing the patches, and posting the advisory to the usual places. 

The OpenSSL problems were a rather different story. I found these whilst work 
ing on a security review of OpenSSL commissioned by DARPA 8 and the USAF. 9 
OpenSSL is a rather large and messy piece of code that I had, until DARPA 
funded it, hesitated to do a security review of, partly because it was a big job, 
but also partly because I was sure I was going to find stuff. And sure enough, I 
found problems (yes, I know this flies in the face of conventional wisdom 
many eyes may be a good thing, but most of those eyes are not trained observ 
ers, and the ones that are do not necessarily have the time or energy to check the 
code in the detail that is required). Not as many as I expected, but then, I 
haven t finished yet (and perhaps I never will, it does seem to be a never-ending 
process). Having found some problems, which were definitely exploitable, I was 
then faced with an agonising decision: release them and run the risk that I 
would find more, and force the world to go through the process of upgrading 
again, or sit on them until I d finished, and run the risk that someone else would 
discovered them and exploit them. 



7 A hacker (or group of hackers, it is not known which). 

8 The United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, responsible for spending a great 
deal of money on national security in this case, for a thing known as CHATS, or Composable 
High Assurance Trusted Systems. 

9 Yes, I do mean the United States Air Force. 

SB X Open Source and Security 



In fact, I dithered on this question for at least a month then one of the prob 
lems I d found was fixed in the development version without even being noted 
as a security fix, and another was reported as a bug. I decided life was getting 
too dangerous and decided to release the advisory, complete or not. Now, you 
might think that not being under huge time pressure is a good thing, but in 
some ways it is not. The first problem came because various other members of 
the team thought I should involve various other security alerting mechanisms 
for example, CERT 10 or a mailing list operated by most of the free OS vendors. 11 
But there s a problem with this: CERT s process is slow and cumbersome and I 
was already nervous about delay. Vendor security lists are also dangerous 
because you can t really be sure who is reading them and what their real inter 
ests are. And, more deeply, I have to wonder why vendors should have the ben 
efit of early notification, when it is my view that they should arrange things so 
that their users could use my patches as easily as I can. I build almost every 
thing from original source, so patches tend to be very easy to use. RPMs 12 and 
ports 13 make this harder, and vendors who release no source at all clearly com 
pletely screw up their customers. Why should I help people who are getting in 
the way of the people who matter (i.e., the users of the software)? 

Then, to make matters worse, one of the more serious problems was reported 
independently to the OpenSSL team by CERT, who had been alerted by Defcon. 14 
I was going, and there was no way I was delaying release of the patches until after 
DeFcon. So, the day before I got on a plane, I finally released the advisory. And 
the rest is history. 

So, what s the point of all this? Well, the point is this: it was a complete waste of 
time. I needn t have agonised over CERT or delay or any of the rest of it. Because 
half the world didn t do a damn thing about the fact they were vulnerable, and 
because of that, as of yesterday, a worm is spreading through the Net like wild 
fire. 

Why do I bother? 

Two years later, I am still bothering, so I suppose that I do think there s some point. 
But there are interesting questions to ask about open source security is it really true 
that "many eyes" doesn t work? How do we evaluate claims about the respective vir 
tues of open and closed source security? Has anything changed in those two years? 
What is the future of open source security? 



10 CERT is an organization funded to characterize security issues and alert the appropriate 
parties a job they do not do very well, in my opinion. 

1 1 Apparently, I m not one, so I m not on this list. 

12 One of those recursive definitions programmers love: RPM Package Manager, a widely used 
system for distributing packaged open source software, particularly for various flavors of Linux. 

13 FreeBSD s package management system. Also used by other BSDs. 

14 DefCon is a popular hacker s convention, held annually in Las Vegas. 



* cq 

K1 33 



Many Eyes 

Although it s still often used as an argument, it seems quite clear to me that the 
"many eyes" argument, 15 when applied to security, is not true. It is worth remember 
ing what was originally said: "Many eyes make all bugs shallow" (Eric S. Raymond). I 
believe this is actually true, if read in the right context. Once you have found a bug, 
many eyes will, and indeed, do, make fixing it quick and easy. 

Security vulnerabilities are no different in this respect once they are found, they are 
generally easy to track down and fix (the Apache chunked encoding vulnerability was 
the hardest I ve ever had to track, and even that took only one long day s work). But 
vulnerabilities aren t like bugs in that sense until they are discovered. Once you find 
them, you have a recipe for making the software behave unexpectedly. Until that time, 
what do you have? A piece of software that does what you expect. 

The idea that bugs and security vulnerabilities are really the same thing is quite 
wrong and it s an idea that I suspect has been perpetrated by the reliability commu 
nity, 16 sensing a new source of funding. Software is reliable if it does what is 
expected when operated as expected. It is secure if it does what is expected under all 
circumstances. This is a very critical difference, indeed. Nonsecurity bugs have a sig 
nificant qualitative difference from security bugs people don t go out of their way to 
find bizarre things to do to make the software go wrong just for the fun of it. And if 
they do, and it s not a security hole... well, yes, that s interesting, and we ll fix it one 
day but, in the meantime, you didn t need that functionality, so just stop poking 
yourself in the eye and it will stop hurting. 

What has happened is that advocates of open source have taken the "many eyes" 
argument to mean that because the source is available, many people will examine it 
for weaknesses. This simply isn t true: most people never look at the source at all 
(until it doesn t work), and even if they do, most do not have the experience to find 
the problems. The argument simply does not hold water, and it s time we, as a com 
munity, abandon it. 

However, there is an important sense in which the "many eyes" theory holds a grain 
of truth: those who want to look at the source to check for vulnerabilities, can. The 
interesting question is whether those who want to look the the code are generally the 
good guys or the bad guys. But this is a question I will come to later, when I com 
pare open and closed source. 



15 The argument is that if enough people look at the code, bugs (and hence security issues) will be 
found before they bite you. 

16 Academics who study the reliability, as opposed to the security, of computer systems. 



60 *C Open Source and Security 



Open Versus Closed Source 

Since I wrote my rant, Microsoft has decided that security is important (at least for 
sales), and as a result, there s been a sudden increased interest in the truth of the 
claim that open source is "more secure" than closed source and, of course, the 
counterclaim of the opposite. 

But this claim is not easy to examine, for all sorts of reasons. First, what do we mean by 
"more secure"? We could mean that there are fewer security bugs, but surely we have 
to take severity of the bugs into account, and then we re being subjective. We could 
mean that when bugs are found, they get fixed faster, or they damage fewer people. Or 
we might not be talking about bugs at all. We might mean that the security properties 
of the system are better in some way, or that we can more easily evaluate our exposure 
to security problems. 

I expect that, at some point, almost everyone with a serious interest in this question will 
choose one of these definitions, and at some other point a completely different one. 

Who Is the Audience? 

It is also important to recognize that there are at least two completely different reasons to 
ask the question "is A more secure than B?" One is that you are trying to sell A to an 
audience that just wants to tick the "secure" box on their checklist, and the other is 
because you actually care about whether your product/web site/company/whatever is 
secure, and are in a position to have an informed opinion. 

It is, perhaps, unkind to split the audience in this way but, sadly, it appears to be a 
very real split. Most people, if asked whether they think the software they use should 
be secure will say, "Oh yeah, security, that s definitely a good thing, we want that." 
But this does not stop them from clicking Yes to the dialog box that says "Would you 
like me to install this Trojan now?" or running products with a widely known and 
truly dismal security record. 

However, it is a useful distinction to make. If you are trying to sell to an audience 
that wants to tick the security box, you will use quite different tactics than if the 
audience truly cares about security. This gives rise to the kind of analysis I see more 
and more. For example, http://dotnetjunkies.com/Weblog/stefandcmetz/archive/2004/10/ 
ll/28280.aspx has an article titled "Myth debunking: SQL Server vs. MySQL security 
2003-2004 (SQL Server has less bugs!!)." The first sentence of the article gives the 
game away: "Seems that yet again a MS product has less bugs that (sic) the corre 
sponding LAMP 17 product." What is this telling us? Someone found an example of a 
closed source product that is "better" at security than the corresponding open source 



17 LAMP stands for Linux, Apache, MySQL, Perl (or PHP) and is common shorthand for the 
cluster of open source commonly used to develop web sites. 



Open Versus Closed Source * * 61 



one. Therefore, all closed source products are "better" at security than open source 
products. If we keep on saying it, it must be true, right? 

Even if I ignore the obviously selective nature of this style of analysis, I still have to 
question the value of simply counting vulnerabilities. I know that if you do that, 
Apache appears to have a worse record than IIS recently (though not over longer 
periods). 

But I also know that the last few supposed vulnerabilities in Apache have been either 
simple denial-of-service (DoS) attacks 18 or vulnerabilities in obscure modules that 
very few people use. Certainly I didn t even bother to upgrade my servers for any of 
the last half-dozen or so; they simply weren t affected. 

So, for this kind of analysis to be meaningful, you have to get into classifying vulner 
abilities for severity. Unfortunately, there s not really any correct way to do this. 
Severity is in the eye of the beholder. For example, my standard threat model (i.e., 
the one I use for my own servers, and generally advise my clients to use, at least as a 
basis) is that all local users 19 have root, 20 whether you gave it to them or not. So, 
local vulnerabilities 21 are not vulnerabilities at all in my threat model. But, of course, 
not everyone sees it that way. Some think they can control local users, so to them, 
these holes matter. 

Incidentally, you might wonder why I dismiss DoS attacks; that is because it is essen 
tially impossible to prevent DoS attacks, even on perfectly functioning servers, since 
their function is to provide a service available to all, and simply using that service 
enough will cause a DoS. They are unavoidable, as people subject to sustained DoS 
attacks know to their pain. 

Time to Fix 

Another measure that I consider quite revealing is "time to fix" that is, the time 
between a vulnerability becoming known and a fix for it coming available. There are 
really two distinct measures here, because we must differentiate between private and 
public disclosure. If a problem is disclosed only to the "vendor," 22 the vendor has the 
leisure to take time fixing it, bearing in mind that if one person found it, so will others 



18 In a DoS attack, the attacker prevents access by legitimate users of a service by loading the 
service so heavily that it cannot handle the demand. This is often achieved by a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack, in which the attacker uses a network of "owned" (i.e., under the 
control of the attacker and not the legitimate owner) machines to simultaneously attack the 
victim s server. 

19 That is, people with user accounts on the machine, rather than visitors to web pages or people 
with mail accounts, for example. 

20 Root is the all-powerful administrative account on a Unix machine. 

21 A local vulnerability is one that only a local user can exploit. 

22 A term I am not at all fond of, since, although I am described as a "vendor" of Apache, 
OpenSSL, and so forth, I ve never sold any of them. 



62 X Open Source and Security 



meaning "leisure" is not the same as "forever," as some vendors tend to think. The time 
to fix then becomes a matter of negotiation between vendor and discloser (an example of 
a reasonably widely accepted set of guidelines for disclosure can be found at http://www. 
wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html, though the guidelines are not, by any means, universally 
accepted) and really isn t of huge significance in any case, because the fix and the bug 
will be revealed simultaneously. 

What is interesting to measure is the time between public disclosures (also known as 
zero-days) and the corresponding fixes. What we find here is quite interesting. Some 
groups care about security a lot more than others! Apache, for example, has never, to 
my knowledge, taken more than a day to fix such a problem, but Gaim 23 recently left 
a widely known security hole open for more than a month. Perhaps the most inter 
esting thing is that whenever time to fix is studied, we see commercial vendors Sun 
and Microsoft, for example pitted against open source packagers Red Hat and 
Debian and the like but this very much distorts the picture. Packagers will almost 
always be slower than the authors of the software, for the obvious reason that they 
can t make their packages until the authors have released the fix. 

This leads to another area of debate. A key difference between open and closed 
source is the number of "vendors" a package has. Generally, closed source has but a 
single vendor, but because of the current trend towards packagers of open source, 
any particular piece of software appears, to the public anyway, to have many differ 
ent vendors. This leads to an unfortunate situation: open source packagers would 
like to be able to release their packages at the same time as the authors of the pack 
ages. I ve never been happy with this idea, for a variety of reasons. First, there are so 
many packagers that it is very difficult to convince myself that they will keep the 
details of the problem secret, which is critical if the users are not to be exposed to the 
Bad Guys. Second, how do you define what a packager is? It appears that the critical 
test I am supposed to apply is whether they make money from packaging or not! 24 
This is not only blatantly unfair, but it also flies in the face of what open source is all 
about. Why should the person who participates fully in the open source process by 
building from source be penalized in favor of mere middlemen who encourage peo 
ple not to participate? 25 

Of course, the argument, then, is that I should care more about packagers because if 
they are vulnerable, it affects more people. I should choose whom I involve in the 
release process on the basis of how many actual users will be affected, either posi- 



23 A popular open source instant messaging client. 

24 Of course, not all packagers make money, but I ve only experienced this kind of pressure from 
those that do. 

25 This is because vendors tend to encourage users to treat them as traditional closed source 
businesses with their own support, their own versions of software, and so forth instead of 
engaging the users with the actual authors of the software they are using. 



Open Versus Closed Source *C 63 



lively or negatively, depending on whether I include the packager or not, by my 
choice. I should also take into account the importance of these users. A recent argu 
ment has been that I should involve organizations such as the National Infrastruc 
ture Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC), a UK body that does pretty much what 
it says on the tin, and runs the UK CERT (see http://www.niscc.gov.ufe for more infor 
mation) because they represent users of more critical importance than mere mortals. 
This is an argument I actually have some sympathy with. After all, I also depend on 
our infrastructure. But in practice, we soon become mired in vested interests and 
commercial considerations because, guess what? Our infrastructure uses software 
from packagers of various kinds, so obviously I must protect the bottom line by mak 
ing sure they don t look to be lagging behind these strange people who give away 
security fixes to just anyone. 

If these people really cared about users, they would be working to find ways that 
enable the users to get the fixes directly from the authors, without needing the pack 
ager to get its act together before the user can have a fix. But they don t, of course. 
They care about their bank balance, which is the saddest thing about security today: 
it is seen as a source of revenue, not an obligation. 

Incidentally, a recent Forrester Research report claims that packagers are actually 
quite slow as slow as or slower than closed source companies at getting out fixes. 
This doesn t surprise me, because a packager generally has to wait for the (fast!) 
response of the authors before doing its own thing. 

Visibility of Bugs and Changes 

There is argument that lack of source is actually a virtue for security. Potential attack 
ers can t examine it for bugs, and when vulnerabilities are found, they can t see what, 
exactly, was changed. 

The idea that vulnerabilities are found by looking at the source is an attractive one, 
but is not really borne out by what we see in the real world. For a start, reading the 
source to anything substantial is really hard work. I know I did it for OpenSSL, as I 
said earlier. In fact, vulnerabilities are usually found when software misbehaves, 
given unusual input or environment. The attacker follows up, investigating why that 
misbehavior occurred and using the bug thus revealed for their own evil ends. The 
"chunked encoding" bug I mentioned earlier is a great example of this. This was 
found by the common practice of feeding programs large numbers of the same char 
acter repeatedly. When Apache was fed A lots of times, it ended up treating it as a 
count of characters in hex, and it came out negative, which turns out to be a Bad 
Thing. In this case, all that was needed was eight characters, but the problem was 
found by feeding Apache several thousand. 26 



26 This particular method is popular because it is so easy: perl -e "print "A xlOOOO" | target. 
64 xx Open Source and Security 



So, not having the source might slow down an attacker slightly, but given the avail 
ability of excellent tools like IDA (a very capable disassembler) and Ollydbg (a pow 
erful [and free! debugger), not by very much. 

What about updates? The argument is that when source is available, the attacker can 
compare the old and new versions of the source to see what has changed, and then use 
that to craft software that can exploit unfixed versions of the package. In fact, because 
most open source uses version control software, and often has an ethos of checking in 
changes that are as small as possible, usually the attacker can find just the exact 
changes that fixed the problem without any clutter arising from unrelated changes. 

But does this argument hold water? Not really, as, for example, Halvar Flake has 
demonstrated very clearly with his Binary Difference Analysis tool. What this does is 
take two versions of a program, before and after a fix, disassembles them, and then 
uses graph isomorphisms to work out what has changed. I ve seen this tool in action, 
and it is very impressive. Halvar claims (and I believe him) that he can have an 
exploit out for a patched binary in one to eight hours from seeing the new version. 

Review 

Another important aspect to security is the ability to assess the risks. With closed 
source, this can be done only on the basis of history and reputation, but with open 
source, it is possible to go and look for yourself. Although you are not likely to find 
bugs this way, as I stated earlier, you can get a good idea about the quality of the 
code, the way it has been written, and how careful the author is about security. And, 
of course, you still have history and reputation to aid you. 

Who s the Boss? 

Finally, probably the most important thing about open source is the issue of who is 
in control. When a security problem is found, what happens if the author doesn t fix 
it? If the product is a closed source one, that generally is that. The user is doomed. 
He must either stop using it, find a way around the problem, or remain vulnerable. 
In contrast, with open source, users are never at the mercy of the maintainer. They 
can always fix the problem themselves. 

It is often argued that this isn t a real choice for end users; usually end users are not 
programmers, so they cannot fix these problems themselves. This is true, but it com 
pletely misses the point. Just as the average driver isn t a car mechanic but still has a 
reasonably free choice of who fixes his car, 27 he can also choose a software maintainer 
to fix his software for him. In practice, this is rarely needed because (at least for any 
widely used software) there s almost always someone willing to take on the task. 



27 This is a metaphor that is rapidly going out-of-date, as car manufacturers make cars more and 
more computerized and harder and harder for anyone not sanctioned by the manufacturer to 
work on. Who knows perhaps this will lead to an open source culture in the car world. 



Open Versus Closed Source X 65 



Digression: Threat Models 

I mentioned threat models earlier. Because not all my readers will be security experts, 
it is worth spending a moment to explain what I mean. When you evaluate a threat 
to your systems, you have to have a context in which to do it. Simply saying "I have a 
security hole" tells you almost nothing useful about it. What you want to know is 
how bad it is, how fast you have to fix it, what it will cost if you don t fix it, and what 
it will cost if you do fix it. 

To make that assessment, there are various things you need to know. The obvious 
ones are what systems you are running; what the value of each component is; what 
impact the vulnerability will have on each component; how likely you are to be 
attacked; and so forth. But less obvious is the question of whether you actually care 
about the attack at all and this is where threat models come in. They characterize 
what you have already assumed yourself to be vulnerable to and how you are vulner 
able it. 

So, as I mentioned, my threat model is that local users have root. Because root can 
do, essentially, anything she wants, this means that any vulnerability that can only be 
exploited by a local user, no matter what it is, and no matter how bad, is irrelevant to 
me. They could do that already. 

Threat models can get quite complicated, and you may well find that when a new 
vulnerability comes along, you have to consider what your model actually is, because 
you don t already know. For example, suppose there s an attack on the domain name 
service that allows it to be faked. Do you care? Was that something you assumed had 
to be correct when you built your system, or is incorrectness merely a nuisance? 

Anyway, I don t want to turn this chapter into a textbook on security, so suffice it to 
say that threat models are important, everyone s is different, and you can t evaluate 
the impact of vulnerabilities without one which means, really, that the whole ques 
tion of which is better is one only you can answer. 

The Future 

PREDICTION is DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE. 

Niels Bohr/Mark Twain 28 

There are two futures: the one we should have, and the one we re going to get. I ll 
talk about the one we should have first, because it s more fun, more interesting, and 
definitely more secure. 



28 Apparently it s difficult about the past too we don t know which of these people said this! 
66 X Open Source and Security 



Today s operating systems and software are based on decades of experience with 
developing software that was run by nice guys on machines over which they con 
trolled access relatively easily (whether as users or nonusers interacting with the 
machine or software in some way). This was a world where your biggest security 
threat was a student playing a prank. We learned a great deal about how to write 
software that did clever things, was easy to use, and had pretty interfaces. 

Unfortunately, we learned almost nothing about how to write secure software. And 
in the meantime, we built up a huge amount of insecure software. Worse, we used 
insecure languages to write the insecure software in. And worse even than that, we 
used languages thath there s no real prospect of securing. And we continue to use 
them, and the same insecure operating systems we wrote, with ever-increasing teeter 
ing towers of software piled on top of them. 

So, in my Brave New World, we get smart enough to scrap all this and use an idea 
invented in the 1960s: capabilities. Unfortunately, academics decided very early on that 
capabilities had all sorts of problems, and this has prevented their widespread adoption. 
Mark Miller and Jon Shapiro, in "Paradigm Regained: Abstraction Mechanisms for 
Access Control" (http://w\vw.erights.org/talks/asian03/paradigm-revised.pdf), have very 
effectively debunked these criticisms, though I have to admit to being bemused by how 
anyone could believe them in the first place, since they are so easily solved. 

In any case, there are still some of us around who believe in capabilities, and I enter 
tain the fond hope that we may start using them on a larger scale. The foremost 
project using capabilities at the moment is the E language (http://www.erights.org), 
which, as well as being a capability language from the ground up, has some very nice 
features for distributed computing, and is well worth a look. Unfortunately, I do not 
believe a language with such esoteric (and ever-changing) syntax will ever be widely 
used. It seems that privilege belongs to a very few. Perhaps more promising from the 
point of view of likelihood of adoption is my own nascent CAPerl (think "Kapow!") 
project, which adds capabilities to Perl. Although this is far less elegant and satisfy 
ing, it has the virtue of looking almost exactly like Perl to the experienced program 
mer, and so I do have some hope that it might actually get used. I don t have a web 
site for it yet, so I invite you to Google for it. 

No discussion of capabilities in the 21st century would be complete without men 
tioning EROS (http://www.eros-os.org). Funnily enough, EROS is short for Extremely 
Reliable Operating System, since its author, Jon Shapiro, thought that was what was 
important about it when he started writing it. Now, though, we are far more inter 
ested in its security properties than in its reliability. EROS, like E, implements capa 
bilities from the ground up. More importantly, it runs on PCs. Unfortunately, it 
seems it is a project that won t be finished. Work is, however, starting soon on the 
second attempt. 



The Future JJ 67 



Of course, if I really think this will happen, I m on crack. Not enough people care 
enough about security to contemplate throwing everything away and starting again 
(make no mistake, that s what it takes). But I can (and do) hope that people will start 
writing new things using capabilities. And I hope that drawing them to your atten 
tion will assist that. 

Now I ll move on to what I think will really happen. Certainly people have become 
more aware of security as an issue, and the increasing use of open source in corpo 
rate environments also increases the pressure on security. It seems likely that this will 
drive open source toward better ways to deliver updates faster. I don t think it is 
actually possible to drastically improve open source s record on fixing security issues. 
I believe that by any measure, that open source is ahead of closed source. But the 
flow from author to end user is not yet a smooth one. 

Interestingly, the fix for that is strongly related to the fix for another widely acknowl 
edged problem with open source: package management systems. We do not yet have 
the ultra-smooth systems to handle installation and update of systems in a way that 
makes it a no-brainer for end users. Open source and closed source present interest 
ingly different problems. Open source packages of any complexity tend to depend on 
other open source packages, usually with a completely different set of authors and 
release cycles. Managing installation in this environment is much harder than in the 
closed source situation, where one vendor even one that buys components from 
others is in control of the whole package. I think the open source world is moving 
toward better package management, and this will automatically improve the end 
user s management of security. 

However, for corporate environments, this probably makes little difference. In such 
situations, there are almost always elaborate procedures for rolling out new versions 
which are almost unchanged when using open source. Even so, clearer visibility of 
dependencies and, therefore, what needs to be upgraded when a fix comes out, 
would be useful. 

I also hope that better package management would reduce the dependency of users 
(at least, if they choose to have their dependency reduced) on packagers. Although 
packagers, in theory, add value, they also add latency. Perhaps worse, they damage 
the open source model by introducing dozens of slightly different versions of each 
package, through the widespread practice of applying patches to the packages 
instead of contributing them back to the original authors, which reduces the effec 
tiveness of community development by splitting the community into many smaller 
subcommunities . 

As always, there is a price to be paid for better package management. Automated 
updates are a fantastic vector to mount automated attacks. We know well how to 
prevent such attacks using public key cryptography, but once more, the complexity 



88 X Open Source and Security 



of multiple authors introduces problems of key management to which there aren t 
really good answers, at least, so far. 29 

One thing that does seem certain is that the increasing trend of concern about secu 
rity by end users will continue. The seemingly never-ending rise of spam, adware, 
and Trojans, if nothing else, has put it on everyone s agenda, and that doesn t seem 
likely to change. 

Interesting Projects 

I ve already mentioned some projects in passing, but no chapter on open source 
security would be complete without mentioning some of the more interesting 
projects out there. I ll start with the obvious ones and move on to the more esoteric. 
This list probably reflects my current obsession with privacy and anonymity: 

OpenSSL 

Well known, but still essential. This library implements most known crypto 
graphic algorithms, as well as the SSL and TLS protocols. It is very widely used 
in both free and non-free software, and at the time of this writing was in the final 
stages of obtaining FIPS-140 certification, http://www.openssl.org. 

Apache 2 

Of course, we ve all known and loved Apache for years. Finally, Apache 2 has 
HTTPS support out of the box. http://www.apache.org. 

Mozilla 

A suite of web browser, mail, and news reading software, and related utilities. 
You probably don t think of this as security software, but it is probably second 
only to Apache in the number of financial transactions it protects. And it does it 
with a minimum of fuss. What s more, it isn t plagued with its closed-source 
rivals fondness for installing evil software you never intended to install! http.7/ 
www.mozilla.org. 

GnuPG 

Implementing the OpenPGP standard under the GPL. Primarily used for email, 
but also the mainstay for validation of open source packages (using, of course, 
public key cryptography), http://www.gnupg.org. 

Emgmail 

Small, but (almost) perfectly formed. This is a plug-in for the increasingly popu 
lar (and, of course, open source) email client, Thunderbird, providing a nicely 
streamlined interface for GnuPG. http://enigmail.mo2dev.org. 



29 1 should perhapsat this point plug KeyMan, a package I designed to solve this problem, but 
since it has singularly failed to take off, that might be inappropriate. 



Interesting Projects X 69 



CVE 

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. This is a database of security problems, 
both commercial and open source. The idea is to provide a uniform reference for 
each problem, so it s easy to tell if two different people are talking about the 
same bug. http://cve.mitre.org. 

TOR 

The onion router. Onion routing has been a theoretical possibility for a long 
time, providing a way to make arbitrary connections anonymously. Zero Knowl 
edge Systems spectacularly failed to exploit it commercially, but now it has come 
from a most unlikely source: the U.S. Navy. The Navy s funding recently ran out, 
but the Electronic Frontier Foundation stepped up to take over. Well worth a 
look, http://tor.eff.org. 

Conclusion 

In the end, it seems to me there s little to be sensibly said that, from the viewpoint of 
security, truly differentiates between open and closed source. The points I believe are 
critical are my ability to review the code for myself and my ability to fix it myself when 
it is broken. By "myself I do, of course, include "or anyone of my choice." What I don t 
believe in at all is the often-quoted but never-proven "many eyes" theory. 

In the digression on threat models, I mentioned that the only person who can really 
answer the question of whether open source is better for security is you. Leave the 
camp of people who think security is a good thing that we should all have more of, 
and join the camp of people who have thought about what it means to them, what 
they value, and so, what they choose. 



70 X Open Source and Security 





b CHAPTER 5 

Michael Olson 




Dual Licensing 



Over the past decade, there have been many attempts to commercialize open source 
software. One common strategy has been to create services businesses, which offer 
consulting and support to users of open source. Another strategy has been to build 
hybrid businesses, which distribute open source platforms with proprietary add-ons, 
and which make money by licensing the add-ons. 

A third strategy, and the focus of this chapter, is called dual licensing. Companies that 
use dual licensing provide a single software product under two different licenses. 
One license, which imposes open source terms, is available to a certain class of users. 
A second license, with proprietary terms, is available to others. 

Business and Politics 

This chapter is about business. Software is deep in the modern economy: it provides 
the mechanism for the flow of capital around the world, and it is itself a good that 
can be produced, bought, and sold. Whenever something interesting happens in the 
world of software, business leaders pay attention. 

Open source is interesting. It enforces new rules for use and distribution of software 
products. It changes the economics of software production. It impacts the way that 
companies can capitalize on the software they control. 



At the same time, though, open source has no business agenda. Open source is about 
freedom in the political sense. It is about peer review and scientific collaboration. 
Open source licenses take no position whatsoever on the profitability of business 
models. Open source is not antibusiness; it has no opinion. 

Businesspeople, of course, have opinions on open source. Some years ago, when 
open source was still new to the business community, it was unfamiliar, and that 
unfamiliarity bred fear, confusion, and opposition. More recently, as quality open 
source software products have proven their value to all kinds of businesses, that 
opinion has shifted. Most businesspeople who have thought about open source at all 
are guardedly interested in it, and want to find ways to use it in their companies to 
be more efficient, to spend less, or to earn more. 

An informed opinion on open source is important. Just as software is a powerful eco 
nomic force, open source is a powerful force in the development and deployment of 
modern software systems. The Internet, including the World Wide Web, and a wide 
range of the services that run on it (for example, e-commerce sites such as Amazon.com; 
information retrieval services such as Google; and portals such as Yahoo!) exist because 
of open source software. Open source is a genie that is too big for its bottle. Now that it 
is out, it will not fit back in. If you do not put it to work for you, it is likely to wreak bad 
magic on your business. 

My own opinion on open source is simple. It is one tool among many that can, when 
used sensibly, create business value. I run a business based on open source, but my 
agenda is commercial, not political. I understand the politics behind open source, 
and I appreciate and respect many smart people in the open source community. 
When I sit down at my desk, though, I am more interested in the difference between 
income and expenses on my profit and loss statement. To the extent that open source 
helps move that difference in the right direction, I care deeply about it. 

The open source business strategy about which I know the most and the focus of this 
chapter is called dual licensing. Dual licensing is a way to make a single software prod 
uct available under two different licenses. One is an open source license, and encour 
ages sharing and collaboration. The other is a more conventional proprietary license, 
and permits secrecy and competition which promote the creation of proprietary value. 
Dual licensing is a way to give a single product to open source users on open source 
terms, and to paying proprietary customers on conventional proprietary terms. 

Open Source: Distribution Versus Development 

Open source can include a distribution strategy or a development strategy. While 
people often think of the development strategy (many programmers working on a 
common project) when they think of high-profile projects like Linux, we are instead 
going to focus on the distribution strategy. 



72 X Dual Licensing 



Open source is just a way to put product in many users hands inexpensively. Dual- 
licensing businesses do not use collaborative development to build their products. In 
fact, as we will see, that production strategy is poisonous to dual-licensing businesses. 

A dual-licensing business can take advantage of the cheap and ubiquitous Internet to 
distribute its products at low costs. Open source licensing promotes use at much 
lower cost, with much less friction, than an expensive marketing campaign could do. 
Dual-licensing businesses can distribute software to more people, more cheaply, than 
their proprietary competitors. 

At the same time, dual licensing permits these businesses to generate revenue by licens 
ing the software to certain users for a fee. Software licensing revenue is good revenue 
because you can make and license a second copy of a piece of software for essentially 
no additional cost, businesses and the financial markets like licensing revenue. Selling 
support or services, by contrast, imposes new costs with every deal, because a business 
must have the capacity to answer the telephone for every new customer it captures. As 
a result, licensing-based businesses, including dual-licensing businesses, generally get 
higher valuations and can raise capital more cheaply than businesses based exclusively 
on services. 

A Primer on Intellectual Property 

Dual licensing, when you first encounter it, can seem like a parlor trick. How can I 
possibly charge money for software that you can get for free? 

There is, in fact, no sleight of hand. Nobody gets tricked. Dual licensing requires 
some care, and the same diligence that most businesspeople bring to their jobs, but it 
turns out that governments around the world want businesses to be able to do this. 
They have constructed legal infrastructures that permit all sorts of businesses to 
make money with confidence. All it takes is to behave like a business and comply 
with the law. 

Understanding the mechanism here is easier with some background in intellectual 
property law. Most software vendors make money by charging fees for an intangible 
product algorithms and their implementations as expressed in computer code. All 
these businesses, including dual-licensing businesses, exist because of crucial legal con 
cepts regarding intellectual property concepts such as ownership and license grants. 

Ownership 

Ownership of real property is easy to understand my ball, your house, her island. 
Ownership of something intangible like the expression of ideas, is harder to under 
stand. Over several centuries, governments have created rules about who may and 
may not make copies of artifacts like books and music. This "copyright" law bal 
ances the interests of the creator of a work an author or a composer with the 



A Primer on Intellectual Property X 73 



interests of consumers who purchase those copies. Copyright law clarifies issues and 
resolves disputes among authors and readers. Copyright law has been adapted to 
apply to software, balancing the rights of software authors with those people who 
license and use their computer programs. 1 

Copyright law worldwide generally says that the creator of an expression of an idea 
owns that expression. From the point of view of a computer programmer, this means 
that whoever writes a program owns the program. If the programmer copied parts of 
it from somewhere else, of course, he was not the creator of those parts, and he does 
not own them. 

Unless the owner expressly assigns his rights to someone else, he owns his creation. 
Most employment agreements include just such an assignment provision, so the code 
a programmer writes for his job instantly becomes the property of his employer. The 
Free Software Foundation, an important organization in the free software move 
ment, requires such assignment for any contribution to projects that it manages. 

Without an explicit assignment, there can be many different owners of a large soft 
ware product. This is exactly the case with many open source projects, including 
Linux. If 10 developers collaborate on an open source package, each of the 10 owns 
the pieces she produced. None of them owns the entire work. 

Licensing 

Except in very rare circumstances, no one ever buys computer software. The person 
who created the work is its owner; a purchaser only buys certain rights to use the 
copy of the software in his possession. This distinction is critical to businesses that 
build software products. These businesses do not sell ownership. Instead, they sell 
licenses to the software, where "licenses" generally means a collection of rights to 
copy, run, and use the software product. 

The owner is allowed, under the law, broad latitude to set conditions on use of the 
software. If someone wants a license to use the software, the owner can require that 
person to do any number of different things in exchange for the license. 

Most proprietary software vendors require payment of a fee. This has been a remark 
ably successful business strategy for many decades, producing a number of billion- 
dollar software companies. 

Open source software licensing does not require payment of a fee. The owners of 
open source software do impose other conditions on their open source licensees. 



1 The bodies of law dealing with trade secrets and patents are also both important to businesses, 
but are beyond the scope of this discussion. Patents in particular complicate open source 
software development and distribution, and are something of a lightning rod in the debate 
between proponents and opponents of open source. 



74 xx Dual Licensing 



Those conditions vary, depending on the open source license in use, but two broad 
categories are most common: 

Reciprocal licenses require that any recipient promise to contribute back any 
changes or additions to the software. Reciprocal licenses are coercive; they essen 
tially enforce sharing. The most common reciprocal license in use is the GNU 
General Public License, or GPL. 

Academic licenses usually require very little often, just acknowledgment of the 
original owner s work on the software. Academic licenses encourage reuse of 
other programmers work by making it available on liberal terms. The most pop 
ular academic license in use is the Berkeley Software Distribution, or BSD, 
license. 

In both the proprietary and open source cases, the owner of the software sets the 
conditions that others must meet to use the software. 

The owner is allowed to set different conditions for different people. This same situa 
tion applies to real property: you might allow your brother to sleep in your spare 
bedroom for free, but probably would not let me do that on the same terms. At best, 
I could hope to pay you rent for use of the room. Likewise, the owner of a piece of 
software can grant different rights, on different terms, to different people. 

This is common in proprietary software businesses. For example, if you buy a com 
puter with an operating system and a word processor installed, you are most likely 
permitted to use those packages, but not to make copies of them for others to use. By 
contrast, the computer manufacturer is allowed to copy, install, and distribute both 
pieces of software to you and to others. The company that owns the operating sys 
tem and word processor chooses to grant the computer manufacturer broader rights 
than you have, because the owner s goal is to make money in business, and creating a 
distribution channel that generates license fees is a good way to do that. 

The fundamental point to remember is that open source licensing rests on the same 
foundation that proprietary software businesses use for their own licensing: copy 
right law and the notions of ownership and licensing that inform it. In both the pro 
prietary and open source cases, the owner grants licenses to use the software under 
certain conditions. 

One main benefit of being an owner is having the right to set those conditions. 

Dual Licensing 

Dual licensing exploits these attributes of copyright law to construct profitable busi 
nesses using open source software. The software s owner distributes a single product 
under both an open source license and a proprietary license. Open source licensees 
pay no fees, but make certain promises. Proprietary licensees have different rights, 
and pay a fee for that consideration. 

Dual Licensing * 75 



By making the software available on open source terms, the owner creates a large and 
inexpensive distribution channel. Generally, users can download the software on the 
Internet for free. In many cases, the software is bundled with third-party offerings, 
and is distributed by others not formally affiliated with the owner. Open source dis 
tribution makes the software ubiquitous, putting it in the hands of many users at 
very low cost. 

Reciprocity 

Open source, as it has emerged from the academic world, emphasizes the importance 
of reciprocity. Fundamentally, everyone in the community is allowed to share the bene 
fits of the code that others have written. Everyone is expected to share their work, how 
ever. If you give me your work for free, I reciprocate and give you my work on the 
same terms. This emphasis on reciprocity encourages collaboration and allows the 
community to build better software than any small group could on its own. 

In a dual-licensing business, the open source license demands reciprocity. If a cus 
tomer uses the software under the open source license, his own additions which 
may well include the code for his own product must be open source, as well. 

Under the proprietary license, by contrast, reciprocity is not required. The cus 
tomer s own code, and any changes or additions he makes to the original product, 
can remain proprietary. 

This distinction between the two licenses is crucial. Sharing source code is a virtue in 
the open source community, but is a serious competitive disadvantage in many com 
mercial settings. Proprietary software vendors would much rather pay money than 
give away the competitive advantage inherent in their source code. 

Warranty 

A warranty is a promise. These promises are the bedrock of most commercial rela 
tionships. Software vendors that use proprietary licenses to do business with their 
customers and suppliers use warranties to spell out clearly what each party expects 
from the other. 

As a software vendor, I might warrant that my software product will work as docu 
mented, and that I will fix any errors if it does not. I will generally warrant that I 
wrote the software, and that I am the person who owns it. I may ask my customer to 
warrant that he will not give my software away for free to anyone else. If either of us 
breaks one of these promises, our licensing agreement will usually spell out the steps 
that the other party can take to fix the problem. If we cannot fix the problem, either 
of us can sue the other in court for breakingthe promise. 



76 X Dual Licensing 



People do not generally make promises casually. There are real costs in keeping your 
word. For example, if I have promised that my software works, and it does not, I 
need to spend time, and possibly money, to fix it. 

Virtually all open source licenses and certainly all those used by dual-licensing 
businesses are "as is" licenses, with no warranties, no promises, and no recourse in 
the event of problems. The user gets the software as is, and assumes all risk in using 
it. This allows the business to minimize business risk from users of its software who 
did not pay a license fee. Put simply, if the user does not pay for the license, the 
owner will not use his money to protect the user in the case of a problem. 

Proprietary licenses, by contrast, generally include clear warranties. A company can 
afford to make promises to its paying customers, because it can use some of the 
money paid to defray the costs of keeping the promise. 

Depending on how a customer plans to use a software package, he may or may not 
be able to tolerate the "as is" nature of an open source license. If the customer is will 
ing to risk problems in the software, and to fix those problems himself, the open 
source license is fine. On the other hand, if the customer plans to ship the software 
to customers of his own, he may want the assurance of a committed partner behind 
him. Likewise, if the customer runs mission-critical infrastructure on open source 
software, he may need the confidence that commercial warranties provide. 

Competitive Issues 

Many vendors that consider dual-licensing strategies are concerned with competition. 

Naturally, open source distribution presupposes that there are no valuable propri 
etary techniques in the software that need to be kept secret. If an owner distributes a 
software package in source form, competitors can read the source code, just like any 
other person who receives a copy. 

This seems at first like it should be a major concern, but in point of fact, the amount 
of innovation in the software market is much smaller than is generally supposed. 
Especially in relatively mature sectors of technology, such as operating systems and 
databases, the techniques and algorithms are well understood by all the suppliers 
The combination of particular techniques that any single vendor uses may be some 
what interesting to its competitors. All of the vendors in a market hire from the same 
pool of technical talent, and even poach employees from one another. As a result, 
most vendors know pretty well how their competitors products work. 

Proprietary vendors will naturally claim that their products are novel and innova 
tive, and must be kept secret. The problem is that there is no way to test this asser 
tion, since doing so requires examination of the source code, and that is precisely 
what the vendors cannot permit, yet still protect their market positions. 



Dual Licensing X 77 



In some cases, these claims are no doubt true. The strategy of concealment, however, 
does not distinguish between ugliness and beauty, and may be used to hide either. 

A different competitive concern arises from confusion between ownership and licens 
ing. Some vendors considering dual licensing worry that their competitors will 
download the open source version of the product and license it under proprietary 
terms to others. In effect, this would allow a competitor to use the vendor s own 
product to compete with him. 

Copyright law, of course, prohibits this. Only the owner has the right to grant pro 
prietary licenses to the software. In fact, no competitor can copy pieces of the work 
into its own products, since those products would then be forced to comply with the 
terms of the open source license. 

There is another, subtler, force that protects dual-licensing vendors from unscrupu 
lous competition. Open source software is preemptive: the existence of a quality 
open source package makes it very difficult or impossible to introduce a for-fee com 
petitor. The cost of building such a competitive offering has to be recovered some 
how. If a no-cost offering is available, selling an alternative for a fee will likely fail. 
The result is that very few businesses are willing to challenge open source software in 
the market once it is established. 

The converse, of course, is not true. Open source frequently, and aggressively, chal 
lenges established proprietary software. 

Even in cases where proprietary alternatives exist, dual licensing creates competitive 
advantage. The open source product is ubiquitous as a result of an inexpensive distri 
bution channel. In addition, the fact that many users are able to use the software at 
no charge actually takes money away from purely proprietary vendors in the market. 
If a user can choose between a good open source product for free, and a competitive 
proprietary product for a fee, the for-pay competitive vendor is likely to lose the sale. 
Dual-licensing vendors are not paid by their open source users. Neither, however, 
are their competitors. 

Ownership 

Only the owner of a work has the standing to offer it to different users under differ 
ent licenses. As a consequence, dual licensing works only if there is a single, well- 
defined owner of a work. Otherwise, customers have no single entity with whom to 
negotiate their license terms. In practice, projects that use the open source develop 
ment model (a large community of independent programmers collaborating on a 
work) are poor candidates for dual licensing. There are just too many contributors to 
contact for permission every time a new customer wants to license the software 
under non-open source terms. 



78 J* Dual Licensing 



As a result, dual-licensing businesses do not use the open source development model. 
Instead, they invest in the development of the open source software and do not accept 
contributions from the community at large. Dual-licensing businesses rely on open 
source as a distribution strategy, not as a production strategy. 

Ownership is an issue in the larger open source community, of course. As a practical 
matter, assessing the provenance of contributions to an open source project is hard. 
Individual contributors are often judgment-proof, and ensuring that they have not 
misappropriated the intellectual property they contribute to the project requires real 
diligence. Projects manage this problem the same way that proprietary vendors do 
they put experienced managers over coders to review contributions, and they rely on 
mature and experienced contributors to build the product. 

In fact, this ownership issue cuts both ways. Proprietary vendors are equally at risk 
from employees who take pieces of open source software and incorporate it into the 
proprietary products that their employers build. 

The answer for both proprietary and open source developers, of course, is to set up 
formal policies and standards on intellectual property use. Diligence is simply part of 
the job. Both proprietary and open source developers can and do write large, sophis 
ticated products without stealing from others. 

Practical Considerations 

Dual licensing works. Using it, businesses can generate revenue based on license fees 
paid for copies of software. Because the public markets view this revenue as inher 
ently lower margin than services revenue, dual-licensing companies have attractive 
valuations and can raise capital at parity with proprietary software vendors. 

Attractive Margins 

Every sustainable business must consistently earn more money than it spends. This is 
often hard. 

One of the key considerations in designing a new business is the margin that the rev 
enue stream can produce. Margin is, at base, the percentage of revenue that is profit. 
If you pay $100 to build a widget, and you pay a salesperson $100 to sell it, the wid 
get costs you $200. If you charge $400 for it, you have an attractive margin 50%. If 
you charge $205 for it, you have a very thin margin 2.5%. 

Most technology businesses sell licenses, or services, or a mixture of the two. For exam 
ple, a company might license its product to customers, and might also sell consulting 
services to help customers integrate the product into existing IT infrastructures. 

Licensing businesses generally have attractive margins. This is because, while it may 
cost $1 million in payroll to produce a new software program, the second copy of 
that program is essentially free. Having sunk the cost into building the product, the 

Practical Considerations X 78 



company can sell as many copies as it likes without paying the developers to start all 
over again. As a result, selling a new copy of an existing product really just requires 
paying the sales team that sells it. 

Services businesses, by contrast, have much slimmer margins. This is because, to 
deliver the service, the business must have the people on the payroll who can do the 
work that is inherent in the services contract. Selling more consulting engagements 
requires that you hire more consultants. Thus, the costs that a services business incurs 
on every contract include not just the cost of selling it, but also the cost of fulfilling it. 

Of course, very few companies are purely licensing businesses. Most provide at least 
customer support. However, building attractive margins is easier in a business with a 
significant licensing component. 

Dual-licensing businesses offer two different revenue streams. Proprietary customers 
pay licensing fees, giving the business a high-margin licensing revenue stream. Both 
proprietary and open source users may choose to buy consulting or technical sup 
port, giving the business a lower-margin services revenue stream. This diversity in 
the revenue streams can allow the company to weather temporary slowdowns in 
either its licensing or its services businesses. 

Capital 

Over the past several years, the success of open source business models, and of dual- 
licensing models in particular, has caught the attention of the investment commu 
nity. As investors have learned more about open source and dual licensing, they have 
begun to make investments sometimes substantial investments in new busi 
nesses. In addition, established companies have begun to look at open source as a 
strategic business advantage, and not just as a low-cost way to bring technology in- 
house. Major technology vendors have demonstrated their willingness to acquire 
open source businesses at prices that reward the principals and original investors in 
those businesses. 

Venture capitalists and other sources of early-stage funding for companies look for a 
few key attributes in open source businesses. 

First, of course, the company must have a credible, defensible business model. It is, 
generally, easier to raise money for a company that uses dual licensing, than for one 
planning to make money exclusively from services. The big risk for a new services 
business is that it will demonstrate the viability of a new services opportunity, and 
thus attract the attention of a large established services player. Popular open source 
packages have enormous installed bases. Businesses exist today that earn tens of mil 
lions of dollars supporting and training those users. That is enough money to inter 
est even a large, established company. 



80 X Dual Licensing 



The real problem with providing only services for an open source package is that the 
strategy is hard to defend against competitors. While it is true that the original 
authors of an open source package have an advantage in supporting it after all, they 
know the most about how it works freely available source code permits anyone else 
to learn the product internals and offer the same service. 

Investors and acquirers are generally willing to pay less for a pure services business 
than for a licensing business, or for a business that combines the two sources of reve 
nues. After all, costs grow in proportion to revenue growth. Every services sale 
requires staffing to meet the service commitment. Selling licenses for software, on the 
other hand, is much cheaper; making another copy of an existing product is free. 

Second, investors look for open source packages with a solid market presence. The 
investor typically wants to see a track record of successful deployment to prove that a 
market exists. Thus, it is very hard to raise money to build a brand-new open source 
package from the ground up. Indeed, virtually all of the open source businesses 
funded in the past decade have tried to commercialize on the value of existing open 
source packages. 

This creates a chicken-and-egg problem. The open source package must exist before 
it can be funded. Somehow, though, the package must get written in the first place. 
Generally, the open source packages that serve as the foundation for successful busi 
nesses were labors of love in the beginning, created by developers working in their 
spare time for free. Only when they succeeded in building a credible product could 
they raise money. 

Third, and significantly, investors always look at the team in which they are asked to 
invest. As a rule, no investor will back an unbalanced organization all engineering, 
or all marketing, for example. A fundable open source business must combine the 
technical expertise of a solid group of engineers with experienced management. In 
particular, the company must be properly staffed to market and sell the licenses or 
services that the business will offer. This point may seem obvious, but in practice, it 
is very hard to put together a solid team with the ability to make and execute a busi 
ness plan that demands both solid product development and execution against a 
financial plan. 

Once an open source business is successful in the market, it can choose to go in a 
number of directions. 

If the business is generating profits, the owners may choose to continue to run it as a 
privately held company, earning a return on their effort and investment in the form 
of dividends. As a rule, venture-backed businesses do not have this option. The ven 
ture capital community wants to liquidate its investment at a profit within a few 
years of making the initial investment, and will press management to sell the com 
pany at some point. Absent that pressure, however, a strong, profitable, and growing 
business is a wonderful thing to own. 



More commonly, small businesses are acquired by larger businesses, and folded into 
the bigger company. This rewards the original investors, as well as the principals 
who started the company and helped to make it successful. The acquisition will most 
often pay off in cash, stock in the bigger company, or a mixture of the two. 

Established companies are willing to buy open source businesses for a variety of rea 
sons. For example, open source technology is often ubiquitous in the market, and 
controlling that technology can give the big company important advantages over its 
competitors. In addition, an open source platform can create opportunities to build 
new proprietary product offerings that run on top of the open source, which creates 
new service and licensing revenue. The open source business s revenue may, on its 
own, be enough to capture the attention of the larger company. 

The reasons that any particular acquirer chooses to buy any other business depend 
deeply on the peculiar circumstances of each, so there is no cookbook for building a 
company to sell. In general, though, a solid customer base, a track record of consis 
tent growth, and a profitable revenue stream are good things. 

The last way that small, privately held businesses transform themselves is to offer 
their stock for sale on the public markets. This is a much less common practice in 
today than it was six years earlier; a business must, in general, have very high reve 
nues to make this transition. In addition, the demands on the management team in a 
publicly traded company are very different from, and in many ways more onerous 
than, the demands on a private company s team. The requirements for reporting 
financial information to the public markets and the need to manage the public 
investment community s expectations dramatically change the way that a company 
president works. As a result, many companies are forced to change their executive 
teams before offering themselves for sale on the public market. 

Choosing Licenses 

One of the most important decisions in a dual-licensing business is what the terms 
will be for both the proprietary and the open source license. This issue is much big 
ger for the open source license, because that license is never negotiated. People sim 
ply download the software and accept the terms. As a result, a mistake in the open 
source terms is a mistake every single time the software is distributed. 

Academic licenses are poorly suited to dual-licensing businesses, but reciprocal 
licenses generally work well. An academic license simply requires acknowledgment 
of the owner. Most rational businesspeople would much rather make that acknowl 
edgment than hand over precious capital for use of software. A reciprocal license, by 
contrast, requires that the customer s own intellectual property be given away under 
an open source license. There is a very large population of potential customers who 
are more interested in protecting their intellectual property than in saving money. 



82 ** Dual Licensing 



As a result, the only kind of open source license that makes sense for a dual-licensing 
business is a very strong reciprocal license. The best example, of course, is the GNU 
GPL. Choosing the GPL gives you the benefit of the work already done by the Free Soft 
ware Foundation, or FSF, in drafting the license and defining the key terms. In addi 
tion, the FSF has a strong vested interest in demonstrating the enforceability of the GPL, 
so, in the event of a dispute over unauthorized use of your dual-licensed product, you 
have access to a seasoned legal team that knows the subject well 

It is almost certainly a mistake to try to draft your own open source license for a 
dual-licensing business. Doing so requires that you understand and apply the funda 
mental concepts of open source development and distribution in a new legal license. 
This is work you do not need to do if you choose an existing license. More impor 
tantly, writing a new license from scratch creates the opportunity to make bad mis 
takes. Finally, drafting a new license will require you to educate the open source and 
proprietary software business communities about the terms of your own license. This 
will create friction and inhibit adoption. You want developers concentrating on your 
software, not on your license. 

Need and Pain 

The interplay between the software product and its open source license is probably 
the single most important business issue for dual-licensing companies. The software 
product must create need in the market. Ideally, it will be so attractive to customers 
that they simply have to use it. At the same time, the open source license must cause 
enough pain that some users would rather pay money than endure the pain. 

My company makes a product called Berkeley DB. It is an established product with a 
good reputation, but the only way for our customers to use it is to combine it with 
software they write themselves. That act of combination gives us leverage, because 
the resulting work is derived from our software, and we thus can dictate the terms 
under which the derivation must be licensed. 

Our open source license requires that the entire work be released in open source 
form. Open source users, of course, can do this, but the requirement is poisonous to 
most proprietary vendors. Our dual-licensing strategy lets the proprietary customers 
pay for a proprietary license and keep their own intellectual property secret. 

Linux is, once again, a good example of a product for which dual licensing would 
not work. Ignoring the ownership issues raised earlier, no customer needs to create 
and redistribute derivative versions of Linux. Customers simply want to install and 
use the operating system on their computers. None of those actions is forbidden by 
the GPL, so there is no pain. 



Practical Considerations ** 83 



Of course there are businesses making money distributing Linux, but they are doing 
so in different ways. Dual licensing works with only certain sorts of software, with 
very specific ownership characteristics. 

Any vendor considering dual licensing must consider both technology and licensing 
when designing a business model. The software technology must be constructed so 
that users need to do something specific for example, combine it with their own 
intellectual property and distribute the combined work to others to use it. The 
open source license must make this activity painful to at least some customers with 
money. These customers must be willing to pay enough money to avoid that pain to 
make the business profitable. 

On the other hand, the open source license must not be painful to the open source 
community, or it will undermine the benefits of the cheap and ubiquitous distribu 
tion channel that open source licensing provides. Open source users must experi 
ence only pleasure in their use of the software, or the product will fail to penetrate 
the market. 

Measuring the Market 

Businesspeople generally measure markets in terms of dollars the amount of money 
that customers in the market will spend for a product or service. Dual-licensing busi 
nesses need a different metric, because they distribute their software to a combina 
tion of paying and nonpaying customers. The result is that a dual-licensing business 
can have a much larger installed base than a measure of dollars spent would suggest. 

Dual-licensing businesses need to look at this issue pragmatically. Put bluntly, a 
dual- licensing business is never going to get all the money on the table. Some users 
would rather meet the open source terms than pay money for the software. A dual- 
licensing business must balance the size of its installed base, and the concomitant 
opportunity to sell more proprietary licenses, with the money that could be extracted 
by charging for every use. 

The long-term goal of the business is to maximize profits and to grow. By foregoing 
some revenue in the short term, a dual-licensing business may make its product ubiq 
uitous, which creates additional long-term opportunity. Though you might never get 
all the money on the table, you can find yourself sitting at a much bigger table this way. 

There are two other benefits to a large installed base, even if not everyone in it pays a 
license fee. One, noted earlier, is that the earth is scorched for competitors: the only 
way to compete on price with a free product is to pay people to use a competitive 
one. This is an expensive way to capture customers. 

The other, of course, is the opportunity to sell services independently of license fees. 
A large installed base may be willing to pay for consulting and support, even if it is 
not willing to pay for the software. Generally, dual-licensing businesses offer these 



84 X Dual Licensing 



services and book revenue profitably as a result. As a rule, however, dual licensing is 
more valuable for the license fees that proprietary users pay than for the service fees 
that open source users are willing to pay. 

Piracy 

Because open source software is widely available, it is easy for software pirates to 
make and distribute copies in ways that violate the open source license for the code. 
Significantly, it is easy for a user to download the software under an open source 
license, and then to use it in ways that only a paid proprietary license would permit. 

Piracy is not, of course, a problem unique to open source or dual-licensing compa 
nies. Every software vendor indeed, every software developer who distributes a 
product runs the risk that unscrupulous users will pirate copies of the product. 
Individual vendors and umbrella organizations like the Business Software Alliance 
battle the problem continually. 

Piracy is a very real business problem for dual-licensing vendors. The two lines of 
defense are diligence in protecting intellectual property rights, and consistent and 
clear explanations of the terms under which the software is distributed. 

Diligence in protecting intellectual property rights is relatively simple. Anytime a 
dual-licensing vendor learns of a misappropriation of its software, it must pursue and 
resolve the issue. This is no different from the rules that apply to a proprietary soft 
ware vendor, of course. 

Consistent and clear messaging on the license terms is equally important. Open 
source licensing is now generally well understood by the software industry. By 
emphasizing the conditions that apply to open source use, and making clear the dif 
ference between its paid and proprietary licenses, a dual-licensing vendor can edu 
cate its users and capture business before problems crop up. 

In general, no responsible business or consumer wants to misappropriate the intel 
lectual property of another. The penalties are large, the risks are unacceptable, and it 
simply is not fair. Most consumers of software want to obey the law. 

Dual-licensing vendors are in exactly the same position as purely proprietary ven 
dors. Digital distribution means that copying is easy. There are pirated copies of both 
proprietary and dual-licensed software in the world. Vendors of both have the same 
law behind them and the same recourse against pirates. 

The Social Contract 

Open source is much more than an ingredient in a business model, of course. The 
movement predates the dual-licensing model by decades, and its long history has 
produced a complex and nuanced present. Any business that proposes to use open 



source technology, including dual-licensing businesses, must understand and partici 
pate in the open source movement as it exists today. 

The open source community generally cares a great deal about reputation; compa 
nies, as well as individuals, gain status by being smart and by contributing to the 
good of the community. Contribution certainly includes developing open source 
technology for use by others, and any dual-licensing business will do that. Contribu 
tion can also mean, for example, promoting and explaining open source technology 
in the press and at industry meetings a task for which businesses are often better 
suited than individuals and supporting worthy open source projects with staff time 
and money. 

It is unusual in business for an outside group that pays a company no money and that 
has no legislative authority to have as much influence over a business and its policies as 
the general open source community does over open source businesses. If a company 
alienates the open source community, the main advantages of open source distribu 
tion ubiquity and a large installed base can disappear in a flood of bad press and ill 
will on developer discussion lists. Executives at dual-licensing businesses must speak 
clearly to their open source constituencies. They must show the community the respect 
it deserves in order to earn the community s respect in return. 

Besides merely making friends with the open source community, dual-licensing busi 
nesses must pay attention to issues that are unique to the business model. 

An unwritten social contract among open source developers says that the commu 
nity generally will produce software that benefits the community most. This is in 
some sense driven by Darwin the people who write open source code work on the 
problems they consider most important, so if there is widespread pain around a par 
ticular issue, there will be widespread attention to addressing it. 

The social contract, of course, is not perfect. For example, many open source projects 
are more poorly documented than their proprietary competitors, because very few 
programmers enjoy writing documentation, and few will do it without being paid. 
While proprietary enterprise software is not always more polished than open source, 
it is generally the case that the drudgery in proprietary development gets more atten 
tion than it does in open source projects. A programmer working as a volunteer often 
lacks the patience to do the exhaustive testing and debugging, interface cleanup, and 
so on, that commercial licensees of software have come to expect. 

The introduction of companies focused on profits into this mix alters the social con 
tract of open source. The change is, in some respects, for the better, but it is a change 
nonetheless. 

Businesses driven by profits will invest to maximize those profits. A large customer 
willing to pay a significant price for a new feature or for changed behavior in a product 
will get more attention from a business than will a large number of nonpaying users 

86 xx Dual Licensing 



who all want some different feature or behavior. In business, customers vote with their 
money. In pure open source, contributors vote with their programming time. 

A dual-licensing business will, and should, pay attention to the requirements of its 
paying customers. The business needs to balance the needs of its paying customers 
with the needs of the nonpaying open source user community. After all, the com 
pany does not want to alienate its open source users and thereby lose the benefits of 
its open source distribution. 

As a rule, this issue requires attention, but seldom causes real problems. Paying cus 
tomers are usually interested in speed, reliability, or enhancements that make a prod 
uct more powerful. Those improvements are all useful and interesting to open source 
users as well, so it seldom happens that the open source community loses and the 
paying customer wins. 

From the point of view of the paying customer, the ability of money to influence the 
product roadmap is actually a benefit. Many companies considering adopting open 
source technology are concerned that they have no way to influence the develop 
ment community to solve real business problems for them. Because dual-licensing 
companies care about income and profits, customers know that they can get the ven 
dor s attention the old-fashioned way: by pulling out a checkbook. 

Trends and the Future 

Dual licensing is an innovative strategy that combines open source distribution with 
proprietary licensing. The combination confers competitive advantages on busi 
nesses that use it. These advantages include a low-cost distribution channel, power 
ful product marketing, and a high-margin, scalable revenue stream. 

Of course, dual licensing is just one tool that businesspeople can use to build sus 
tainable enterprises in a world where technology and economic forces are in con 
stant change. The rest of this chapter examines dual licensing in that larger context. 

Global Development 

The flow of capital and information across borders has transformed the world from a 
collection of economic islands into a more integrated global economy. That trend 
will surely continue, and will likely accelerate, over the next decade. At the same 
time, security concerns, and particularly worries about terrorism, create a strong 
political incentive to encourage the development of a prosperous middle class with 
an economic stake in the future in emerging economies. 

Worldwide economic development is necessarily influenced by information technol 
ogy. Leaders of emerging nations are clearly interested in building clean, sustainable 
IT industries. Doing so requires a significant investment in education, but also an 
investment in enabling technology. 

Trends and the Future X 87 



Dual licensing provides a way for nascent knowledge economies to grow. Because 
dual-licensed software is available for use at no charge under open source terms, 
emerging businesses can preserve precious capital by choosing to comply with the 
terms of the open source license. 

China is an instructive example. In 2004, the Chinese government announced its 
intention to invest in the development of a version of Linux tailored for use in the 
country, with language and character set support and other new features. The eco 
nomic advantage conferred by a low- or no-cost operating system in a country where 
an enormous number of computers will be installed soon is obvious. Between 2005 
and 2010, China is likely to become the world s largest consumer and producer of 
open source software. Consumption will increase earlier, and faster, than production. 
Demand for high-quality open source and dual-licensed products will be very high. 

Although there is little or no short-term revenue for dual-licensing businesses here, 
they do establish a long-term competitive advantage. As these small businesses in 
emerging economies grow, and as they build value in expertise or new hardware and 
software products, they can choose to pay some of their new capital for the more per 
missive terms of the proprietary license. The cost of switching encourages customers to 
stay with the product that they know, and the one built into their own products. 

This same strategy applies to developed economies. Software vendors are generally 
interested in the education market, in part because they want the next generation of 
software consumers trained to use their products. Many vendors encourage univer 
sity researchers and students to use their products so that the students will prefer 
those products when they graduate and eventually recommend software purchases to 
their new employers. 

Dual-license vendors have an advantage in both cases, relative to proprietary ven 
dors. Because the open source license terms permit use at no charge under reason 
able conditions, individual business owners, as well as researchers and students, can 
choose the open source software easily. They do not need to negotiate a special low- 
or no-cost introductory license to use the product. There is much less friction in the 
distribution of open source software than in most proprietary software distribution, 
and the lower friction translates into higher adoption. 

Open Models 

Dual licensing is, at base, the combination of a venerable business strategy licens 
ing software for money with a relatively new open source distribution strategy. This 
combination is interesting and valuable on its own, but it is by no means the only 
such combination that is possible. 

The global Internet makes the distribution of content much cheaper and easier than 
it ever was before. At the same time, it eliminates barriers to sharing among widely 



88 J* Dual Licensing 



dispersed individuals and companies. The effect is to create new opportunities for 
the collaborative creation of intellectual property. 

Some examples of this collaborative development were all but unknown just a few 
years ago. Weblogs, or blogs, are common today. They have emerged as an alternative 
source for news and information, replacing older media such as newspapers and radio, 
especially for fast-breaking stories. Similarly, the publication and production of scien 
tific journals is changing. Single-vendor control over high-profile journals, and the ven 
dor s ability to dictate pricing to the market, is eroding because researchers can collabo 
rate and publish their research online more easily than ever before. Finally, some web 
sites encourage user contributions to make themselves more valuable to visitors. An 
excellent example is the book and other product reviews on Amazon.com. Amazon s 
visitors share their reviews with one another because they benefit from that sharing, 
but Amazon itself gains an enormous advantage because of the depth and breadth of 
those reviews. 

In all three of these cases, old-fashioned ideas, like news distribution, journal publi 
cation, and product reviews, have been transformed by the open, collaborative pro 
cesses that the Internet encourages. Licensing is as much an issue here as in software 
distribution ownership of the content, and the right to distribute it online, must be 
considered carefully. 

Collaboration and open distribution continue to transform the way that businesses 
operate. That transformation necessarily damages some established businesses, espe 
cially those where a middleman controlled the flow of goods or information, and was 
able to extract a fee from the flow. The Internet allows individuals to bypass that 
middleman the well-known "disintermediation" strategy and to share and pub 
lish on their own. 

Any new business built on a disintermediation strategy must consider the law. 
Unlawful distribution of copyrighted music files is theft, not sharing, but that fact 
alone does not mean that the existing music retailing industry makes sense in a 
world with cheap ubiquitous bandwidth. The next generation of businesses must 
find ways to use the legal system to protect intellectual property, even while they 
take advantage of the powerful collaborative properties of the global Internet. 

The Future of Software 

Open source has transformed the way that software is produced. Now, with dual 
licensing, open source is changing the way that proprietary software is distributed. 

Dual licensing will never replace either pure proprietary or pure open source strate 
gies. There are compelling reasons for both to exist. 



Purely proprietary distribution allows companies to invest significantly in new devel 
opment and to be rewarded for that investment. Particularly at the edge of informa 
tion technology, where the newest products and services are built, businesses will 
use proprietary licensing to protect their competitive position and to extract maxi 
mum value from their efforts. 

Purely open source development and distribution, on the other hand, reduces costs 
of core infrastructure for consumers, and powerful market forces encourage invest 
ment in that cost reduction. Open source has been most successful in those sectors of 
the market where technology is mature and stable operating systems, databases, 
web servers, and middleware. This is not to say that open source development is not 
innovative, but its impact has been largest in the cases where it has commoditized 
products in mature markets. 

The net effect of open source distribution, from the point of view of the consumer, is 
to reduce the total cost of software licensing. Dual licensing does nothing to reverse 
this trend; dual-licensed software will exert downward price pressure on established 
markets just as purely open source software does, though the net reduction in costs 
will be lower since some consumers continue to pay for software licenses. 

Dual licensing will continue to grow in popularity as new and established businesses 
apply the strategy to new opportunities. Competitive pressure ensures that busi 
nesses will look for ways to gain advantages over one another, and building a hybrid 
business offers advantages in many cases. Other novel hybrid strategies will, no 
doubt, appear in the future. 



90 X Dual Licensing 




if CHAPTER 6 

Ian Murdock 




Open Source and the 
Commoditization of Software 



It is said that the only things certain in life are death and taxes. For those of us in the 
IT industry, we can add one more to the list: Commoditization. The question is, how 
do we deal with it, particularly if we are IT vendors and not simply IT consumers, for 
whom Commoditization is an unquestionably positive event? 

Commoditization is something that happens to every successful industry eventu 
ally success attracts attention, and there are always competitors willing to offer 
lower prices to compensate for lesser-known brands or "good enough" quality, as 
well as customers to whom price means more than brand, quality, or anything else 
the high-end providers have to offer. 

Often, to remain competitive at lower price points, the low-end provider employs a 
strategy of imitation for example, investing less in research and development than 
its high-end peers, and instead relying on the high-end providers to "fight it out" and 
establish standards and best practices it can then imitate in its own products. 

This strategy works because success also breeds interoperability. Unless a company 
monopolizes a market (a temporary condition, given today s antitrust laws), an 
industry eventually coalesces around a series of de facto standards that govern how 
competing products work with each other, or how consumers interact with like 
products from different vendors. In other words, given time and a large enough mar 
ket, every industry naturally develops its own lingua franca. 



This kind of natural standardization is good for consumers and for the world as a 
whole. Few people, for example, would know how to type if every typewriter used a 
different layout for its keys, and the telephone wouldn t be in widespread use today if 
each carrier s network couldn t talk to any of its competitors networks. And where 
would we be today without the descendants of typewriters and telephones namely, 
computer keyboards and telecommunications? 

Of course, from any incumbent s point of view, an ideal world would allow, say, the 
market leader in typewriters to own the layout of its product s keys, so anyone who 
learned to type using its product would face huge barriers to switching to a competitor s 
product. Fortunately, the layout of a typewriter s keys and similar interoperability fea 
tures are very difficult proprietary positions to enforce, so once a standard way of inter- 
operating emerges, all vendors are free to imitate that standard in their own products. 

The moral of the story is that standardization, and thus commoditization, are both 
natural market forces as well as key events in human history. When an industry 
matures and competing products become more or less interchangeable commodities, 
this allows new industries to build atop them to create new and innovative products 
that would not have otherwise been possible if the industries they built upon had not 
standardized. In the case of typewriters and telephones, it is clear that the industries 
they enabled the computer industry, e-commerce, etc. greatly exceed the size of 
the industries that enabled them, both economically and in their contribution to 
human progress. 

So, how do incumbent firms fight commoditization? Another moral of the story is 
that they shouldn t. The forces of commoditization, being natural market forces, can 
not be beaten. Yet time and time again, incumbent firms fight them. First, the chal 
lengers are ignored or dismissed as cheap knockoffs, unsuitable for any but the least- 
demanding customer. Then they are ridiculed for lacking imagination and innova 
tion. Then, invariably, they are imitated but by this point, it is too late, as the mar 
ket has fundamentally changed, and the incumbent finds itself unable to compete 
because the challengers were built for a commodity market and the incumbent was 
not. In very simple terms, this is Clayton Christensen s Innovator s Dilemma at work. 

This chapter argues that the open source movement is just another commoditization 
event and that, like other commoditization events, it represents a disruptive shift in 
the software industry as well as an opportunity for entrant firms to unseat the estab 
lished firms against seemingly overwhelming odds. That being said, commoditiza 
tion does not equate to certain death to the established firms if they have the vision 
to see beyond the disruptive events that may befall them in the short term and can 
adapt themselves to the new commodity environment. Above all, this chapter aims to 
convey that commoditization is a natural and unstoppable force that is good for 
everyone involved if that force is allowed to develop on its natural course. 



92 * C Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 



Commoditization and the IT Industry 

The computer industry managed to escape the forces of commoditization for the first 
20 years or so of its life a natural occurrence given the industry was young enough 
and small enough that standards had not yet had the opportunity to emerge. In the 
first two decades of the industry, computer manufacturers delivered an end-to-end 
solution to the customer, from the hardware on up through the operating system 
software that ran the hardware to the applications that ran on top of the operating 
system. Every layer of the stack and, most importantly, the interfaces between 
them was proprietary to the computer vendor. As a result, every computer spoke a 
different "language," and it was difficult to get different types of computers to "talk to 
each other" and interoperate. 

Because of these incompatibilities, the initial choice of hardware implicitly tied the 
buyer to an operating system; in turn, the operating system dictated what applica 
tions the buyer would be able to use. Over time, the high cost of computing technol 
ogy made it financially impractical for the buyer to move away from the incumbent 
vendor because previous investments in that vendor s technology would have to be 
discarded. The combination caused users to become "locked in" to a single vendor. 

However, as the industry matured, the dynamic changed. Entrant firms such as 
Apple, Apollo, and Sun saw the opportunity to create products that targeted an 
entirely new class of computing consumer the individual user that could not 
afford the mainframes and minicomputers sold by established firms such as IBM, 
DEC, and Data General. 

By focusing on "good-enough" quality and lower prices, and by tapping into years of 
consumer frustration caused by batch processing, timesharing, and incompatibility 
between proprietary stacks, the new "personal computing" products were received 
enthusiastically and began to appear in offices and dens everywhere. 

The strategies employed by one entrant firm in particular and one established firm in 
particular would forever change the computer industry. The latter, ironically, would 
lead directly to the commoditization of the hardware industry, and the former would 
lead directly to the ongoing commoditization of the software industry. 

On the hardware side, IBM sought to stem the rising tide of Apple by introducing its 
own personal computing product, the IBM PC. Because of internal cost structures 
designed around multimillion-dollar mainframe products as well as an aggressive prod 
uct launch timeline, IBM decided to use off-the-shelf parts for the IBM PC instead of 
following its traditional approach of developing proprietary components in house. 

On the software side, Sun sought to attain a competitive advantage against the pro 
prietary stacks of the mainframe and minicomputer vendors by basing its worksta 
tion products on the Unix operating system. Unix was already hugely popular in aca- 
demia and corporate research labs, so this approach gave Sun instant access to a large 

Commoditization and the IT Industry X 33 



portfolio of compatible applications as well as an enormous user base already famil 
iar with the operating system that shipped on its products. 

In other words, Unix was an open system that is, a system based on open standards. 
Unix variants from different groups (for example, AT&T Unix and BSD Unix, the 
two variants in widespread use in the early 1980s) were largely based on the same 
APIs. Because of this, applications could be easily ported from one version of Unix to 
another, and users familiar with one version of Unix could easily learn to operate a 
different version. 

Decommoditization: The Failure of Open Systems 

The impact of Sun s decision was the first to be felt. Open systems quickly became 
popular because of the compatibility they offered a completely foreign notion at the 
time. Users adopted systems based on open standards because doing so allowed 
them to move freely among products from different vendors, avoiding the lock-in 
common in the proprietary world. Soon, numerous companies including some of 
the mainframe and minicomputer vendors launched Unix-based workstations to 
compete with Sun s, and Unix became big business. 

As the Unix market grew, the competition for customers became fierce. "Compatibil 
ity among products," which helped the Unix vendors win converts from the propri 
etary world, changed from an asset to a liability. In an attempt to imitate the lock-in 
strategies that had served the mainframe vendors so well for so many years, the Unix 
vendors themselves began adding incompatible features to their respective products. 
This ultimately fragmented the market and alienated customers. By the late 1980s, 
Unix was no longer a lingua franca for the workstation market, but a veritable tower 
of Babel. 

Meanwhile, IBM s decision to use off-the-shelf parts in the IBM PC inadvertently cre 
ated the industry s first open hardware platform. It was not long before a new wave 
of entrants, such as Compaq, Dell, and Gateway, realized they could build products 
that were 100% compatible with the IBM PC, thus gaining access to a large base of 
applications and users, much as Sun had done by adopting Unix. On the component 
side, two companies experienced the biggest windfall from IBM s decision: Intel and 
Microsoft. As the clone market emerged, both companies found an entire market to 
sell to, not just a single company a much larger opportunity, even if that single 
company was IBM. 

At this point, the events set in motion by IBM and Sun intersected. As the Unix ven 
dors were competing vigorously with each other through the introduction of propri 
etary extensions to Unix, thereby "decommoditizing" the lowest level of the software 
stack, the fully commoditized PC waited in the wings. As PCs became more power 
ful, they began to replace workstations, and as PCs continued their march upmarket, 



94 X Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 



the market power of the PC vendors (and, thus, the vendors of their constituent 
components) increased dramatically. In particular, the new ubiquity of the PC helped 
Microsoft s Windows operating system replace Unix as the lingua franca of not just 
the new PC-based workstation market, but also of the entire computer industry. 

Why did Unix fail while the PC has succeeded beyond anyone s wildest expecta 
tions, particularly those of its progenitor, IBM? Both began life as open systems as 
ecosystems of sorts and both grew enormously popular because of their open 
nature. On the Unix side, though, each vendor tried to own the ecosystem by itself, 
and, in the end, all they collectively managed to do was destroy it. Meanwhile, on the 
PC side, the ecosystem won out in the end, for the betterment of all who embraced 
that ecosystem; and, most importantly, the existence of that ecosystem enabled the 
creation of other ecosystems above it. For example, without a truly open platform in 
every office and den, the Internet would not have been able to take root, and it too 
evolved into an ecosystem that has spawned countless products, services, industries, 
and ecosystems that were previously unimaginable. 

Linux: A Response from the Trenches 

It was into this environment that Linux emerged in the early 1990s. At first the mere 
hobby project of a young college student, Linux captured the imagination of those who 
could best be described as the "collateral damage" of the Unix wars. Two features of 
Linux made it appeal to this large group of users and developers: its compatibility with 
Unix, with which they were intimately familiar; and that it was licensed under the GNU 
General Public License (GPL), which not only allowed the scores of Unix refugees to 
contribute to its development, but also guaranteed that Unix-style fragmentation could 
never happen to the result of the community s work, at least at the source-code level. 

Linux grew by leaps and bounds during the 1990s. As with previous challengers, it 
was first ignored, then ridiculed, by the incumbents, primarily Microsoft, which had 
masterfully used its position as the de facto standard operating system to expand into 
numerous additional markets and gain additional even unprecedented market 
power. Unlike so many companies that had come before it, Microsoft wielded the 
forces of commoditization expertly. By offering its products at lower prices than its 
competitors could afford to offer them, Microsoft preemptively commoditized many 
of the markets in which it competed, depending on high volume to make its prod 
ucts profitable and making it impossible for challengers to undercut it. 

As Microsoft s power grew, so did the desire of Microsoft s competitors to counter it. 
By the late 1990s, it was clear that Linux was a powerful force, and many of the 
industry s largest companies began to see it as a competitive weapon. These compa 
nies also recognized that the power behind Linux wasn t so much its technology as 
its licensing and development model, by now referred to as "open source" and in 
particular, the open source model s ability to "out-commoditize" Microsoft. 

Linux: A Response from the Trenches * 95 



The fundamental question is this: why is Linux (and the open source movement it 
helped launch) able to out-commoditize Microsoft? Because it, like the PC, the Inter 
net, and the other open systems and open standards we take for granted today, is 
more of an ecosystem than a technology. Indeed, Linux builds above those previous 
ecosystems without open, commoditized hardware, and without the Internet to 
enable the open source development model to work, Linux would not exist today. 

Microsoft may wield the forces of commoditization more expertly than any company 
that has come before it, but its platform is not an ecosystem. By definition, an ecosys 
tem is an environment to be shared, not owned. Linux is positioned to become the 
lingua franca of the lowest level of the software stack, if we never forget it is an eco 
system and not a product to be owned. Looking at the lessons of the past, if it 
remains an ecosystem, we all win. If not, we destroy it. 

"So, How Do You Make Money from Free Software?" 

If the open source movement represents the commoditization of software, how can 
the challengers of today s software industry utilize its commoditizing power to unseat 
the incumbents, Microsoft in particular? Perhaps more importantly, if this strategy 
succeeds, is there money to be made in a software industry that has been commod 
itized? Finally, are there lessons that can be applied from past commoditization 
events, particularly the events that reshaped the hardware industry in the 1980s? 

For a textbook example of how to turn the commoditization of an industry into busi 
ness advantage, one need look no further than Dell Computer. Dell, of course, was 
one of the companies that started life in the mid-1980s to build IBM clones. Dell s 
initial claim to fame was "build to order," taking advantage of the fact that a PC was 
not really a product in itself, but rather, an assemblage of numerous products that 
any individual with a moderate amount of skill could assemble himself a direct lin 
eage from IBM s decision to base the original IBM PC on off-the-shelf parts. 

Unlike some of its competitors, Dell saw itself for what it truly was: an assembler of 
off-the-shelf components and a distributor of these components in a form its custom 
ers found useful namely, a complete PC. Dell gave its customers choice not an 
overwhelming amount of choice, but enough choice to give those with the skill to 
build their own PCs reason to buy from Dell instead of building themselves. Its com 
petitors, on the other hand, attempted to mold the PC into a monolithic, unchange 
able product, a collection of specific components from specific vendors with the 
occasional bit of proprietary technology added to the mix a thinly veiled attempt to 
decommoditize the PC standard and own it all to themselves. 

To accommodate its new approach to selling hardware, Dell had to develop a new kind 
of business model. Over the years, the Dell model became more about the assembly of 
product than the final product of that assembly process. Dell became remarkably good 



96 * * Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 



at assembling components from a multitude of suppliers into cohesive wholes, and in 
negotiating with those suppliers to get the lowest possible price. It stuck to commodity 
components, allowing the market to pick winning technologies and resisting the temp 
tation to invest heavily in the R&D required to play the proprietary lock-in game its 
competitors were playing. It employed unusual tactics on the sales side, most notably 
selling directly to the consumer instead of going through wholesalers and resellers, 
each of whom took a substantial slice of the profit margin. 

As a result of its streamlined processes and lower cost structure, Dell was able to sell 
PCs at a much lower price than its competitors could. As the PC market grew, and as 
the market commoditized further with each failed proprietary extension to the PC 
standard, Dell s position grew stronger. As the PC began to move upmarket, it sim 
ply became less expensive to "outsource" the assembly of the PCs to a supplier that 
specialized in assembling them, and Dell was extremely well positioned to play this 
new role. Today, as the commoditization of PCs extends to other parts of the hard 
ware market servers, storage, printers, handheld devices Dell continues to be 
extremely well-positioned, and its entry into a new market is often taken as impend 
ing doom for that market s established firms. 

The First Business Models for Linux 

So, what lessons can we leam from Dell as open source commoditizes the software 
world? Namely, that operating in a commodity market calls for entirely different busi 
ness models than the business models that have preceded them. Beyond general conclu 
sions such as this, what specific lessons are there to be learned from Dell s success? As a 
start, we will look at the lowest layer of the software stack, the operating system, and 
attempt to draw parallels between Dell s successful strategy and the strategies of today s 
open source operating system vendors namely, the Linux distribution companies. 

To millions of users around the world, "Linux" is an operating system. They re right, 
of course, but the reality is far more complex than that. First of all, Linux proper is 
just the kernel, or core, of the operating system the rest of the software that com 
prises the "Linux operating system" is developed independently from the kernel, by 
different groups that often have different release schedules, motivations, and goals. 1 

Traditional operating systems are built by cohesive teams, carefully coordinated 
groups of product managers, project managers, and programmers at companies and 
universities. In contrast, Linux is built by thousands of individuals hackers and 
hobbyists and professional programmers some paid to work on specific projects 
but the majority simply working on what interests them. And the reality is even more 
involved: Linux is not just a single system, but hundreds of subsystems, programs, 



1 To avoid confusion, I will use the term Linux to refer to the operating system, following 
standard usage. When referring to just the Linux kernel, I will say "the Linux kernel." 



The First Business Models for Linux * * 97 



and applications, themselves developed by their own communities of individuals 
around the world. 

So, who glues all this mishmash together into something that actually looks like an 
operating system? Since almost the inception of the Linux community, this has been 
the job of the "Linux distribution," a curious term in itself for those coming from 
broader computing circles accustomed to operating systems being built by cohesive 
teams, or at least teams of cohesive teams. 

A Linux distribution is a collection of software (typically free or open source soft 
ware) combined with the Linux kernel to form a complete operating system. The first 
distributions (HJ Lu s boot/root diskettes, MCC Interim) were very small affairs, 
designed simply to help bootstrap the core of a Linux system, on which the user 
(typically a Linux hacker himself, eager to get into writing some code) could com 
pile the rest of the system by hand and as needed. 

A second generation emerged (SLS, Slackware, Debian) that aimed to expand the 
breadth and depth of software shipped by the first-generation distributions, includ 
ing software typical end users of Unix systems might find useful, such as the X Win 
dow System and document formatting systems. In addition, the second-generation 
distributions attempted to be easier to install than the first, as they were targeted not 
at Linux hackers eager to get into writing code, but rather, at the ever-expanding col 
lection of end users Linux was just beginning to attract at the time. 

As Linux s user base grew, many in the Linux community began to sense a business 
opportunity, and the first Linux companies were formed: Red Hat, Caldera, SuSE, 
and many others whose names have long been forgotten. These companies formed 
around the concept of selling commercial distributions to the expanding Linux user 
base. A third generation of Linux distributions was born. 

The commercial opportunity was ripe, as the primary means of acquiring Linux to 
that point had been the Internet, and up to that point, the primary users of Linux 
had been students at universities, where Internet access was plentiful. However, in 
the broader population where Linux was beginning to get noticed, potential Linux 
users were lucky to have dial-up access to online systems such as CompuServe. 
Combined with the rising popularity of CD-ROM drives and the growing size of dis 
tributions to incorporate more and more software to appeal to a wider and wider 
audience, the first business models for Linux were born. 

These business models served the first Linux companies well through most of the 
1990s and, indeed, this is where the term "Linux distribution" originated the com 
panies themselves were little more than assemblers and distributors of Linux soft 
ware, including the Linux kernel, the GNU compiler toolchain, and the other soft 
ware that came with a typical Linux system. As the typical Linux user became less 
and less of a technologist and more and more of a traditional end user, the focus of 



98 * * Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 



the distributions shifted from simple assembly and distribution to making the distri 
butions easier to install and use. 

Linux Commercialization at a Crossroads 

Of course, as distributors of a commodity (for, after all, any company could easily 
become a Linux distributor all the software being distributed was free), these new 
Linux distribution companies lacked the "proprietary advantage" every business 
needs to survive, not to mention thrive. So, following time-honored tradition, many 
of the Linux companies kept their "value add" proprietary in an attempt to better 
compete with each other. 

For a time, one company took a different approach: Red Hat. After a brief flirtation 
with proprietary extensions, Red Hat announced its products would include only 
open source software. Why? It listened to what the market was telling it. The scores 
of Unix refugees, now occupying important positions in the companies that were 
adopting Linux in droves, had already been down that path; furthermore, the giants 
of the industry now supporting Linux, which by now included virtually all of the 
companies that had participated in Unix s destruction and had seen the conse 
quences, saw Linux as a commodity platform that could recapture the position they 
had collectively handed to Microsoft in the early 1990s. As a result, Red Hat emerged 
as the market-leading supplier of Linux software. 

However, as the Linux market continued to grow, and as it began to take a place at 
the core of the computer industry, Red Hat bumped up against its own ceiling, 
caused by lack of proprietary advantage other companies were beginning to take in 
billions of dollars per year in revenue from Linux-based sales, while Red Hat seemed 
to have hit its peak at $100 million or so. 

To counter this, Red Hat came up with a strategy that was still in keeping with its 
"100% open source" market position. Instead of focusing on selling Linux as a boxed 
product, it would sell software updates to those boxed products in the form of 
annual subscriptions. This strategy by itself proved inadequate, as the software 
updates it distributed were available for free. So, it combined the new strategy with 
another maneuver, a redefinition of the "Linux platform" to one it could define and 
control itself. 

Moving away from its traditional, freely redistributable Red Hat Linux product line, it 
launched Red Hat Enterprise Linux. The key part of the strategy behind Enterprise 
Linux was that independent software vendors (ISVs) and independent hardware ven 
dors (IHVs) were directed to certify to this new "high-end" Linux platform, while the 
old Red Hat Linux was relegated to software developers and infrastructure roles. The 
other key pan of the strategy was that Enterprise Linux was no longer freely redis 
tributablethe acquisition of the product was tied to the subscription, and any 
redistribution of the product caused the subscription to be null and void. 



99 



In other words, if Linux users wanted access to the applications and hardware certi 
fied to Red Hat s platform, they had to run Enterprise Linux. To run Enterprise 
Linux, they had to acquire it from Red Hat via the new subscription model, which 
entailed signing a subscription agreement that forbade them from redistributing it. 
More precisely, customers were still free to redistribute Enterprise Linux, but in 
doing so, they lost all support from Red Hat and, most importantly, from the legions 
of ISVs and IHVs that certified to the Red Hat platform. Red Hat s transformation was 
complete when it dropped its Red Hat Linux product line altogether in 2003. Red 
Hat s new model was still in keeping with the letter of the open source movement 
but no longer with its spirit. 

Proprietary Linux? 

By any measure of the term, this is proprietary lock-in, albeit proprietary lock-in that 
does not involve the traditional attainment through source code intellectual property 
i.e., proprietary software. In a way, Red Hat has learned from the lessons of Dell s suc 
cess: it has come up with a clever new business model to match the commodity mar 
ket in which it competes operating systems used to be sold as products in boxes or 
bundled with other products, and Red Hat realized this approach would not be profit 
able in the new operating system market Linux was helping to create; so it found a new 
way to sell its operating system products that was profitable. 

However, in a very real way, Red Hat s model is also dangerously close to the model 
employed by the Unix vendors, which had catastrophic consequences. It is attempt 
ing to decommoditize the Linux platform, not through proprietary extensions in the 
form of software, but through a redefinition of the Linux platform to its own ends 
and the restriction of how that platform can be used and redistributed. Sure, the 
source code to its platform is still freely redistributable, but with the shift of propri 
etary position away from source code intellectual property and to third-party rela 
tionships and subscription agreements, the rules of the game have changed dramati 
cally here as well. 

What s at Stake? 

Red Hat s new business model may be helping its revenues in the short term, but is it 
in Red Hat s best long-term interest not to mention the best interest of the Linux 
ecosystem as a whole if Linux is owned by a single company, or if Linux fragments 
like Unix did as Red Hat s competitors follow down the proprietary Linux path? 

If Red Hat s business model is wrong, what is the right business model for Linux dis 
tribution vendors? In my view, the Dell model can be taken a step further than any of 
the Linux distributors have thought to take it. After all, what are open source tech 
nologies but commodity software components, and what are Linux distributions but 
assemblers of those components into products the end customer finds useful? 

100 * C Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 



Indeed, such an "assembler of commodity software components" business model might 
fully realize many of the benefits of Linux that the traditional, product-oriented busi 
ness models of Linux distribution companies have failed to capture: flexibility and 
choice, without the substantial expertise and financial investment required to adapt a 
Linux distribution for its own purposes. What if a Linux distribution was a collection of 
parts that could be mixed and matched to suit the needs of the company buying it 
instead of a one-size-fits-all, monolithic product like the Linux distributions of today? 

As with new business models that have come before it, such an approach would 
open Linux to new markets, markets that are already using Linux, but for whom 
today s product-oriented business models are ill-suited: server appliance vendors, 
set-top box makers, and others to whom Linux is an invisible vehicle for driving 
their own products. In their world, Linux is a piece of infrastructure, not a product 
to be owned by Red Hat or otherwise. 

Indeed, this is the model being employed by my company, Progeny. Our approach is 
to embrace the commoditizing effect Linux and open-source software have on the 
software industry instead of fighting it. Since every company needs a proprietary 
advantage of some kind, we ve chosen to focus on building advantage through our 
processes, not technology, much as Dell did in other words, to leverage our exper 
tise in distribution building to help other companies assemble commodity software 
components from disparate places into cohesive wholes, and to do so in a scalable 
and flexible way. 

Beyond building a better business model around Linux, what s at stake? I contend far 
more is at stake, for one simple reason: Linux needs to remain a commodity, as it is 
now a core piece of infrastructural technology at the heart of the computer industry. 
Indeed, Linux was enabled by the commodity nature of the last infrastructural tech 
nology to redefine the IT industry: the Internet. 

In "IT Doesn t Matter," which appeared in the May 2003 edition of Harvard Business 
Review, Nicholas Carr points out that infrastructural technologies "[offer] far more 
value when shared than when used in isolation." What happens if Linux is decom- 
moditized and ends up being the proprietary product of a single company to serve its 
own purposes? What if the PC or the Internet had been decommoditized? Where 
would we be today? 

Carr s essay provides hope that there is money to be made in infrastructural technol 
ogies that have been fully commoditized, and that there s no need to try to own those 
infrastructural technologies: 

. . .the picture may not be as bleak as it seems for vendors, at least those with the 
foresight and skill to adapt to the new environment. The importance of infra- 
structural technologies to the day-to-day operations of business means that they 
continue to absorb large amounts of corporate cash long after they have become 



What s at Stake? X 101 



commodities indefinitely, in many cases. Virtually all companies today con 
tinue to spend heavily on electricity and phone service, for example, and many 
manufacturers continue to spend a lot on rail transport. Moreover, the standard 
ized nature of infrastructural technologies often leads to the establishment of 
lucrative monopolies and oligopolies. 

Carr s essay also provides historical perspective on the commoditization process: 

...infrastructural technologies often lead to broader market changes. [...]A com 
pany that sees what s coming can gain a step on myopic rivals. In the mid- 
1800s, when America started to lay down rail lines in earnest, it was already 
possible to transport goods over long distances hundreds of steamships plied 
the country s rivers. Businessmen probably assumed that rail transport would 
essentially follow the steamship model, with some incremental enhancements. 
In fact, the greater speed, capacity, and reach of the railroads fundamentally 
changed the structure of American industry. 

In a commodity world, technologists need to think about innovating in their business 
models as much as (if not more than) innovating in their technology. Of course, it s a 
natural trap for the technologist to think about technology alone, but technology is but a 
small part of the technology business. Look for your competition s Achilles heel, which 
more often than not is an outdated business model in a changing world, not technol 
ogy. To attack your competition with technology alone is to charge the giants head on, 
and this approach is doomed to failure the vast majority of the time. 

Businesses operating in a commodity world also need to build business models with 
the larger ecosystem in mind. It is tempting, once the incumbents have been over 
thrown through the powers of commoditization, to lapse into the same old propri 
etary lock-in strategies that served the former incumbents so well. In effect, though, 
this is decommoditizing the industry, "poisoning the well." It is possible to build a 
successful business in a commodity market, as Dell and many others before it have 
shown, and in the long run, it is far better to ride the forces of commoditization than 
to fight them. 



102 ^ > Open Source and the Commoditization of Software 





t CHAPTER 7 

Matthew N. Asay 




Open Source and the Commodity 
Urge: Disruptive Models for a 
Disruptive Development Process 



Open source hastens software s natural trend toward standardization/commodification. 
While technologically innovative companies will always find ample customer interest, 
the most important innovations for the next decade of software will come from business 
model innovation, mostly spawned by open source license requirements. Open source 
builds a new intellectual property regime centered on the source of code, not source 
code. Protection, in other words, shifts to "owning" the code creator, rather than the 
product she creates. Those business models that acknowledge this and leverage it will 
yield better profits than those that attempt a halfway embrace (or rejection) of open 
source. 

Introduction 

We are missing the point. Yes, open source imposes dramatic changes on the soft 
ware industry, and yes, it is roiling the fortunes of many an established vendor. It 
will continue to do so, and at an increased pace. Yet despite the sometimes 
anguished, sometimes giddy reception that open source has provoked in the IT 
world, open source is not novel. It is not odd. 

Open source is simply the software world s mechanism for becoming just like every 
thing else. 

All the world s a commodity or a service to support and distribute commodities: 
this book that you are reading, the chair that supports you, the restaurant you will 



eat at tonight everything including, increasingly, software, thanks to open source. 
Open source accelerates the natural progress of software toward commodification, or 
standardization. 

It is critical that IT vendors understand this so that they can deploy (or fight, if they 
so choose) open source effectively, and more intelligently choose how and where to 
innovate. Open source does not destroy all value in software innovation; instead, it 
shifts the control point from the code itself to the creator of the code. In so doing, 
open source software will not pillage all closed source software. As in other indus 
tries, there will continue to be plenty of room for upmarket vendors (e.g., Whole 
Foods in grocery retailing; Starbucks in coffee; and Nordstom in retail clothing). 

That said, there is no room for middling and muddling. Open source will commod 
ity from the bottom up while "upmarket" vendors will dominate "up the stack." 
Everything else will be a wasteland. Just as Safeway finds itself pummeled by Wal- 
Mart and Whole Foods so, too, will middle-ground IT vendors find themselves 
grasping at a dwindling market opportunity. 

Open source offers hope, but perhaps not for the reasons normally associated with it. 
Much has been made about the open source revolution, and with good reason. But 
perhaps the best reason has little to do with development of source code, and instead 
has much to do with distribution, marketing, and sales. In other words, what we 
thought was a software development methodology may have far more importance as 
a business strategy that undercuts competitors while driving down costs and shifting 
control to buyers. In such a world, those who understand and leverage open source 
commodification (or escape it) will thrive everyone else will be marginalized into 
economic oblivion. Commodification, the highest stage of capitalism; open source, 
the highest stage of software. 

A Brief History of Software 

Once upon a time, software did not matter hardware did. Software was something 
that hardware vendors wrote to help them sell hardware. Little more. Software was 
important because it made hardware operate, but customers understood that they 
were paying for hardware, and not the software that ran on top of it. (This is still 
somewhat true of certain areas of the embedded software market.) 

As hardware commodified, software grew in importance as a differentiator with these 
same customers. Not all hardware commodified at the same pace: Solaris servers, for 
example, handled a workload in a way that commodified hardware could not, and 
Sun consequently charged a premium. But the real premium increasingly gravitated 
up the IT stack to the applications that people ran on their hardware. Hardware was 
important, but only because the applications had to run on something. With the rise 
of Dell and other commodifiers, however, IT buyers came to care less and less about 



104 x C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



the "guts" of their computing experiences they bought systems for the applications 
they could run, for the productivity they could achieve. 

No single company did more to send the applications trend into hyperdrive than 
Microsoft. Microsoft made software easily consumable by the masses. By simplifying 
computing, and by doing so at a dramatically lower cost, Microsoft grew the market 
by competing against nonconsumption and underconsumption, inviting multitudes 
of average users into the hitherto closed world of computing. Microsoft s Visual Basic 
lowered the bar of expertise to be a proficient developer, and its Office suite created a 
market of home and business users who suddenly could create brochures, quality let 
terhead, etc. Whatever open source developers feelings about Microsoft, they should 
acknowledge Microsoft as the natural parent to their own brand of commodification. 

For this is what open source is doing: commodifying software. We are now at the 
point where mainstream software is becoming commodified by the open source com 
munity, perhaps pushing all value to the services that support hardware and soft 
ware. Microsoft, in a sense, is being out-Microsofted. 

In this world, customers benefit as vendors focus on solving their business prob 
lems, instead of innovating new methods to achieve customer lock-in. Much of 
today s IT world is composed of expensive, monolithic software "solutions" that end 
up creating complexity and integration problems, instead of resolving customer 
problems. That is, today s IT industry is a morass of conflicting standards, complex 
installations, tepid product interoperability, and expense all products of the indus 
try s Wild West "level of thinking" in its adolescent years. Increasingly, however, cus 
tomers are tired of subsidizing the disarray and are turning to open source as a way 
to get more for less. As open source proliferates, the cost of infrastructure software 
will plummet, freeing up resources that the CIO can spend on resolving application 
requirements up the stack. 

Vendors, for their part, also benefit from increased use of open source, because it 
removes the "IP safety blanket." Because code is open, vendors must find innovative 
ways to satisfy and "lock in" customers. Copyright and patent are fine, but they pit 
the vendor in an adversarial relationship with the customer, whereas open source 
control mechanisms tend to force vendors to win by intimately understanding and 
fixing their customers business problems. In addition, this commodification of IT 
will push vendors to move up the stack (and off the stack, into services) to deliver 
increased customer loyalty/value. Finally, as prices for software drop to match the 
drop in hardware costs, more buyers will enter the market, increasing the size of the 
market. Everyone wins. 



A Brief History of Software 



A New Brand of Intellectual Property Protection 

To fully appreciate this trend, it is critical that we better understand the intellectual 
property regime powering the open source revolution. Intellectual property (IP) law 
has always been about control. That control benefits creators by holding off would-be 
competitors long enough to allow the creator to attempt to profit from her innovation. I 
write a piece of software; I copyright it; I sell it (assuming it is a useful piece of soft 
ware and I have adequately marketed it so that people know about it). Simple. This has 
been the software industry s dominant model for decades, and has created a few mam 
moth software companies that have successfully exploited their IP to generate billions 
of dollars in revenues. In this model, exclusion (i.e., the ability to keep competitors or 
customers from copying one s code and distributing it to others) yields profits. In this 
model, the code itself locked up and protected matters most. 

In the open source world, at least as defined by the GNU General Public License 
(GPL), IP continues to play a critical role, but it is a different kind of IP. Dubbed 
"copyleft," open source IP focuses on keeping code access open rather than closed. 
And, unlike in the world of proprietary software, the code matters less than the 
coder anyone can see the code, but not everyone can replicate the coder s influ 
ence on the community to which she contributes her code. By virtue of her contribu 
tion, she builds influence in her chosen code community, and this influence trans 
lates into a new kind of IP: reputation property instead of intellectual property. 

In this new world of open source, reputation property means as much as or more than 
traditional intellectual property. If I employ the developers on a given project, I have a 
measure of control over the direction that the open source project will take. But even 
more importantly, the more developers I employ who work on, say, the PostgreSQL 
database project, the more likely it is that would-be customers will trust me to be able 
to support it. Once a company is thought of as the default support vendor for a given 
project, the harder it becomes to dislodge that vendor. This jibes perfectly with other 
commodity businesses where brand, price, and service provide the only lock-in, a 
benevolent lock-in that customers choose instead of one that vendors impose. 

In this way, the open source code creator exercises a form of control over her cre 
ation, and that control translates into her (and only her) ability to charge a premium 
for the software. As an open source creator, then, my options for deriving profit from 
my creation are not more limited, but they are different. Instead of a limited monop 
oly guarded by law, I have a monopoly guarded by common sense: buyers want to 
buy from the most qualified source of support. They pay to have access to the source: 
not the source code, but the source of the code. 

This distinction is important. The importance of source code gets trumpeted so often 
that one would think that every IT buyer on the planet is clamoring for access to 
source code. They are not. Indeed, Microsoft recently conducted a survey of its cus 
tomers and found that roughly 60% felt that access to source code was "critical." But 

106 * C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



when pressed on the matter, 95% said that they would never look at the source, and 
a whopping 99% said that they would never modify it. (If they did, chances are that 
such modification would violate their support agreement anyway, whether their ven 
dor was Microsoft, Novell-SuSE, Oracle, Red Hat, etc.) In sum, customers perceive 
source code access to be important, but are not exactly sure why. As I will detail 
shortly, the "why" relates to a desire for additional choice and control, and choice 
and control drive down costs. 

Of course, nothing in this chapter should lead one to believe that source code is irrele 
vant. Source matters. It matters because it lowers switching costs (i.e., the cost of swap 
ping out one vendor s software for a competing vendor s software); because it provides 
buyers with more control over their IT, as it allows them to shape code to fit their par 
ticular needs; and because it provides a mechanism for keeping vendors honest, by 
forcing them to take responsibility for the quality of their code. In short, source code 
matters because it shifts control back to the buyer, which forces vendors to offer better 
software at lower prices. While none of these source code benefits requires the inter 
vention of a vendor, we should not get sucked into the belief that vendors matter but 
little in the open source world. Instead, open source actually makes vendors more rele 
vant to customers than ever before at dramatically lower prices. 

Besides benefiting customers, this GPL licensing scheme offers vendors a way to 
exercise an incredible amount of control over competitors. By open sourcing my 
code under the GPL, I push my competitors to follow suit or to increase their R&D 
efforts to escape commodification. Unfortunately for them, this counterstrategy of a 
unilateral R&D arms race tends toward paltry results: customers will often opt for 
the "good enough" product when the price is dramatically lower. Yes, my closed 
source competitors could simply take my freely accessible source code, "fork" it, and 
build it into their own products, but they almost never will. Doing so compels them 
to open source their own software, which they will be disinclined to do. Even if they 
did so, however, and even if my competitor were not a stodgy old closed source ven 
dor, but rather, an agile open source predator, it would matter little, because open 
source buyers invariably favor the source of the source, as it were: they trust the cre 
ator of the code to support it best. 

Open Distribution, Not Source 

This has huge implications for the software industry. Disruptive vendors can opt to 
completely open source their code, relying on reputation property to net them reve 
nues, and further relying on their freely available alternative to competitive products to 
force competitors to meet them on their home turf. This is not to say that all vendors 
must adopt an open source strategy, but rather, that they must compete with open 
source s lower cost structures and superior distribution mechanisms. All must increas 
ingly compete on open source s terms. More detail is needed on why this is so. 



Open Distribution, Not Source ** 107 



The Open Source Weapon 

Open source enables a vendor to maximize its market penetration at minimal cost, 
which is the goal of every IT vendor, but particularly of emerging-growth vendors 
seeking to displace incumbent vendors. One of the biggest roadblocks to any com 
pany s growth is the Bureaucracy Bottleneck the larger the buyer (and, hence, the 
larger the opportunity), the more layers of bureaucracy an IT buyer must fight 
through to try-before-they-buy. Not so with open source, which surreptitiously 
makes its way into enterprises via free download. 

Such distribution fattens a vendor s bottom line without fattening the customer s price 
tag. MySQL had 10 million downloads in 2003, and by mid-2004 had more than 5 mil 
lion installations. Of these would-be customers, 5,000 have returned to buy a support 
contract/license from MySQL, bumping the company s revenues by 100% to $10 mil 
lion in 2003. The revenue growth is important, but even more so is that it achieved this 
growth by spending less than 10% of total revenues on sales and marketing activities. By 
contrast, most public software companies spend 45-50% of total revenues on sales and 
marketing, and companies of MySQL s size generally spend 21.8% on these activities, 
according to a study done by Softletter.com. In short, open source creates a small uni 
verse of prequalified buyers who seek out the vendor, instead of the other way around, 
with the vendor s primary marketing costs relating to setting up an FTP server and 
mostly word-of-mouth-type evangelism to developers. 

The savings do not stop there. Whether the open source vendor "borrows" much of its 
code (e.g., Novell, Specifix, Gluecode) or creates it almost entirely in-house and then 
open sources it (MySQL, SugarCRM, JBoss), open source delivers development-related 
cost savings. For the "borrowers," the cost savings are obvious: they leverage a well- 
developed body of code, most of it written by individuals not on their payroll. For the 
JBosses and MySQLs of the world, which do 85100% of their own development 
work, there is still a significant QA savings from the global pool of testers who submit 
bug fixes and code contributions (which may or may not be used by the vendor) 
cheaper to build, cheaper to sell, cheaper to buy. 

Proliferating Open Source Beyond the Enterprise 

Today, open source largely confines itself to infrastructure software, in part because 
this is where the widest computing community resides. Community-based open 
source projects require a sufficient body of developers with aptitude and interest in a 
given development problem. But as the IT industry begins to recognize the promise 
of emerging open source business models, community becomes less critical to the 
success of a project. As this happens, no area of the software stack will be exempt 

from open source s influence and intrusion. 

r 

Significantly, open source business models will pave the way for open source to 
conquer the Great Middle Class of IT: the small to medium-size enterprise (SME) 



108 ^ C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



market. Open source, as a disruptive methodology in the Clayton Christensen 
sense, will do more than simply allow startup vendors to compete against estab 
lished vendors in established markets: it will help to create new markets by com 
peting against under-consumption and nonconsumption. The Internet, and open 
source s unparalleled use of it, is at this trend s core. 

In "Does IT Matter?" Nick Carr offers one example of how this worked in another 
industry: chocolate. Milton Hershey, founder of the Hershey Company, noticed a gap 
in the chocolate landscape, a gap the railroad could resolve. Until his observation, 
transportation deficiencies had forced production to stick close to consumption there 
was no quick and refrigerated way to ship chocolate over long distances, creating 
scores of micromarkets for chocolate. With the advent of the railroad, however, Her 
shey conceived the idea of a national chocolate market, built it, and owned it. 

Today, the Internet parallels the railroad infrastructure of Hershey s era. It offers 
independent software vendors (ISVs) a similar opportunity to that which Hershey 
had, yet the majority of ISVs are not capitalizing on it. Yes, some traditional ISVs can 
and do offer their products for download, but this is a makeshift attempt to leverage 
the Internet. Open source is an Internet phenomenon it depends upon the Internet 
and extends the Internet s utility. Open source should disproportionately benefit 
from the Internet s distribution mechanism, provided companies understand this fact 
and act accordingly. As I will show shortly, tomorrow s most successful software ven 
dors will triumph to the extent that they develop models that leverage the Internet as 
a distribution mechanism, and use open source licensing as the rules-based system to 
govern that distribution. 

So, Why Not Freeware? 

Let us assume that all of this is true. Open source is great because it enables upstart 
competitors to undercut established vendors on price while providing their custom 
ers Porsche technology at Pinto pricing. But if open source is so important because it 
allows me to freely distribute my product over the Internet, why is freeware not 
equally disruptive?! Stated another way, if the source code does not matter, and only 
distribution matters, why not just give the software away as freeware and charge 
users who require support? Why offer something (access to source code) that simply 
does not matter? 

The easy way out of this apparent quandary is to allow that while open distribution mat 
ters most, open source code access is also important. But this does not get us very far. I 
will therefore detail the reasons that freeware cannot match open source as a distribu 
tion strategy. Most importantly, I will explain how the two matter most when they inter 
sect, making distribution without access as hollow as access without distribution. 



1 Larry Augustin originally needled me with this question, for which I thank him. 

Open Distribution, Not Source * C 109 



Don t view. Don t modify. What do you do? 

As mentioned earlier, it is an indisputable fact that the vast majority of IT buyers will 
never view or modify source code, even if offered the ability. There are numerous 
reasons for this, but the most compelling one is that customers expect to pay for a 
solution to their problems, and not merely a tool to help them solve their problems. 
(More on this shortly.) No company can afford the time and human resources neces 
sary to resolve all IT problems; therefore, they take "shortcuts" by buying software 
that purports to fix certain problems for them. This applies equally well to closed 
source software and open source software. Most IT buyers just want their software to 
work, they don t want to have to fiddle with it. 

By opting not to view or modify source code, does an IT buyer thereby opt out of 
any and all of the benefits of access to the source code? Absolutely not. Just because 
customers do not choose to exercise their rights to view and modify source code does 
not mean they do not benefit from the right, even when not exercised. On one level, 
the option to view the source code serves as a surrogate for the actual exercise of this 
ability. As an example, because I can review the database code that Sleepycat deliv 
ers to me, it forces Sleepycat to provide a higher-quality product than closed source 
vendors would have to offer. 

ROml Lefkowitz of AT&T Wireless gives a tangible example of how this works. In 
June 2003, ROml related that he had asked his wife to solicit multiple contractors 
bids for a home improvement project. Instead of gathering several bids, however, 
ROml s wife procured only one bid. When he asked her why, she responded that she 
figured the contractor would assume she had collected a number of bids, and so 
would give her his best bid from the start. The option to exercise choice, then, served 
her as a useful surrogate for actual choice. 

In this way, access to source code motivates the code s vendor to provide a superior 
product, knowing that it will be open for all to see. It also functions as a security 
blanket for customers. Hopefully, they will never have to look at the source code. But 
if Vendor X fails to deliver on its promises, or if it goes out of business, that cus 
tomer will have the option (unpleasant though it might be) to have some other ser 
vices firm support the stranded code. Source code access lets buyers rely on their 
vendors... but not too much. Importantly, the more independent the buyer is from 
the vendor, the lower the vendor s prices must be. More on this shortly. 

As IT buyers have grown comfortable with open source projects, another benefit has 
emerged. Initially, it is true that buyers will tend to want to avoid tampering with the 
software they buy. Over time, however, as they grow familiar with a product (closed or 
open), the buyer s developers will want to make tweaks here or there. They begin to 
support themselves, in other words, because calling out for support takes unnecessary 
time (and patience). In a closed source world, however, their ability to tweak the "solu- 



110 * C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



tions" they buy is limited. In an open source world, the Amazons of the world have free 
reign over their IT. Source code access gives customers the ability to experiment with 
and tailor software to their liking, if they choose, and on their own time table. 

Other reasons have been suggested. Developers like to be creative. Like anyone else, 
they prefer not to have self-expression manacled, and they choose to express them 
selves in the code they write and modify. On a mailing list in June 2003, Frank 
Hecker argued that access to source code is critical for developers at the heart of a 
company s IT infrastructure. Such people want to be able to modify code, and so 
must have access to source, because they will need to be able to fix any problems 
they may download into the company. Outside the corporate firewall, Ben Tilly (on 
the same email list) stipulated that while the majority of developers are not involved 
in open source, access to source code is critical to that core of developers who do 
participate. They are the lifeblood of open source communities and are the ones who 
will openly extend assistance to newbies who just want the code to work without 
getting their hands dirty. 

All of which is a verbose way of repeating the earlier point: source matters, even 
where it may not directly matter to the end user. Access to source extends benefits to 
users beyond those chosen few who actually exercise the right to touch source code. 
Source matters because choice matters. Choice matters for a number of reasons, not 
the least of which is that choice drives down prices. And choice is amplified by open 
source, not by freeware, which has its source code closed. 

Open source. Open choice. Open wallet. 

Many successful software vendors would have us believe otherwise. That is, they 
want to sell suites of services that take care of all needs, that reduce complexity, and 
that reduce choice. The primary perpetrator of this strategy is Microsoft, which, as 
Dana Gardner of Yankee Group notes, wants to "make the end user any offer they 
can t refuse to go Windows everywhere" (http://enterprise-wtndows-it.news/actor.com/ 
story.xhtmZ?story_td=22143). One major problem with buying into these monolithic 
visions is that once in, the switching costs to go with another vendor are prohibitive. 

By buying into Microsoft or any other vendor that holds out greatly reduced choice 
as a way to accomplish moderately reduced complexity, a buyer surrenders his IT 
destiny to that vendor. He upgrades when the vendor wants him to. It gets new tech 
nology when the vendor chooses to innovate. (I would argue, and have on several 
occasions, that Microsoft s market dominance has caused it to stagnate in terms of 
innovation. When was the last time Microsoft s Office product significantly improved 
over the last version? And yet the buyer keeps buying, because he finds himself on 
the Microsoft treadmill.) And he pays whatever the vendor demands, because the he 
has no other options. He is a prisoner of the vendor s universe, however expansive 
the vendor pretends that universe to be. 



Open Distribution, Not Source ** 111 



Over time, buyers who condemn themselves to such vendor-controlled realities will 
pay more for their IT, both in hard costs and in opportunity costs. Open source 
offers the opposite vision: maximum freedom to shift among vendors (even while 
staying with the same or similar code base). Open source therefore costs less in the 
short term and, especially, in the long term. 

If we step outside the IT world for a moment, this point will become even clearer. 
My wife and I recently redid our landscaping, including our cement work. Or, 
rather, we wisely chose to hire out the work. True, with a Dummy s Guide to Cement 
(my "source code," as it were), even I might have been able to figure it out and could 
have completed the project satisfactorily. Had I opted to do the work myself, the cost 
would have been X. Because I could have done the work myself for X, my cement 
contractor was only able to charge me 1.5X. Had he bid higher, I would have had 
strong incentive to perform the work myself. I had access to the source, so his pric 
ing power was curtailed. (In the same way, access to a closed binary, as with free 
ware, does not accomplish this same effect of driving costs down.) 

The cement contractor ended up performing shoddy work and walked off with a 
portion of our money, for which he had not completed the associated work. Measur 
ing it out, it will cost us 5-10X to hire a lawyer to compel our cement contractor to 
satisfactorily complete his 1.5X worth of work. I happen to be a lawyer, but not one 
that has ever actually practiced law, so I am stuck paying the lawyer s fees: $5007 
hour to recover $1,500+ in payments owed to me by the contractor. 

Perverse world, you say? Yes, I suppose so, but the point is that the delta between the 
cost of me doing my own cement work and the cost of me doing my own legal work 
is directly proportionate to the skill set involved and the artificial licenses set up by 
the legal profession to keep would-be attorneys in "would-be land." I am effectively 
barred from accessing the "source code" of the legal (and medical, among others) 
profession, which drives up the price that I must pay. 

Again, access to source code, whether in software or cement, offers choice, and choice 
ensures lower prices. It does not matter that most people will never choose to do their 
own cement work, just as it does not matter that most IT buyers will never choose to 
view and modify source code. The important thing is that they could if they were so 
inclined. That "could" is instrumental in dropping prices through the floor. 

Such lower prices, then, allow the CIO to spend more money on developers who can 
further customize software to meet that specific organization s requirements. Imag 
ine that: IT that works for a customer, rather than against it. That is innovative. 

Such innovation is what open source is all about, and is why it continues to make 
inroads in the enterprise, in embedded devices, and everywhere else. Open source 
brings choice, and choice saves money. Freeware does not engender such choice. 
Meaningful choice is not created by cost-free technology; rather, choice is created by 

112 * * Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



the freedom to manipulate code to one s personal (or corporate) advantage, or to 
have it widely distributed in such a way that one can benefit from others exercise of 
that freedom. Access matters little without distribution, and distribution matters lit 
tle without access. Together, they spell the commencement of a new age of software 
innovation, innovation that benefits vendors and buyers bottom lines. 

Open Source Business Models 

All of this may sound plausible enough, but we now need to trace through some real- 
world business models that vendors use or could use to leverage the benefits of open 
source to drive revenues and boost profits. Before doing so, it is important to note 
that an "open source business model" means more than simply supporting Linux as 
an operating system. In other words, the fact that my CRM system runs on Linux, or 
that my hardware appliance has Linux as its core, does not make me an open source 
company. An open source business model means that a vendor somehow engages 
with the open source community. 

With that said, I also need to stress that whatever the importance of open source, not 
all companies must adopt open source to find success. Open source is the great corn- 
modifier, but there will always be those who successfully evade that commodifica- 
tion. Other industries prove instructive on this point. 

Take retail, for example. Even as low-cost commodifiers devour middle ground in 
this market, profits persist up the stack. Wal-Mart is the 8,000-pound gorilla of corn- 
modification, cannibalizing groceries, clothing, and just about everything else on 
which it puts its hands. Still, for all of Wal-Mart s success in low-end fashion, for 
example, Nordstrom continues to win at the higher-end game. This is more than a 
case of customer snobbery it has to do with an experience that Nordstrom delivers 
(superior customer service) that Wal-Mart is structurally incapable of offering. (This 
same phenomenon exists in coffee why are consumers so willing to shell out $4 for 
a cup of coffee? Because Starbucks has defined a customer experience that tran 
scends Maxwell House at home.) 

Another example is the groceries market, as Charles Fishman highlights in the July 2004 
issue of Fast Company (http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/84/wholefoods.html). In 
just a few short years, Wal-Mart has become the United States largest grocery chain, yet 
the title of "Most Profitable Grocery Chain" and "Fastest Growing Grocery Chain" eludes 
Wal-Mart (and its European competitor, Aldi). No, those titles go to Whole Foods, with 
remarkable year-over-year growth in the face of a nationwide 2.5% annual compound 
growth rate: 17% (2003), 21% (2002), 21% (2001), 23% (2000), and 14% (1999). 
Whole Foods delivers an upscale grocery experience, offering organic foods and superb 
quality, and Wal-Mart stocks its shelves according to its modus operandi: decent selec 
tion at rock-bottom prices. Both chains have found their respective strategies to be 
highly profitable everyone else has gobbled their dust. Whole Foods has registered 

Open Source Business Models JJ 113 



$188 million in profits over the last several years, and Food Lion cleared only $150 mil 
lion with seven times as many stores and five times Whole Foods revenues. Safeway, for 
its part, lost $1 billion in the same period on even greater revenues. The takeaway? 
There is no room in the middle for undifferentiated players. One either commodifies or 
evades commodification through innovation. Everyone else languishes. 

Both Source (a.k.a. Mixed Source) Model 

So, the first business model is for the technical innovator that refuses to join open 
source commodification at all. But what about those companies that opt for a "both 
source" model, whereby they offer both open source and proprietary software? This 
model has promise and peril, requiring the vendor to walk a fine line between the 
model s divergent business requirements (low-end commodification/standardization 
coupled with high-end specialization). To the extent that a company marries the two, 
it must do so with a clear understanding of open source complements and substi 
tutes to its proprietary product portfolio. 

Both source offers a way to fill in the gaps left by open source, and to charge a pre 
mium for this "service," while still delivering open source software. Such a model 
seems to be ideal for established players that cannot abandon existing customers of 
closed source products, and blanch at the thought of losing existing profit margins. 
Of course, whether a vendor can avert the open source "threat" depends upon 
whether open source has created a viable substitute to its product. If so, head-on 
competition with that open source project is likely futile unless it can move signifi 
cantly upward in the feature set. Even if it can, competing against free and "good 
enough" is exceptionally difficult. 

A both source strategy makes more sense where the vendor can define and contrib 
ute to open source complements. In economic terms, a complement is something 
that completes a whole; in software terms, it is a component of a software solution. 
So, just as French fries may be considered a complement to a hamburger, so, too, is 
Apache a complement to IBM s WebSphere product. Importantly, the more comple 
ments that exist for a given product, the more desirable that product becomes for 
customers, so vendors want as many low-cost, high-quality complements to their 
products as possible. Oracle likes Linux and x86 hardware because it drives down 
the total cost of a customer s database solution... without lowering the cost of Ora 
cle s software. Customers, thus, can buy more Oracle software, which gives Larry 
Ellison more time on his boat. 

So far, this sounds like a reasonable defensive strategy for vendors that want to toe- 
dip into the open source community without getting very wet. But both source also 
allows vendors to take a scorched-earth agenda against their competitors, by skill 
fully choosing to build open source complements to their proprietary software, com 
plements which cut directly at those areas that competitors have chosen to retain as 



114 * C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



proprietary. Of course, such a strategy must bear in mind the distinct possibility that 
the opposing vendor will then choose to open source pieces of its portfolio that 
injure the first vendor, creating a lot more open source software, but not necessarily 
any profits for either company. 

Still, it is an open question whether this is a solid strategy against upstart competi 
tors with lower costs who can undercut a proprietary product s margins. In addition, 
a both source strategy works best for vendors with products that have respectable 
market share. Slapping open source on or around an also-ran product will not sell it. 
Good technology, good service, and good sales/marketing sell products. Open 
source, by itself, is as much a losing strategy as closed source, by itself. 

Open source complements to a market leader s products make that proprietary prod 
uct more valuable by lowering the total cost of the product. Hence, while both 
source may be the easiest step for a closed source company to make, it will help the 
vendor only if its products were already competing well against other proprietary 
products. Again, both source offers no panacea for market losers. The lesson? Com 
panies should adopt the both source strategy when they are on top of their games, 
instead of when they are losing the final sets of their matches. For market losers, a 
better bet is to make the difficult transition into a pure-play open source vendor, as 
defined shortly. 

Professional Open Source (a.k.a. Services) Model 

The dirty little secret of open source is that the term open source community is some 
thing of a misnomer. In general, the actual number of contributors to any given 
project, including the Linux kernel, is tiny. Thus, to "own" an open source project 
requires little outlay of human resources in terms of numbers, though it may require 
a significant amount of time to build reputation capital within a given open source 
community. (Newbies to the Linux kernel, for example, should expect to put in two 
years or more before they can hope to attain "committer" status in the kernel hierar 
chy.) Despite the low number of developers required to corner the market on an 
open source project, the importance of doing so is massive: employing a majority of 
the developers on a given project roughly equates to intellectual property owner 
ship, as explained earlier. 

For this reason, companies that spawn open source projects e.g., JBoss are able to 
completely open source their code without abandoning pricing power. JBoss, for its 
part, employs roughly 85% of the developers who contribute to the JBoss open 
source project. JBoss offers its code under the Lesser General Public License (LGPL), 
which allows users a wide range of action vis-a-vis their code, including the right to 
fork the JBoss project and start JBoss II. 

But no one does that, for reasons already detailed. 



Open Source Business Models . * 115 



Because of the heavy JBoss "ownership" of the committers to the project, the com 
pany does not save a great deal of money on development costs. It functions much 
like any closed source company, except that its development is open for public view 
and consumption. Any appreciable development savings derive from the bug finds/ 
fixes that JBoss receives from its development community. 

Still, the professional open source business model is not really about development 
savings. Rather, it is about maximizing distribution of one s product; getting it 
beyond the purchasing firewall/bureaucracy bottleneck to plant the product in the 
hands of its developer end users so that they can try and then revisit the professional 
open source vendor for support/service contracts. To get approval to use BEA s 
Weblogic or IBM s WebSphere, a developer would need to go through a cumber 
some process. To use JBoss, she simply needs to click "Click here to download." And 
while the developer might choose to support herself through newsgroups or other 
online fora, in production situations she will generally turn to the source of the code 
(in this case, JBoss). This is the classic open source model, though it is only now 
starting to be exploited effectively. 

Dual-License Model 

The dual-license model has been popularized by MySQL, but has been around for 
some time, most notably deployed by Sleepycat and Trolltech. In the case of a dual- 
license vendor, that vendor employs not most, but all, of the developers who contrib 
ute to the code. Because it employs all of the developers, it also owns all of the copy 
rights to its work. Then, as the owner of the copyrights, it is entitled to license its 
software under one or more different licenses. 

However, the fact that it owns the copyrights and employs the developers begs the 
question as to what benefit, if any, it derives from its open source status. The answer, 
as with the professional open source model, lies in distribution strategy. For a dual- 
license vendor, open source is less a matter of development and more a matter of dis 
tribution for open source vendors. Yes, the dual-license vendor derives benefit from 
outside developers who contribute code (though MySQL, for example, tends to 
repurpose/rewrite incoming code to help it better fit its existing code base) and bug 
fixes, but its primary benefit is in the ability to broadcast its product to the world 
with customers benefiting from lower prices and less lock-in. 

Also interesting, though not a benefit touted by the primary adopters of the dual- 
license model (MySQL, Sleepycat, Trolltech, and now SugarCRM), is the fact that the 
dual-license strategy provides the customers with a mechanism to buy their way out of 
the GPL, if consider this desirable. This is of particular benefit in the embedded world 
where, for example, Linksys might receive GPL d code from Broadcom and might want 
a closed source license to that code, so that it will not have to open source the software 
running its routers and access points (a purely hypothetical example, of course...). 



116 * C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



db4objects is promoting its embedded database with precisely this message, one that 
customers appreciate because however much a vendor may prefer the GPL or another 
open source license, the fact remains that it may not always be the best fit for a given 
customer. As such, the dual-license model offers customers a way to pay for the right to 
choose the license under which to receive software. 

ASP Model 

Such are the prominent open source models that are easily recognized as such: open 
source business models deployed by open source companies. But, as Tim O Reilly 
has been telling the industry for years, "open source" is a much bigger tent than we 
may recognize. Tim includes such "infoware" vendors as Google and Amazon in his 
open source tent. The common denominator between the two? Internet infrastruc 
ture powered by open source (Linux and a great deal else), plus an architecture that 
promotes participation that makes the infoware increasingly valuable. 

The enterprise IT industry has also been moving toward a related model for stan 
dard enterprise applications, calling it utility computing, on-demand computing, and 
a range of other names. In this model, IT vendors deliver computing power in a util 
ity fashion: Enterprise Consumer X gets the computing cycles when it needs them, 
instead of buying all of the hardware/software upfront. 

Importantly, customers in this model buy IT (including software) as a service, rather 
than as a standalone product. As such, customers do not really buy software at all 
they buy solutions to their business problems. Whether the "guts" of that solution are 
open or closed source does not matter anymore. Customers simply pay for value, 
delivered as a service: SP (service property) rather than IP (intellectual property). 

This sounds much like software s ASP model, in which software is delivered to the cus 
tomer over the Internet, hosted on a central server by the vendor, with customers pay 
ing for the value they access over the network. A prominent example is Salesforce.com. 
Whether the software underpinning the service is closed or open source becomes irrel 
evant. The requirement to release modifications to a given open source project is trig 
gered by distribution: so long as the code itself is not actually distributed (and only the 
resultant service dictated by the code is), open sourcing of modifications is not 
required, but voluntary. 

Other Models 

The aforementioned business models are the primary models in use today by most 
open source companies. However, some of the most interesting new companies 
employ equally interesting (and innovative) business models, generally altering the 
way open source software is supported. For such companies, the real customer bene 
fit of open source is the availability of source code. But, as noted, major vendors such 
as Novell and Red Hat, which tie their support contracts to specific product builds, 



Open Source Business Models X 117 



obviate this benefit. Gluecode and Specifix resolve this irony and may point to 
tomorrow s most successful open source business models. 

Managed source model 

Gluecode incorporates three levels of source code support into its model. First, Glue- 
code conglomerates various Apache packages, tests them, and generally makes them 
play nicely together so that customers need not worry about visiting Apache.com for 
themselves. Second, Gluecode develops its own proprietary software to extend 
Apache s reach and thereby provide a compelling solution for portals/business pro 
cess management (BPM). Third, and unique to Gluecode, the company offers source- 
level support to its customers, allowing them to check in their code to Gluecode s 
CVS repository. Gluecode runs the customer s code against test suites to ensure the 
customer s modifications or additions work properly with Gluecode s open+closed 
codebase, enabling the customer to become something more: a development partner. 

Code-level service model 

Specifix does something similar. Focusing on embedded and server deployments of 
Linux, Specifix allows its customers to modify Specifix s Linux distribution to meet 
their particular requirements. Instead of invalidating their support agreement with 
Specifix by doing so, Specifix tracks exactly where the modifications were made and 
allows the customer to support its own modifications, while continuing to support 
the original Specifix distribution. The customer may, in other words, opt for the 
"road less traveled," but Specifix is happy to maintain the more-trafficked road for 
them, keeping it parallel with the customer s chosen divergence. 

Conclusion 

Open source propels software toward Commodity Land, a happy place where cus 
tomers pay for real value and vendors compete on that value, not intellectual prop 
erty lock-in. Each of the open source business models detailed in this chapter will 
help to further this trend, making open source mainstream and possibly displacing 
the traditional, IP-based model as the default. 

We are thus on the cusp of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, one that will fundamentally 
alter the way IT vendors create, sell, and distribute software. Once apparently sty 
mied by the restrictions that open source licensing places on traditional business 
practices by IT vendors, open source vendors are now finding that open source 
licensing creates as many opportunities as it closes, changing the nature of software 
competition for decades to come. This means that incumbent and emerging IT ven 
dors must understand the new rules of engagement to compete effectively. Whether 
they like to admit it or not, open source will force every software vendor to come to 
grips with omnipresent, ravenous commodification. 



118 ^ C Open Source and the Commodity Urge: Disruptive Models for a Disruptive Development Process 



Some may opt for technical innovation over business model innovation, with vary 
ing degrees of success. However, such innovators should recognize that while 
copyright and patent provide potent protections, they also put the vendor in an 
adversarial relationship with the customer. As such, these traditional intellectual 
property tools hurt customers as much as (or more than) they do competitors, and 
will put them at a disadvantage against open source competitors who offer custom 
ers choice and value at lower prices. Open source, then, allows vendors to lay 
waste to their competitors profit margins by lowering their own costs of distribu 
tion, sales, marketing, and development, while simultaneously blessing their cus 
tomers with increased IT flexibility and a more finely tailored approach to solving 
their business problems. 

Open source, then, offers a new way to innovate, a new way to compete, and a new 
way to win. 



Conclusion ** 119 





kf CHAPTER 

Stephen R. Wall! 




Under the Hood: Open Source 
and Open Standards Business 
Models in Context 



People debate regularly whether open source software is "good for business," and 
how one makes money on something given away "for free." People raise concerns 
over the commoditization effects of open source, 1 and portray a gloomy road ahead 
where open source software will "eat its way" up a stack of functionality to the logi 
cal conclusion where software has become valueless. 

Standards as a commoditization driver have been well understood for quite some time 
across many industries. A standard exists to enable multiple implementations. The eco 
nomic argument is that they serve to broaden the market for all producers while foster 
ing price competition (which also fosters production efficiency) for the benefit of con 
sumers. Industry associations of vendors support such work where it expands their 
market opportunities in complementing areas. Governments support such work 
because of the "good" economic effects. Seldom does one hear complaints about this 
commoditization effect, and vendors continue to participate in the development of 
standards and compete on implementations regardless of that effect. 

In this chapter, we will take a look at traditional working definitions of open stan 
dards and open source software focusing on the veneer of differences, then step back 



1 "Will Open Source Middleware Commoditize J2EE?", Nov. 5, 2004, http://linuxworld.com/story/ 
46957.htm; visited Nov. 9, 2004. Also: Paula Rooney, "Open Source Will Commoditize Storage, 
Databases and Security," Jan. 20, 2004, http://www.storageptpehne.com/hardware/J7500067; 
visited Nov. 9, 2004. 



and look under the hood at a broader business context for the dynamics at work to 
provide a business model where standards and open source software can be seen in 
context. 

Open Standards 

A standard can be a specification, a practice, or a reference model. It is used to define 
an interface between two (or more) entities such that they can interact in some pre 
dictable fashion and to ensure certain minimum requirements are met. Standards 
exist to encourage and enable multiple implementations. 

It is important to put some simple perspective on the standards discussions that fol 
low, as books can be written about this seemingly dry subject. We will look at the 
context for standards defined by their development and use, a process for develop 
ing and maintaining standards, and a set of implementation issues such as intellec 
tual property concerns, conformance and certification concerns. Finally, we ll dis 
cuss the history of the concept of "open standards." 

Standardization efforts are typically divided into various categories, but the classifica 
tion systems are often orthogonal. For example: 

Standards can be categorized by the type of development organization e.g., 
national or international body, industry and trade associations, and consortia. 

Standards can be viewed as industry voluntary efforts or government-regulated 
efforts. 

Standards can be thought of as formal de jure developed specifications, or market- 
dominant de facto product technologies. 

All standards live within a context of development and use. Many formal standards 
are developed by national bodies or international organizations such as ISO. These 
standards often define procurement policy for government organizations and large 
enterprises alike. Industry and trade associations develop standards relevant to their 
expert and specialized constituencies. In the information technology space, for exam 
ple, the IEEE has a standards arm, and historically CBEMA (now NCITS) and Ecma 
International acted as standards development organizations in the U.S. and Europe, 
respectively, for IT standards. Each of these three organizations was accredited 
within its national and regional geographies to produce standards that could be later 
adopted by the relevant nationally or internationally sponsored standards organiza 
tion to prevent overlapping efforts, and to build on the relevant expertise within dif 
ferent industry groups. 

Narrowing the focus even further, consortia of vendors often arise within a specific 
area of technology within an industry to develop standards and specifications. The 



122 * C Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



consortia often try to build specifications more quickly to expand a particular mar 
ket, feeling that the more traditional organizations are too slow to deliver standards. 

We can categorize standards differently if we bucket them between regulatory versus 
voluntary standards. Government regulation defines a separate set of concerns over 
the voluntary work of many organizations within industries. Such government 
involvement is often driven by economic concerns for the public good (e.g., commu 
nications-related standards) or safety issues (e.g., pharmaceutical testing and registra 
tion requirements or vehicle safety). Regulatory-based standards will not be dis 
cussed further in this chapter because the focus is on the role of standards and open 
source in market-dynamic areas rather than government-regulated areas. 

Another categorization attempts to discuss the difference between de jure standards 
developed in a consensus-based process and de facto standards. A more accurate 
statement might be that de facto technology describes a market-dominant product, 
rather than a specification for interoperability open to all implementers. 2 

Common examples of voluntary information technology standards across this organi 
zational spectrum include SQL, HTML, TCP/IP, and programming language stan 
dards like C/C++ and C#. 

Standards act as a yardstick against which multiple competing implementations can 
be judged in the marketplace to make sure that certain basic requirements are met. 
Vendors compete on implementation beyond the standard to establish competitive 
differentiation in the market. Ultimately, customers choose the product that does 
more than simply meet their base requirements. It is this relationship among specifi 
cation, implementation, and competitive differentiation that provides basic interoper 
ability among vendors, drives competition, and spurs innovation. 

All standards organizations have rules about participation, construction, adoption, 
and amendment. They establish processes for how meetings are carried out to pro 
mote fairness of discourse and prevent anticompetitive practices. Standards develop 
ment organizations also put in place intellectual property rules to ensure partici 
pants are aware of the intellectual property landscape with respect to the standard 
under development. 

Most standards bodies require participating holders of essential patents to announce 
the existence of such patents, and to make them available on "reasonable and non- 
discriminatory" (RAND) 3 terms if an implementation of the standard would require a 
license to the patented technology. Under RAND terms, patent holders cannot dis- 



As we shall see, Clayton Christensen has proposed a situation that says there is market pressure 
that can change de facto technologies into de jure standards. 

While each organization s rules are stated somewhat differently and with different levels of 
formality, a quick look at the governing rules of the IEEE, ISO, IETF, and Ecma International 
shows a remarkable similarity. 



Open Standards *C 123 



criminate against a particular company or a particular platform. Standards organiza 
tions supporting such patent policies ensure that developers interested in delivering 
standards-based products can do so, while ensuring developers that have invested in 
a particular invention still have their investment respected. 

It is important to remember, however, that no standards development organization 
can speak for the intellectual property of developers that are not participants in that 
organization. Standards development organizations structure their patent policies 
this way because they cannot be the policing organizations nor bear the liability for 
patent infringement cases from nonparticipants. They are neither funded nor set up 
to do so. Indeed, if they took on this role, they would likely collapse under the fiscal 
burden and serve no one. 

The interesting thing to observe is that while standards exist to encourage multiple 
implementations, patents are government-enacted legal tools to protect a single 
implementation. Patents exist to allow the developing company government- 
enforced, time-limited legal protection of an invention by preventing others from 
building the invention. It allows the inventing company to recover the costs of bring 
ing an invention to market in return for publishing the idea for future use by the 
broader market. A patent is in some regards the antithesis of a standard. Standards 
are to trade agreements as patents are to tariffs. By definition, they serve different 
purposes in the economic landscape. 

Just as standards organizations are not organized or funded to handle intellectual prop 
erty liability claims, neither are they typically the conformance certifying agencies for 
implementations for the standards they produce. Conformance requirements in the 
standards and specifications are typically simple "claim" style i.e., you provide the 
functionality required by the standard and claim conformance to the standard. Organi 
zations that care about conformance then take on the fiscal and legal responsibility of 
verification around the conformance claims. For example, in the government space in 
the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a pro 
curement process (FIPS 4 ) and certification testing process for the standards that it 
cared to use in those procurements. The government was acting appropriately to pro 
tect and serve the public good in federal procurement policy essentially putting pub 
lic tax dollars where its mouth was to improve the return on investment. In a commer 
cial setting, The Open Group (nee X/Open) as a market consortium handled 
conformance claims and liability for its specifications. Beyond the testing requirement, 
warranties of conformance are required and a brand license is signed which is tied to 
the trademark usage associated with the standards it produced. Companies that wanted 
to use the trademark on their products in the market had to pay royalties. The X/Open 
standards were developed through the organization and a company paid for its seat at 



4 FIPS stands for Federal Information Processing Standards. 

124 * C Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



the specification setting table through its consortium membership dues. Conformance 
certification, on the other hand, was funded through the cost of trademark use. 

If standards act to define a base functionality to encourage multiple implementa 
tions, essentially the greatest common denominator for a specific technology, they 
help create a commodity. This results in a constant, healthy tension among the stan 
dards bodies participants as they work with each other on the standard, while simul 
taneously vying for market share with their different products. 

The term "open" with respect to standards became a mantra in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and was tied to the concept of "open systems." As Cargill observed, 
"open systems" was marketing-speak for the idea that if all the vendors would just 
build their computing products to "open" standards, the consumer would be able to 
build data processing systems by mixing and matching information processing hard 
ware and software modules in much the same way that one could mix and match ste 
reo components to build the desired system. 5 "Open systems" was a description of 
the architecture the consumer thought should exist. Unfortunately, the complexity of 
interconnected data processing systems doesn t lend itself so readily to the metaphor 
of a single-purpose device (i.e., the stereo system) and the ability for plug compatibil 
ity between stereo components to solve all the attendant complexity. 

"Openness" became a quality attributed to the standards that would enable open sys 
tems. The openness was an attribute of the creation process (the standard was built 
in some form of public, consensus-based process open to all participants) rather than 
an attribute of implementations of the standard. 

The development model for a standard is unrelated to the development model used 
for the implementation of that standard. It is equally possible for a standard (open or 
otherwise) to be implemented in a closed proprietary software product or in an open 
source software project. 

Open Source Software 

Open source software (OSS) is a term applied to a collection of software development, 
licensing, and distribution practices. A lot has been written about OSS over the past 
decade, as various open source projects gain market importance and the license models 
demonstrate economic significance. Eric Raymond s original treatise 6 on the develop 
ment practices remains relevant. The Open Source Initiative (http://www.opensource.org) 
publishes the definition of the requirements a license must meet to be considered an 



5 Carl Cargill, Open Systems Standardization: A Business Approach (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall 1997), 70-71. 

6 Eric Raymond, The Cathedral &> the Bazaar (Sebastopol, CA: O Reilly Media, 2001). The original 
essay was published in 1997. 



Open Source Software ** 125 



"open source software" license. I will focus on a group of attributes of OSS projects that 
sets up the economic discussion to come. 

OSS projects are interesting "buckets" of technology. Successful OSS projects share a 
number of attributes. 

For instance, distributed communities with good software development practices 
develop technology packages that satisfy well-defined needs. 

Software quality is a measure of community activity (i.e., the developer customers). 

Contributions reflect the individual economic considerations of the contributor 
and are based on selfish asymmetric value propositions. 

The projects reflect their Unix history of loosely coupled component architectures 
with well-defined interfaces that make it easy to assemble larger solutions (e.g., the 
LAMP stack is assembled from Linux, Apache, MySQL, and Perl/Python/PHP). 

OSS projects develop software packages in a distributed community where the core 
developers that inspired the project act as a hub for the evolution of the software as a 
"benevolent dictatorship." Just like all successful software projects, successful OSS 
projects support a strong software engineering discipline and ethic at the project s 
core. Essentially, good software is developed by good software developers. 

What makes the software "open source" is the licensing model. While a wide variety 
of licenses are considered "open source licenses," the basic common denominator 
(without relisting all the requirements from the Open Source Initiative) is that the 
software s source code is always freely available and users can modify it without 
restriction; however, requirements associated with distributing the software may 
exist. In similar fashion to standards efforts supporting a lack of discrimination 
(either in participation within the context of their community or in their intellectual 
property engagement goals), OSS licensing discriminates against no one. Anyone can 
participate in the community development of the software. Anyone is free to use the 
software. Anyone can see the source code. Anyone can distribute the software. In 
each case, requirements may be imposed by the license or reputation that must be 
earned in the community, which would lead some to not want to participate, but 
nothing inherent in the process prevents participation, use, or distribution. 

An interesting dividing line in the licensing schemes is whether the license is consid 
ered "viral." A reciprocal license such as the GNU General Public License (GPL) 
attaches itself to new software by requiring that if the software is modified and dis 
tributed, the license is attached to the new software. This forces the "open" aspect 
upon new software, keeping the source code publicly available. A company may be 
wary of publishing the source code to its software, as it may contain trade secrets or 
other third-party licensed software for which it doesn t have the ability to publish the 
source. The classic permissive licenses arose in academic settings (e.g., the Berkeley 



126 x * Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



license and the MIT Project Athena license) and had no requirement to associate new 
work with the license. This class of licenses was very liberal in what was allowed, and 
a company could easily take software, modify it, and not publish the new source 
code. 

One of the most interesting aspects of OSS development is the economics of the 
community participation. Surveys have been run and much has been written about 
the rationale for participation. 7 The "simple" economics is that participants in a com 
munity get more than they give. It is a normal selfish asymmetric value proposition. 
To understand that statement, think about context for a moment. Many people in 
many walks of life use and value their skill sets differently in different contexts. A 
writer might be a technical writer or communications writer for a corporation as her 
paying job, but still use that same collection of writing skills teaching an English as a 
Second Language class in the evenings, working on a writing project with her child s 
class at school, and writing a sonnet to a loved one. In each case, she values her skill 
set differently, and the reward accordingly. Software developers are no different. The 
interesting aspect of community is that corporations are equally economically ratio 
nal in their participation. Developers and corporations participate in OSS projects 
because of the same simple asymmetric value proposition. Many companies partici 
pate in OSS projects and draw upon the software to deliver the products and ser 
vices upon which they base their revenue streams. We will look at this a little more 
closely in a moment. 

Coupling the license and distribution model that ensures the source code is freely 
available, with a core project team that is disciplined allows for the community effect 
of OSS development to shine. The community of interest in a particular project can 
directly contribute changes and bug fixes. While there may be orders of magnitude of 
difference in the number of bug reports submitted, down to the number of bug 
reports submitted with proposed fixes, down to the number of "good" fixes that meet 
the bar defined by the core project team, there is definitely a net gain for the project, 
both from a testing and a bug fixing point of view, as well as the opportunity to find 
new talent for the project that wants to participate. 

The Real Business Model 

Customers view solutions as a network of related "bits" that have to come together in 
some definable fashion to solve their IT problems. This network can be defined with 
nodes representing various technology objects and the paths between nodes represent 
ing the relationships. This is a very informal network, but very real. For example, a 



7 Most notable were the surveys by the Boston Consulting Group (http://www.bcg.com/publications/ 
pub/ication_view.jsp?pubID=935<S language=Eng!ish, Dec. 15, 2004) and the broader FLOSS 
survey done at the University of Maastricht (http://www.in/onomics.nl/FLOSS/report/index. htm, 
Dec. 15, 2004). 



solution for a new retail inventory management system will include nodes representing 
the existing application systems to which the new retail system must interface, com 
puter resources on which it will run, the programming language environment in which 
it will be developed and maintained, the staff and their experience and skill sets that 
will develop and then maintain the new system, databases with which it will need to 
interact, . The other application systems to which the new retail inventory system will 
need to interface have their own historical networks. The platform resources may rep 
resent a different network view if multiple application systems share the fundamental 
computing platform. Companies define architectures for their IT functions to attempt 
to simplify the decisions that need to be made, and often publish these as internal pro 
curement and development standards. History also counts in the network for exam 
ple, some shops always buy "Unix" hardware or always program in C or Java, because 
that is how their resource history has developed. 

Turning the discussion around to the vendor-centric product perspective, Geoff Moore 
defined a model 8 in 1991 for technology adoption that suggests that once a market 
starts to develop, a company best leads by providing a customer the best "whole prod 
uct solution." By this he means that the vendor offers its core value product proposition 
to the customer and then needs to wrap as much around that product as it can to 
present a "complete" product solution to the customer to meet the customer s broader 
needs, essentially mapping as much of the customer solution network as possible. 
Another way to think about this is that the vendor wants to provide as many comple 
ments as it can to its core product offering, covering as much of the customer s solution 
network as is feasible to present the best (most valuable) solution in the customer s eyes. 

The business of a vendor would then be to ensure that the complements were as 
inexpensive as possible, indeed commoditized if possible, so that the whole solution, 
from the customer s perspective, is as inexpensive as possible but the lion s share of 
the revenue would come to the vendor through its core offering. Several business tac 
tics and tools are available to the vendor to try to drive these complement spaces: 

Traditional buy-versus-build strategies can be used to ensure that as much as of 
the customer s solution is provided through the vendor s own brand, regardless 
of whether the complement products are offered as add-ons or are bundled 
directly with the core revenue stream. 

Develop a rich ecosystem of add-ons by encouraging developer and partner net 
works to provide a richer whole solution to the customer. Publishing propri 
etary specifications for the complement space enables more partners to develop 
businesses in the complement spaces. 

Develop tool spaces that help add complements to the complement ecosystem. 



8 Geoffrey Moore, Crossing the Chasm (New York: Harper Collins, 1999). 
128 * C Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



Provide certification programs around the core technology to ensure that there 
are lots of service professionals to help the customers complete and support their 
solution. Indeed, a company might have its own consulting services arm for 
parts of a solution, and provide certifications for other parts of a solution. 

Taking this view, a company s assets and offerings also form a network of related 
products and services it matches against the customer s solutions network through 
the sales and marketing functions. Each node in the network has cost, risk, and reve 
nue models associated with it, and as long as the overall revenue model is greater 
than the sum of the costs, the company will be profitable. 

It is important to remember, however, that no company exists alone in the market to 
solve the customer s problems. Each vendor in a particular space must have different 
product networks to allow a differentiation in its sales pitch to the customer. Differ 
ent vendor companies will also behave differently in their hiring and acquiring strate 
gies to shore up their "whole product offerings." 

In addition, it is important to note that one can now look at intellectual property (IP) 
tools (and by that I mean trademarks, patents, copyrights, and trade secrets) in con 
text. Each of these four legal property types or tools (regardless of legal and geo 
graphical jurisdiction) provides a different set of legal protections at different costs. 
One is far more likely to spend heavily and strategically with IP protection tools in 
the spaces defining one s core product value proposition or in spaces in which one 
has the greatest investment, than farther out in the complement spaces of one s prod 
uct offering network. Indeed, in the complement spaces, a vendor may aggressively 
publish (or sparingly strategically patent) to ensure that no other vendor can patent 
in the complement space and raise the prices on that complement. 

If we now stan to consider open source and open standards in this core-complement 
context, we see that they are simply additional tools in the tool chest to drive comple 
ment spaces. Let s look at each separately for a moment. 

Open Source Complements 

It becomes very easy for a vendor (OEM, ISV, or systems integrator) to bootstrap a com 
plement product or project space for its core value proposition to its customers using 
open source software directly. The projects are polished to product readiness either 
within the company or within the community itself. To "buy" versus "build" as comple 
ment strategies for a vendor, we can now add "borrow" and "share." If a vendor joins an 
existing community, it can polish the OSS project to product readiness to complement 
its core value proposition to its customer. If it starts its own project, it can be used as the 
hook to find and engage with new customers around the rest of its core offering. 

The engagement in the community is actually a very leveraged conversation directly 
with people interested in the community s project and then possibly the company s 
offerings. As people cross the line from community participant and software user to 

Open Source Complements * 1Z9 



potential customer, they are self-selecting the vendor s services. This is a very efficient 
way to find new customers. This does not mean one should consider the community as 
a mass-marketing broadcast channel (it s not), but rather, as a public conversation with 
one s customers and potential customers. This is not for the faint hearted. Unlike a tra 
ditional "Go to Market" plan, the technical people have real-time unmanaged discus 
sions with the customers. 9 

The vendor s challenge becomes ensuring that products remain products and com 
munities are communities. Starting a community project is not that risky if the ven 
dor plays by the rules, staffing it with good software developers that will lead the 
community well, and understanding that the real return is the conversation they have 
with customers, and the product complement effect. The "community" at large does 
not exist to work for free improving a company s products. This mistake is still being 
made despite the public experiences of the past. 

The community leadership is a benevolent dictatorship. Sponsoring the community (or 
earning your place in an existing community) does give the vendor the opportunity to 
manage things on its own terms. Software stability is maintained through the commu 
nity project by the leadership. Project direction is developed by the community leader 
ship and people that have joined the community and earned their position of trust. 
There may not be a road map with a view three to five years out, as is almost necessary 
in a product, but the complement space doesn t need the rigor of the core product. 
Viewpoint becomes important. A customer s view of the need for a road map around a 
solution may not map to a vendor s view of the need for a product road map. 

While a number of relatively small companies are using OSS in their businesses, 
large vendor participation is very interesting. [Caveat lector: the following examples are 
observations from the author and do not represent any direct knowledge of these vendors 
business plans or models.] 

IBM has made three big plays: Apache, Linux, and Eclipse. IBM joined the Apache 
community six years ago, borrowing a web server while selling WebSphere. It joined 
the Linux community four years ago while managing the commodity curve on the 
AIX product line and using it as a competitive shot into the Sun server market. Most 
recently, it has begun a "share" project creating the Eclipse project out of technology 
it acquired (and then it acquired Rationale). 

In joining the Apache community, IBM doesn t need to maintain its own web server 
team and can focus its efforts on WebSphere instead. In the Linux community, it can 
focus on the parts of the OS that best meet its needs. Linux is clearly becoming the Unix 
server replacement over time. IBM s AIX product space will be replaced. It can either 



The first thesis in the Cluetrain Manifesto is "Markets are conversations." Indeed, most of the 95 
theses are highly relevant to the discussion (http://www.duetrain.com/fimanifesto, Dec. 15, 2004) 



130 I * Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



actively participate and position itself on the leading edge of the curve, or wait until its 
product space is consumed. 

SAP released a complete modern relational database for free in August 2002 to drive 
its core business into the mid-tier customer space where the customer may not 
already have an enterprise-class database and may not be willing to pay the "Oracle/ 
IBM/Microsoft" tax to get SAP R3. It was released under the GNU GPL after a two- 
year, 100-person investment in updating the acquired Adabas technology. SAP then 
partnered with MySQL AB in Sweden to "manage" the database community. 

Sun Microsystems worked in the GNOME desktop community to develop, acquire, 
and contribute the accessibility features it needed to meet U.S. government procure 
ment policies to complement its Linux workstation offerings. For a relatively modest 
investment in the tedious and difficult accessibility technology, it is getting an entire 
full-featured desktop environment. 

In each case, the corporation is getting more than it gives, developing a complement 
rapidly around core offering(s). They gain time-to-market for the complement at a 
reduced investment. While initially met with skepticism when a large company joins 
an existing community, as long as that company plays by the community s rules with 
respect to engagement and quality, it can become as accepted as any other active par 
ticipant. Depending upon the nature of the product relationship to the core and 
company commitment, the company may make best efforts to hire key community 
developers. This is not altruistic, but neither does the company expect the develop 
ers to change their community engagement. It gives the company deeper insight into 
the community it is looking toward for support as it develops the complement. 

There is a competitive edge to OSS community development as well. Often the com 
pany takes advantage of the reciprocal aspect of the licensing to salt the intellectual 
property fields around it by aggressively publishing prior art, holding the comple 
ment costs down, and preventing competitors from directly monetizing their origi 
nal investment in the community project software. For example, SAP is not in the 
database business and so may feel comfortable publishing the investment in SAPDB 
(now MaxDB), but it probably doesn t want Oracle, Microsoft, or IBM directly mak 
ing use of that investment in their respective database products. In this case, the 
reciprocal license is the most business-conservative license SAP could choose. As well 
as driving a complement directly, the community engagement also allows the ven 
dor to work closely with partners, customers, and potential customers to build the 
relationships they will need to sustain the business over time. 

The other competitive aspect happens when you consider two competing vendors 
product-centric networks, and how they appear to the customer. The customer is 
looking at things as a "whole product solution" and does not really think (or care) 
about what is core or complement from the vendors perspectives. A vendor can 
develop a complement community directly in the path of a competitor s core value 

Open Source Complements ** 131 



proposition to a mutual customer. It need not be a deliberate move and the sole pur 
pose of a community; it is the icing on the cake of the multifaceted approach of a 
business in using OSS development and engaging with its customers. 

Small companies can also easily use the OSS buckets to bootstrap product comple 
ments. Clayton Christensen s original research 10 around disruptive business models 
shows how small companies assemble off-the-shelf parts into underperforming prod 
ucts compared to the industry norm, offering those products in their own niches 
with different business models. As the sustained innovation around the new disrup 
tive product develops, it eventually becomes mature against the yardstick used to 
judge the incumbent but at a better price for the performance, and the incumbent s 
business is disrupted. Consider the development of the Linux operating system 
from its inception in 1991, delivered by a university student, its growth in educa 
tional use, to simple infrastructure servers, to the point in history where it is pres 
ently challenging the traditional Unix vendors products (though it has, in some 
cases, become too complex to teach anymore 11 ). 

There is also a situation, as we shall shortly see, where a product market hits the point 
when customers start to be overserved, and there is a call for standardization. This 
means that OSS components that already represent a package with well-defined inter 
faces may be a rapid way to bootstrap a "good-enough" product into that market. 

One thing to note in this discussion using the network of core and complements 
together is that there is no "stack" of technology per se. Think back to the earlier dis 
cussion of customer-centric solution networks and vendor-centric product networks. 
Vendors may see their world as a stack with their valuable core at the top and all the 
commoditized complements below, but in reality, it is simply their view through their 
own product stack and its relationship to the customer and their partners. A chip man 
ufacturer views the stack very differently from an operating system company or from a 
middleware company (hardware design in silicon is where the value is, with operating 
systems and middleware and apps being less and less interesting to the chip manufac 
turer). The terminology of eating up the stack may have more to do with the position 
in which the vendor perceives itself. 

Open Standards Complements 

Clayton Christensen further observed in his research 12 that as companies begin to 
overdeliver functionality in their product lines faster than customers are able to use 
the new functionality and therefore faster than customers are willing to pay for it 



10 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator s Dilemma (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). 

11 In interviews in February 2003, a number of university OS professors made reference to the 
current revision, with the addition of symmetric multiprocessor suppor, becoming too complex 
to teach. As a result, they were basing their course work on earlier versions of Linux. 

12 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator s Solution (New York: Harvard Business School Press, 2003). 

132 ^ C Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



the market begins to call for standardization. Indeed, prior to the point where they 
begin to overdeliver, the market leader is often offering the technology in a tightly 
integrated fashion and best delivers to consumer needs in this space where the solu 
tions typically are not yet good enough. This is the time when tight integration, not 
standards-based components, is the path to success. Standards develop once the 
marketplace reaches a point where the market leader begins to overdeliver. These are 
the circumstances in which a market-dominant de facto technology is at a critical 
point and the call for de jure standardization is possible. 

The signal to standardize a technology is somewhat unclear, but there is likely a col 
lection of factors: 

Competitors with standards experience and similar product offering networks 
but different core drivers likely use the opportunity to "call for standards," 13 
hoping to reduce their own complement costs while causing a competitor grief 
in a core revenue stream. 

Customers managing substantial procurement budgets will support and call for 
standards in the hopes of prolonging investments and attempting to reduce costs 
from vendors that are overdelivering. For example, the U.S. government as the 
largest IT buyer on the planet at the time, led the charge around the POSIX and 
C-language standards, quickly followed by the large companies in the petroleum 
and automotive industries. 

If you are the one true implementer, and the market (i.e., partners, customers, and com 
petitors) is calling for standardization in your core technology space, you have a prob 
lem. They re calling for the benefits of standards (expanding market and price competi 
tion) because they want the ability to replace you. Some segment of your customers 
wants the choice of multiple implementations. Your competitors are happy to support 
the call, as this is the thin edge of the wedge to break open your value proposition to 
your customer, all in the name of open systems. Your partners may be happy to support 
the call for standardization because they want price pressure as their margins diminish 
and perhaps your percentage of their Cost-of-Goods-Sold is increasing. 



13 Geoff Moore argues that the first response in the market from competitors when they see a 
"gorilla" forming is to cry for "open systems" (Geoffrey Moore, Living on the Fault Line [New 
York: HarperBusiness 2002], 119). This might be more of a cause for standardization too early 
with all the attendant problems that ensue as has been observed by James Gosling of Sun 
Microsystems (James Gosling, "Phase Relationships in the Standardization Process", circa 
1990). Goslings observations are more closely in line with Christensen s, arguing that there is 
an optimal time in a technology s development for standardization. Some of us have always 
suspected that it is best to standardize existing practice and experience, instead of trying to 
standardize ahead of the market curve. Indeed, it would be interesting to do a survey of 
successful and unsuccessful standardization efforts to determine whether the unsuccessful 
efforts were undertaken too early in a marketplace, when vendors are still trying to define the 
marketplace itself and stake out claims with products and patents. First, of course, one would 
need to define the measure of a successful standard. Christensen s observations are likely more 
in line with standards forming at the optimal market time. 

Open Standards Complements ** 133 



It is important to note that one needs to get the view of the market "right" for this 
sort of discussion, and hindsight is always 20/20. It is not necessarily the dominant 
vendor s product that is to be standardized, but the product market space. For exam 
ple, one can argue that the POSIX standards (and the C-language standards, for that 
matter) were not about standardizing Unix systems, but rather, were an effort to 
standardize an OS interface for minicomputers. Digital Equipment Corp. was the 
dominant player in minicomputers (which became departmental servers and work 
stations). DEC was driving customers up the hardware upgrade cycle to support its 
market growth faster than customers were willing or able to absorb the change. Unix 
systems of the early and mid-1980s represented the best opportunity around which 
the market could form a minicomputer application programming standard to sup 
port customers applications portability. While the Unix systems of the day were 
often less scalable, less robust, and less secure than VAX/VMS systems, the Unix 
operating system had been ported to most vendors hardware (including DEC 
VAXen), so competing vendors could see the market opportunity. 

At the same time, the PC arrived on the scene. Many have argued that the PC won 
against Unix systems by taking over the desktop, largely due to the inability of the Unix 
vendors to set a desktop "standard" fast enough. The PC certainly took the desktop by 
storm, but it was actually competing against nonconsumption. In a Christensen view of 
the world, it was put together from inexpensive parts, and when compared to mini 
computers it was certainly underperforming, but it became the de facto business appli 
ance in a document-centric world, enabling a whole new class of electronic document- 
centric applications. (Word processing systems companies vanished almost as fast as 
the minicomputer companies.) The PC was competing with nonconsumption, giving 
business users computing resources on their desktop instead of being stuck waiting for 
their business data processing applications to be developed by corporate IT, with its 
ever-growing systems development backlog. The Unix systems (driven by standards 
and an "open systems" message) were data processing-centric rather than document- 
centric, and caused DEC grief in a completely different space. 

Christensen observed that as an area of technology is standardized, the value moves 
to adjacent spaces in the network. 14 The trick then becomes to ensure that one is 
building one s business efforts in the product network around the space being stan 
dardized. This would lead us to believe that the richer a product offering network a 
vendor has, among different software, hardware, and service components and prod 
ucts, the more opportunity that vendor has to move with the value or to define new 
components that the old components complement. 



14 This was originally referred to as "the Law of Conservation of Attractive Profits," but is now 
referred to as "the Law of Conservation of Modularity." 



134 X Under the Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models in Context 



This core-complement product network view allows one to very rapidly see how the 
vendor politics in a standards working group play out. A vendor with a de facto 
product technology that is being dragged by the marketplace into a de jure stan 
dards working group is likely a little less than enthusiastic about participating in its 
own commoditization. The vendor alliances within the working groups are partici 
pants in the complement space. The game is one of technology diplomacy, where the 
goal as a vendor representative is to expand your area of economic influence while 
defending sovereign territory. This holds true regardless of whether one is participat 
ing in a vendor-centric organization such as Ecma International, as an "expert" to a 
national delegation to the ISO (on behalf of her employer), or as an individual con 
tributor to an organization like the IEEE (again, funded by her employer to partici 
pate). Vendor consortia offer a similar view. Which vendors formed the consortia 
and which vendors quickly and noisily joined shortly afterward says a lot about who 
the incumbent in a product space is and who the competitors are. 

Conclusion 

Businesses are often much more than simply hardware companies or a software com 
panies or a service providers, offering breadth of product and service in overall value 
proposition to their customers. Successful companies use a collection of strategies to 
deliver a "whole product offering" for their customers, driving their core revenue 
generator with a host of complementing products and services. 

Standards have traditionally been one tactic or tool for driving additional comple 
ment value to a customer by developing a complement space in a maturing market 
with a lot of implementations at a reduced price. 

Open source software can also be used as a tool to develop a complement space that 
supports a core revenue product or service. The open source project can act as a 
quick and convenient bucket of technology around which other product offerings are 
wrapped, or plugged into an existing product offering network. 

A number of models were presented on how to think about customer-centric solu 
tion networks and vendor-centric product networks (and for thinking about the 
product network from a core-complement point of view), alongside Moore s tradi 
tional Technology Adoption Life Cycle and Christensen s models for how product 
markets behave. Open source software projects and standardization efforts can be 
viewed as tools to be used to attain competitive advantage. A number of large corpo 
rations are now participating in OSS communities to the benefit of the corporation 
and the communities, just as corporations have historically driven voluntary stan 
dards engagements. The model-based view certainly doesn t take away from the 
excitement inherent in different OSS projects or the overall economic value of a suc 
cessful standard. It merely provides context to businesses that want to understand 
how to adopt and participate in either. 



Conclusion ** 135 





t CHAPTER 9 

Russ Nelson 





I ve been giving away my software since 1983, full time since 1991. I don t do it for 
fun, although I enjoy it. I do it because it s a way for a small business to earn money 
and it s fun. Each of my software interests started as a hobby, and some have turned 
into a profession. Not every hobby of mine has turned professional, and I hope to 
explain why some have and some have not. 

Three of my hobby projects, which I ll talk about in depth after I introduce myself, 
have turned profitable. They are Freemacs, Packet Drivers, and qmail. 1 Freemacs is an 
MS-DOS text editor, styled after Emacs. It s still used today as the official editor of the 
FreeDOS project. Packet Drivers hide the difference between Ethernet cards in an MS- 
DOS system. If you ve ever eaten at a McDonald s restaurant, your order was communi 
cated through Crynwr Packet Drivers. Qmail is a mail transfer agent (MTA) for send 
ing and receiving Internet mail. Qmail is the engine behind Rediffmail s 30-million- 
user, multiterabyte, 100-node email cluster, and many smaller sites. 

Introduction 

I did hardware hacking long before college. Digital electronics was too expensive for 
me: $1 per TTL quad nand gate at a time when vinyl records cost only $5. So, I fid 
dled around with analog electronics. I invented a trigger sweep for my dual-beam 
oscilloscope, and an analog computer throttle for my model railroad. 



Qmail is an all-lowercase name, and will be capitalized here only at the beginning of a sentence. 



^137 



My high school was a member of LIRICS: Long Island Regional Instructional Com 
puter System, which had a PDF- 10 students could use to leam to program, via tele 
types operating over modems. I was at Baldwin Senior High School from 1972 to 1975, 
but took advantage of the program only in my last year, from 74 to 75. I learned 
BASIC and wrote a four-banger calculator program. I also wrote a word processor in 
BASIC, for which I had to do all sorts of horrific string manipulation. It took hours to 
format a two-page social studies paper. Partway through I got an Instant Message (IM) 
from an operator who asked me what I was running, and if it was looping. 

During this period I learned PDP-10 Assembly language. JRST, HRRLZ, and SKIPNE 
are all familiar friends to me. Unfortunately, none of my candidate colleges had a 
PDP-10. MIT almost certainly did, but I was a poor scholar who was more interested 
in getting an education than in proving that I had one. Of course, everything on the 
PDP-10 was what we d now call "open source." Nobody thought of holding back the 
source code in those days. 

Many colleges will teach you how to become a businessman. I didn t have that desire 
upon entering college, and so I sought a degree in electrical engineering. Only later 
did I decide to run my own business, but how to learn? I started slowly, learned 
through experience, and didn t take too many risks. 

I learned "on the job," and discovered new ways to profit from open source soft 
ware. Everyone in the business had to teach themselves. There is no master s degree 
of open source business administration not yet anyway. 

Hewlett-Packard recognized my "genius" and hired me and my wife to work in its 
calculator division doing integrated circuit design. I missed programming, so I 
bought a RadioShack Color Computer (CoCo). This led to my first freelance income 
associated with programming. 

I wrote programs for fun and sold them to CoCo Magazine for distribution. They were 
just little cute things, but they were in Assembly language, so they were fast, small, 
and easy to distribute. The standard distribution was on audio cassette through a 
paid subscription. It was nice to receive money for writing a program for fun. With 
out a local user community, it was also the only way I could distribute my software. 

Freemacs and Open Source 

After I returned to graduate school, I started writing a programmable editor for MS- 
DOS. Instead of writing it de novo, I thought it should be compatible with Emacs. I 
had used Emacs while working at Hewlett-Packard, where I had done some hack 
ing on an editor. That experience convinced me I wanted an editor without any dis 
tinction between editing and typing. I purchased a copy of the MIT AI Lab memo 
describing Emacs, written by Richard M. Stallman (RMS). I recognized his name 
because of his GNU Manifesto, a new document then. I sent email to RMS to get 



138 K * Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 



permission to sell a copy of the memo along with my editor. The document was in 
the public domain, but I thought that asking permission was only polite. 

I got a call from RMS (this was back when his wrists hurt so badly that he couldn t 
type). He persuaded me to give away my version of Emacs rather than sell it. He 
appealed to my sense of fairness. He asked why I should profit from a manual that I 
had not written. I was impressed that so stellar a personage as RMS would take the 
time to call me. I decided that it would be best to give it away. I didn t really have 
any idea whom I might sell it to. All my previous software sales had been for the 
RadioShack Color Computer, and had been sold to CoCo Magazine. My editor was 
for MS-DOS, so this was a completely new situation for me. Once I decided to give it 
away, I gave it the catchy name Freemacs. 

In graduate school, I had access to worldwide networks, and it was actually possible 
to distribute software "for free." Nobody was kidding themselves; the Department of 
Defense was paying the bills for the ARPANET, universities for BITNET, and compa 
nies for CSNet. Nothing was free to the institution, but the users perceived the net 
works to have no incremental cost. This led to allocation by congestion, but I m not 
talking about economics yet. Regardless, a software author could give away software 
for the mere cost of uploading it to a distribution point. 

Freemacs was distributed from SIMTEL-20.ARPA, an FTP site with copies of most useful 
MS-DOS software. It was run by the Army at the White Sands Missile Base, but nobody 
cared about where it was physically. The point was that they had good stuff, and they 
were sharing it. This made me a contributing member of the open source community. 

Freemacs and Business 

Freemacs was a hobby, and I had no intention to turn it into a business. My comput 
ers (even my home computers) were paid for by my employer, so I had no expenses 
to cover. As the program gained users, they told other MS-DOS users about it. Those 
users wanted updates, and none were available on any of the worldwide networks of 
the day. Having no other recourse, they asked me for copies. I knew that they were 
gaining from these copies, so I asked for a portion of those benefits in the form of a 
copying fee. Between 1985 and 1991, most of the activity of Crynwr Software con 
sisted of putting software on floppy disks and mailing it to customers. 

Two interesting stories about mailing floppies: one is about a customer in Ireland who 
had two floppies go bad on him. Guessing that his email was going through some kind 
of antiterrorist scanner (as the Irish Republican Army was quite active at the time), I 
sent him a third floppy wrapped in Imm-thick lead foil. That floppy got through OK. 
Another is of a customer who, although a part of the defense department, had no Inter 
net access, or even have a modem and this was after almost everybody had gotten on 
the Internet, so I was surprised that they were even allowed to telephone out, but I sent 
them a floppy with software on it and they were happy with that. 

Freemacs and Business I * 139 



Staying in Touch 

It s crucially important to stay in touch with your users. The biggest advantage 
an open source developer has is close contact with users. If you re the primary 
user for the software, of course you know what users want you just sit and cog 
itate. Quite a bit of open source software is written to "scratch your own itch." 

This is easy and rewarding because very little communication is needed. Pro 
grammers are not typically great communicators (most programmers fall into one 
of the four NT classes on the standard Myers-Briggs personality test). A program 
mer who can listen and talk is worth her weight in chips (and chips are worth 
more per ounce than gold). 

With Freemacs, I started with a single mailing list, which proved to be a mistake: 
some people don t need any help and just want to know when new releases come 
out; other people want to get or give help but don t want to code; and still other 
people are interested in every miniscule detail of the program. One list cannot 
serve everyone. I found that I needed three lists. 

One list carried only announcements of new releases. You really want to have an 
announcements list, and you need to remember to use it. You might send only 
one or two pieces of email a year, but those are crucial. First, you need to remind 
people that they ve given permission for you to send them email. Second, people 
need to know that you re in business even if they don t currently need your busi 
ness. Any user might suddenly find himself needing to become a customer. You 
need to be the proprietor of the relationship between the software and the user, 
as you ll use that relationship to make money. 

A second list was for user-level help. Some programs are exceptionally powerful 
(I m not thinking of the Unix "cat" or "tail" here, but something more like send- 
mail or qmail) and in-depth knowledge to properly exploit all that power. Some 
users want to acquire that depth. Others do not, but will dip their toes into the 
depths by asking a question on the user mailing list. If there are sufficient users 
of the program, you will have other businesses competing with you. One of the 
ways they will compete is by offering to help other people. No need to worry, 
though! By virtue of your proprietary interest in the program, you will have a 
built-in advantage over these other businesses. In any case, customers like com 
petition because they perceive it as ensuring fair prices. 



140 * C Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 



The third list is for developers. 1 am of two minds here. You could have the devel 
opers list open to all comers, regardless of their to contribute to the project. Or 
you could have the developers list be open only to those who actually have con 
tributed. The main tradeoff is protecting the time and attention of your contrib 
utors. You don t want them signing off the developer mailing list because it has 
too many user-level questions being asked on it. You really need their attention 
to help you make decisions that will affect them. For example, if you change an 
API, you need to clear that change with your developers first, because it keeps 
them involved in the process, and second, because they may be relying on some 
thing you re doing. 



FreeDOS has adopted Freemacs as its standard text editor, so it still has a user base. I 
only rarely do any MS-DOS work, and when I do, I m happy with the state of 
Freemacs, so it s now frozen in time. There were never any commercial users, so 
apart from selling copies on floppies, Freemacs managed only to buy me my own 
computer for home. 

Packet Drivers 

Crynwr Software came into its own with packet drivers. A packet driver allowed the 
sharing of an Ethernet card between two protocol stacks. For about a year, the only 
possible way to get Novell network clients on the Internet was by using a packet 
driver. Also, a packet driver would hide the differences among Ethernet cards. 

Unlike video boards, which are at least compatible at the VGA level, Ethernet boards 
have never been compatible. 

Back before packet drivers existed, there were network clients and servers largely 
Novell NetWare. The manufacturer- written network driver was linked to Novell s 
code in a single executable. The resultant program had no API for an external pro 
gram to send or receive an Ethernet packet, which was very bad for any competition 
to NetWare. Maybe Novell planned it that way, but I doubt the company was that 
Machiavellian. 

Anybody wanting to send packets other than NetWare s had a problem. 

The 3Com 3C501 was the market leader, but it was a very insufficient card. It had one 
buffer shared between transmit and receive, so a packet could be lost if it arrived when 
the buffer had not been emptied, cleaned, and turned around. However, everybody had 
drivers for it. Novell, in an attempt to improve the state of the art, took National s 8390 
demo board and put it into production as the NE1000 (and later as the NE2000). This 
board had sufficient memory with separate transmit and receive buffers. 



Just about then, other Ethernet controllers were coming on the market. People were 
using the Intel 82586, the AMD LANCE, and the National 8390 (in non-NE2000- 
compatible ways). Only NetWare included a device driver development solution. It 
had a driver development kit (DDK), and a certification house (Novell Labs). 

Other protocol stack vendors were doing the same thing producing drivers linked 
into their own products. No vendor had a driver that could be shared, however. 
While Novell and Microsoft pondered, little FTP Software (now owned by NetMan- 
age) had the same problem as everyone else: too much hardware and too few driv 
ers. It came up with its own specification for a shared Ethernet driver and, unlike 
other vendors, published it as an open standard. 

I was working for Clarkson University at the time, and we had the same problem as 
everyone else: how to support multiple pieces of software and hardware at the same 
time. I was using Phil Karn (KA9Q) s NOS, and he had packet driver support. So, I 
wrote packet drivers for the two Ethernet adapters in use at Clarkson (the 3c501 and 
Racal-Interlan NI5210) and published them as open source software. 

A number of fellow Internet users contributed drivers, and before long, we had cov 
ered a considerable portion of the industry. This led to more support from TCP/IP 
vendors, and a group at Brigham Young University wrote a NetWare driver that 
could use a packet driver. We really got the ball rolling then, because anyone with a 
NetWare network could put it on the Internet. 

There were some holdouts, notably Microsoft and Novell, both of whom started pro 
moting their own standards: NDIS and ODI, respectively. The NDIS document was 
published from the start, but there were no sample drivers, and no base of code from 
which to build. ODI documentation was available only with an expensive DDK pur 
chase. A packet driver distinguishes itself by coming with source code, by having a 
simple, approachable API, and by being small in size. The typical driver was 5K of 
executable, compared to 20K for ODI, and 40K for NDIS. 

By the mid- 1991, I realized there was money to be made providing packet driver 
programming and certification services the latter for drivers not written by Crynwr. 
So I left Clarkson and, after a five-month placeholder stint at a local PBX company, I 
started Crynwr Software. Up until 1998, Crynwr s main source of income was from 
packet drivers. 

Packet Driver Income 

Most likely, everybody has heard that the way to profit from open source software is 
to sell services. That s true, but there are many different types of services. I ll list 
some of them in the following paragraphs. 



142 * * Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 



The first, and most profitable, is contract programming. Various people need packet 
drivers written, or features added, or bugs fixed. I contract with them to fix it, either 
for a fixed price (if I understand the problem), or at an hourly rate (if discovery is 
needed). Buyers don t like cost uncertainty they really like to know what some 
thing will cost up front but whenever you bid a fixed price, you are taking on the 
risk that the project will be much harder than you thought. 

I have actually been successful doing what appears, at first sight, to be the worst of 
both worlds: charging per hour with a minimum and maximum price. If you set the 
minimum and maximum to reasonably sane values, the risk is reasonably shared 
between the two parties. 



Business Tutorial 

Here s a quick tutorial, which I wish I had had when I started, on how people do 
business. First, customers expect to do business first, and pay you for it later. The 
customer accomplishes this by issuing a private currency called a purchase order 
(PO), with a face value and a serial number called the "PO number." Purchase 
orders owed to you are Accounts Receivable. Purchase orders you have issued 
and will pay are called Accounts Payable. I call a PO a currency because you can 
get a loan against good receivables, and you can sell bad receivables (customers 
who don t pay, or pay very late) at a discount. 

Never do work on a promise to pay you. If someone is really going to pay you, 
they ll be able to cut you a PO. People change jobs and companies go into bank 
ruptcy. If you have a PO number, that s as good as gold, because a company s 
ability to purchase things depends on its reputation for paying on terms. If it loses 
that ability, nobody will accept a PO from the company, and then it has to pay 
cash for everything. Get that PO! 

Some companies have intricate purchasing systems, where you have to be a qual 
ified vendor, you have to sign a W-9, and you have to sign a nondisclosure agree 
ment just to work with them. Other companies just whip out the credit card, and 
you re good to go. For any company larger than 50 people, though, you ll be 
dealing with a buyer. Most buyers are used to purchasing software as a product. 

Although they are starting to understand that software can be a service, you 
might still might run into a confused buyer, because sometimes they re told to 
"buy this software" and they don t understand that they re purchasing a CD and 
a support contract. Take the time to educate them about the difference, and you ll 
have an easier time working with them. 



Packet Driver Income X 143 



I ve also sold proprietary packet drivers, although this was a special circumstance 
(and one that was very profitable to me). I had a customer who wanted a new packet 
driver, but who didn t want to pay the entire price for it. He wanted to pay only half. 
He persuaded the vendor (SMC Semiconductors, now SMSC) to pay the other half, 
since the packet driver would be useful for all the vendor s customers. That seemed 
fair to me. I had his purchase order and SMSC s promise. Unfortunately, he paid up 
and SMSC didn t, so I had a packet driver that the vendor hadn t paid for. If I made it 
freely copyable, no vendor would ever bother to pay me, so I decided to license it to 
SMSC s customers until SMSC paid me. The company never paid, so I sold it with a 
clear conscience. 

I ve also dual-licensed packet drivers. A vendor that was going to embed an Ethernet 
chip into its product and use an embedded processor wanted to freely copy code 
from the packet driver without taking a chance that its driver would become a 
derived work under the provisions of the GPL. So the vendor purchased a copy of 
the code from me, licensed for any use except resale. 

I ve also sold compatibility certification. Digital Equipment Corporation had written 
its own proprietary packet drivers. DEC wanted me to certify that the company was 
compatible with the open source packet drivers. I had written a test program that 
would exercise the edges of a packet driver to try to break it. If that program ran, it 
meant DEC had made no stupid mistakes reading the specification. I also ran a stress 
test for several days; if that didn t run into problems, it meant DEC had made no stu 
pid coding mistakes. 

I ve also done pure consulting. Contracting is different from consulting. A contractor 
is someone who sells his work output, and a consultant is someone who sells his 
ideas. A customer wanted me to describe how my packet driver worked on their 
hardware, so they sent an engineer to my site for a day to get a debriefing. He took 
my family out to lunch, and I got paid handsomely for the day not as much as I 
would have been paid to write the improvements myself, but you can t make all the 
money all the time. 

Qmail 

Qmail 2 is an MTA written by Daniel J. Bernstein, a University of Chicago professor. 
He needed a fast MTA to run his mailing lists. While I was working on Freemacs and 
Packet Drivers, I was also running my own mailing lists. 



Qmail is not open source. It s freely copyable, but you can t redistribute modified executables. 
Although open source MTAs do exist, qmail is close enough to open source that I have 
insufficient reason to switch. 



144 x x Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 



I experienced the same problems he did, so when he published qmail, I was on it 
right away. First, I ran it on a test machine, because I hate to lose email. Later, I ran it 
on my email hub after I learned to trust it. Slowly, the qmail community grew. 

Working with qmail has been a different experience from Freemacs and Packet Driv 
ers, as I did not write the qmail code. It s just as well, since that gives me something 
different to write about. It s a truism that you cannot sell something you don t own. 
A number of the techniques that I used for Packet Drivers do not work for qmail, as I 
don t own the copyright on it. Nonetheless, I have done quite well with qmail. 

Open source software serves to promote the author. By writing quality software 
(code and documentation), the author shows everyone the quality of his work. The 
software pushes his reputation out into the world. But what if you haven t written the 
software? I have found the best technique is to spend time reading user forums and 
answering questions. You can advance your reputation in this manner. 

There are other ways to establish your expertise with a particular program. You can 
contribute improvements to the code or documentation. You can write your own 
code that enhances the software, but that otherwise stands alone. You can also write 
extra documentation or maintain a web site about the software. 

I did all these things for qmail. Dr. Bernstein was not interested in registering the 
qmail.org domain, so I did it for him and maintained the web site, and I wrote a 
POP3 daemon for qmail and gave it back to him. I answered questions on the qmail 
mailing list. I wrote add-on packages and patches that people have found useful. 

Using all these techniques, I found paying qmail employment. Most often this came 
from people who needed qmail installed on their machines and had extra requirements 

that needed custom coding. Sometimes the customer wanted on-site qmail training 

which I have provided in Stockholm, Mumbai, London, New York City, Oslo, and 
Istanbul. All these trips were, of course, paid for by my customers, who also paid me. 

Open Source Economics 

It was my reputation, or "brand name" if you wish, that got me involved in the Open 
Source Initiative (OSI). I had been running the Free Software Business (FSB) mailing 
list since 1993, and had some success and reputation. When I heard about the Open 
Source name, I immediately adopted it in describing my software. It s so much easier to 
explain to customers why they should pay for software when it isn t "Free Software." 
Sometime after that, I heard that Eric Raymond was seeking to create an organization 
to promote OSI. I had been corresponding with Eric about open source, and we had 
discussed it on the FSB mailing list, so I volunteered to be on the board of OSI. 

I started the FSB mailing list so I could be more aware: I wanted to know what other 
people were doing to make money from open source. It seems that adding value to 



Open Source Economics * * W5 



things others created is a revolutionary way to make money; even Shakespeare might 
agree, as he routinely "recycled" plots and storylines written by other people. 

Certainly in the software business, an FSB is a new thing. With proprietary software, 
about the only way to add value is to sell the software for a higher price, or bundle 
products and sell them together for a lower price in toto. 

Running an FSB interested me in economics. When you give up a payroll check and 
start paying yourself, you also have to pay the business s share of Social Security 
taxes and start paying estimated income taxes quarterly. The government imposes 
this dead load on businesses. Why do they do this? Who benefits? Who loses? Eco 
nomics helps you answer these questions. 

Think carefully about how you price your services. There is an economic concept 
called "price differentiation." It means that you charge different parties different 
prices for slightly different services. If you charge a single price to everyone, and that 
price is too high, you miss out on helping some people who cannot afford your ser 
vices. If you charge a single price that is too low, you create value for some people 
beyond the amount they paid. It s not exactly fair that they should gain a lot more 
than you. To maximize your gain, sell things to people based on the value they 
receive rather than the cost to you. For example, everyone has seen software sold for 
less in a third-world country or to a school. 

Of course, pricing is also related to costs. Think about both transaction costs and so- 
called "sunk costs." Every transaction consumes a small amount of value in the transac 
tion itself. The buyer needs to evaluate whether the cost spent is worth the value 
received. The seller needs to take the money and provide the value. This cost is not 
received as value by either the buyer or the seller; it is simply wasted. One way you can 
sell support to a customer is on a self-renewing yearly support subscription. One 
month before the subscription expires, you send the customer an invoice. The sub 
scription portion avoids having to bill the customer for each support request, and the 
self-renewing portion avoids having to ask the customer to renew the support contract. 

A sunk cost is one you cannot recover by selling the thing you bought for example 
a railroad or a run of fiber optics cable. You can pull up the rails and sell them, but 
you won t get back anywhere near the cost of building the railroad. Likewise, spend 
ing money to create or improve open source software is a sunk cost. Once you ve 
spent that money, you have no way to sell the software (except by exiting the open 
source system by using a dual license). Just as a railroad needs to recover its sunk 
cost by selling transportation services, you need to recover your investment in the 
software by selling related services. 

One of the ways to manage costs is by making use of "public goods." A public good 
is nonrivalrous (meaning that my use doesn t affect your use) and nonexcludable (I 
can t stop you from using it). Absent copyright or patent protection, information is a 



146 ^ C Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 



public good. Open source is typically copyrighted software, but is licensed under 
terms that make it effectively a public good. There is currently great debate over how 
much excludability is necessary to produce the optimal amount of software. 

Previously, economics students were taught that public goods were always underpro 
duced, with lighthouses as the canonical example. 

Someone dug up the history of lighthouses, only to find that the early ones were 
built by voluntary organizations. In a similar manner, the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF) wrote the GNU tool set as a public good. Economists can no longer assume 
that public goods are underproduced. 

People don t particularly care about products. People only buy things and own things 
for the services those things render to them. People don t want to own a washing 
machine; they just want clean clothes. Any desire to own a washing machine is second 
ary to having the clean clothes. The same thing goes for computers, only computers can 
provide many different services. The same services that someone can get from a soft 
ware product can also come from open source software and a support contract. 

Economists have discovered many principles helpful to the proprietor of an open 
source business. Nevermind the joke about 10 economists having 11 opinions. This 
chapter can but touch on the principles. (See the "For Further Reading" section at the 
end of this chapter for more information.) 

Where Do We Go from Here? 

I ve brought you up to my present life. Well, not quite. I received an inheritance 
from my mother, which, when invested in the stock market, generates sufficient 
income that I no longer need to work for a living. I still take interesting jobs as they 
come up, and I support long-term customers because they ve become friends, not 
just customers. In everything else, I just write open source and distribute it as I wish. 
My advice to you is to always pay your retirement fund first: put 10% of every 
project s check into a brokerage account and invest it in an Exchange Traded Fund. 

Happy hacking! 

For Further Reading 

For a basic (and enjoyable) introduction to price theory, read Hidden Order, by David 
D. Friedman (Collins, 1997). In fact, read anything written by any member of the 
Friedman dynasty: Milton, Rose, David, or Patri. 

For a basic introduction to economics, read Economics in One Lesson, by Henry Hazlitt 
(Three Rivers Press, 1998). 



Where Do We Go from Here? *C M7 



For an explanation of the proper function of the law, read The Law, by Frederic Bas- 
tiat (Foundation for Economic Education, 1987). It s in the public domain, so you 
can find it on the Web, in print, and as a free audio book. 

For a very deep exposition on economics, read Human Action, by Ludwig von Mises 
(Fox & Wilkes, 1996). It s available at http://www.mises.org/humanaction.asp. 

The FSB mailing list is at http://crynwr.com/fsb.html. 
Freemacs is at http://www.freedos.org/jhall/freemacs. 
Packet Drivers are at http://crynwr.com. 
qmail is at http://qmail.org. 



148 x x Open Source and the Small Entrepreneur 







CHAPTER 10 
Wendy Seltzer 



Why Open Source Needs 
Copyright Politics 



Some programmers and businesspeople draw a distinction between "Free Software" 
and "open source." Free Software is political, they say, and open source is pragmatic. 
Free Software developers want to recede the world; open sourcers just want to write 
good code. This distinction is, of course, exaggerated. Many people adopt these 
labels for their own reasons; some switch between them depending on audience or 
context. But even the most apolitical of open source developers and users should be 
concerned by the copyright battles waged right now. The copyright law being made 
and enforced today will impact the software we can develop and use for decades, and 
its impact reaches far beyond commercial media. 

Imagine, for example, that you d like to build an open source home multimedia 
server. Nothing fancy yet, just a place to play music, watch the occasional DVD, and 
record television programs one machine to replace the menagerie of devices nest 
ing in your media center. Easier developed than cleared legally. Technically, you (or 
others willing to share with you) will be able to meet the challenges with Moore s 
Law-fast processors, ever-cheaper massive storage capacities, and clever user inter 
faces. The legal obstacles are harder to hack. Start with the music. If you have stan 
dard CDs, you re all set: plenty of Free programs let you play them from the CD 
drive, rip them to Ogg, FLAG, or MP3 (with a nod, perhaps, to the patent licensors at 
Fraunhoffer). Try to connect to a streaming service or purchase music online, and 
things get tricky. Apple s iTunes, the "new Napster," and Rhapsody all lack open 
source clients, and none would be happy with reverse engineering to write one that 
plays the music they sell encrypted or by subscription. 



Yet music is the easy part. Want to write a player for DVDs you ve purchased or Net- 
flixed? Because only closed source implementations have been licensed to decrypt 
the DVD s files, any DVD player you write is liable to be deemed a "circumvention" 
by the movie studios and courts, even if the only features you write match those of 
WinDVD or the standalone player under the TV. Television, then; recording over- 
the-air broadcasts shouldn t be too hard, since those are unencrypted. Watch out for 
the digital television transition and the broadcast flag, though. Unless public interest 
groups challenge succeeds, the FCC s broadcast flag rule will ban open digital TV 
tuners that can be used with open source software. The only ones who will be able to 
play will be those making closed hardware or proprietary software decoders. You ll 
encounter these obstacles before you even try to take any of your media off the server 
to exchange with friends or family. 

OK, but say for a moment that you have no interest in multimedia. Leave that mine 
field for another day and move on to business networks or productivity software. 
Even there, copyright law intrudes. Your security analysis of a system s encryption 
might be limited by what media companies have preemptively claimed as "techno 
logical protection measures;" your selection of replacement parts or add-on modules 
could be dictated by copyright-based tying more than fitness for use; your ability to 
interoperate depends on whether reasonable interpretations of the law prevail over 
some vendors extreme copyright claims. 

Like a group of once-healthy cells grown out of control, copyright law has metasta- 
sized to threaten the system of creativity it was once helping to support. No longer a 
"limited monopoly" to encourage creativity and dissemination of creative works to 
the public, copyright has become a blunt tool of exclusion, chilling development of 
software, among other creative endeavors. And so the fight to restore balance to 
copyright law cannot be dismissed as mere politics. Unless users and developers of 
open source software join the copyfight, they will find the new reality of copyright 
law restricting not just their freedom to play blockbuster movies, but also their core 
freedoms to write and run independent and interoperable software. 

From Movable Type to MovableType 

A balanced copyright law is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution: "to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts," Congress was empowered to grant authors 
exclusive rights "for limited times." The monopoly created was limited in time and 
scope. The first copyright law gave authors a 14-year term, renewable once, to pub 
lish and vend maps, charts, and books. Copyright protected original expression for a 
short time, while leaving others free to build around that expression (translations and 
dramatizations, for example), and then to recycle works entirely from the public 
domain once copyright expired. 



ISO ^ C Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 



Copyright law has changed with the introduction of new technologies. New means of 
reproduction often first challenge the copyright framework, then establish them 
selves as new creative tools for authors and their public audiences alike. At the turn 
of the last century, printers bought single copies of sheet music and punched holes 
into rolled paper to program "piano rolls" for then-new player pianos. Composers 
and music publishers sued, seeking to rein in this appropriation. When the courts 
held that punched paper didn t "copy" inked notes, Congress updated the law with a 
compromise not to ban player pianos or mechanical reproduction, but to permit 
anyone to produce piano rolls if they paid a "mechanical license" royalty for every 
roll sold. As the player piano market grew, more music reached more people, and 
more composers got paid for creating it. 

The pattern has repeated itself many times since. Songwriters and performers 
denounced radio until both found that it could promote sales. Movie studios deplored 
the videocassette recorder, saying Sony s Betamax would be the "Boston Strangler" to 
their industry. When they failed to shut Sony down, however, the industry converted 
its peril into a profit center, finding that viewers with home recorders were potential 
customers for rentals and sales of appropriately priced videotapes. Meanwhile, the 
Supreme Court s ruling that technology makers would not be liable for users copy 
right infringements so long as their devices were "capable of substantial noninfringing 
use" fueled a technology boom. The public and the creators shared the benefits of new 
technology the public could record movies from television to videotape; studios 
could sell or rent videocassettes more easily than reel-to-reel. 

Despite making it through these earlier transitions, the entertainment companies 
haven t stopped fighting technological change and the competitive threats it repre 
sents. The MP3 player is a slightly more convenient cassette deck, and the weblog is 
just the next step forward from the typewriter and mimeograph. This time, however, 
the entertainment industry has swayed many in Congress and the courts to the view 
that "digital is different," and induced them to change the law in ways that are differ 
ent and dangerous. 

This expansion of copyright s control interferes with open source development. The 
changes manifest themselves in layers, most notably overassertion of protection for 
code itself; excessive protection of other copyrighted content that code is dealing with; 
and misuse of copyright to control markets and maintain cartels in technologies of dis 
tribution or manipulation of code and content. Together, the copyright layers build a 
shell around not only proprietary code, but also around culture and innovation. 

Copyright in Code 

Copyright protects original expression in code, as it protects any other "original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Some developers 
use that protection to enforce the openness of their code, as with the GNU General 



Copyright in Code X 151 



Public License (GPL); others use it to reinforce a proprietary distribution model. But 
while copyright protects code s creative expression, it does not protect the functions, 
methods, or procedures that expression implements. Thus, even for closed code, a 
programmer remains free to study interfaces and functionality, free to interoperate or 
replace that code with his own. 

Situated as it is in an environment filled with proprietary software and poorly docu 
mented interfaces, open source development frequently relies on reverse engineering 
to fit in. Anyone who has used Samba to bridge Windows and non- Windows net 
works has benefited from Andrew Tridgell s reverse engineering of the Windows pro 
tocols for network services; anyone who exchanges files to read and write them in 
OpenOffice.org rather than Microsoft Word appreciates the reverse-engineering- 
derived ability to edit files in Microsoft Word format. 

Courts have long held that reverse engineering, the practice of examining something 
and taking it apart to figure out how it works, is a fair use, not an infringement of 
copyright. Even when programs are released only as closed, binary code, program 
mers can often discover a great deal about them by watching their operation or the 
file formats they use, or by disassembly. Reimplementing those discoveries in new 
code comports with copyright too. So, companies have been protected in taking 
apart a video game console to build a console emulator (Sony v. Connectix) or disas 
sembling a game to build a new one compatible with the console (Sega v. Accolade). If 
someone builds a better mousetrap after examining those that exist, copyright law 
will not stop her from deploying it. 

At least that s the black-letter law. In practice, though, many copyright holders try to 
extend copyright s limited monopoly to block reverse engineering, through a combi 
nation of copyright, contract, and anticircumvention. For example, Blizzard, maker 
of the popular Starcraft and Warcraft video games, claims that all players have 
"agreed," through click-wrap licenses they encounter before the programs run, to a 
contract that prohibits reverse engineering the Blizzard games. This contract plus 
copyright, Blizzard asserts, prevents anyone from interoperating without permission. 

The bnetd project began when a group of programmers became frustrated by the 
poor performance of Blizzard s battle.net server for multiuser play of the games they 
had bought. Instead of putting up with the frequent downtime and rampant cheat 
ing on Blizzard s server, they started work on their own open source game server. By 
watching the communications between game and server, the bnetd programmers 
were able to reverse engineer their own compatible server, which they set up to give 
owners of Blizzard games an alternate place to meet, and made the source available 
for others to join the effort. The public got another option for playing Starcraft, and 
another reason to buy Blizzard games. 

Blizzard rewarded the bnetd team s creativity with a lawsuit claiming, among other 
things, copyright infringement and breach of the click-wrap contract. The team had 

152 * C Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 



not seen any of Blizzard s source code, much less copied it, as they reimplemented 
uncopyrightable functionality, but that didn t stop Blizzard from pulling out the 
copyright sword. Copyright s lack of protection for functionality is deliberate and 
sound innovation policy the public benefits from being able to choose among com 
peting implementations of functionality, be they game servers or network services 
yet Blizzard follows in the steps of many trying to get around copyright s limits with 
contract claims. 

Blizzard was trying to limit the code others could produce, to extend the copyright 
protection on its own code. But many of those pulling out copyright s swords aren t 
trying to protect code, but other copyrighted content touched by or that they re 
afraid will be touched by code. These efforts, assertions of secondary liability, anti- 
circumvention regimes, and attempts to impose technology mandates, all limit open 
source developers ability to produce new code, to learn from old code, and to com 
pete in the market with proprietary code. 

Secondary Liability 

Copyright law has not been strictly limited to the direct infringers, but may be 
extended to those who "contribute" to the infringement in an ongoing relationship 
with the infringer, or with special-purpose equipment suited only for infringement. 
Thus, the proprietor of a hall, who looks the other way while paying guests listen to 
unlicensed music, can be held vicariously liable for the infringing public perfor 
mance, and the seller of tapes of a length precisely timed for copying particular copy 
righted albums could be held contributorily liable for the subsequent infringing use. 
Extended too far, however, secondary liability chokes off innovation. 

Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court rejected Universal and Disney s "unprece 
dented attempt to impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equip 
ment" with the ruling that manufacturers of devices "capable of substantial non- 
infringing use" could not be held secondarily liable. The MGM v. Grokstcr lawsuit, an 
attack by all the major record labels and movie studios against Grokster and Stream- 
cast, maker of the Morpheus filesharing software, is nothing short of an all-out 
assault on the Sony standard. 

The studios argue that Grokster and Streamcast should be liable because many users 
of the peer-to-peer software infringe copyrights notwithstanding that many others 
transfer public domain works from Project Gutenberg or the Internet Archive; freely 
licensed works including open source software and Creative Commons-licensed 
media; or government works. They argue that the producers of software should be 
held liable for its "predominant" or "principal" use. Their standard is unworkable 
both to an entrepreneur financing an untested product and to an open source devel 
oper releasing software, any of whose users could adapt it to an unintended, infring 
ing purpose. 



Secondary Liability *C 153 



Under the Betamax standard, makers of multiuse devices such as the VCR could thus 
offer them to the public without fearing that they might be held liable if customers 
misused them to infringe copyrights. With this assurance, hardware makers built 
components with open interfaces, including CD and DVD burners and massive hard 
drives, without fearing that someone might put the Plextor on the copyright hook by 
using that CD burner for large-scale copyright infringement. They built copying 
devices to transfer content. Software makers, too, have safely offered highly config 
urable and open source software with relative confidence that their users configura 
tions won t land them in hot water. The studios proposed redefinition threatens that 
freedom to innovate. 

Grokster is thus much bigger than peer-to-peer. An expansion of copyright liability, 
with a "predominant use" test, would make it safer to produce limited-purpose, non- 
user-modifiable devices and software than open hardware and open source software, 
regardless of the intent of the developer. 

If secondary liability for those who "contribute" to infringement in some ill-defined 
way weren t enough, the entertainment industry is likely to return to Congress with 
pleas of renewed urgency to pass the INDUCE Act, which stalled last term. That pro 
posed bill would add yet another level of indirect liability: "inducing" infringement of 
copyright would extend beyond those who made the tools, to those who explained 
how to make them work. Watch out that your documentation isn t too thorough! 

Anticircumvention 

The next stage of copyright expansion beyond direct infringement is the anticircum- 
vention and antitools provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA). In 
the real world, these provisions do little to stop hard-core piracy, but they present a 
serious barrier to open source compatibility. 

Section 1201 of the DMCA prohibits "circumvention" of technological protection 
measures controlling access to copyrighted works, and it bans manufacture, distribu 
tion, and trafficking in devices, products, components, or services that are promoted 
for, primarily useful for, or designed for circumvention of technological protection 
measures. Now, a copyright holder who employs a technological lock, such as sim 
ple encryption of content, gains the ability to control who and what programs or 
devices can unlock it, as part of the new right to control "access" to a protected work. 

This is an important functional change from the world of printed books or even CDs, 
where anyone who purchased or borrowed the physical item had the right to use it 
as she chose read the last chapter first or play the CD in the car or the computer. 
Someone who wants to develop a new shuffle mode for CD playback, or a new rip 
per with better compression for transfer to a portable music player, can do so with 
out seeking permission from the recording companies. It s the misuse of those 



154 * x Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 



tools say, to copy CDs and sell the copies without authorization, that can be pur 
sued as an infringement of traditional copyright. 

Under the new anticircumvention regime, however, those who control copyrights 
can take their control much further. Thus, copyright holders say, and courts have 
agreed, anyone who develops a decoder for an encrypted format without a license is 
producing circumvention tools in violation of the DMCA. So, groups of copyright 
holders, who couldn t individually control markets, join together in licensing cartels 
backed by the magic of the DMCA, by which they control not only copyrights but 
also the surrounding player technologies. 

And so it is with digital video discs. Movie studios and consumer electronics and 
technology companies developed the content scrambling system, a.k.a. CSS, applied 
it to DVDs, and declared it to be a technological protection measure. By forming the 
DVD Copy Control Association to license the CSS specification as a trade secret on 
restrictive terms, they sealed themselves a nice cartel, simultaneously protecting 
themselves against disruptive innovation in video players from outside of the estab 
lishment and walling off their copyrighted works against fair use copying. 

The CSS encryption was trivially easy to break, once Jon Johansen and some Ger 
man programmers set their minds to it. But that s beside the point, since the law pro 
tects even weak technological protection measures with the full panoply of anticir 
cumvention and antidevice prohibitions. Even weak measures set up the law s sharp 
division between licensed access and unlicensed circumvention. Thus, with DeCSS 
and its successor code, anyone can play or rip a DVD on any platform, but with 
DMCA, no one can lawfully do so in the United States, or even develop code for 
DVD playback, without a license from the DVD-CCA. 

Kaleidescape is a small company with a rich clientele owners of hundreds of DVDs 
willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a DVD jukebox to organize and store them all. 
Kaleidescape built this machine a computer filled with massive hard drives onto 
which customers could rip their DVD movie collections. For its efforts to help the 
movie industry s best customers get more out of their purchases, Kaleidescape earned 
itself a lawsuit from the DVD-CCA, claiming Kaleidescape had breached its contract 
licensing the not-so-secret DVD trade secrets. 

Kaleidescape s system, which allows the creation of persistent digital copies of the 
content of DVDs and allows copying of the CSS copy protection data, is not designed 
in a manner and does not include features clearly designed to effectively frustrate 
efforts to defeat the copy protection functions.... For these reasons, Kaleidescape has 
breached the CSS license. 

Without that license, even if similar information could be derived from reverse engi 
neering and publicly available information, using it to enable DVD "access" and play 
back would be labeled circumvention. 



Anticircumvention X 155 



As the movie studios have done with DVDs, record labels and software companies 
have done with multiple incompatible formats for streaming and downloadable 
music: Windows Media, Janus, Apple s FairPlay. Many of these have succumbed to 
reverse engineering of varying degrees of sophistication, from "burn it to CD and 
rerip," to "run it through a simulated sound-card driver," through cryptanalysis 
(much of it from Jon Johansen, again). 

Yet, like CSS, none of the music protection measures is licensed on terms that per 
mit open source development, nor could they be. Open source is incompatible with 
both their stated aim, to prevent "piracy" of content, and the unstated underlying 
goal of technology control. Since the essence of open source is user modification, 
users could easily modify in or out any particular features and the first to go would 
likely be the restrictions of digital rights management (DRM) and barriers to interop 
erability. Even if open source version 1.0 incorporated all the restrictions of propri 
etary clients, numerous versions 1.0.1 would likely disable them. Thus, anticircum- 
vention regimes lock open source out of mainstream development of entire classes of 
applications to interact with these copyright cartels media. 

Of course, it s not just open source developers who need reverse engineering. Con 
sider RealNetworks attempt to sell music that would play on the popular iPod. Real 
could have transcoded downloads into standard MP3, which play on the iPod, but 
Real (or its record-label-relations department) wanted to include DRM on the files. 
So, it reverse engineered Apple s FairPlay format, in a move Real called Harmony, to 
encode Real files for the iPod. Apple fought back with legal and technical threats. 
Along with intimations that it might use the DMCA, Apple issued a statement that 
said, "We strongly caution Real and their customers that when we update our iPod 
software from time to time it is highly likely that Real s Harmony technology will 
cease to work with current and future iPods." Real wasn t threatening to infringe 
copyrights, but to give customers a way to interchange their iPods for other devices. 
Once again, DRM is market protection, not copy protection. 

The Threat to Research 

Again in the DMCA, copyright bleeds beyond entertainment media and content. 
Here, it also chills research into encryption that may be used to secure copyrighted 
works, regardless of whether that research touches entertainment content directly. 

When the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) invited programmers to "attack" 
security technologies they were promoting to control digital music, Princeton com 
puter science professor Ed Felten and his team stepped up to the challenge. They 
broke the security and prepared a scientific paper analyzing the weaknesses of digi 
tal audio watermarking. By scrutinizing these implementations, they could help the 
public, and particularly those considering watermarks to protect their own materi 
als, to evaluate the security of watermark technologies. 



156 * C Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 



But when the Felten paper was accepted for presentation at a computer security con 
ference, its authors were threatened with a lawsuit from the Recording Industry Asso 
ciation of America (RIAA) and SDMI s technology providers. RIAA and the technol 
ogy companies claimed that even the scientific analysis of flaws in security 
technology "would subject [the] research team to enforcement actions under the 
DMCA and possibly other federal laws." The RIAA suggested that the paper and con 
ference presentation fell under the DMCA s antidevice prohibition, which bans offer 
ing to the public "any technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof," designed or marketed for circumvention or having only limited commer 
cially significant other purposes. Facing legal pressure on conference organizers and 
researchers, the team withdrew the paper. 

While Professor Felten and his team ultimately published a version of the paper, 
"Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge," they were forced to 
strip out technical detail. With the vague anticircumvention threat hanging, the 
authors felt they had to omit code samples that could be construed as aiding circum 
vention even though that code would have helped other researchers and develop 
ers to understand the watermarks weaknesses better and to learn from SDMI s errors 
in building their own security systems. 

The work of the Felten team never infringed copyright. The researchers did not copy 
a single piece of music without authorization, nor even produce tools that enabled 
others to do so directly. And yet, they were caught up by the DMCA s vagaries 
because their paper intended to educate other researchers and developers of secu 
rity systems might also have provided "part" of a tool for circumventing a copy 
right control. Will the same hurdles rise before someone who builds a tool to strip 
accidental copy protection from fonts he himself has created; security researchers 
who find vulnerabilities in network software they analyze; someone describing hard 
ware modifications to make the Xbox a more general-purpose device? So far, the 
answer has been "yes" for Tom Murphy, SNOsoft, and Bunnie Hwang. 

For those who are attracted to open source development because of its opportunities 
to learn from and share with others, this antiresearch aspect of the DMCA should be 
particularly troubling: research is being chilled precisely because it teaches too much, 
because its teaching might be misused. Of course, closing systems doesn t stop them 
from having security flaws, or even prevent those flaws from being discovered, and it 
does block some of the most effective information sharing around better security. 
Both the teaching that open source developers depend on to improve their programs 
and the teaching of open source code itself are at risk. 

Further, the DMCA has been used in attempts to block competitive interoperability 
of devices including printer toner cartridges and remote control garage door open 
ers, as manufacturers add little scraps of code to devices and hope to leverage its 



The Threat to Research *> 157 



"protection" into market control. Though those arguments have been rejected so far, 
it s unlikely we ve seen the last of them. 

Technology Mandates 

The final layer of copyright s expansion, so far, is to technology mandates, where an 
entire technology is redesigned by government fiat in the name of copyright protec 
tion. Senator Ernest "Fritz" Rollings proposed one of these in 2002 that would have 
required every "digital media device," including the personal computer, to be rede 
signed to protect copyrighted content. While the "Fritz chip" never came to be, a 
smaller version has been foisted upon us in the form of the Broadcast Flag, an FCC 
rule set to take effect July 1, 2005. 

With the government eager to get broadcasters off the valuable analog spectrum and 
onto digital transmissions, movies studios threatened that they wouldn t allow their 
content to be broadcast digitally in the clear, and warned that there would be no transi 
tion without their "high-value" content. The FCC didn t want to abandon the notion of 
unencrypted over-the-air television broadcasts, but it did want to give the studios their 
"protection," so it put the restrictions into the hardware. At the studios recommenda 
tion, the FCC adopted a rule that adds a "flag" to these unencrypted broadcasts and 
then requires every receiver to watch for the flag and output flagged content only to 
"compliant" devices or in low resolution. Only devices that can implement DRM in a 
manner "robust against user modification" will be deemed compliant. 

The Broadcast Flag rule enforces copyright on communications through the devices 
that receive them: 

We conclude that in order for a flag-based content protection system to be effec 
tive, demodulators integrated within, or produced for use in, DTV reception 
devices ("Demodulator Products") must recognize and give effect to the ATSC 
flag pursuant to the compliance and robustness rules. . ..This necessarily includes 
PC and IT products that are used for off-air DTV reception. 

Instead of focusing on infringing uses of TV broadcasts (taping a show and selling 
copies, for example), this new kind of regulation puts the government in the busi 
ness of redesigning products that might be used to infringe. In the process, it locks 
out many noninfringing uses, innovative technologies, competitive products, and 
open source developers. Building a device for time-shifting, pausing live TV, 
remotely scheduling recordings, and watching shows at double speed doesn t 
infringe copyright, but because the hardware/software to enable those capabilities 
isn t "robust," it is sacrificed to illusory copyright protection. Because these collateral 
harms are unavoidable, technology mandates should be a last resort, not a predictive 
strike against hypothetical danger. 



158 ^ C Why Open Source Needs Copyright Politics 



The result of this rule is restriction on open source even greater than encryption 
would have been. Open source can implement encryption, but it can t offer 
"robust [ness] against user modification." Pre-flag, you could get an HDTV tuner card 
for a PC, pair it with open source software such as MythTV, and build your own dig 
ital video recorder to compete with TiVo. Post-flag, TiVo must use government- 
approved "robust" technologies to lock down its hardware and software, and open 
source will be shut out from access to the high-definition signals entirely. 

Under the Broadcast Flag regime, market participants, bound up in the welter of 
licensing and preapproval requirements, can t offer the products users want. Where 
the market fails to provide fair-use-enabling technologies, the robustness rules pre 
vent end users from correcting the problem. Absent technology mandates, users dis 
satisfied with commercial options can and do write their own software alternatives 
and often share them in open source. In a world of restricted, robust hardware, users 
are limited to the options the commercial market provides: the fully capable hard 
ware HD tuner card can t be manufactured. Consumer-driven innovation is cut off 
when users can t tinker with existing technologies or develop new ones that chal 
lenge market leaders. 

What About That Media Server? 

Copyright in its historical form benefits open source developers. Along with the gen 
eral public, they benefit from the incentive to creativity and the support copyright 
gives to open source distribution models. Copyright as special-interest law, however, 
hurts open source development, because the special interests are those of closed mar 
kets and closed content. DRM can t stop piracy, but it can prevent anyone from 
Betamaxing another industry, commercializing disruptive technology development 
without content-industry sanction. Where the entertainment industry can t stop 
infringement, it attacks openness instead, and the "honest person" loses. 

Whether you want to build a media server or an embedded network device, you ll 
likely run across the snares of copyright law. It s time to peel back the layers of copy 
right protectionism and return copyright to its original purpose: "to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts." 



What About That Media Server? * * 159 



XX 





CHAPTER 11 



Jesus M. Gonzalez-Barahona 
Gregorio Robles 



Libre Software in Europe 



The libre (free, open source) software 1 community is probably one of the more global 
and internationalized. Therefore, it may be a little artificial to try to separate the Euro 
pean share of it in the hope of finding peculiar characteristics. But at the same time, 
Europe is so diverse, so full of national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries, that it may 
be difficult to find common patterns in this already diverse libre software world. How 
ever, our feeling is that in between these two facts, there is plenty of room for writing 
about what is happening in the European libre software scene. While preparing the 
material for this chapter, we have come to the idea that, in fact, this is not such a glo 
bal world, nor does its European fraction lack common patterns despite its diversity. 
With this focus in mind, we have looked for both the peculiarities and the commonali 
ties. We have walked through the enormous amount of data concerning what is hap 
pening in the vibrant European libre software scene with the aim of offering the reader 
the more relevant and revealing trends and facts, providing a vision of a complex and 
diverse, but also uniform, landscape. And, for sure, a very personal one. 



In this chapter, we will use the term libre software to refer both to/ree software (according to the 
Free Software Foundation definition) and open source software (according to the Open Source 
Initiative), except where making distinctions makes sense. Libre is a term well understood in 
romance languages, such as Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Italian, and is understandable for 
speakers of many others. It lacks the ambiguity of "free" in English ("libre" means only "free" as 
in "free speech") and is used by some people especially in Europe (although the term is rooted 
in the early U.S. free software community; see http://stnetgy.org/jgb/articu/os/Itbre-so/tware-origtn/ 
ltbre-so/tware-origin.htm/ for details). In this respect, it is important to notice that although the 
communities, the motivations, and the rationales behind "free" and "open source" are different, 
the software to which they refer is basically (although not exactly) the same. 

X 161 



In fact, although libre software can be considered to come from the U.S., the spread of 
the Internet (and before that, the Usenet) in Europe made it possible to develop a frag 
mented European libre software community as early as the late 1980s. With time, com 
mon trends that could be called "European" seem to be emerging from this framenta- 
tion. However, even without strong pan-European relationships, and maybe due to the 
common sociocultural background, some trends are found now and again in different 
parts of the continent, producing a collage with many common patterns. 

In this chapter, we provide some snapshots of that collage. Instead of focusing only 
on issues that can be truly called European (because they involve participants from 
many areas of the continent), we have tried to show the diversity of initiatives and 
environments, so the reader can have at least an idea of the details of a very complex 
landscape. We have also devoted some efforts to identifying common patterns and 
Europe-wide initiatives, especially when we find they are a signal of an emerging 
common trend. Intentionally, many examples which are European by nature or 
birth, but have evolved into global projects, are not included, or are mentioned 
briefly, since they are now more global than European and therefore make little sense 
here. There is, however, a clear intent to show the main European contributions to 
the libre software world, in terms of development, use, and promotion. 

All in all, the set of case examples, and the issues presented on these pages, are just a 
(hopefully representative) showcase of what is happening in the European world of 
libre software, obviously filtered by our personal biases and backgrounds. For sure, 
the selection by any other observer of libre software in Europe would be different. 
We just hope that the reader will find our selection illustrative enough. 

Brief Summary of an Already Long History 

Before showing the current landscape of libre software in Europe, it seems necessary 
to provide some historical background. From issues like the European involvement 
and impetus in projects such as Linux (the kernel) or the KDE project, which influ 
enced greatly the shape of the currently available libre software, to very specific use 
cases in European companies, which are mainly a consequence of the global impor 
tance of the phenomenon, there is a whole rainbow of milestones which will contrib 
ute to the understanding of the present situation. 

The evolution of libre software in Europe during the early days was parallel (as it 
was in other parts of the world) to the penetration of the Internet (and before it, 
the Usenet). Therefore, it is not strange that areas which had an early and deep 
exposure to these Nets such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom also had the first cases of involvement in global libre software 
activities. However, it is important to also consider some linguistic issues. For 
instance, those countries where the English language (which is clearly the lingua 
franca in the global libre software community) has more penetration (either as the 
mother tongue or the second language) commonly had an earlier involvement in 

162 ^ x Libre Software in Europe 



libre software. With the passage of time, maybe since the mid-1990s, specific 
dynamics started to show strength in other regions, with more or less of a relation 
ship to the global evolution. Most European countries (Germany, France, and 
Spain are clear examples) have grown their own communities and libre software 
fabric in partial isolation, to the point that many initiatives that are very well 
known in one country are almost unknown in the others and outside Europe, 
despite their valuable contributions. In many cases, the flux of information among 
Europeans of different areas is still carried through global (or, for that matter, 
American) events and initiatives. Just as a case example, we still find out about rel 
evant news in other European countries through the American web news service, 
Slashdot, despite being reasonably well linked to the libre software communities in 
several European countries. 

Considering this situation, the contributions of Europe to the history of libre soft 
ware are extensive. We can consider, for example, events such as the birth of many 
applications and projects (consider Linux, the kernel, by Linus Torvalds, Finnish; 
Python, by Guido van Rossum, Dutch; MySQL, by Michael [Monty] Widenius, 
Swedish; PHP, by Rasmus Lerdorf, Danish; KDE, by Matthias Ettrich, German; and 
many more); or the foundation and development of some of the first companies with 
a business model based on developing or distributing libre software (such as MySQL 
AB, Trolltech, or SuSE); some of the first studies and initiatives denoting attention by 
public administrations to the libre software phenomenon (such as those by the Euro 
pean Commission); and some of the first research projects considering libre software 
as a matter of study (such as those performed by the FLOSS project). 

Most of those contributions will be mentioned and presented in some detail within 
this chapter. Instead of following a timeline approach, we have preferred to group 
matters according to the different topics involved, each one in its own section: devel 
opers, community, companies, public administrations, legal initiatives, licenses, edu 
cation, and research. Of course, this implies a certain degree of artificial delimiter, 
since many issues in fact belong to more than one of those sections. But we hope that 
what is lost with respect to that precision is gained in readability and comprehen 
sion of the situation as a whole. 

The Development Community 

Since the emergence of libre software as a concept, European developers have con 
tributed considerably to its growth. Only recently have we had evidence of how large 
this contribution is: the WIDI survey in 200 1, 2 the FLOSS study in 2002,3 and the 



2 Gregorio Robles, Hendrik Scheider, Ingo Tretkowski, and Niels Weber, "Who Is Doing It?"; 
http://widi.beriios.de/paper/study.htm!. 

3 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Ruediger Glott, Bernhard Krieger, and Gregorio Robles, "FLOSS Final 
Report, Survey of Developers"; http://www.in/onomics.ni/FLOSS/report/index.htm. 



The Development Community X 163 



FLOSS-US study in 2003 4 showed that large numbers of developers declare them 
selves as nationals of a European country. In the case of FLOSS-US, from a sample of 
almost 1,500 developers, more than 900 (or about 60%) declared themselves to be 
living in Europe (including Russia), compared with about 405 in North America. In 
the FLOSS study, more than 70% of the developers were living in Europe (14% in 
North America). WIDI reported developers were 54% European and about 35% 
North American. Of course, all these studies could be biased (and at least they are 
with respect to language, since they all were done in English), since the respondents 
were self-selected in nature and the studies were not focused on geographic charac 
terization, which was more like a side product of other characterizations. But they 
were conclusive about the European contribution to libre software development 
being quite high and, as an aggregate, incomparable to any other region worldwide. 

It is also interesting to notice the distribution of libre software developers within 
Europe, since not all countries are equally represented. In this respect, results from 
studies are variable, although some common patterns can be inferred. For instance, 
France and Germany seem to be the countries with a greater population of develop 
ers in absolute numbers, closely followed by the United Kingdom and Italy. Accord 
ing to the FLOSS study, France has the highest, with 15% of the total of respon 
dents, followed by Germany (12%), Italy (8%), the UK, the Netherlands, and Spain 
(all at about 6.5%), and according to the FLOSS-US study the first country is Ger 
many (25%), followed by the UK, France, and Russia (all close to 4%), Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Italy (about 3% each). WIDI results give 20% for Germany, close to 
5% for France and the UK, and about 3% for the Netherlands. 

These absolute figures are hardly surprising, since they match (with some excep 
tions) the countries with a greater population and GDP (which in general shows a 
certain correlation with the number of developers all around the world). But some 
countries are clearly overrepresented. Among them, the Netherlands is a clear case. 
Sweden, Spain, Poland, Switzerland, Finland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and 
Austria also seem to have more developers than their population or GDP would sug 
gest. In fact, the Czech Republic and Austria are two relatively small countries that 
have some of the highest figures for libre software developers per capita. 

A much more specific case study is the Debian project, where developers have the 
option of indicating their residence. Of those who registered, the figures are in line 
with the previously described results. Seven of the top eleven countries in November 
2004 were European: Germany (151), the United Kingdom (80), France (57), Spain 
(37), Italy (34), the Netherlands (30), and Sweden (28). The total number of Euro 
pean developers is well over 400, which compares to 364 in North America (U.S. 
and Canada), the second-highest region in this survey. 



4 "Paul A. David, Andrew Waterman, and Seema Arora, "FLOSS-US The Free/Libre/Open Source 
Software Survey for 2003"; http://www.stanford.edu/group/floss-us/. 



164 * H Libre Software in Europe 



In summary, Europe clearly has a high concentration of developers, possibly higher 
than any other region in the world. Within Europe, the Western countries have 
higher concentrations (though the Eastern countries of the Czech Republic and, to 
some extent, Poland, buck this trend). An area extending from the UK to Italy seems 
to include most of the European developers (with countries such as France, the 
Benelux, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic). The Nordic coun 
tries also have high concentrations (with respect to population). In Southern Europe, 
Spain seems to be the country with the most developers. 

Although some successful libre software projects could be considered European by 
origin, or (in some rare cases) because almost all developers are European, this iden 
tification is tricky: libre software projects are global by nature (any developer from 
any part of the world can, in principle, join in). Therefore, we will not try to identify 
strictly European projects. 

On the contrary, infrastructure to host libre software projects can easily be assigned a 
nationality (although usually it is open to the world). In this respect, Europe is well 
behind the U.S., since SourceForge and other well-known hosting sites are physically 
located there. But some hosting facilities do also exist in Europe, usually focused on a 
given national or linguistic community. As an example, we can cite BerlioOS , the larg 
est one (http://berlios.de; in Germany, with more than 2,400 projects and almost 12,000 
developers registered), Software-libre.org (http://software-libre.org; Spain, 66 projects 
and 234 developers), and Gna! (http://gna.org; France, 360 projects and almost 2,000 
developers). All of these figures (checked during March 2005) turn pale in comparison 
to SourceForge. This is one of several cases where, despite the importance of the Euro 
pean developer community, its infrastructure is not at the same level. 

The Organization of the Community 

The libre software community in Europe, despite being healthy and full of life, is also 
fragmented, reflecting the cultural, national, and linguistic diversity we have in the 
continent, but also lacking the strength and power it could have if it were more coor 
dinated. However, more and more links (usually at the personal level) are being 
established, and something similar to a really European libre software community 
seems to be emerging. Although it is still some distance from speaking as loudly as it 
could for instance, behind the European Union institutions, we are seeing more 
and more transnational initiatives as with any other community formed around the 
Internet, it has its own virtual and real-world meeting points, such as news sites, 
conferences, and associations. However, as we will show in the next paragraphs, 
most are closely linked to relatively small geographic areas, and can hardly be identi 
fied as being "for Europeans." 

Many news sites are strongly related to libre software. Maybe the most transnational one 
is The Register (http://theregister.co.uk) (probably because it runs in English), which of 



The Organization of the Community * C 165 



course, is the most popular in the UK. Although it carries news on many IT-related sub 
jects, libre software receives more than reasonable coverage. Similar things can be said 
for Heise Online (http://www.heise.de), but applied to the German-speaking community. 
Other sites worth mentioning are Barrapunto (http://barrapunto.com; Spanish), LinuxFr 
(http://linuxfr.org; French), Linux.pl (http://Iinux.pl; Polish), gildot (http://gildot.org; Por 
tuguese), and Svenska Linuxforeningen and Gnuheter (http://gnuheter.com; Swedish, 
both read also by Norwegian and Danish speakers). Some of them are built as Slashdot- 
like sites, others are not, but each has its own flavor. Most of them are helping to foster a 
sense of community and are even assisting in the foundation or consolidation of more 
formal organizations related to libre software. There have been some attempts to estab 
lish a "European Slashdot," but without success (for now). Maybe that is simply not pos 
sible where there is such cultural and linguistic diversity. 

If we consider real-world meeting places, we can find some that come close to being 
truly European. Probably the clearer examples are FOSDEM 5 (Free Open Source 
Developers Meeting), which is especially oriented to libre software developers and 
has for several years been pulling together a good quantity of European hackers (also 
attracting some from other regions), LinuxTag, 6 which is more oriented toward users 
and companies, although also attractive to developers, and LSM/RMLL 7 (Libre Soft 
ware Meeting/Rencontres Mondiales du Logiciel Libre), for developers specifically 
devoted to libre software. Several projects also have European meetings: GUADEC 
(GNOME User and Developer European Conference; http://guadec.orgf), 
YAPC::Europe (http://yapceurope.org; for the Perl community), EuroBSDCon (http.7/ 
eurobsdcon.org), ApacheCon Europe, 8 OOoCOn (http://marketing.openoffice.org/confer- 
ence) OpenOffice.org Conference, not specifically European, but always held in 
Europe), and many others. These are usually held every year in a different location. 

In addition, we have the national events: the aforementioned LinuxTag in Germany, 
LSM/RMLL and Solutions Linux (http://sclutionsHnux.fr; a more commercial event) in 
France, Linux Forum (http://linuxforum.dk) in Denmark, Congreso Hispalinux (http.7/ 
congreso.hispalinux.es) in Spain, Linuxwochen (http://Iinuxwochen.at) in Austria, and so 
on. In some countries, there are no national events, but smaller meetings are usually 
organized by Linux User Groups (LUGs) or libre software associations. 

With respect to associations, diversity is also the rule. In addition to more or less local 
LUGs (spread through all of Europe), there are some organizations which either repre 
sent groups of local associations, or have a wider membership, usually at the national 
level. Some of them are: APRIL (Association pour la Promotion et la Recherche en 
Informatique Libre; http://april.org) and AFUL (Association Francophone des Utili- 
sateurs de Linux et des Logiciels Libres; http://aful.org) in France, NUUG (Norwegian 



5 http://fosdem.org, which takes place in Brussels, Belgium, usually in late February. 

6 http://linuxtag.org, which takes place in Karlsruhe, Germany, usually in June or July. 

7 http://rencontresmondiales.org, which takes place somewhere in France, usually in July. 

8 http://apachecon.com/2005/EU for the 2005 edition. 



166 * * Libre Software in Europe 



Unix User Group; http://nuug.no) in Norway, DKUUG (http://www.dkuug.dk) in Den 
mark, Atviras kodas Lietuvai (Open Source for Lithuania; http://akl.lt) in Lithuania, 
SSLUG (Skane Sjadland Linux User Group; http://sslug.dk) in Sweden and Denmark, 
ANSOL (Associagao Nacional para o Software Livre; http://ansol.org) in Portugal, 
PLUTO (http://pluto.it) in Italy, AFFS (Association for Free Software; http://affs.org.uk} 
in the UK, PLUG (Polish Linux User Group; http://www.Iinux.org.pl) in Poland, and 
Hispalinux (http://hispalinux.es) in Spain. At the European level, there is also the FSFE 
(Free Software Foundation Europe; http://fsfeurope.org), and the corresponding FSF- 
related associations in some countries, such as FSF France (http://fsffrance.org), Verein 
zur Forderung Freier Software (http://ffs.or.at) in Austria, and Associazione Software 
Libero (http://softwarelibero.it) in Italy. 9 Each of these associations has its own history. 
Some of them were formed as Unix associations (now more than 20 years old) and 
have evolved into Linux and libre software associations with time. Some others were 
formed specifically as LUGS, mostly in the mid-1990s. Still others are devoted to libre 
software in general, again mostly founded in the late 1990s. Membership, activities, 
involvement of companies, etc., vary a lot from one to another. 

On many occasions, there have been discussions suggesting the convenience of a 
European umbrella association devoted to libre software, which could speak on 
behalf (and be some kind of federation) all of these organizations. But so far, none 
has crystallized. 

In addition to these "community" associations, there are also some others represent 
ing corporate interests. Among them, probably the most notable is Open Forum 
Europe (http://www.openforumeurope.org), which has backed some actions related to 
libre software promotion in Brussels, but performs most of its activity in the United 
Kingdom. 10 

Libre Software in the Private Sector 

Since the early 1990s, it became clear to some European entrepreneurs that libre soft 
ware was interesting for business. Approximately at the same time in other parts of the 
world, companies started to use libre software, and a new market niche for companies 
providing services based upon libre software emerged. During the mid- 1990s, many 
small companies started to offer services based on the then-new Linux-based operating 
system (MandrakeSoft in France and SuSE in Germany are well- known cases that will 
be discussed later in more detail, but they were not unique). Some other companies 



9 A more complete list (which also includes some organizations that are not associations of the 
libre software community, but includes information from almost any country in Europe) is 
available at the Open Source Observatory, http://europa.eu.int/idabc/enJdocument/1631/471. 

10 Open Forum Europe was widely criticized by libre software advocates when its president signed 
a public statement in favor of software patents, in 2003 (see http://swpat.ffii.org/letters/ofeu034 
and http://www. kuroShin. org/story/2003/5/6/8355/78133). 



Libre Software in the Private Sector *C 167 



focused on the libre software infrastructure of the Internet or on specific products 
(such as Trolltech AS in Norway and MySQL AB in Sweden). By the late 1990s, inter 
est in libre software was strong enough to maintain several mid-size companies devoted 
(completely or in part) to generic consultancy, support, and development of libre soft 
ware, such as Alcove in France, Andago in Spain, and ID Pro AG in Germany. 11 Later, 
starting in the early 2000s, large companies began to show interest in libre software, 
especially in the secondary sector (these were intensive users of software, although that 
was not their main line of business such as telecommunications, automotive, aero 
space, and banking). In 2005, the list of large European companies with a significant 
use of libre software is too long to include here. 

A good exponent of the interest of European industry in libre software is the ITEA 
Report on Open Source Software, 12 published in January 2004, which is aimed at 
elucidating the libre software world (from legal and economic, to development and 
quality issues), and uncovering business opportunities and issues to be resolved in 
relation to it. The following sentences, taken verbatim from the report, may provide 
some insight on the opinion of those drafting it (and maybe on the view of the com 
panies for which they work): 

Depending on the business they are in, companies are likely to have different rea 
sons for using OSS. In some cases, OSS can help them lower the cost of the ser 
vice, system or product that they offer. In others, their contribution to OSS can 
help to establish new standards worldwide. By carefully applying license condi 
tions it is certainly possible to derive considerable benefits from OSS, while mini 
mizing the risks. Open Source Software is not the "magic bullet" to solve Europe s 
software development competitiveness. However, OSS is an important new devel 
opment and an interesting option for software -intensive systems. 

Different sources provide different figures for the market share of libre software in 
Europe, but they are consistent in indicating its continuous growth. The market for 
libre software in Germany in 2003 was estimated, according to a study by Soreon 
Research, 13 to be in the region of EUR 131 million (with a projection of more than 
EUR 300 million for 2007). The manufacturing industry was the one with the high 
est penetration, with 18% of the companies making significant use of libre software. 
The structure of the market was heavily based on support services (EUR 81 million) 
and training (EUR 27 million), and direct sales of software accounted for only EUR 



1 1 Some of these companies stopped business during the early 2000s. This was the case of ID Pro 
AG and Alcove (which still maintains a web site in early 2005, http://alcove.com. Andago, http:// 
andago.com, is an example of those still remaining in the market. 

12 ITEA, http://www.itea-office.org, is a joint effort by many European companies to stimulate 
precompetitive research and development, specially in the field of information technologies, 
including in its partnership companies like Alcatel, Bosch, Bull, Daimler-Chrysler, Italtel, Nokia, 
and Siemens. See http://www.itea-office.org/newsroom/publications/Open_Source_Software.htm. 

13 Soreon Research "The Market for Open Source Software in Germany" (July 2003). 



168 * * Libre Software in Europe 



10 million. However, a year later IDC 14 estimated that USD 98 million would be 
spent on IT services for libre software in the whole of Western Europe, and pre 
dicted that USD 228 million would be spent by 2008 (for the same region). 

To provide an overview of the landscape of European libre software companies, we 
have selected a short list of them, probably the better-known ones. This list is, of 
course, not exhaustive, but will hopefully be illustrative enough to show the Euro 
pean contribution to the world of libre software business models: 

SuSE 15 was one of the first companies providing services for Linux-based distri 
butions, almost since it was founded in 1992 in Germany, as S.u.S.E., by Hubert 
Mantel, Burchard Steinbild, Roland Dyroff, and Thomas Fehr. They started by 
selling floppies of Slackware Linux partially translated into German. Later, they 
decided to build their own distribution, which was released in 1996 and quickly 
becoming the most-used GNU/Linux distribution in Germany. Based on the suc 
cess of this distribution, the company grew, with a business model that also 
included support, training, and consultancy for libre software. It had a work 
force of more than 500 and had one of the more well-known GNU/Linux distri 
butions in the world when it was acquired by Novell in 2003, for USD 210 mil 
lion. SuSE has also been known for its contributions to the libre software 
community, supporting or directly contributing to many projects, from KDE to 
ALSA to the Linux kernel itself. 

MandrakeSoft (http://mandrakesoft.com) is a French company with major opera 
tions in the United States and other countries. It was funded in 1998 by Gael 
Duval, Frederic Bastok, and Jacques Le Marois, after the success of the first 
release of Mandrakelinux some months before. One of its innovations was to let 
people download the entire distribution from the Net, which assisted its spread 
around the world. Agreements with the Pearson Technology Group (then Mac- 
millan Software) and other distributors helped too and, by 2000, had made it 
one of the companies with a larger market share in the libre software segment in 
the United States and France, having gone from three to about a hundred 
employees in just two years. In 2004, the company had revenues of more than 
EUR 5 million. Currently, its business model seems to be mainly linked to its 
distribution, although it also provides consultancy and support services for libre 
software in general. MandrakeSoft has recently acquired Conectiva, one of the 
other companies producing a major GNU/Linux distribution, and has changed 
its name to Mandriva (http://www. mandriva.com). 



14 IDC, "Services around Linux, Open Source, and Free Software Western European Market 
Forecast" (June 2004). 

15 SuSE was bought by Novell, but still maintains its original url: http://suse.com. 



Libre Software in the Private Sector * C 169 



Open CASCADE S.A. (http://opencascade.com), now in the AREVA group, is a 
French company providing services around the Open CASCADE system (a set of 
3D modeling components and libraries) and SALOME (a platform for the inte 
gration of numerical simulations), both distributed as libre software. The com 
pany is rooted in Matra Datavision, also French, which was a major player in the 
CAD/CAM market from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. One of its lead prod 
ucts was CAS. CADE (Computer Aided Software for Computer Aided Design and 
Engineering), released in 1993. In 1999, after the decision to change the focus of 
the company from products to services, Matra Datavision decided to release 
CAS. CADE as libre software, under the name Open CASCADE. One year later, 
the company of the same name was segregated and acquired by Principia (in the 
AREVA group). Open CASCADE S.A. is now focused on providing customized 
development, training, consulting, and other services, with a team of about 80 
developers. The company is also fostering the building of communities around 
its products, channeled through a specific site (http://opencascade.org). 

Trolltech AS (http://trolltech.com) is a Norwegian company well known for pro 
ducing Qt, an essential component for KDE and many other systems. It was 
founded in 1994 by Haavard Nord and Eirik Chambe-Eng, with the aim of 
building cross-platform C++ GUI tools. Now a company with more than 90 
employees, it pioneered a dual-licensing model for Qt (and other products). In 
the beginning, this software was gratis but not free. However, after the launch of 
the GNOME project (promoted by the FSF, among others, and backed by some 
companies worried about the dependence of KDE on the proprietary Qt), 
Trolltech decided to distribute it under QPL (a libre software license). Finally, 
Trolltech moved to the GPL (for the Xll-based version of Qt), and gave those 
not willing to comply with the GPL the option of purchasing proprietary 
licenses. 

MySQL AB (http://mysql.com) is the company that owns the code for the MySQL 
database server. It was founded in Sweden in 1995 by David Axmark, Allan Lars- 
son, and Michael Widenius (the founders of the MySQL project) and has since 
opened offices in many countries. Its business model is based on selling support 
and services for MySQL, and selling licenses to those unwilling to fulfill the con 
ditions of the GPL (that is, dual licensing MySQL). This is why my SQL AB has 
been careful to maintain the ownership of the code, by having all the developers 
of MySQL as employees of the company. MySQL AB has run on venture capital 
since 2001, had revenues of about EUR 15 million in 2004, and about 160 
employees. 

To complete the vision of this landscape, let us introduce some examples of large 
European companies involved in libre software. The examples were chosen at ran 
dom from our experience and therefore are not representative, but again, hopefully 
illustrative of what is happening out there: 



170 ^ C Libre Software in Europe 



ObjectWeb (http://objectweb.org) is a consortium created in 1999 in France by 
Bull (http://bull.corn), France Telecom R&D (http://rd.francetelecom.com), and 
INRIA (http://inria.com) to develop libre software middleware, ranging from spe 
cific software frameworks and protocol implementations (such as CORBA) to 
integrated platforms. In 2002, it evolved into an international and independent 
nonprofit organization open to companies, institutions, and individuals. The 
software developed by ObjectWeb includes more than 40 products in the appli 
cation platforms, workflow engines, IDE plug-ins, and software engineering 
domains. ObjectWeb uses GPL and LGPL licenses, and has managed to create a 
large community of companies providing services around those products. 

Based in Spain, Telefonica Investigacion y Desarrollo (TID (http://www.ttd.es) a 
subsidiary of Telefonica (http://telefonica.com), one of the largest telecommunication 
companies in the world), launched in late 2004 the Morfeo Project (http://mor/eo- 
project.org), in collaboration with some other Spanish companies, universities, 
and public administrations. Morfeo is a framework for distributing and develop 
ing as libre software some products that TID either has produced or needs, 
mainly in the field of platform software (middleware, workflow, communica 
tions, etc.). It has already released products such as CORBA systems, and is try 
ing to build a community of developers. In the long term, this could be a first 
step toward a strategy based on libre software for some of the activities of TID. 

Ericsson (http://ericsson.com), based in Sweden and not especially well known for 
its contributions to libre software, has distributed several products as libre soft 
ware. Ericsson s . implementation of the Erlang programming language 16 was 
released in 2000, and has an active developer community. Erlang provides facili 
ties for concurrency, distribution, robustness, and soft real-time processing. 
Another contribution is TIPC (http.V/tipc.source/orge.net), a protocol for intraclus- 
ter communication implemented as a loadable module for Linux. 

Nokia (http://nofeia.com), based in Finland, and also not normally known as a libre 
software producer, has distributed some software under NOKOS (the Nokia Open 
Source License, an OSI-recognized open source license). But recently another event 
related to the use of libre software by Nokia hit the news: the availability of a Python 
environment for some of its products (http://www./orum. nofeia.com/python) using the 
Symbian OS, in what could be a strategy of letting libre software developers in the 
Python community build applications for Nokia devices. 

Symbian (http://symbian.com), with headquarters in the UK and owned by Nokia, 
Siemens, Ericsson, and others, is releasing one of its products for Symbian OS, 
the Open Programming Language (OPL; http://opl-dev.sourceforge.net), as libre 
software, using the LGPL. OPL is a BASIC-like language used in Symbian OS 
phones for rapid prototype development. 



16 Open-source Erlang, http://erlang.org. 

Libre Software in the Private Sector ** 171 



These examples show how, despite their general strategy of being more or less ori 
ented toward proprietary software, many European companies are experimenting 
with libre software models and, in some cases, are considering new lines of business 
based upon them. In fact, similar cases of exploration of the libre software world can 
be found in almost any medium to large-size company heavily involved in the soft 
ware business. 

Public Administrations and Libre Software 

Before the year 2000, libre software was almost completely off the political radar in 
Europe. But since then, and with widely varying intensities, it has entered the politi 
cal agenda in many European cities, regions, and countries. In some cases, it is con 
sidered as one possible choice for public administrations in their role as intensive 
users of services based in software. In some others, it is deeply linked to efforts to 
promote the information society. In this respect, some public administrations are 
actively proposing libre software as a viable alternative for citizens and companies in 
their area of influence. Finally, some legislative bodies have also considered law pro 
posals which deal specifically with libre software. 

Initiatives are happening at all levels: European Union institutions, national govern 
ments, regional administrations, and municipalities. However, the situation varies a lot 
from country to country and from region to region. All in all, our feeling is that we 
have reached a point in Europe where it is strange to find institutions that have not at 
least considered the use of libre software. In fact, several studies signal the public sec 
tor as one of the driving forces behind libre software in Europe for the coming years. In 
the rest of this section, we will take a look at some of these initiatives. 

Actions by the European Commission 

The European Commission (the institution in the European Union most similar to an 
"executive branch") has promoted several actions related to libre software. By 1999 an 
informal group of experts, the European Working Group on Libre Software, 17 was 
meeting in Brussels at the request of some officials of the DG-INFO (Directorate Gen 
eral on Information Society). The main interest of these meetings was to explore spe 
cific opportunities for Europe in the field of libre software, to provide the Commission 
with some input about its impact in the European IT sector. The most widely known 
output of the group was the report titled "Free Software/Open Source: Information 
Society Opportunities for Europe?" (http://cu.conecta.it/paper.pdf) which was presented 
in Brussels in March 2000. This was probably the first public activity of the Commis 
sion in relation to libre software and represented a kind of turning point which led to 
many other actions by European institutions. The report identified some signals that 



17 Although the group is no longer active, http://eu.conecta.it hosts some information about it. 
There is also an open mailing list, freesw, that is still used for announcements and discussions 
related to libre software in Europe. 



172 X Libre Software in Europe 



evolved later into trends. It also recommended both the consideration of libre software 
solutions in public administrations, and activities to inform the European industry 
about new possibilities. In addition, the report presented a complete landscape of the 
libre software world, from technical, legal, and economic points of view. 

Since the days of that group, libre software has been present in several actions 
funded by the European Commission, which has had a policy of researching and 
publishing information about it, without promoting it explicitly. To describe just a 
few of those actions, we will concentrate on some initiatives promoted by the IDA 
(now IDABC) program and by the 1ST program (in the context of the fifth and sixth 
R&D Framework Programs). 

IDA (Interchange of Data between Administrations) was a program of the European 
Union, started in 1999 and aimed at the funding, development, and coordination of 
pan-European services for public administrations. Since 2004, it has been continued 
by the IDABC program. IDA and IDABC have performed many activities related to 
libre software, which are referred to in the IDA Open Source Observatory (http:// 
europa.eu.int/idabc/en/chapter/452). Among them, the following can be highlighted: 

"European Interoperability Framework for pan-European eGovernment Services" 
(http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3761; 2004). This reference document on 
interoperability was written after an extensive consultation process. IDABC con 
siders it the highest-ranking module for the implementation of e-government in 
Europe. It includes several references to libre software, among which the follow 
ing can be highlighted: 

Open Source Software (OSS) tends to use and help define open standards 
and publicly available specifications. OSS products are, by their nature, 
publicly available specifications, and the availability of their source code 
promotes open, democratic debate around the specifications, making them 
both more robust and interoperable. As such, OSS corresponds to the 
objectives of this Framework and should be assessed and considered 
favourably alongside proprietary alternatives. 

"IDA OSS Migration Guidelines," (http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/ 
2623#migration; November 2003). One of the best guides for the migration to 
libre software. Specially targeted at public administrations, many of its analyses 
and recommendations are, however, valuable for any party considering moving 
from proprietary to libre solutions. It includes a detailed methodology for esti 
mating the convenience of the migration, and for putting it into practice. It also 
provides complete descriptions of some typical scenarios, and configurations for 
the usual cases (email, desktop, server, etc.). 

"Pooling Open Source Software, Feasibility Study," (http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/ 
document/2623#feasibility) June 2002. A study on the opportunities for sharing 
libre software among public administrations, from technical, legal, functional, 
and financial points of view. 

Public Administrations and Libre Software X 173 



"Study into the Use of OSS in the Public Sector," (http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/doc- 
ument/2623#study) June 2001. One of the first reports on the use of libre soft 
ware in public administrations. Includes some general information on libre soft 
ware, and details on libre software solutions (about 100 examples showing 
specific systems that could be useful in the public context). It also analyzes the 
deployment of libre software in Europe at the time of the report, and presents 
some interesting conclusions. 

Organization of meetings and symposiums for sharing experiences on the use of 
libre software in public administrations in different countries. These have been 
helpful for coordinating actions and establishing links among the promoters of 
different initiatives. 

The IDA Open Source Observatory. This is worth mentioning, as it provides a 
good compilation of information about libre software, its situation in Europe, 
and many issues especially relevant to public administrations. 

Within the 1ST (Information Society Technologies; http://www.corfiis.Iu/isO research 
program, the Commission has funded (and is funding) several projects related to 
libre software. Many of them are aimed at the production of libre software in a given 
domain, such as AGNULA (http://www.agnula.org; libre software distributions special 
ized in audio and video). A detailed listing of those projects is available in the area 
devoted to libre software in the Information Society Thematic Portal (http://europa.eu. 
int/information_society/activities/opensource/european_activities). Some others are 
devoted to researching libre software as a matter of study, with the aim of improving 
general knowledge about it: 

FLOSS (http://www.tn/onomtcs.nI/FLOSS) was the first academic research of the 
libre software phenomenon as a whole, looking at it from many different points 
of view. It included studies on the developers themselves, based on a survey and 
on the analysis of author information in source code, focusing on sociological 
data about them. It was the first to provide some insight about why developers 
participate in libre software projects, what professional profile they have, what 
amount of time they devote to libre software, and where they come from. The 
study was also successful in the introduction of the name FLOSS (an acronym for 
"free, libre, open source software"), which has since been used in many other 
cases, especially within the research community. 

AMOS (http://www.clip. dia.fi.upm.es/~amos/AMOS) was a project to research the 
feasibility of building a system capable of categorizing and allowing searches 
among libre software package descriptions. This is especially useful for develop 
ers looking for code to reuse in their systems. 

COSPA (Consortium for Open Source in the Public Administration; http:// 
cospa-project.org), started in 2003, aimed to analyze the effects of the introduc 
tion of libre software and open standards in European public administrations. 



174 ** Libre Software in Europe 



FLOSS-POLS (Free/Libre/Open Source Software: Policy Support; http://www.floss- 
pols.org) is a project started in 2004 as a follow-up to FLOSS, and includes research 
tracks on government policy toward libre software, gender issues, and the efficiency 
of libre software development methods for collaborative problem solving. FLOSS- 
POLS will also deal with libre software in e-government, and will look for feedback 
from governments in relation to policies about libre software. 

CALIBRE is an action to coordinate the research on libre software in Europe, and 
to help transfer its results to industry. It started in mid-2004, and has already 
organized several conferences with a special focus on showing the results of libre 
software engineering, or on the use of libre software within European industry. 

In the following years, it is expected that more and more projects related to the study 
of libre software will be approved in future calls, in what seems to be a growing 
interest by the European Commission research work programs to understand how 
libre software works from several points of view. 

National Initiatives 

At the national level, the situation is different from country to country. And even 
among those who have started some kind of action related to libre software, 
approaches are diverse. However, some common patterns can be identified. It is 
unusual to find a national government that has not issued studies and recommenda 
tions for the use of libre software in public administrations. There is also a certain 
consensus on some matters that have been proposed again and again, such as consid 
eration of libre software for public acquisitions, adherence to open standards and 
interoperability, the need for inspection, and the importance of retaining proprietary 
rights on software. In any case, the following brief descriptions of the state of affairs 
in several countries should show both consensus and diversity of approaches: 18 

France 

ADAE (Agence pour le Developpement de rAdministration Electronique, Agency 
for the Development of the Electronic Administration; http://www.adae.gauv.fr/ 
index.php3\ formerly ATICA, maintains a good deal of information related to libre 
software in public administrations, and organizes activities related to that topic. It 
has also published several reports of special interest. Among them, it is worth men 
tioning the "Guide de choix et d usage des licences de logiciels libres pour les 
administrations" 19 ("Guide to Choosing and Using Free Software Licenses for Gov 
ernment and Public Sector Entities), a complete guide to the legal implications of 
using libre software licenses, either for external software (obtained with or without 



18 Some of this information was obtained from the European Information Society Thematic Portal, 
http://europa.euAntfinformation_society/activities/opensource/cases, and from the Open Source 
Observatory, http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/l 677/471 . 

19 http://www.adae.gouv.Jr/upload/documents/free_software_guide.pdf, linked from http://www.adae. 
gouv.fr/artide.php3?id_artick=172, which includes a translation into English. 



Public Administrations and Libre Software X 175 



cost) or for software produced by the administration itself (recommending the GPL 
in this case). There are also some recommendations for the promotion of libre soft 
ware in the framework of e-administration programs, and cases of large-scale 
deployment, mainly of OpenOffice.org, in French public administrations. 

Also in France, two of the first proposals of laws related to the use of libre soft 
ware in public administrations were produced. In 1999, Laffitte, Tregouet, and 
Cabanel drafted in the French Senate the 2000-117 law project, aimed at enforc 
ing the use of libre software in public administrations in those domains where 
technical solutions were already available (considering a whole set of exceptions 
and temporary measures to facilitate the transition period). It also considered the 
creation of a Libre Software Agency, funded by the government, which would 
help public administrations in the deployment of libre software technologies. In 
2000, another law was proposed by Jean-Yves Le Deaut, Christian Paul, and 
Pierre Cohen. It was similar in objectives and rationale, but was not compulsory 
about the use of libre software in public administrations, but more focused on 
the availability of source code for applications and on the principle of "right to 
compatibility of software," which aims to guarantee the interoperability princi 
ple, common in European legislation. Although neither of these projects was 
approved, both have influenced later law initiatives in many other countries. 

United Kingdom 

There have been several studies and pilot experiences, which led in 2002 to the 
publication by the OGC 20 (the Office of Government Commerce) of a formal 
policy on the use of libre software, "Open Source Software: Use within UK Gov 
ernment" (http://www.ogc.gov.uk/oss/OSS-policy.pdf) which mandates not only the 
consideration of libre software in procurements, but also that decisions must be 
made considering "value for money" (a policy that has been widely copied in 
many other countries, especially in the developing world). At the same time, it 
establishes a policy of avoiding lock-in by proprietary software providers, sup 
porting open standards and specifications, and exploring the use of libre soft 
ware licenses for dissemination of research and development funded with public 
money. A document on implementing this policy was also published. "Guidance 
on Implementing OSS" (http://www.ogc.gov.uk/embedded_object.asp?docid=2498) 
provides details on how and when to consider libre software, and includes a 
detailed study of proprietary software lock-in practices and how to avoid them. 

Some trials have also been conducted, with an interesting final report about 
them, "Open Source Software Trials in Government: Final Report" (http://www. 
ogc.gov.uk/embedded_otyect.asp?docid=1002367; published in late 2004), which 
states the viability of libre software solutions, with different perceived levels of 
maturity depending on the area of implementation. 



20 http://www.ogc.gov.ufe/. Information related to libre software is at http://www.ogc.gov.ufe/index. 
asp?docid=2190. 



176 * C Libre Software in Europe 



In March 2005, the Open Source Academy was announced (http://www.egovmoni- 
tor.com/node/319). Funded by the UK government, supported by several munici 
palities and other institutions (including OpenForum Europe and Open Source 
Consortium), and with the help of the private sector, it is aimed at the promo 
tion of the use of libre software in local government. 
Germany 

The German federal government produced in 2002 one of the first official docu 
ments dealing with the use of libre software in public administrations, "Open Source 
Software in der Bundesverwaltung" 2 ! ("Open Source Software in the Federal 
Administration"), by the KBSt (Coordination and Advisory Agency of the Federal 
Government for Information Technology). Later, in 2003, it produced the "Migra 
tion Guidec" (http://www.kbst.bund.de/Anlage303777/pdf _datei.pdf), one of the more 
complete documents about how to migrate to libre software, including detailed 
technical information about possible paths for migration in several domains. The 
German government has also funded some libre software developments, or 
improvements to existing systems, that were critical for its IT strategy. In 2005, it 
announced the Open Source Software Competence Centre, 22 a web site aimed at 
spreading best practices regarding the use of libre software in the public sector. 

Italy 

In February 2004, the Italian government issued rules regarding the use and 
acquisition of libre software in public administrations, "L Open source nella pub- 
blica amministrazione."23 hey were formally made public after the release of an 
official report, "Indagine conoscitiva sul software a codice sorgente aperto nella 
Pubblica Amministrazione," 2 ^ which presents some rather interesting conclu 
sions on the characteristics of the use of software by public administrations. The 
rules set the criteria to consider when acquiring software (which include interop 
erability, nondependence on a single provider or on proprietary technologies, 
availability of code for inspection, etc.), and specifically included libre software 
as a possible choice. 

Finland 

A working group promoted by the Finnish Ministry of Finance produced in 2003 
the report "Recommendation on the Openness of the Code and Interfaces of State 
Information Systems," 2 5 which (among other interesting recommendations) 
proposes the consideration of libre software for the custom developments funded 
by the public administration and for the acquisition of software. 



2 1 http://www.kbst.bund.de/dokumente/Publikation/,-300432/dok.htm. A long summary in English is 
also available at http://www.kbst.bund.de/Anlage302856/KBSt-Bnef + - + English + Version.pdf. 

22 OSS-Kompetenzzentrum, http://www.kbst.bund.de/oss-cc. 

23 http://www.governo.it/Governolnforma/Dossier/open_source/index.html. 

24 http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/open_source/open%20software%20PA pdf. 

25 http://www.vm.ji/tiedostot/pdf/en/6505Lpdf, referred in http://www.vm.fi/vmAiston/paze 
lsp?r=65052&l=en&menu=2678 



Public Administrations and Libre Software X 177 



Denmark 

The strategy of the Danish government with respect to libre software is exposed 
in the report "Danish Software Strategy," 26 officially adopted in 2003. In sum 
mary, the approach is based on the principle of obtaining the maximum value 
for money, irrespective of the type of software (which is also the reason several 
detailed studies on total cost of ownership in libre and proprietary software sce 
narios are being carried out), but also not forgetting the importance of promot 
ing competition, interoperability, and flexibility. Some preliminary studies per 
formed prior to this report showed potential major savings could be made 
through the use of libre software. 27 

Sweden 

In 2003, Statskontoret, the Swedish Agency for Public Management, published 
"Free and Open Source Software, a Feasibility Study," 28 a complete and detailed 
study of libre software, including cases in Swedish public administrations, with 
very positive conclusions. 

Spain 

Many of the interesting developments related to libre software in Spanish public 
administrations have been achieved at the regional level. However, there are also 
some interesting actions by the national government. One of the most revealing is 
the inclusion of measures related to libre software in the document "Criterios de 
seguridad, normalizacion y conservacion de las aplicaciones utilizadas para el ejer- 
cicio de potestades" 29 ("Criteria of Security, Standardization and Conservation for 
Applications Used in the Exercise of Authority"), edited by the Consejo Superior 
de Informatica (Higher Advisory Board on Informatics), an interministry body of 
the Spanish administration. It details the issues to consider for all the applications 
used by the public administration and recommends specifically the use of libre 
software whenever technically feasible. It also recommends requiring the availabil 
ity of source code for programs acquired by the administration, the use of open 
formats, and the use of libre software applications to access some kinds of data. 

The Netherlands 

The OSOSS program (http://www.ososs.nl) is aimed at encouraging the use of libre 
software and open standards in public administrations. OSOSS is a program of 
ICTU, the national organization for IT in the public sector, founded by the Minis 
try of the Interior. In the context of this program, libre software is promoted as a 



26 http://www.oio. dk/files/Softwarestrategi_-_Engelsk.pdf (available as a part of the Offentlig 
Information Online, http://www.oio.dk/so/tware). 

27 http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?artide=969&survey=14& langu.age=uk&>front=l. 

28 http://www.statskontoret.se/upload/Publikationer/2003/200308A.pdf (in English). 

29 http://www.csi.map.es/csi/criterios/pdf/criterios.pdf. A summary available at http://www.csi.map.es/ 
csi/pg5d0.htm. 



178 xC Libre Software in Europe 



full-fledged option. OSOSS is basically an informative advisory body, supporting 
policy makers in exploring the relationship between libre software and public 
administrations. 

Norway 

The issue of libre software in the public administration has been dealt with by 
the Norwegian Board of Technology (a public, independent think tank on tech 
nology) in its report, "Software Policy for the Future" 30 (November 2004). It rec 
ognizes the potential interest of libre software, and recommends a policy similar 
to that of Denmark: pilot programs and careful case-by-case studies. 

Other Initiatives in the Public Sector 

There are many other initiatives in the public sector. Among them, we have selected 
a short list which we have found especially meaningful as illustrative examples of the 
whole landscape: 

Extremadura (Spain) is a small, with a population of about a million, and rela 
tively cash-poor region that has defined a strategy based on libre software to catch 
up on information society issues. The main principles of this strategy are connec 
tivity and IT literacy for all citizens. One of the key projects for implementing it is 
gnuLinEx (http://linex.org), a GNU/Linux distribution originally targeted for pri 
mary and secondary education (deployed in tens of thousands of computers in all 
public schools), but which is now also used in the public administration and 
offered to SMEs and individuals. One of the latest initiatives announced by 
Extremadura (jointly with Lambdaux (http://lambdaux.com), a Spanish libre soft 
ware company) is the CompatibleLinux (http://compatibldinux.org) catalog, an 
analysis of the hardware available in the market with respect to its compatibility 
with GNU/Linux distributions. This initiative has also led to the AENOR 31 com 
patibility certificate, which can be specified by public administrations and compa 
nies seeking to purchase hardware for use with GNU/Linux distributions. 

The French police (Gendarmerie Nationale) started a plan in 2004 to switch to 
OpenOffice.org in all its desktop machines 32 (about 80,000 PCs). They expect to 
complete the switch by the end of 2005. They estimate savings at about EUR 2 
million. 

The Kolab Groupware Project (http://kolab.org) was initiated in 2003 as a spinoff 
of the Kroupware contract (http://kroupware.org), which was funded by the Ger 
man Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI, Federal Agency 



30 http://www. teknologiradet. no/files/enddig_rapport^)rogramvarepolitikk_0066_20041 1 09.pdf (full 
report, in Norwegian); http://www.teknologiradet.no/files/english_summary_041223_copy.pdf 
(executive summary, in English). 

31 AENOR is the Spanish standardization organization; http://www.aenor.es. 

32 http://www.solutionslinux.fr/document_conferencierH20c7d6295f27.pdf. 



Public Administrations and Libre Software X 179 



for IT Security) and won by a consortium of three companies: erfrakon, Inteva- 
tion, and Klaralvdalens Datakonsult. Kolab is today a libre software system that 
allows for the interaction among mixed groupware environments: KDE, Out 
look, and web-based tools. This is one clear case of the promotion of a new libre 
software project by a public administration (in this case, because it was inter 
ested in overcoming this missing functionality in the libre software world). 

The city of Munich (Germany) started in May 2003 a plan to migrate to GNU/ 
Linux and libre software (LiMux) 33 most of its desktop machines (some 14,000 
PCs). This initiative, which started as a political one (including in the process a 
delay to get attention to the proposed European directive on software patents, dur 
ing the summer of 2004), is backed by detailed studies and has had a lot of media 
attention. Despite this attention, the project had not been completed at the time of 
this writing. However, it seems to have started a trend followed by some other 
European cities (although there are also earlier cases, such as the city of Florence, 
which passed a law in 2001 mandating the use of libre software when feasible 34 ). 

Rijkswaterstaat 35 (Directorate for Public Works and Water Management, the 
Netherlands) has been using the Geoservices system, heavily based on libre soft 
ware, since 2003. Rijkswaterstaat has the responsibility of maintaining dikes, 
roads, bridges, and canals, and uses Geoservices for web-based access to geo- 
information obtained from many different sources. 

The Junta de Andalucia (regional government of Andalucia, the most populated 
Spanish region) has instigated two of the few laws related to libre software that 
are actually in force. The first one was the "Decree of measures to push the 
knowledge society," 36 which deals with (among other issues) the use of libre 
software in education. It fosters the use of libre software in public schools (not 
mandating it exclusively) and mandates that computers purchased for that use 
be compatible with libre operating systems. The second law is an order approved 
on February 21, 2005, 37 which mandates the distribution as libre software of 
any program owned by the Junta de Andalucia. This order basically amounts to 
releasing a large quantity of code to the libre software community, doing the 
same for new programs built on behalf of the Junta. To the knowledge of the 
authors of this chapter, this approach is completely novel and marks the begin 
ning of a new path in the promotion of libre software by public administrations. 



33 http://www.muenchen.de/Rathaus/referatc/dir/limux/89256/ (note by the city of Munich) http:// 
news.zdnetco.uk/software/applications/0,39020384,39171380,00.htm (note in ZDNet). 

34 http://www.softwarelibero.it/portale/legislazione/mozione_comune^irenze2.shtml. 

35 http://www.rijkswaterstoat.nl; report on the experience available at http://europa.eu.mt/tdabc/en/ 
document/3934/4 70>. 

36 Decree 72/2003, March 18, BOJA of March 21; http://andaluciajunta.es/SP/AJ/CDA/Secciones/ 
Boja/AJ-BojaPagina/2004/i 0/AJ-verPagina-2004-10/0,20748,bi%253D696836605883,00. html. 

37 Published in the BOJA of March 10, 2005; http://www.andaluciajunta.es/SP/AJ/CDA/Secciones/ 
Boja/AJ-BojaPagina/2005/03/AJ-verPagina-2005-03/0,22557,bi%253D699234368885,OO.html 

180 * * Libre Software in Europe 



Bergen, the second largest city in Norway reported a strategy, already deployed 
in large part, of using Linux on servers 38 (including the servers of the network 
for schools). The experience seems to allow for cost cuts both in hardware and in 
software, and includes the wide use of lib re software instead of proprietary solu 
tions for many services. 

The city of Vienna (Austria) announced in early 2005 a plan offering its depart 
ments migration to OpenOffice and GNU/Linux on the desktop. 39 The migra 
tion plan is voluntary, linked to lower costs charged by the city s IT department, 
and is currently targeted for about 7,500 desktops. For this solution, a Debian- 
based distribution (Wienux) has been created. 

Legal Issues 

Legal issues are still largely undecided for libre software worldwide. However, some 
of these issues are specific to Europe. Among them, we have selected two cases: the 
European Union directives (affecting most of Europe) that have (or may have, 
depending on approval) a negative impact on libre software; and the concerns about 
the validity of libre software licenses within European jurisdictions. 

EU Directives with Negative Impact 

For sure, not all legislative initiatives in Europe in the field of software have a neutral 
impact on libre software. In some other cases, important laws have been passed (or 
are in the process of approval) that cause serious problems by producing an environ 
ment hostile to libre software. Two of the most relevant cases are: 

Directive on software patents 40 

Although software patents may affect any kind of software, the libre software 
community is especially concerned about the problems it poses for the freedom 
of innovation. The directive on software patents (actually, "Directive About Pat 
entability of Computer Implemented Inventions") was proposed by the Euro 
pean Commission in February 2002. If approved as such, it would mean the 
introduction of software patents in Europe very similar to those in the United 
States. 

Early in the process, groups all over Europe started to explain the problems this 
directive would cause to European software developers (be they individuals or 



38 http.7/www.!ini^/omm.dfe/2005/program/slides/LinuxIBergen/Linioc_i_Bergen_-_Tu/(edaI.ppt (slides, 
in Norwegian), http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3471/469 (note in IDABC), http://news. 
2dnet.co.ufe/so/tware/Iinuxunix/0 ) 39020390,39173557,OO.htm (note in ZDNet). 

39 Http://news.2dnet.co.ufe/so/tware/!inuxunix/0 ) 39020390,39185440 ) 00.htm (note in ZDNet). 

40 There are many web sites with information on the directive on software patents. Probably the 
most complete about software patents in general (including information about the directive itself), 
and the European campaigns against them, is the site of the FFII group, http://swpat.ffii.org. 



Legal Issues ** 181 



companies) and users. In part thanks to the awareness caused by this campaign, 
led to a great extent by libre software activists, the European Parliament passed 
in September 2003 a set of amendments which, together, would amount to the 
invalidation of software patents in Europe. Meanwhile, the European Council of 
Ministers (representatives of EU national governments) has approved a text even 
more radical than the proposal of the Commission, allowing more clearly for 
software patents, in a rather strange meeting in March 2005 (http://kwiki.ffii.org/ 
Cons050307En) . Things are in quite a mess at the time of this writing. The Parlia 
ment asked the Commission to withdraw its proposal, what was refused, enter 
ing into the "second reading" stage, which will lead to a new vote in Parliament, 
probably during the summer of 2005. All in all, this directive proposal is having 
one of the more complex, strange, and time-consuming paths ever seen in Brus 
sels. There is a strong perception in the libre software community in Europe that 
the introduction of software patents would be a strong barrier to the develop 
ment of libre software. On the contrary, if Europe were to remain free of soft 
ware patents, libre software development would benefit from much more legal 
certainty, a friendlier environment, and a more level playing field. 

The European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD) 41 

This was approved in 2001. It is in many respects similar to the Digital Mille 
nium Copyright Act (passed in the U.S.). It poses risks for libre software: the 
impossibility of distributing programs for handling certain file formats (for con 
tents subject to the EUCD), and of interoperation with certain systems. This 
directive can make it illegal to produce libre software programs for handling 
DVDs, for instance. The libre software community is concerned about this prob 
lem, but is not mobilized to the same extent as in the case of software patents. 

Although there are other legal initiatives in Europe hostile to libre software, these two 
are the more well-known ones. In particular, there is now discussion about DRM sys 
tems and the legislation surrounding them, which could develop into very danger 
ous laws making it impossible for a libre software system to handle content such as 
e-books, movies, and music. Only the future will say whether the legal environment 
that was, until the late 1990s, basically neutral to libre software will evolve into a 
fairly hostile one. 

Libre Software Licenses in Europe 

Most (in fact, almost all) libre software licenses were formed in the United States, in a 
jurisdiction alien to European countries. Therefore, for many years now, there have 
been concerns about the validity of those licenses in European jurisdictions. This has 
spawned many efforts in different directions: either to assess the validity of, or to trans- 



41 There is information about how EUCD affects libre software in the FSF Europe web site, http:// 
www./sfeurope. org/projects/eucd/eucd. en. html. 



182 ^ C Libre Software in Europe 



late and localize such licenses, having versions valid in every European country. Until 
now, the former approach has had more impetus, as is shown, for example, in the 
aforementioned "Pooling Open Source Software" study, which includes a detailed 
review of the validity of the GPL and other libre software licenses, concluding that it is 
valid for practical purposes. The latter approach is tricky, since it could contribute to 
the fragmentation of the libre software world and to endless problems in cases of inter 
national collaboration (so common in libre software projects). That is why many peo 
ple from the legal community are considering the proposal of international regulations, 
which would complement intellectual property treaties with the consideration of libre 
software, given clearer international support for these licenses. 42 However, two of the 
clearer cases of the validity of libre software licenses in Europe happened in Germany. 
On April 14, 2004, a German court granted a preliminary injunction to stop distribu 
tion (by a company called Sitecom; http:7Avwvv.siiec0m.c0m) of a router that included 
code (Net-filter/IPtables) licensed under the GPL, yet failed to comply with its provi 
sions, because Sitecom did not distribute the source code. This preliminary injunction 
was confirmed on July 23, 2004, 43 along with a significant judgment, after which Site 
com started to provide the source code on its web site. The second case was also a pre 
liminary injuction (http://yro.slashdQt.org/article.pl7sidr05/04/14/2024258), also for the 
use of Net-filter/IPtables code in some firewall products distributed by Fortinet.(http:// 
www.fortinet.com). Both cases have lent weight to the GPL worldwide, but particularly 
in the German jurisdiction (and in other European jurisdictions of similar tradition). 

Libre Software in Education 

One of the fields where libre software has entered with most impetus in Europe is 
education. This does not mean that libre software is mainstream in European educa 
tional institutions, but that there are several very clear examples that seem to have 
been successful and that are currently being considered in many other realms. For 
several reasons the specific advantages of libre software in the education field, the 
importance of localization, the lack of suitable tools for many educational tasks, the 
funding problem so ubiquitous in education, and the readiness of large parts of the 
educational community to accept and embrace its assumptions and philosophy this 
field seems to be especially receptive to libre software. 

For illustrating this rich landscape of experiences, we have selected four examples 
that have come to our attention: 

SkoleLinux (http://sfe0fchnux.org) is a successful case of a grass-roots effort to 
bring libre software to the education world. It was formed in 2001 as a project 



42 One of such proposed regulations is the Free Software Act, http://www.fsc.cc/node/view/69. 

43 http://www.heise.de/newsticfeer/meldung/49377 and http://yro.slashdot.org/artide.pl?sid=04/07/23/ 
1558219; see also http://www.oti. ox. ac.uk/resources/feedbacy OIIFB_GPL2_20040903.pdf for a 
translation into English of the Court decision. 



Libre Software in Education X 183 



for developing software systems for schools in Norway. It was originally aimed at 
the localization of a GNU/Linux distribution for that country (mainly by translat 
ing it into Norwegian written languages), to improve the installation and mainte 
nance so that it would be suitable for the needs of schools (including distributed 
administration), and to promote the introduction of the product in Norwegian 
schools. In this respect, it has been successful, being used in many schools in 
Norway and other countries, with a healthy community of developers and users 
around it. The project has been funded by a loan from the SLX Debian Lab 
Foundation, which pays for three employees and has strong relationships with 
the Debian project. 

gnuLinEX (http://gnultnex.org) is promoted by Junta de Extremadura, the regional 
government of Extremadura, Spain. It is a part of a larger project (already men 
tioned in the section about public administrations). gnuLinEX is a Debian-based 
distribution, completely localized, which is currently deployed in the whole pub 
lic education system of the region (about 66,000 computers in 2004, mainly in 
schools) and is now being considered for other kinds of environments. Teaching 
materials and specific applications for education are also being developed (usu 
ally under libre software or libre documentation licenses). A complete strategy 
encompassing training, support, development, and dissemination within the 
society of Extremadura is also being put into practice. The project started in 
2002 and is evolving into a complete strategy for the promotion of the use of 
information technologies based on libre software. gnuLinEX was the first of a 
series of education-oriented libre software distributions that have been deployed 
in many other Spanish regions. 

AbulEdu (groupe Education de 1 ABUL; http://abuledu.org) is a French project ori 
ented toward the use of libre software in schools. Its best known product is a 
GNU/Linux distribution, completely in French, developed mainly by volunteers. 
It includes many educational software products, and is designed to be simple to 
maintain in the environment usually found in classrooms. It is currently in use in 
many schools all over France. 

SIGOSSEE (Special Interest Group on Open Source Software for Education in 
Europe; http://ossite.org), co-funded by the European Commission, has been 
established to investigate, inform, and advise about libre software in education. It 
is a kind of umbrella project providing a common space for many working 
groups, organizing many conferences, workshops, and seminars, and acting as a 
framework for relationships with other projects (such as JOIN, devoted more 
specifically to libre software learning management systems). This is a good case 
of a mixture of grass-roots and government-promoted efforts and has been suc 
cessful in disseminating the advantages of libre software for educational organi 
zations all around Europe. 



184 x x Libre Software in Europe 



Another interesting development related to education has been observed over the last 
two years: the appearance of studies specifically oriented toward explaining the libre 
software phenomenon, usually from many different angles, including technical, eco 
nomic, legal, and sociological. We are not referring here to technical courses about 
software systems which happen to be libre, but to studies about libre software itself, 
which are usually aimed at developing an understanding of the complex interactions 
between technology, development processes, business models, licensing schemas, 
volunteer motivation, etc., which are inherent in libre software. Those would be 
needed, for example, to drive the libre software strategy of a company. At the time of 
this writing, we know about some master s-level programs which point in that direc 
tion: those delivered by Universidad Oberta de Catalunya 44 (Spain, started in 2003), 
and Universita di Bologna 45 (Italy, started in 2004). More programs are due to start 
in 2005. And an informal group of universities, the MoLOS group (Master on Libre, 
Open Source Software), is designing a curriculum suitable for being taught as a mas 
ter s study in the context of the new European Higher Education Space. 

Research on Libre Software 

An active research community is concerned with libre software in Europe. From soci 
ologists and economists to software engineers, the interest in studying and under 
standing this phenomenon is on the increase. 

One of the first projects specifically devoted to analyzing the libre software world was 
the aforementioned FLOSS Survey and Study (led by Rishab Ghosh, University of Maas 
tricht, Netherlands, and finished in 2002). It opened several lines of research, from 
authorship of libre software code to motivations of libre software developers. Some other 
pioneering works were performed by Stefan Koch (http://wwwai.wu-wien.ac.at/~feoch/ 
uni.html) in Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien (Austria), who in 2000 was already studying 
the GNOME project from a quantitative point of view, and by the group to which the 
authors of this chapter belong, at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos (Spain), who were study 
ing Debian at the same time. 

Also in 2001, one of the first research workshops on libre software engineering took 
place, the Workshop on Open Source Software Engineering (http://opensource.ucc.ie/ 
icse2001), organized by Joseph Feller and Brian Fitzgerald (both then at University 
College Cork, which hosts an active group on libre software engineering (http://open- 
source.ucc.ie); Brian is now at the University of Limerick, also in Ireland) and Andre 
van der Hoek, and continued every year since. It is interesting to note that in that 
many of the papers presented at the workshop were by European groups, even 
though it was held in Toronto. 



44 http://www.uoc.edu/masters/softwarelibre/esp/index.html. 

45 http://www. unibo. it/Portale/Master/Master+Universitari/2004-2005/Tecnologia+del+So/tware.htm. 



Research on Libre Software , C IBS 



Since those early day s many research groups have joined this field in Europe. Just to 
name a few of those researching libre software as a matter of study, we can mention 
(in no particular order): 

The FLOSS group at MERIT, University of Maastrich (http://www.in/onomtcs.nl/ 
FLOSS; the Netherlands; focus on the economics of libre software and the moti 
vations of developers) 

The Software Engineering Group at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (http:// 
sweng.csd.auth.gr; Greece; strong emphasis on studying the development processes) 

The Open Source group at University College Cork (http://opensource.ucc.ie; Ireland, 
research on libre software processes) 

The Software Engineering team at the Department of CSIS, University of Limerick 
(http://www.csis.ul.ie; Ireland; focus on processes, organization, and coordination) 

The Libre Software Engineering group at the University Rey Juan Carlos (http.7/ 
libresofldaLescet.urjc.es , Spain; focused on the quantitative and qualitative analy 
sis of projects) 

The Distributed Software Engineering Group at University of Lincoln (http:// 
/acs. lincoln.ac.uk/Research/Distributed; the UK; focused on the relationship of 
libre software development and agile methods, and on its distributed 
component) 

The Software Engineering Group at Politecnico di Torino (Italy; focus on evolu 
tion and maintenance) 

The Center for Applied Software Engineering at Free University of Bolzano- 
Bozen (Italy; research on metrics applied to libre software and its relationship to 
agile methods) 

The team at the Institute of Computing Science at Poznan University of Technology 
(http://www.cs.put.p02nan.pl; Poland; focus on data mining of publicly available 
information) 

The Open Source Group at the University of Szeged (http://www.inf.u-szeged.hu/ 
opensource; Hungary; publishing on quality and complexity metrics) 

The Science and Technology Policy Research team at SPRU, University of Sussex 
(http://www.sussex.ac.uh/spru/J-4-9.html; the UK; focus on the economics of libre 
software development) 

The Open Source research team at Technical University of Berlin (http://ig.cs.tu- 
berlin.de/forschung/OpenSource; Germany; research on economics and politics of 
libre software) 



IBB ^ C Libre Software in Europe 



There are, of course, many more research groups, and not finding one here implies 
nothing but my poor knowledge (please, forgive me if you are one of those not named). 
In particular, note that only groups, and not individuals, have been mentioned. 

Some of these groups are partners in the CALIBRE (http://calibre.ie) coordinated 
action (already mentioned in the section about public administrations), funded by 
the European Commission and aimed at coordinating some of the research on libre 
software being performed in Europe and transmitting its results to industry. 

Although it is difficult to tell, we think that European research on the libre software 
phenomenon is at a very high level, and when compared to similar efforts in other 
parts of the world (mainly in the United States), it may be more focused on under 
standing how libre software projects work (whereas in other cases, the understand 
ing is more a side effect of analyzing software development in general). 

The Future Is Hard to Read.... 

We have tried to show how libre software is flourishing all over Europe. Of course, 
there are many differences throughout an area where diversity is the rule, but also 
many coincidences. For now, Europe is an important pillar of the libre software 
world, and is maintaining an equal leadership of it. We have a large share of develop 
ers; there are companies producing, maintaining, using, and providing services; and 
our public administrations seem to be aware of the libre software phenomenon. 

However, experiences are fragmented. Few companies are based on libre software in 
Europe as a whole, although an increasing number are working at the national and 
regional levels. The developer community, and the libre software community in gen 
eral, is in fact a collection of loosely linked national or linguistic communities, with 
very little coordination among them. We do not have common news sites, and there 
are very few umbrella organizations, or even meeting events, recognized throughout 
Europe. The initiatives of the public administrations may be a bit more coordinated, 
but even those are wildly different from country to country. Maybe all this is just a 
consequence of the fragmentation of Europe or maybe it is a first step toward a real 
European space of libre software. Whatever the reason, for now the real impact of 
European initiatives in the libre software world is far lower than the relative impor 
tance of libre software in Europe. In a few specific cases (such as the campaign 
against the directive on software patents, which is not carried only by libre software 
activists), we are starting to see coordinated movements that show the real strength 
of libre software in Europe. 

In this context, we still have to wait to see whether Europe will capitalize on its cur 
rent leadership in libre software penetration or, on the contrary, will lose this position 
in favor of other regions with a clearer and more active policies of promotion. The 
coming years will tell but, for now, we have the potential to be the first economic area 
to experiment with the benefits of large-scale deployment of libre software, creating a 

The Future Is Hard to Read.... X 187 



whole new industry around it, and promoting not only companies, but also the indi 
vidual developers who are making this a real possibility. 

In case libre software provides real advantages in terms of innovation, competence, 
and social benefits, Europe is well placed for advancing in that direction. Are those 
opportunities not worth exploring? Can we risk losing our advantageous position in 
what could be the next revolution in the information society? 



188 * C Libre Software in Europe 



XX 
XX 



Alolita Sharma and 
Robert Adkins 



CHAPTER 12 



OSS in India 



In modern times, India has accomplished miracles through the power of collabora 
tion. Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) has the potential to accomplish yet 
another set of miracles in automating government and industry, and producing 
affordable education for all. 

Three earlier revolutions using collaboration have dramatically improved the basic 
infrastructure within the country. The first revolution was called the Green Revolu 
tion, which started in the 1970s and took India from being a grain deficit to a grain 
surplus country. The second revolution, in the 1980s, was the White Revolution, 
which used the power of dairy cooperatives to enable large-scale milk production. 
Not only could India s own population be satisfied, India also became an exporter of 
dairy products. The third revolution, in the 1990s, was the Gray Revolution, which 
used India s plethora of English-speaking engineers and scientists to capture a signifi 
cant share of the world s outsourcing business in software and pharmaceuticals. 

Open Source Software (OSS) is poised to become the next revolution perhaps 
named the Gold Revolution. OSS promises to build India s local infrastructure and cre 
ate new wealth based on information services. 



ion 

189 



Business 

OSS is a boon for the Indian export market. However, automation of any sort is only 
beginning in the domestic market. Hence the local market languishes in the adop 
tion of all automation tools, whether proprietary or open. 

Domestic Market 

The localization and adaptation of computer-based solutions to move the local econ 
omy in India from pre-automation to automation continues to be a very slow march. 
Business processes remain predominantly manual. For example, it is reported that 
most doctors in India are practicing the same way they did 75 years ago with pen 
cils and pieces of paper. Ideally, OSS can promote the cost-effective adoption of 
automation, especially when legacy constraints are minimal. However, ground reali 
ties often discourage adoption of OSS. 

Developing economies such as India s tend to foster low wages for services and sup 
port while permitting low prices for proprietary products because of piracy. This has 
led to a proliferation of proprietary technologies with affordable support structures 
and, at the same time, a resistance to OSS. 

The resistance to OSS is driven by three main factors: 

The parity of "purchase price" when equalized by piracy 

The perception of a lack of maturity of OSS solutions 

A higher cost of support due to relative scarcity of Linux-trained labor 

However, a recent trend is the emergence of local businesses that provide support for 
point solutions important to small to medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in India. For 
example, companies have sprouted up in metropolitan areas to support the migra 
tion of email from large-scale proprietary server environments to the equivalent OSS 
solutions. This is partly because companies which have significant server-based infra 
structure have been recent targets of licensing enforcement campaigns by propri 
etary vendors and government enforcement agencies. The perception of increased 
risk in using unlicensed software has provided the impetus for OSS adoption. 

In contrast, automation for the export economy in India, with its highly skilled, 
English-speaking workforce, is beginning to exploit some of the new business oppor 
tunities offered by open source, especially in providing services for migrations from 
Unix to Linux and from Microsoft platforms to Linux. 

Outsourcing and OSS 

Meeting the needs of the outsourcing market, low wages in India have fueled a sub 
stantial generic services economy with a global reach. Now, the outsourcing industry 
is beginning to take a serious look at using OSS for Information and Communication 



190 xx OSS in India 



Technology (ICT) solution development and implementation, for migration services, 
and for complex systems integration. As early as 1998, Dr. Ajay Shah, a consultant to 
the Indian Ministry of Finance, realized the importance of exploiting the inherent 
characteristics of OSS to build a services industry which could amplify the tradi 
tional Indian outsourcing services business. Today Indian companies like Tata Con 
sultancy Services (TCS) have translated Dr. Shah s realization into sophisticated 
methods of services provision for example, employing the state-of-the-art "ongoing 
cost reduction formulas" for client companies using the year-over-year economic 
advantages of OSS. The emerging market for OSS-based development and services 
has created high-value jobs in India for developers and, in addition, for business pro 
cess analysts and service providers. 

A principal portion of OSS outsourcing requirements centers around migration from 
older software platforms to Linux. For example, interest is rapidly increasing in 
retooling software from earlier, proprietary Unix platforms to Linux. Much of the 
conversion of traditional Unix applications and tools, like the earlier bonanza of Y2K 
work, is being done in India. 

A second set of OSS outsourcing requirements involves building custom business 
applications using the new open source environments. 

Companies taking advantage of these new outsourcing opportunities include HP 
India, Cognizant, Infosys, Wipro, Mindtree, IBM India, and many others. 

Infosys, a top Indian IT company, is building a Linux migration practice as part of its 
multidimensional systems services and integration business strategy. Recent projects 
at Infosys illustrate both migration services and custom application development. For 
example, to meet the needs of a large petroleum industry client, Infosys ported appli 
cations for visualizing oil exploration data to Red Hat Linux from Solaris and IRIX. 
For another client, Infosys migrated a multinode high-availability application cluster 
from Solaris to Linux. In a project to help a leading peripheral manufacturer in Japan 
develop a new cost-effective product line, Infosys built Linux-based POS terminals 
using Java POS international standards. 

Well-publicized projects at Wipro in the financial services and messaging services mar 
kets also illustrate the harnessing of OSS to drive cost-effective outsourcing services. 

Government 

OSS is providing the first steps toward an information society in India and thereby 
helping to close the digital divide. Examples include the Open Source Simputer 
project, CoIL-NET &r TDIL localization projects, e-governance projects, and others. 



Government X 191 



Maharashtra and Kerala state land record systems have separately demonstrated the 
cost effectiveness of applying OSS, including database technologies, to what tradi 
tionally has been a slow and manual process. 

Government-sponsored software technology parks of India (STPIs) are often used by 
companies to demonstrate their solutions to large government customers. One exam 
ple is a 2003 MoU between IBM and the state of Karnataka to build an OSS center of 
excellence in the government-built Hubli software technology park. IBM has also set 
up a similar Linux Center of Competency in Bangalore, which provides development 
and testing services for Linux applications. Other OSS resource centers have been 
built or are being planned. 

Two 2004 MoUs between IBM and the state of Uttaranchal have initiated a statewide 
university education program and an eGovernance program for an OSS-based frame 
work addressing both legacy and new applications. These applications cover munici 
pal services for record keeping, taxation, and social and health programs. 

Also, IBM signed an MoU with the union territory of Chandigarh to set up an 
eGovernance Solutions Center for Linux for the local government. The center will 
help Chandigarh develop eGovernment applications using open standards and 
IBM s open source-based development framework. 

Oracle s eGovernance Center of Excellence, set up in partnership with HP in the state 
of Haryana, helps government agencies develop better ICT policies and deploy 
improved ICT systems using OSS and Linux. 

Challenges in Local Adoption of OSS 

The trend toward OSS adoption faces a number of significant challenges. 

Support 

The perceived lack of support available for OSS in India is largely due to support ser 
vices being readily available for legacy platforms. The legacy support industry has 
been built over many years. However, today there are a growing number of channels 
of support for OSS. Because of its collaborative nature, a great deal of high-quality 
yet inexpensive or free help for OSS is provided online. Furthermore, if a user has 
money, the same level of support is available for OSS as for proprietary solutions, 
and at the same prices. It should be noted that, while readily available, legacy sup 
port is often of poor quality. Furthermore, users or organizations that already have 
Unix skills find few difficulties in supporting OSS applications or systems. As more 
students trained in OSS enter the workforce, increasing support services options will 
emerge. In addition, as more OSS services revenues are derived by the software 
industry, the OSS services infrastructure will mature, and greater fulfillment of sup 
port requirements will be possible. 



192 X OSS in India 



Piracy 

The high seas are unfriendly to both OSS and proprietary products. 

According to industry sources, more than 70% of proprietary software is pirated in 
India. Rampant piracy equalizes the price between "free" software and proprietary 
software. Since there is little legitimate market value for proprietary desktop pack 
ages, there is little financial incentive to develop a local software product market. IT 
growth is consequently stunted. OSS is seen, by some, as an antidote to these effects 
because it has the potential to transform the technology consumer of proprietary 
products into a technology collaborator of open solutions. 

India s commitment to maintain compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and WIPO standards in the protection of intellectual property will encourage the 
proliferation of OSS packages. In particular, antipiracy drives and subscription 
licensing models are already improving the attractiveness of functionally equivalent 
OSS packages in India. 

Localization 

Proprietary as well as OSS vendors have committed considerable resources to localiz 
ing software in India. Microsoft has pledged millions of dollars to the localization of its 
proprietary software in Hindi, Marathi, and other major Indian languages. Red Hat has 
announced a plan to build a U.S.$250 million center to support localization and other 
software development. IBM has initiated various multimillion-dollar localization 
projects. Government agencies such as the Center for Development of Advanced Com 
puting (C-DAC) and the Department of Information Technology (D-IT) also have 
active programs to develop localization solutions. And OSS community resources have 
initiated projects to localize various components of the OSS suite. Examples include the 
Indie-Computing Project, and IndLinux. 

Localizing the killer applications of open source, such as OpenOffice.org, the KDE 
and GNOME suites, and the Mozilla browser and email applications, has increased 
adoption and usage by the non-English-speaking majority of Indians. 

In fact, localization efforts are the main channel by which Indian contributions are 
being made to OSS projects. Desktop localization projects are the most active collab 
orative efforts in India. Projects include BharateeyaOO, IndLinux, JanaBhaaratii, and 
AnkurBangla. 

The BharateeyaOO project represents the "Indianization" of OpenOffice.org. It is a 
cross-platform project for translating a rich office productivity suite into languages 
appropriate for non-English-speaking Indians. Availability of major computational 
tools in local languages is already helping to bridge the digital divide and spread 
computer usage and learning in the rural areas of India. 



Challenges in Local Adoption of OSS * 193 



The IndLinux project has created a Linux distribution that supports major Indian 
languages, including Hindi, Punjabi, Oriya, Telegu, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, 
Malayalam, and Tamil. Like BharateeyaOO, this project tries to bridge the digital 
divide by bringing the benefits of computer and information technology to non- 
English-speaking Indians. 

The AnkurBangla project has created a Bangla-language Linux distribution as well as 
Bangla support for some major applications such as office suites, databases, develop 
ment tools, and desktop environments like GNOME and KDE. The project s objec 
tives include developing and maintaining open source software targeted toward 
Bangla-speaking users. 

JanaBhaaratii is an Indian government project run by the C-DAC and is funded by 
the D-IT. This project uses OSS to promote localized computing applications. The 
project will develop and deploy technology in Indian languages for a broad range of 
areas such as home use, mass applications, education, rural areas, info-kiosks, cyber- 
cafes, and e-governance. 

Other projects include localized regional voter registration applications, such as the 
Voter List project, which uses a bootable CD distribution called GNUBhaaratii that is 
based on Morphix. 

Culture 

India s work culture embodies a complex mix of both rigid hierarchy and elastic 
opportunism. 

Opportunism drives the consideration of special favors at all levels of economic activ 
ity in India. It is common to hear senior Indian administrators say that there is "no 
money" to be made in procuring OSS. Today, the Indian form of guanxi in the OSS 
world is a trickle at best. But some form of guanxi may always be needed to success 
fully conduct business in India. Guanxi "reciprocity" may ultimately be based on the 
growing wealth from the IT services economy. However, if some measure of transpar 
ency and containment of corruption is to be achieved, cost-effective and pervasive 
automation is key to reducing discretion in the conduct of government and in the 
application of governance. It s icing on the cake that automation can be achieved using 
legitimate, nonpirated OSS tools. 

Organizational rigidity is the other face of India s work culture. India s tradition of 
social hierarchy in the workplace tends to reduce the value of collaboration. While 
innovation is a strong Indian value, collaboration is not. Traditional Indian business 
culture is strictly hierarchical. Collaboration with peers is less valued than perform 
ing a prescribed duty according to one s place in the organizational structure. This is 
slowly changing, as more relaxed and flexible Western business practices are 
adopted. Collaboration inhibitions are reflected in the lack of contributions to collab 
orative OSS projects. 

134 X OSS in India 



Software Patents 

Intellectual property concerns affect all software, whether proprietary or open source. 
Globally, the status of software patents is unclear, with a number of initiatives in var 
ious stages of contest. Software patents are allowed in both the U.S. and Japan. The 
European Union is examining its options. In India, unconstrained software patents 
are not yet allowed. However, recently, the government of India amended the Indian 
Patents Act to support patenting of embedded software to conform to WTO/WIPO 
agreements. There is strong pressure from industry bodies such as NASSCOM to 
extend IPR protection to all forms of software as a way of strengthening the Indian 
software industry. The counterview that patents serve to inhibit innovation in soft 
ware is not widely recognized and, unfortunately, the FOSS community appears to 
be having minimal influence on keeping software free from patents. The new patent 
protections for embedded software came into effect January 1, 2005. 

OSS in Education 

Despite its IT prowess, India lags behind in contributing to large-scale OSS projects. 
It also lags behind in the use of OSS in the educational curriculum at all levels. 
Nonetheless, OSS is viewed by many in Indian industry and government as a key for 
improving the quality of education. 

The enthusiasm for OSS in education is still in its infancy, since India s secondary 
school curriculum is today oriented toward proprietary products such as Microsoft 
Office, Windows applications, and development environments like Visual Basic and 
database applications like SQL Server and Oracle. In the curriculum, there is little 
support for generic computing concepts or platform-neutral software applications. 

But there are exceptions, where FOSS advocates have worked with local school 
administrations to teach computing concepts using open tools and development 
environments. 

More significantly, industry players such as Red Hat, Novell, IBM, and Intel have ini 
tiated open source resource centers and internship programs to grow the talent pool 
of open source engineering in India. Intel, in conjunction with the Department of 
Information Technology, has established an Open Source Resource Center to pro 
mote ICT education and curriculum development. IBM and the C-DAC have created 
an Open Source Software Resource Center (OSSRC) in Mumbai to foster OSS devel 
opment, to increase understanding of OSS models, and to develop courseware which 
promotes OSS skills and builds a national OSS talent pool. Red Hat has launched a 
scholarship program with IIT Bombay to encourage OSS development skills. Novell 
has started an OSS internship program to boost student participation and contribu 
tions from India in OSS projects such as Mozilla, GNOME, and OpenOffice. 



OSS in Education *C 195 



Conclusion 

OSS is still early in its influence in India. While the outsourcing business of Indian IT 
industry is profiting from the new services and integration market provided by OSS, 
the domestic market is still immature. The domestic adoption of OSS is also handi 
capped by the ready availability of inexpensive, pirated, proprietary software prod 
ucts. However, there are signs of increasing use of OSS in government information 
processing and provision of services, as well as in educational curricula and in tools 
used to create educational content within many knowledge areas. 

However, the long-term potential of OSS is recognized by some of the leadership of 
India for example, by the current president of India, Dr. APJ Kalam. With contin 
ued advocacy, OSS can become a Gold Revolution that powers export as well as 
domestic industries across all economic segments and realizes the promise of a 
shared knowledge and collaboration-based information society. 



196 X OSS in India 





XX 



CHAPTER 13 



Boon-Lock Yeo, Louisa Liu, 
and Sunil Saxena 



When China Dances with OSS 



One of the key challenges for China s Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) industry is to ensure that China has the right software solutions to support 
usage models and value requirements. The advent of open source software (OSS), 
along with its business model with respect to intellectual property and value proposi 
tion, brings this business force to the fast-growing software industry in China. That, 
in turn, will provide an opportunity for the OSS community to promote and popu 
larize this model throughout the People s Republic of China (PRC). This chapter ana 
lyzes how OSS has developed in China and where it is heading. 

What OSS Was and Is in China 

With the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing at an average rate of 9.8% year 
over year (YoY) from 1979 to 1997,1 China has been pegged as a fast-growing econ 
omy. The high-tech industry had become the number-one pillar industry as of 
2002, 2 and is expected to contribute 7% to the country s overall growth in 2005.3 All 
of this is part of China s tenth Five-Year Plan, with the vision that "information drives 
industrialization" and ICT will continue to be a national focus onward. 



1 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/ztfx/xzgwsnxlfxbg/t20020605_21437.htm. 

2 http://www.ccw.com.cn/htm/news l/dt/inland/02_9_l 6_1 0.asp and httv://www chinabyte com/ 
20020327/1603813.shtml. 

3 http://www.cll4.net/policy/policyread.asp?artickid=249. 



There are many growth opportunities within China s ICT, particularly in software and 
services, hardware, and telecommunications. Currently China is experiencing signifi 
cant growth and success in hardware and telecommunications, notably with compa 
nies like Lenovo 4 and Huawei Technologies, 5 which are recognized as global industry 
players. The software industry, however, is slower to produce such success stories. 

There are three key objectives to consider when examining the future of China s soft 
ware industry: 

Grow the local independent software vendors (ISVs) who can drive more PRC market success 
China currently has many small and medium-sized software companies, 90% of 
which employ fewer than 200 people. Today the revenue generated by the Chi 
nese software companies competing in the global market is relatively small, with 
the most successful local vendors generating approximately $70 million in reve 
nue, only 1% of that of their leading global software counterparts. 

Grow infrastructure software to take advantage of the specific needs of the PRC market 
There is a perceived opportunity to develop specific infrastructure software for the 
Chinese market. Currently 85% of the local ISVs fall into the application software 
segment. China s software industry is largely reliant on multinational vendors, 
which are the predominant suppliers of infrastructure software such as operating 
systems. 

Continue education on the importance of intellectual property (IP) rights to grow a healthy 

software industry 

It will be important to continue to educate Chinese enterprises that software and 
services are not complementary to purchased hardware. Piracy is perceived by 
many organizations as the norm, particularly for popular software and tools. 
Sharing of such IP not only negatively impacts the vendor s bottom line, but also 
hurts the local software industry, making it difficult for vendors to build capital 
with which to compete and innovate. Today more Chinese companies have 
begun to develop original content, which means they will think more about ade 
quate safeguards for their IP. This is borne out by the increasing number of pat 
ents and trademarks that are being filed in the PRC. 

Other factors worth considering to improve and grow the domestic software indus 
try include: 

Minimize piracy by encouraging fair-priced software and services 

China s World Trade Organization (WTO) entry means it will need to confront 
and contain software piracy. The government has adopted a multipronged 
approach targeting piracy to combat the issue of copyright infringement over time. 



4 http://wmv.lenovogrp.com/cgi-bin/main.cgi?section=al?out(S Sub_section=chair_message 

5 hp.7/www.huawei.com/was/wps/portal/. ut/p/.cmd/cs/.ce/7_0_A/.s/7_0_lK4/_th/J_0_6A/_s.7_0_A/ 

7_0_lJJ/_s. 7_0_A/7_0_1 K4 
198 I C When China Dances with OSS 



Enhance national security and decrease viruses and hacker attacks when running software 
As China works to develop infrastructure software, it will continue to rely on 
what is available. To protect national security, China recognizes that it has to 
complement the core parts in the value chain of the software industry, as it sees 
the direct relationship between the software and hardware industries. 

Grow a strong software industry in pursuit of IT industry growth 

As software is where the profitability goes in the ICT industry, China needs to 
position itself to supply the innovation, new software, support, and usage mod 
els which the growing Chinese economy will need. By considering local needs of 
the various market sectors and using standards that would allow for interna 
tional usage, Chinese software companies can build a home base of customers to 
support IT industry growth. 

At this time, OSS has entered onto the PRC SW sage. 

What OSS Means in China 

Picture a generic software stack (Figure 13-1), with levels for the different types of 
software, starting from the firmware/basic input/output system (BIOS), all the way to 
the applications. OSS traditionally has focused on the operating system (OS) part and 
above; Linux has played a key role in the OS layer. 

Applications 



Operating systems I Drivers 1 
Firmware/BIOS 



Hardware: CPU/ chipset/ motherboard 
Figure 13-1. A generic software stack 

The introduction of OSS in China can be attributed to a group of technical enthusi 
asts in the early 1990s. It is said that copies of Linux were brought back by Chinese 
visiting overseas from the University of Helsinki, UC Berkeley, and MIT, and quickly 
spread throughout universities and research institutions such as Tsinghua University 
and the University of Science and Technology of China. 6 At that time, computer sci 
ence students and professors focused on becoming familiar with the system and 
localization. 



http://www^nuxforum.net/forum/gshowflat.php?Cat=^Board=linuxtalk& Number= 
492466&page=0^iew=collapsed& sb=5& 0=all& fpart=all& vc=l. 



What OSS Was and Is in China I C 199 



In 1997, OSS was officially recognized by the government with the development of 
"Free Software Research and Application Development," a sub-branch of the China 
Software Industry Association, along with a wide range of OSS communities, such as 
a free software database freesoft.cei.gov.cn and some other bulletin board sys 
tems (BBSs), newsgroups, and Linux User Groups (LUGs). 

In 1999, the first Chinese Linux company Xteam was founded and delivered to 
the industry the first commercial operation of Linux/OSS in China. Consequently a 
nascent market started on this initial engagement, which drew the attention of com 
petition and keen interest from entrepreneurs. 7 Companies such as Red Flag, China 
Software Network Technology Co., Ltd., and BluePoint, as well as multinational ones 
such as TurboLinux have since begun activities in China. 

Status of OSS in China 

Since 1999, China has placed a stronger focus on OSS. There are many different 
components in OSS, from infrastructure software like Apache (web server), MySQL 
(database), and JBoss (application server), to tool and application software. In China, 
many of the efforts and activities have focused on Linux. 

As seen in the market, the server side of Linux is relatively established in enterprise 
infrastructure, with a healthy growth rate. Increasingly Linux is being deployed for 
application servers and backend databases. This has been mainly seen in the financial 
services industry (FSI) and telecommunications. Vendors such as TurboLinux and Red 
Flag have taken an active part in these segments to grow their corporate revenues. 

Since the Linux OS is the most well-used OSS in organizations, enterprises, and govern 
ment bodies, a snapshot of China s Linux market is an appropriate way to study the 
market potential. Table 13-1 shows the key players in the market in China. 

Table 13-1. Linux distributors in China 



Type 


Company 


Background/description 


Commonality 


Local 


Red Flag 


Market leader in Linux client operating environ 


Strong 






ment (COE) and second in server operating envi 


government 






ronment (SOE). a 


background. 






Co-founded by Software Research Institute of the 


Fewer than 






Chinese Academy of Sciences and NewMargin 


200 staff. 






Venture Capital in 2000. 


Revenue 






Got investment from CCID Capital incorporated 


mainly from 






under the Ministry of Information Industry in 


government 






2001. 


IT purchasing. 






Offers a complete portfolio of Linux products for 








desktop, server, and embedded systems. 





7 http.7/www.linux/orum.net//orum/gshow/lat.php?Cat=c : r Board=linuxtaIf?cVNumber= 
492466&page=0^iew=collapsed&sb=5&>o=all&>fpart=all& vc=l. 

200 ^ C When China Dances with OSS 



Table 13-1. Linux distributors in China (continued) 



Type 



Company 



Background/description 



Commonality 



China Stan 
dard Software 
Co., Ltd. 
(CS2C) 



Co-Create 



Xteam 



Foreign 



BluePoint 



TurboLinux 
China (TLC) 



Novell SuSE 



Red Hat 



MandrakeSoft 



Ranks as third Linux distributor in COE and SOE 
markets, respectively. 13 

Spun off from China National Software and Ser 
vice Co., Ltd. (CS&S) in 2003. 
Focus on desktop, server, and office products. 

Joint entity formed by tens of local IT compa 
nies in 2001. 

Received investment from Caplnfo in 2003. 
Targets Linux desktop and office suite. 

First Linux distributor in China. 
Listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange two years 
after the company was established. 
Transitioned to Linux server from its initial 
focus on Linux desktop. 

Focused on solutions for government and edu 
cation after 2004 investment by Beijing Enter 
prises Holdings Ltd., which had a strong gov 
ernment background. 

Transitioned from a pioneer Linux distributor 
to an embedded firewall provider. 

Existed as an American company, then 
acquired by a Japanese company. 
In 2004, local company Hinge Software became 
the No. 1 shareholder of TLC, C which made it a 
local entity. 

Strong in server side, especially in the telecom 
munications industry. 

After the acquisition of SuSE Linux, Novell, 
with over a decade of operations experience in 
China, started its new Linux business locally. 
Focus on training with local institutions. d 

Leading distributor globally. 

Commenced operation in China in November 

2004. 

Plans to invest $ 1 billion for development in 

China. e 

Ranks as third distributor in the world. f 



Government 
background. 



No government 
background. 

Presence 
in China. 



Plans to enter 
China. 



a Nielse Jiang, "China Linux 2005-2009 Forecast and Analysis." IDC, Feb. 2005. 

b Nielse Jiang, "China Linux 2005-2009 Forecast and Analysis." IDC, Feb. 2005. 

c http://unvw.smartpartner.com.cn/spl/index/article.phpistoryid~8334. 

d http://tech.ccidnet.com/pub/article/c308_al84083_pl .html. 

e http://wunv.ciweekly.com/ciweekly/inforcenter/A20041123364459.html. 

f http://www.chinabyte.com/homepage/219015092686028800/20050110/1898897.shtml. 



What OSS Was and Is in China J J Z01 



In China, Linux distributors are broken into two camps: local and foreign. 

In the local camp, there are five major distributors. The first three distributors, com 
posed of the tier-one groups, make up more than 60% of the market share among 
local players. Although they have different characteristics and strengths, all of them 
possess certain commonalities i.e., they have government backing, fewer than 200 
employees, and revenue coming mainly from government IT purchasing. 

As to the rest, the main difference is that they do not have government backing. That 
may change the fate of these companies. Some have transitioned to new business, 
such as BluePoint. Some have turned to getting government support, thanks to capi 
tal infusions, as seen in Xteam. Still, there are some distributors who continue to 
fight for a ticket into the tier-one group. 

Although there are many indigenous distributors in China, the market potential has 
attracted the attention of foreign distributors also. This group of foreign distributors 
in China includes almost all the leading global distributors: TurboLinux, Novell/ 
SuSE, and Red Hat. Some other distributors, such as MandrakeSoft, are also express 
ing interest in making inroads into China. 

OSS Business Models in China 

Many people may wonder how companies make money based on open source prod 
ucts. There are different approaches, but one that has a proven track record is related 
to the service model i.e., making money mainly in services while selling products 
for a reasonable price premium. 

Several companies have positioned themselves toward the services business model. 
They may compete with each other by providing additional value-add or niche prod 
ucts. Open source distributors like Red Hat, SuSE, and Red Flag are clear leaders of 
open source Linux and have positioned themselves as services companies. These 
companies tend to get service-level agreements for support for the Linux distribu 
tions they supply to their customers. They have made their distribution as rich as 
possible, validate them on many platforms themselves, and get the help of many plat 
forms through their OEM partners. 

The other successful business model is proprietary applications above the open 
source products that run on top of open source distributions and link only dynami 
cally with user-level libraries. Oracle server products, and Office products from King- 
soft, are clear examples of products that deliver value above the open source stack. 

Other examples include set-top boxes like TiVo,8 and Linux-based cell phones. 
These products use Linux as an embedded operating system and provide dedi 
cated proprietary services above the stack. These vendors can easily charge for their 



8 http://www.ttvo.com. 



individual products, as they provide very visible value to end users. These compa 
nies clearly use the Linux operating system as the base for their solution stack, 
leveraging open source to bring cheaper systems into the marketplace. 

In China, both business models are common and advantageous. Red Flag, known as 
a services company, distinguishes itself from its competitors by focusing on provid 
ing value-add via localization for the PRC market. Other additional value that it pro 
vides is management and security solutions not available from other local vendors. 

Red Hat, on the other hand, distinguishes itself with a large volume of ISV support 
and validated stacks from thousands of ISVs. This value-add may fetch additional 
customers, however the core of its business remains as a services company. Another 
key factor in favor of Chinese companies is the strong manufacturing base of con 
sumer electronics and cell phones leading to opportunities for value-added soft 
ware on top of the OSS infrastructure. 

SWOT Analysis of OSS in China 

We have come up with the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
(SWOT) and have done comparisons among China and other geographies with 
regard to OSS adoption. In Table 13-2, we summarized the SWOT analysis of OSS, 
to further separate factors common with other geographies from those unique to 
China. In the sections that follow, we examine strengths and opportunities for OSS 
in China. 



Table 13-2. SWOT analysis of OSS 



Category 



Shared with other geographies 



Unique to China 



Strengths 



Weakness 



Free source code. 

Strong multinational company 

(MNC) support. 

Shortage of applications. 



Opportunities 



Threats 



Opportunities to develop value- 
added software on top of OSS. 



Competition with incumbent soft 
ware and infrastructure. 



Strong government support. 



Lack of localized applications. 

Lack of Linux developer talent. 

Lack of understanding and participation 

in Commons. 

Young software industry. 

Entrepreneurship skill sets are at an early 

stage. 

Shortage of successful OSS businesses. 

Opportunities in China beyond desktop/ 
server, such as embedded, cell phones, 
set-top boxes, and telecommunications, 
all of which are China s strengths. 

Software IP [Editor s Note: I would argue 
this is NOT unique to China.]. 



SWOT Analysis of OSS in China X 203 



Strengths 

The future of OSS in China is bright because of the government s strong support, as 
the traits of OSS match well with what China is in pursuit of: 

Availability of free source code 

This helps develop China s own software products with customized needs and 
requirements. 

Availability of infrastructure software 

Among the OSS, there is a suite of infrastructure software, such as Linux as OS, 
Apache as web server, MySQL as database, and JBoss as application servers. 
These complement what China currently lacks. 

The strategic value proposition of China s developing OSS capabilities includes: 

Financial perspective cost 

In 2003, government IT spending totaled U.S. $2. 8 billion, or RMB 23.1 billion. 
Government IT spending is expected to maintain a fast growth rate of around 
18% through 2008 in anticipation of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and Expo 2010 
Shanghai. By then, total government IT spending is projected to reach U.S. $5. 7 
billion, or RMB 47.2 billion. The 2003-2007 CAGR will reach 15.3%.9 

The packaged software market was calculated at U.S. $264. 3 million or RMB 3.5 bil 
lion, in 2003 and represented 9.5% of overall government IT spending. Along with 
the increasing standardization of government application software and government 
emphasis on software, especially security and storage software, the packaged soft 
ware market will maintain a fairly high CAGR of 21.7% in the next five years and 
will eventually reach U.S.$706.3 million or RMB 5.9 billion in 2007. ^ That spend 
ing may help jump-start the local software industry to be profitable and create a reve 
nue stream for OSS. 

Security consideration 

By allowing access to the source code, OSS-based applications allow organiza 
tions to help ensure that the software they use can protect against viruses and 
hackers, which are becoming more and more of a concern to a well-functioning 
IT capability. While cost is important, security can be more significant. Concern 
ing information security, it is imperative to get transparency from the solution 
and software products, which is hard to realize from proprietary products. OSS 
shows all the source code, which greatly relieves government concern. 



9 Enid Du, "China Government Industry Solution 2004-2008 Forecast and Analysis." IDC, Nov. 
2004. 

10 Enid Du, "China Government Industry Solution 2004-2008 Forecast and Analysis." IDC, Nov. 
2004. 



204 X When China Dances with OSS 



Growth opportunities to create a balanced software industry 

The infrastructure OSS applications are prominently featured in parts of China s 
software industry. 

Developing a competitive edge in the software industry 

The long-term goal of Chinese government of boosting the domestic software 
industry is to realize the transition of China from IT consumer to IT provider. It 
wants to play a leading role in the Linux/OSS community, in the hope of being 
recognized as one of the global standard makers and enablers. 

Policies such as File 18 n and File 4 1 12 have been published to support growth of 
the local software industry. It is suggested that for IT spending, government agencies 
consider support to domestic products/services. 13 If there are no appropriate local 
products/services, foreign ones can be considered. As such, certain governmental IT 
purchasing projects have favored indigenous vendors. 

For example, the Beijing Municipal Government s IT purchasing by the end of 2001 had 
approved all six local vendors plus Microsoft, the only foreign vendor in the bidding. 14 
The local Linux vendors and ISVs that provide products running on the Linux platform 
therefore have been given chances to make inroads into the public sector. That kicked 
off the first round of government purchasing of local software vendors. 

The execution will be run from the top down from central government to tier-one 
government agencies in places like Beijing, Shanghai, and other provinces to tier- 
two and tier- three ones. 

Apart from the efforts of the government and Linux distributors, multinational ven 
dors (MNVs) are another significant force to foster growth. The MNVs include Dell, 
HP, IBM, Intel, Sun, and SAP, to name just a few, many of which are the founding 
members of OSS communities, such as Open Source Development Labs (OSDL). 
Some of the endeavors that these MNVs have made include: 

Dell 

Back in 1999, Dell started to sell Linux-based servers. It also invested in Red Hat. 15 
HP 

For details, please see http://www.hp.com.cn/services/education/edm/itm/0409/17.asp. 



1 1 http://wvw.istis.sh.cn/zbcx/zcdhAist.asp7id~ 1 42 1 

12 http://it.anhuinews.com/system/2005/OI/07/OOJ098472.shtml. 

13 http://vvvmxhinabyte.com/homepage/219001834121986048/200311 15/1 745026.shtml and httpV/ 
tech.tom.com/JJ2J/J793/200485-lJ5570.html. 

14 http://tech.sina.com.en/s/n/200J -J2-3J/97972.shtml. 

15 http://wvw.blogchina.com/new/source/source.asp7bid~148. 



SWOT Analysis of OSS in China * * 205 



IBM 

Since 2000, when IBM invested $1 billion in advertising and R&D on Linux, it 
has fully supported Linux with all the offerings. 16 Support has been conducted 
from the Linux server side to the desktop. February 2005 has seen IBM make 
further commitments to Linux. It plans to spend another $100 million to 
develop a Linux version of Lotus Workplace to deploy on a Linux client. 17 

Intel 

Intel advocates the idea of "platform of choice" i.e., meeting the natural 
demand of the market and customers. Through its worldwide programs, Intel 
has brought together multiple players with an interest in OSS, including gov 
ernment agencies, institutions, and vendors, to collaborate on key projects as 
beacon/reference sites, nurture the native demand for cost-effective and high- 
performance localized solutions, and drive toward a broader customer base in 
a variety of industries with China s self-sustaining OSS ecosystem. 

Oracle 

Linux is one of the key business focuses at Oracle. It has worked with Red Flag 
as well as Asianux. 18 

SAP 

In addition to supporting Linux on the server side, SAP Labs China has worked 
with Red Flag since its establishment. 19 

Sun 

Sun, as the innovator of Java and OpenOffice.org, has entered into a licensing 
and co-development deal with CS2C for its Java Desktop System. By releasing its 
StarOffice codebase into OSS together with specific guidance on localization to 
support emerging markets in 2000, Sun essentially provisioned the desktop 
Linux market. Such movements have helped the local distributors to directly 
gain the technological strength and methodologies, and bridge the gap between 
Chinese companies and foreign ones. 

These efforts have helped contribute to the rapid development of OSS on computer 
systems in China, with more boxes sold with more services and hardware (mainly 
servers); and with more PCs for market segments such as education. But to China s 
software industry, their involvement escalates a healthy growth circle. 

Last but not least, the impact of government s strong push has a ripple effect 
throughout the whole economy, at different levels. 



16 http://www-900Abm.com/cn/servers/eserverninux/news/sumrnarize.shtml. 

17 http://www.enet.com.cn/enews/in/orcenter/A200502I8391054.htmi. 

18 http://www.!inux/ans.org/nuhe/modules.php?name=News&/i!e=print6 j sid=2160. 

19 http.7/www.sapchina.com/china/companypress/press.asp?pressID=2948. 



Momentum has built around the ecosystem of Linux/OSS. As previously stated, the 
Chinese government has taken the lead in adopting open source products in IT sys 
tems. This pattern continues and gradually carries over into hardware, business 
applications, and the IT services sectors. Some of the major Chinese hardware manu 
facturers, such as Lenovo, have preinstalled Linux in desktop PCs and ISVs, such as 
Kingsoft, have provided applications that can run on the Linux platform. 

Educational institutions also appear to be rapidly adopting Linux, as do financial ser 
vices and telecom companies. Communications and process manufacturing verticals 
will likely be the most aggressive adopters, with plans to deploy Linux in two to five 
years. As for SMEs, they have also shown signs of moving toward Linux, mainly due 
to consideration of total cost of ownership. Some mission-critical applications have 
been seen in these verticals. 

Another recent trend of OSS effort in China is that of standardization. First is Asianux, 
initiated by Red Flag and Japanese Linux vendor Miracle Linux, and created to stan 
dardize Linux distribution in Asia. Asianux involved validation of major ISV applica 
tions for compatibility. Recently, Korea also joined in the Asianux effort. 20 At the same 
time, a China-level Linux standardization effort was initiated in 2004 by China Elec 
tronics Standardization Institute (CESI). This standardization effort was later aligned 
with the Linux Standard Base (LSB) effort of the Free Standards Group (FSG). 21 

All these efforts and contributions have greatly strengthened the local OSS commu 
nity s development, as well as helped government to roll out its Linux/OSS initiatives. 

Opportunities 

Currently, many OSS efforts and activities are centered on the Linux OS and Linux 
applications. Much of the effort is based on driving compatibility with other alterna 
tive OS or proprietary software applications. Compatibilities come in various forms, 
ranging from file formats, GUIs, user experience, plug-in availability, and so on. 

Rampant piracy in the China market means that OSS software is expensive com 
pared to pirated incumbent software, which is effectively free and thus cheaper and 
better, as OSS is trying to catch up. To convince end users to switch to something 
inferior and more expensive can be a very difficult value proposition. 

While such attempts will continue from current players leveraging OSS to their advan 
tages and strong government support behind the scenes, we believe success can also 
come in a different form that of treating OSS as a form of disruptive technology and 
leveraging China s current strength to build successes in the software industry. 



20 http://www.cnii.com.cn/20040423/ca253202.htm. 

2 1 http://www.csip.en/new/so/t/2004/09J 6/1 01 0.htm. 



SWOT Analysis of OSS in China * C 207 



The disruption cannot be based on chasing after the incumbents in a well-established 
market. Only when OSS-based software offers unique end-user values unavailable from 
alternatives will end-user adoption follow. This conclusion follows from the theories 
laid out in The Innovator s Dilemma (Christensen). There are at least two implications: 

Impact in niche markets without strong incumbent players. Examples include 
the cell phone handset market and the set-top box market. Both are Chinese 
strengths. 

Impact in existing markets via delivering unique and new end-user values not 
currently served by incumbent software solutions. 

Let s look at these two sets of opportunities. 

The market for embedded software outside the conventional desktop or server 
opportunities 

China is the world s largest consumer of cell phones and an emerging force in cell phone 
handset design and manufacture. With the world transitioning to next-generation cellu 
lar and wireless technologies, there are tremendous opportunities for Chinese cell phone 
manufacturers to use OSS whether operating systems or applications software or soft 
ware tools to build a credible and sustainable cell phone handset business. 

Similarly, China is in the forefront of producing consumer electronics devices, rang 
ing from DVD players to next-generation digital TVs to set-top boxes. As the world of 
entertainment goes digital, such consumer electronics devices will demand more 
software, from operating systems to media codecs to GUI software to supporting new 
usages such as Personal Video Recording (PVR) capabilities. 

The availability of OSS software potentially allows these consumer electronics manufac 
turers to more easily create the entire software stack and to build the entire system with 
greater ease. The Chinese embedded market players, which are good at producing 
high-volume systems at competitive price points, may view OSS as the foundation on 
which to add innovative usages and to deliver new business models for this age of digi 
tal communication and entertainment. The creators and suppliers of such software 
stacks may be ISVs, rather than the system manufacturers themselves. 

Delivering innovations and unique end-user values on top of available OSS values not 
currently served by the presently available software. 

For example, the difficulty entering Chinese characters using alphanumeric key 
boards means opportunities to create value-added pen-based or other, better input 
methods for Chinese characters. This type of end-user value can be delivered on top 
of OSS and can help to offset some of the current shortcomings of the current OSS 
offerings. 



208 * C When China Dances with OSS 



Another example specific to China is the strong focus on education by Chinese fami 
lies and society at large. The opportunities here would be in the form of better learn 
ing software for schools and homes and easier-to-manage e-classrooms, the values of 
which would be delivered and built on top of already available OSS software stacks. 

The preceding two cases present the potential opportunities for OSS as a disruptive 
technology when combined with China s strengths and core competencies. 

Another opportunity that is also unique to China lies in the intersection of the grow 
ing Original Design Manufacturing (ODM) base in China and Chinese Taiwan, and 
the recently announced open source implementation of a next-generation BIOS tech 
nology code-named Tiano, 22 formally known as Intel Platform Innovation Frame 
work for Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI). 

The open sourced Foundation of Tiano, combined with the standardizations of the 
firmware interface via EFI, opened up opportunities for ODM and its partners to 
deliver more platform-level values to end users, in particular in areas of manageabil 
ity, security, serviceability, and administrative interface, which are otherwise more 
difficult to implement in the old BIOS environment. This also represents the first 
example of serious OSS effort in the firmware/BIOS layer in the software stack shown 
in Figure 13-1. 

Where OSS Is Going for China and Beyond 

Although the road ahead is full of challenges, the government and end users are 
helping to drive OSS adoption and enhancement in China to be a significant compo 
nent of the software industry. More importantly, China recognizes the value of help 
ing drive OSS to build a healthy and sustainable software industry. It is our belief 
that what is needed is to prove OSS can be used to create several successful busi 
nesses in China, and to do so soon. 

The SWOT analysis of OSS in China presented in this chapter pointed to various sce 
narios, mostly happening in parallel. First, strong government support will be a key 
force for continued experiments and deployment of OSS in government-related 
usages. There will be many attempts to replicate the success of OSS in server envi 
ronments and in client environments. The challenge of trying to replace clients 
served by strong incumbents with OSS alternatives will remain innovations to 
deliver unique end-user values are critical here. 

Software piracy will likely continue, but the effort to contain it will strengthen; we 
expect the results and impact to be felt over time. China s strong manufacturing 
base in computing, communication, and entertainment systems as the world 
becomes more digital further present unparalleled opportunities for China to lever 
age OSS as a strong base for innovations and to bring more value to end users. 



22 http://www.tianocore.org. 

Where OSS Is Going for China and Beyond * * 209 



With all this happening, the Linux/OSS talent pool will continue to grow, and 
many more developers will make attempts to leverage OSS to create meaningful 
business models. 

One thing is certain. We expect many changes in the Chinese OSS landscape in the 
years ahead. China s policy choices with respect to OSS will have a profound impact on 
how China educates its talent pools, how it grows its software industry, and how it 
competes in the global arena. A SWOT analysis at the turn of the next decade i.e., 
2010 will most certainly have a very different outcome. 



210 * C When China Dances with OSS 




if CHAPTER 14 

Bruno Souza 




How Much Freedom 
Do You Want? 



"Free as in freedom" has been used many times to express the objectives of Free and 
Open Source Software (FOSS). Although the Free Software Foundation (FSF) has 
created a very precise definition of what "free" is with respect to software, freedom 
itself is one of those difficult things to define and agree on, especially since freedom 
always assumes some form of compromise. "Your Freedom cannot be so broad as to 
negate someone else s Freedom" is a common saying. And when we talk about free 
dom in software, it is normal to have different views on what it is and how it is 
achieved. 

The notion of free software was born in the United States, from inside the software 
development community. Long before the birth of free software, collaboration among 
developers from different companies and universities was the norm. Once software 
started to be seen as a company asset, barriers were built to protect these assets, and 
it became increasingly harder for developers to collaborate on and share code. Better 
ways to facilitate and guarantee the necessary collaboration were needed. Free soft 
ware, and later open source software, allowed this to happen: across company 
boundaries, via the Internet,and between people that didn t even know each other. 

Most of the software in the world today is (or was) developed in the United States, 
but software development itself is a borderless activity. It happens everywhere. And 
although many have tried to apply software development in a repetitive "factory-like" 



211 



format, it fortunately is still largely a creative activity that favors the best and insight 
ful developers no matter where they are. 

The Internet has put these developers in touch, connecting people and cultures with 
out the same background as the FOSS movement s original history. Also, other ways 
of limiting freedom are affecting the ability of governments to reach their sovereignty 
and users and companies to decide their own technology future. Now, developers 
that believe in freedom in every country are trying to adapt and expand the ideas of 
the FOSS movement, to map to their needs and realities, and even to apply them in 
their legal systems. 

The diversity of collaboration that resulted from FOSS is one of the greatest achieve 
ments of developers in the last several years. Discussing how the ideas and philoso 
phy are being applied by diverse governments, companies, and cultures will 
strengthen freedom for everybody. 

Livre Versus Gratis 

It is interesting to look at the terms that were used for freedom free and open both 
highly overloaded. Many corporations and developers are still confused because "free 
software" is not necessarily without cost, and "open source software" is not necessar 
ily related to open standards or the simple ability to inspect the source code. 

Developers in Brazil had an easier time coming up with a term. Livre is the Portu 
guese word for free as in freedom, and gratis (from the Latin gratis) is the word for 
"no cost." No one doubts that "software livre" is a way to achieve freedom, not sav 
ings. Maybe because livre is so obviously a good thing, the idea of software freedom 
spread throughout the country, and successfully reached companies, developers, and 
especially government policy makers. On the other hand, Portuguese for open 
source codigo aberto is much harder to grasp, because it can have different conno 
tations. This is reflected in the fact that the vast majority of the Brazilian FOSS move 
ment uses the expressions software livre and free software, and much less frequently, 
open source, although most people do consider these interchangeable. 

But why discuss terms now? Wasn t this debated over and over when the term open 
source was coined back in 1998? Haven t we had enough time already to sort them 
out and be clear on what we mean? Maybe we have, but that discussion took place in 
the developer community, where the terms were defined. Now, we re not talking 
only to developers, we re discussing with governments. And companies. And judges, 
lawyers, and politicians.... But more important than that, we are now discussing more 
than free software, we are really discussing livre, liberdade, freedom. 



How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



Background for Freedom: The Market 

Like many countries, Brazil has a tradition of aiming for independence and sover 
eignty in strategic markets. This brought excellent results in many areas, from oil 
extraction (today Brazil produces almost 100% of the oil it consumes), pharmaceuti- 
cals, energy, and also technology. Software development is seen as very strategic; in 
fact, the country s domestic development market is larger than India s export mar 
ket. Unfavorable currency conversion means that software from outside companies, 
priced in dollars or euros, is usually much more expensive than similar solutions 
developed in-house or acquired from local companies. Also, because of a unique, 
complex tax system, much of the existing commercial software is not suitable to run 
in the country. Add this complexity to the low buying capacity of small and medium- 
size companies , and you see why Brazil is not favored by international companies as 
one of the targets for software customization or translation. For commercial soft 
ware, it is common to feature Portugal Portuguese translations over Brazilian Portu 
guese translations, even though Portugal has only about 5% of Brazil s population. 

The Brazilian government develops large, countrywide solutions, mostly tailored to 
the needs of the poor, large, and dispersed population. The sheer size of those sys 
tems is enough to make the government the single largest buyer of software and the 
focus and target of most software companies, especially infrastructure software ven 
dors. Moreover, extremely high inflation existed for many years, having been con 
trolled only in the last decade but not before it pushed the banking industry to 
invest heavily in technology, putting Brazilian banks among the most technologically 
advanced in the world. Because of specific legislation and finance standards, banks 
are also some of the largest investors in software development. 

For historical reasons, Microsoft and IBM hold strong positions in this market, both in 
government and in private companies. Oracle is by far the largest database vendor. Cus 
tom software developed to run on those companies platforms is a large legacy, which is 
used to justify most large expenditures in software; the result is an effective lock-in that 
is extremely hard to break. With the large amount of custom development, what mainly 
prevents vendor choice in Brazil are the government custom-developed, single-vendor 
solutions. Especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the country had rigid policies 
disallowing hardware imports, there was huge promotion of software product adoption, 
mainly in education. These included incentives either explicit or unofficially hinted 
at to use unlicensed copies, and donation of software to universities and schools at all 
levels. This created a large legacy of knowledge. Many use only Microsfot Windows and 
Office and don t consider any other options. The comparison of this strategy to that of 
drug dealers, who offer the first dose for free, was what recently made Microsoft sue a 
leading software livre activist. 



Background for Freedom: The Market * * 213 



Many older PCs still automate supermarkets, bank branches, and public offices and 
agencies. Many of those are doing their jobs perfectly running older versions of Win 
dows, but Microsoft is pushing for software upgrades and more licensing. The lack of 
options has forced many companies to spend their budget on licenses for new OS 
versions, and on new computers able to run the new OSes all just to be able to run 
the same preexisting applications. 

Developing the Software Livre Movement 

In this market, dominated by preexisting, international companies, the Brazilian- 
organized software livre movement started in the south of the country. Although 
there existed some prior activity, the initial work of Mario Teza and Ronaldo Lages 
joined users and system administrators interested in the GNU/Linux OS and started 
to organize the community. At that time, a discussion about the use of GNU/Linux 
was the main objective, but when this initial group was ready to launch its first 
event, it decided that it should be more than simply a GNU/Linux event and created 
the first FISL Forum Internacional software livre, the International Free Software 
Forum effectively launching the software livre discussion in the country. 

The moment was a turbulent one. On one side, the Internet shed a new light on the 
notion and importance of standards and the real possibility of avoiding lock-in. The 
desktop dominance of Microsoft was being heavily questioned first because of the 
indisputable reality of security problems with Microsoft products, but also because of 
the possibility of multiplatform development raised by new technologies and prod 
ucts such as Apache, HTTP, CGI, Java, and HTML. In the middle of this, decisions in 
the United States on Internet governance and security technologies made clear, not 
only to Brazil but also to the whole world, how much the IT industry was relying on 
U.S. -controlled technologies. Microsoft being declared a monopoly and accused of 
power abuse, raised questions about how much trust Brazil (or any other country) 
should put in a single company, especially for such a strategic market. 

Microsoft launched an astonishing campaign against software copying, or "piracy," 
that backfired by giving a clear demonstration of how important choice is. After 
many years of promoting the copying and usage of its software inside universities 
and companies, by sponsoring local "software protection" organizations, Microsoft 
initiated a fear campaign that included strong TV commercials comparing software 
copying with drug dealing and other major crimes. The company also encouraged 
police raids on large companies. The campaign was legal and was supported by Bra 
zilian antipiracy legislation, but it was an obvious intimidation move. The message 
was clear: stop doing what we told you was OK when you were in the university. 
Revenue from licensing increased overnight, but the initiative backfired in an unex 
pected way. Many of the initial migrations to open source solutions were done for 
fear of investigation. Companies and, especially, universities, lacking the budget to 



214 X How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



suddenly buy hundreds or thousands of very expensive licenses (remember the cur 
rency exchange rates), and risking fines up to 3,000 times the license cost for each 
unlicensed copy, switched to GNU/Linux and OpenOffice in a matter of days. 

These initial migrations were instantly successful. Part of the success stems from the 
Internet s inherent cross-platform nature. Furthermore, people were acutely aware of 
ongoing security problems with Microsoft products. Add the dependency that most 
companies and developers, and even the government, had on systems from these 
large corporations and the U.S. v. Microsoft lawsuit. All this came into play around 
the same time. The stage was set for the discussion of how dependency on propri 
etary software was affecting the Brazilian economy and, especially, its sovereignty. 

At about the same time, state governments were using free software products to offer 
Internet access to the population. A project called Telecentros, led by Sergio Ama- 
deu, the software activist recently sued by Microsoft and one of today s top software 
livre advocates in the country, proved that GNU/Linux, OpenOffice, Mozilla, and a 
full set of open source products could be easily mastered by the population, even by 
people who had no previous contact with computers. The reliability and security of 
these systems, the possibility of running on cheaper donated machines, full support 
for all users, and essential ease of use made the program a huge success. Three years 
later, the balance showed that what was spent implementing software livre in the 
Telecentros would have paid for only half as many systems if Microsoft products had 
been used. Although the cost savings were significant, the fact that users, the govern 
ment, companies, and the country could now see a real choice instead of being 
locked in was the main achievement of the initiative. 

Freedom is something that every politician understands, so many bought the idea 
early on. Walter Pinheiro and Simao Pedro were pioneers on the wave that swept 
almost all political parties and a large number of politicians. Software livre reached 
the legislation houses, first at state level and then at the federal level. Now the discus 
sion has reached the courts, where the laws and decisions taken in favor of software 
livre are being questioned by those who oppose it; even open source licenses are 
being questioned. 

In just a few years, this important discussion has basically surpassed the IT industry, 
reaching all levels of society. 

We have gone from the simple use of FOSS operating systems to freedom in general, 
to patents and intellectual property, Internet governance, international standards, 
and relationships. By going further than the simple four liberties of free software, the 
discussion reached the music and cultural sectors, promoting the sharing of knowl 
edgeall knowledge and today, even the Minister of Culture, the famous singer 
Gilberto Gil supports the software livre movement. Not just for free software, but for 
freedom of choice and of knowledge sharing. 



Developing the Software Livre Movement X 215 



Not About Price, but About Choice 

Many people see the movement to FOSS as an ideological movement. It probably is. 
Every time freedom has been battled for, there has always been some ideology 
involved. Different people have always tried to get as much freedom as possible for 
their partisans, usually ignoring others views of freedom. Eventually, we get to a 
middle ground, where freedom wins not necessarily the myopic view held by the 
partisans on each side, but a more compromised freedom that can be held longer. 

The main discussion is not about economics, but about choice. For too long there 
was no choice but to keep using the software provided by Microsoft. The Internet 
opened the possibility of another option, one that proved to be cheaper and more 
reliable, and one that guaranteed more flexibility and customization. 

So, why not simply move to this new option? If software livre is all that it is claimed 
to be, why even in a government where so much uproar has been generated are there 
still purchases of new hardware, new licenses, and new versions of the old lock-in 
option? There are many reasons. A huge lobby has been set in motion to slow any 
adoption of FOSS. Microsoft is not the only one supporting this lobby, but is surely 
very active in it. 

Microsoft started by giving licenses away or making them a lot cheaper to govern 
ments and schools. This is understandable. It reasoned that the issue driving the 
growing popularity of software livre was economics, so it tried to be even cheaper 
(by avoiding training and migration costs). Then there was some more intimidation. 
It is reported that companies which were promoting their plans to migrate to GNU/ 
Linux and OpenOffice in magazines or events would receive visits or letters from 
antipiracy organizations and, eventually, a friendly visit from the police. Some com 
panies do not allow employees and consultants to talk about what they are doing 
with FOSS, for fear of this antipiracy raid. There are reports from some inspected 
companies that officers concentrate only on Windows machines, ignoring GNU/ 
Linux, Macs, Solaris, and so on. Either these systems and their companies are not 
entitled to receive protection, or maybe it is just that somebody else is asking for the 
inspection.... 

Microsoft surely did a lot of talking. Many Microsoft employees have been vocal 
about software livre, many times through half-true statements and fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt tactics. Microsoft s country manager for Brazil, Emilio Umeoka, even went 
so far as to directly criticize Brazil s president, saying that by supporting software 
livre he was taking the country in the wrong direction an arrogant comment com 
ing from the head representative of a company that was considered guilty in the U.S., 
Europe, and recently Brazil, of hurting competition and governments through its 
commercial practices. Recently, even Microsoft s Bill Gates. The intimidations may 
have gone too far. At the time the software livre movement in Brazil was promoting 



216 X How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



the fifth edition of one of the world s largest international FOSS advocate gatherings, 
the FISL, Microsoft decided to sue the highest authority of the Brazilian govern 
ment s software livre initiative, the president of the National Institute of Technology 
(NITI) and one of the originators of the celebrated "Telecentros" project, Sergio Ama- 
deu. An important representative of the software livre principles, Sergio has a deep 
understanding of the issues and knows that software livre is all about freedom. He 
has been promoting a carefully considered and reasonable strategy that aims to give 
to the Brazilian government the choice it needs to decide about the country s tech 
nology future. By personally suing Sergio Amadeu (or as Microsoft puts it, request 
ing explanations in court) for what he has said, Microsoft generated an uproar from 
people all over the world. Because of the weak basis of the suit, Sergio simply stood 
by what he said and ignored Microsoft s requests for an explanation in court or oth 
erwise. Sergio said he will not be intimidated, because he s sure that he s doing the 
right thing for the freedom Brazil needs and deserves. Microsoft s actions show that it 
doesn t understand what is going on in Brazil. The country is reaching for an option. 
And the price of choice is not measured in the number of licenses you get for free. 
Software livre is a way to achieve choice. 

The huge lobby against software livre does not come only from international ven 
dors. Many software companies in Brazil don t understand how they will compete in 
the software livre market. They don t understand the business model and don t see 
the benefits of Yonchai Bentler s "commons-based peer production" model. It is not 
clear how they will compete nationally and internationally by developing free soft 
ware. In fact, not only traditional software companies are at a loss: many in the soft 
ware livre movement still see any ties with business as "evil" or at least as undesir 
able. Even those that understand that the only way for software livre to survive is to 
have a strong and viable software ecosystem around freedom are still struggling in 
how to create this ecosystem. This has to be addressed by the software livre move 
ment, and it is refreshing to see that some of the most influential software livre entre 
preneurs are already joining forces to expand their ability to compete and participate 
in this market. 

Besides the strong lobby, there are other, more important reasons why a faster move 
to software livre solutions is hard, even when there s a will. 

Choice Requires More Than Free Software 

One of the main lock-in problems governments and companies have is the legacy 
custom software already in place. Although it is reasonably easy to move your Win 
dows users to GNU/Linux and OpenOffice and your web site from IIS to Apache 
Web Server, it is a lot harder to move your internal applications from one platform to 
the other. And without applications, there s no user adoption, of course. 



Choice Requires More Than Free Software X 217 



Every internal or custom system that is developed is tied to a specific infrastructure 
software product be it an operating system, a database, a messaging or security sys 
tem, a file format, or a runtime library, you re locked in. Unless you have this solu 
tion available in the system to which you are trying to move, you ll have a hard time 
porting or rewriting your software. 

As Microsoft, IBM, and Oracle are the dominant players in Brazil, most applications 
that are developed are tied into their infrastructure products. Microsoft is the most 
obvious target of the software livre movement, since it is the king of the desktop and 
it powers many departmental servers where licensing issues are more visible. And 
Microsoft is the one that s pressuring for more licensing and more upgrades. It is 
really the main bully in the playground. But IBM mainframes, with thousands of leg 
acy applications and huge Oracle databases, among all kinds of other systems, fall 
under the same reasoning that says choice is better. Being free to move away from 
those systems requires that applications are ported, and this takes time. 

And once the decision to port the applications has been made, where do you port 
them? Is it to another specific (although software livre) OS? Does choosing any soft 
ware livre solution promise freedom? Does limiting the decision to any solution that 
has a specific FOSS license simplify the question? Should we move to one of the 
great FOSS-licensed solutions (database, framework) that in fact has just a single 
company and no community behind it? Maybe we should put up some criteria, 
based on community side and adoption, that will help in choosing a high-quality 
FOSS product to tie our application to? 

The fact is that once you choose any one product to port your system to, you re cre 
ating ties to it. If this is a software livre product, that can be a big help, but it is not 
enough to guarantee your freedom, your choice. 

Governments and companies do not get locked into a vendor or a platform simply 
because they use closed software, but rather, because they develop their own applica 
tions tied to a specific product, be it a free product or a proprietary product. Once all 
applications are written to a product, and all data is saved into a product-specific for 
mat, to move to another offering (free or proprietary) is a big effort. And the longer the 
ties to that product endure, the more difficult it is to move. Vendors drive their custom 
ers to stay as much as they can. Although software livre makes you less dependent on a 
specific vendor (because you can make your own changes), it does not necessarily keep 
you from getting locked into a product.... 

That s why the best option is to guarantee that developed software be effectively free 
of product lock-in: custom applications are based on open standards, and all data is 
saved into open formats. That s why many of the most valuable software livre 
projects are not simply products. They are open source implementations of open, 



218 X How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



royalty-free standards. The powerful combination of FOSS implementations based on 
open standards is what gives us the choice we need. 

The use of open standards that can be implemented as open source is a strong way of 
promoting software livre. Once applications are free from specific products and stan 
dards, it is possible to replace closed products for the FOSS implementations that 
have a real chance to compete and show their technical advantages. Defending soft 
ware livre on technical merits is a much stronger argument to governments and com 
panies. Keeping custom applications ready to benefit from FOSS implementations of 
open standards favors software livre even in the (quite common) case where the 
FOSS implementation is still in development. 

How Java Technology Can Help 

That s where Java technology enters the story. Yes, I know many of you complain 
that Java is not FOSS, and so how can it even be cited after so many arguments in 
favor of software livre? 

Well, Java is as much software livre as HTTP is. Or as PDF is. Or, for that matter, as 
C is! That is, none of these technologies is software livre. They are standards. Some 
are more open or compatible than others, but all of them are books, pieces of paper, 
and web pages. Standards are not software livre. The fact that you have the GNOME 
PDF Viewer licensed as GPL does not make PDF software livre. It does not even 
make PDF an open standard (it is a royalty-free standard, but it is not open since it s 
controlled by, and only by, Adobe). Having GCC as a C compiler does not make C 
software livre. It means only that it contains software livre implementation of the 
ANSI C standard. In addition, just because they are standards, even standards hav 
ing software livre implementations, does not mean they can be modified at will. 
Apache HTTP Server is the software livre implementation of the W3C HTTP stan 
dard, meaning that although Apache HTTP Server code is legally modifiable, you 
cannot modify it at will and still say it is compatible with the W3C-HTTP standard. 

Then there s Java. As a standard, defined and controlled by the Java Community Pro 
cess (the JCP), the Java standard can now also be implemented royalty free as soft 
ware livre (under any FOSS license). Actually, Java is a set of standards. You have 
things like the Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE), the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and 
the Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) several class libraries defined as separated stan 
dards. Even the class file format and the Java language are standards. 

Until recently, the JCP rules did not really allow for a software livre implementation 
(although many initiatives were being developed). However, this has changed, 
thanks to the initial work of Jason Hunter on behalf of the Apache Software Founda 
tion and supported by Sun and other JCP members. Since the release in 2002 of the 
JCP 2.5 rules, there have been no barriers for compatible software livre implementa- 



How Java Technology Can Help *C 219 



tions of the many Java specifications. Because of the large number of Java specifica 
tions, "Java needs to be open source" and "Java is not free software" are usually 
meaningless statements, especially because of the fact that since JCP 2.5, many of 
these specs already have a FOSS implementation. 

One of the important things that the JCP rules mandate is that every contribution 
made to a standard has to be licensed royalty free to anyone implementing the stan 
dard. This guarantees that the FOSS community will be able to implement all of Java. 
Many standards bodies (ISO and ECMA, for instance) do not mandate this, simply 
requiring the infamous Reasonable and Non Discriminatory (RAND) clause that is 
not necessarily reasonable for the FOSS community, and as such discriminates 
against it. Standards generated by those standards bodies can be, and usually are, 
encumbered by patents and RAND agreements, making them, for all practical pur 
poses, impossible to implement legally by the FOSS community. 

However, because of Java s very broad objectives, the Java standards are hard to 
implement. Different from other standards, Java tries to reach the binary compatibil 
ity promise: the ability to run your Java binary unmodified on any platform with a 
Java runtime. For this even to work, a compatibility test was created to guarantee 
that a Java implementation meets the standard s requirements. Technology Compati 
bility Kits (TCKs) are provided, requiring implementations to pass these tests to 
claim compatibility. Compatibility requirements and the sheer number of libraries 
and standards involved, coupled with Sun s quite restrictive licensing in its own pro 
prietary implementations have delayed software livre implementations of Java. 

This does not mean that initiatives don t exist or that we cannot have a software 
livre implementation. It is important to say that many Java standards already have 
a software livre implementation: servlets, JSP, JSF, EJB, J2EE, JMS, and JDBC are 
among the most important examples. What is missing is the very important under 
lying runtime: the complete JVM and the set of J2SE libraries. Many projects do 
exist to fill this gap and are under development right now. Several are quite capa 
ble of running much of the Java code out there, including some very complex 
applications. These implementations are far from perfect, but we re getting there. 

Java Provides the Other Side of the Choice 

But what does all this have to do with freedom and choice? We saw that software 
livre did wonders to provide freedom for developers and to allow developer collabo 
ration across the Internet, pushing the whole practice of software development to a 
new level. Freedom was well served and well used. 

It is understandable that developers need their freedom to expand, explore, and liter 
ally change the world. Now we re discussing freedom with not only developers, but 
also companies, users, and the government. We saw how these deployers are look- 



ing for freedom of choice. They want to be able to choose. They want actually they 
need options: the ability to choose different vendors, different implementations, 
different software houses, different licensing... in short, to not be locked in. 

Going back to the many visions of freedom, the standards community sees freedom 
as the possibility to choose freely from multiple vendors, since usage of standards 
prevented lock-in. Standards are the way society normally defines its rules we see 
this in very different markets, from water distribution to electricity, from TV to tele 
communications and this was applied to the software world. There were no explicit 
discussions about how developers would collaborate on code; on the contrary, stan 
dards usually hide the underlining implementation. And the focus was not on devel 
oper freedom: standards are actually restrictions on what a few developers can do, so 
a larger group of deployers and users can benefit from choice and option. 

The free software movement was looking for freedom for the developer to collabo 
rate and create, but more than this, freedom as an ultimate goal a social good. 
Quoting the FSF, "for the Free Software movement, non-free software is a social 
problem and free software is the solution." The GPL puts all the responsibility in 
the hands of the developer, who has all the freedom, and only one very strict and 
strong restriction: the copyleft. Once-released code cannot ever be restricted, mak 
ing it difficult (although not impossible) for developers to derive commercial bene 
fit directly from the code they write. This is a strong compromise that free soft 
ware developers accept for the benefit of all developers. 

Then the Java community comes along, looking for another type of freedom, one that 
would free the developer to run his application on any platform. Actually, the main 
goal of Java was to free the user to run an application on whatever platform he chose, 
no matter what the platform the original developer was targeting. That was another 
type of freedom altogether, and it had to be based on standards to allow for multiple 
vendors. This view puts a restriction on a very narrow group of developers, the ones 
that deal with the creation of the runtime. They have to obey strict rules, for the ben 
efit of the vast majority of developers, deployers, and users, from all platforms, who 
are then free to choose what they want to use and run. 

At last the open source movement was formed, and promoted the discussion that 
although free software was good, having companies investing in and commercially 
benefiting from free software would be even better, proposed a similar but different 
view. Seeing freedom in a more practical way, which promotes developer collabora 
tion, but they are willing to accept that not all software must be free, not considering 
proprietary software a social issue. Open source is referred to as a software develop 
ment methodology, having dropped the political manifesto, and making the notion 
more usable and acceptable for the commercial market. The open source movement 
compromises the ideology and accepts that developers will benefit commercially 
from code they did not write, to achieve the benefit of allowing more companies and 



Java Provides the Other Side of the Choice J J 221 



probably more resources to be applied to the evolution of software. This vision tries 
to achieve the much-needed critical mass that made FOSS the success it is today. 

Are these freedoms incompatible? They can complement each other in very powerful 
ways, but freedom is always a compromise. We usually impose restrictions on a few 
to the benefit of a larger group. 

Unfortunately, some people like to see things narrowly, creating unsolvable conflicts 
among these different freedom-promoting movements. As a Java developer, many times 
I have been excluded, ignored, and generally considered an "outsider" of the FOSS 
community. Many other Java developers feel the same way. All you need to do is men 
tion Java in a FOSS discussion forum, and you ll be flamed. You see a lot of Java bash 
ing at FOSS events. At a recent event, one of the main speakers claimed there are no 
good open source Java developers. How would developers from the Apache Jakarta 
project who have implemented so many great FOSS projects, and so many FOSS 
implementations of the Java standards feel about this? What about the developers 
who put a lot of effort on the Kaffe VM, the GNU Java Compiler, and the GNU Class- 
path? These are all great FOSS software projects highly respected implementations of 
the Java standards, done by top-level, committed Java developers. 

Even FSF founder Richard Stallman has not proposed prohibiting the use of Java. In 
his essay, "Free But Shackled The Java Trap," which seems to be misunderstood by 
many in the FOSS movement, Stallman actually recommends that developers use the 
already available free Java implementations and, more important, that they help 
improve them. "We do have free implementations of Java, such as the GNU Java 
Compiler and GNU Classpath, but they don t support all the features yet. [...] Fortu 
nately, [the Java] specification license does permit releasing an implementation as 
free software!...] To keep your Java code safe [...], install a free Java development envi 
ronment and use it," says Stallman. 

Stallman is not only very clear on the importance of the free Java implementations, but 
he also gives us an important argument. He says, "In the early days of the Free Soft 
ware Movement, it was impossible to avoid depending on non-free programs. [...] It was 
inevitable that our first programs would initially be hampered by these dependencies, 
but we accepted this because our plan included rescuing them subsequently." This was 
a reasonable compromise to make to reach a much more worthy goal. But Stallman 
continues: "The situation is different today. We now have powerful free operating sys 
tems and many free programming tools. Whatever job you want to do, you can do it 
on a free platform; there is no need to accept a non-free dependency even temporarily." 
Although Stallman uses this rhetoric to say that you should stick to the free Java imple 
mentations, the effect really depends on who he means by "you." 

One of the powerful freedoms that Java brings is platform independence. As we have 
already seen, the main roadblock for companies and governments in Brazil to choose 



222 * C How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



and migrate to the "powerful free operating systems" is the lock-in of existing legacy 
applications. This is a hard problem to crack, since we cannot move the systems until 
all needed code is ported. So, until we re able to expend enough effort to migrate all the 
existing applications, we have to keep adding to today s Windows system. Since a 
simultaneous migration is improbable, we then have to coexist both systems for awhile. 

Here is where Java comes to the rescue. Applications can be developed to run on 
today s Windows systems, coexisting with any new software livre system that is intro 
duced, thus making the eventual complete migration a lot easier. Certainly there are 
other technologies that allow you to develop cross-platform applications, but Java is 
one of the best options, not only technically but also in terms of available tools, 
information, and market penetration. Anecdotal evidence from the open source com 
munity on the number of non-Java applications that were developed on GNU/Linux 
but can run on Windows shows that platform independence is not that easily 
achieved. It is possible, but the large number of Windows-developed Java applica 
tions that can run on GNU/Linux is a clear statement that Java makes cross-platform 
deployment a much easier task. 

There are many corporate and government developers who need to deal with a 
migration strategy, who need to start moving from Windows to GNU/Linux, or 
maybe to an open source Solaris. Many more are not planning to migrate now, but 
would like to have a number of choices in the future. So, if the "you" Stallman was 
referring to are those developers, they will be better off by accepting a nonfree 
dependency temporarily, to get the freedom of platform now provided by Java, and 
be able to move to a "powerful free operating system" when desired or needed. Mov 
ing Java software to the free operating systems should be easier, and promoting mul- 
tiplatform development and standards for governments and companies is a powerful 
strategy to guarantee choice. Minimizing dependencies on software that cannot be 
implemented by the FOSS community is a clear road map to allow the migration. 

In the meantime, we, the FOSS community, should stop pretending Java does not exist, 
and that freedom of platform is not important to users, and make the effort to accept, 
use, and finish the free Java implementation and tools, as Richard Stallman suggests. 

The existing free Java standards implementations may lack functionality if compared to 
the full proprietary ones, but the huge amount of functionality provided is at least com 
parable, and in many cases is much better than that offered by other major open source 
implemented languages. There s no reason why lots of great software could not be 
developed and used on those free Java implementations, but as long as the FOSS lead 
ers insist on downplaying the importance of Java, this important free software will be 
ignored both by the FOSS community and by the Java community at large. 

When the FSF talks about usage of the term free software, it mentions that "to stop 
using the word free now would be a mistake; we need more, not less, talk about free 
dom." This is an interesting point. Although the FSF has its strong and idealistic view 

Java Provides the Other Side of the Choice X 223 



on what is software freedom, it is clear that its views of freedom are not the only 
important views, and that the freedoms we re talking about are not mutually exclu 
sive. They may be different, and not everybody may want all of them, but they can be 
explored together. Platform independence is an important, easy-to-grasp freedom, 
that can go hand in hand with the notion of free software. The fact that we still don t 
have a compatible FOSS Java implementation should not be a reason to stop promot 
ing the notion of freedom of platform. 

Walking the Path 

With such restrictions from the FOSS community, openly discussing Java and soft 
ware livre seems to be easier said than done. However, we have a series of successful 
examples in Brazil that are helping put some light on the possibilities that Java and 
software livre can bring to developers and deployers. 

We saw how Brazil has chosen the freedom path and some of the strong reasoning 
behind that. One of the pillars of that choice is, without a doubt, software livre: it has 
pushed the idea of technology independence to other levels, and has prompted the 
whole country to discuss freedom in other related areas, like the Internet, music, and 
information sharing. It has also captured all the attention, and many what are now 
discussed as a "software livre" initiative, although more related to freedom in general. 

Because of this discussion of choice and freedom alongside software livre, other initi 
atives are strongly pursued. Standards, for example, receive special attention from 
the many government agencies. Serpro, the largest Brazilian federal IT agency, an 
organization with thousands of developers working in governmental software, has 
declared that one of its main responsibilities is to create, defend, and apply national 
standards. Standards are defined and then used to guarantee vendor independence, 
and then to allow the inclusion of FOSS solutions if they exist and are stable as a 
preferred choice for acquisition. 

But even before software livre was ever discussed in Brazil, multiplatform applica 
tions became increasingly important in the quest for vendor independence. Microsoft 
lock-in was the main catalyst, because lock-in to any vendor is one of the main wor 
ries inside companies and the government. Add to that the almost mandatory 
requirement that every government s software must support GNU/Linux while still 
supporting the huge legacy of Windows systems, usually developed by Windows 
developers that had literally a few hours to start generating multiplatform code while 
still using their Windows machines.... 

Because of all this, from the start Java played an important role in guaranteeing free 
dom for both the Brazilian government and Brazilian companies. As early as 1996 
long before software livre was actually considered a real option anywhere in the 
world software companies and the many government development agencies saw in 



Java the opportunity to gain freedom from Microsoft lock-in. This was an important 
step: for the first time, Brazilian developers were even considering another platform 
for software development. The search for independence platform independence in 
this case drove widespread adoption of the technology inside the government. The 
government-owned Banco do Brasil (Latin America s largest bank), adopted Java in 
1997, training more than 800 developers in their first Java training program. This is 
an early example of the search for freedom that happened before the OSI (and thus 
the open source definition) even existed, and long before any significant discussion 
of free software in the country. 

Although many try to exclude Java developers from the FOSS movement, in Brazil it 
is sometimes hard to separate these two communities. Much of the development in 
the country is being done in Java today, including a large percentage of the FOSS 
development. Projects like JForum, JBanana, Prevayler, Bossa, eGen, Javali, Genesis, 
and Hotwork are just some examples of Java-based Brazilian FOSS projects that are 
in use throughout the country. 

The early software livre movement was clearly driven by system administrators, secu 
rity experts, web designers, social scientists, and politicians. They did one of the 
world s most effective pushes for the adoption of software livre and, if it had been 
only that, it would already be an impressive and fundamental contribution. How 
ever, they did more, and the software livre movement went far beyond the simple 
adoption push. They moved the software livre discussion into the country s hearth 
and involved politicians, lawyers, judges, social scientists, financing institutions, 
entrepreneurs, large- and small-business owners, and the government at large in 
short, creating a viable ecosystem for software livre to flourish. Unfortunately, when 
it got time to discuss software development, they fell short. The push to use software 
livre was so strong that more concern was put into migration and digital inclusion 
strategies. Although there were very good FOSS developers and important projects, 
software development issues were given little attention initially. This is where the 
Brazilian Java community has been focusing its contribution, bringing software 
development back into the discussion. 

Java is one of the most-used languages in the country and is the only one that is mul- 
tiplatform and has strong support in both Windows and in GNU/Linux. So, it is 
understandable that most of the development discussion in FOSS happens around 
Java. There are many examples. Of the recent open source applications that have 
received financing from the Brazilian government, almost all are developed in Java, 
many running on top of free Java application servers like Tomcat and JBoss. At FOSS 
events in Brazil, it s easy to notice that most of the presentation proposals submitted 
that deal with development are Java related. Surprisingly, there s a lot less support 
and interest for important FOSS languages such as Perl, PHP, and Python. 



Walking the Path JJ 225 



Through the history of the software livre movement in Brazil, Java has played an 
important part, although at times it has been ignored and downplayed by many. 
Here are some other examples: 

Direto 

Developed as a replacement of Lotus Notes and Exchange, Direto is a web-based 
email and collaboration tool that handles calendar, address book, and other 
functionality. Developed by Procergs, the IT agency of Rio Grande do Sul 
(where FISL is held), Direto runs on GNU/Linux and Tomcat, with lots of other 
FOSS solutions. The development was mainly done in Java, and at the time it 
was released, it was the first initiative from a government agency to release a free 
software product. Because of the work done by one of the most respected free 
software developers in the country, Ricardo "Gandhy" de Mello (a Java devel 
oper), Direto was at some point able to run, with some limitations, on a free Java 
runtime. Today it probably would run on today s much better free runtimes if 
anyone cared to try. Direto is a strong example of how we can get one freedom, 
and then the next. 

IRPFJava, the multiplatform income tax report application 

For many years, to submit your yearly income tax report (IRPF) electronically, 
receive all the benefits of faster tax returns, and easily handle the complex forms, 
a Windows machine was needed. As a result, the government received many 
complaints from Mac and GNU/Linux users who had to resort to friends or 
accountants. This was an example of a government application that forced citi 
zens to use a proprietary product. Receita Federal, the agency responsible for 
IRPF, rewrote the application to support multiple platforms, specifically GNU/ 
Linux. IRPFJava became the first federal application targeted for large public 
consumption that was focused on supporting GNU/Linux. As expected, the 
developers were still using Windows and had no knowledge of GNU/Linux or 
the Mac: they relied on Java to support those and the many other OSes that were 
used to submit the reports. As another good example that shows the possibility 
of freedom in steps, efforts are now underway to use the free Java runtime to run 
the application. 

Banco do Brasil, Caixa Economica Federal, Dataprev, Datasus, Procergs, and Serpro, to 

name but a few 

These are public companies and agencies, and are among the largest developers 
of software inside the Brazilian government. All use Java heavily to guarantee 
vendor independence, and many were doing that long before the software livre 
movement took place in the country. Most have chosen to use Java-based FOSS 
tools and products because it made commercial and technological sense, and 
these projects are promoted today as success cases of software livre adoption. To 
show their support for software livre, many of these agencies refer to their use of 



226 ^ C How Much Freedom Do You Want? 



Java-based products such as Tomcat, JBoss, and Eclipse. In some of these places, 
Java-based tools are the only free software development tools being used. This is 
a clear sign of the importance of Java in software livre initiatives. 

That is not to say that everything related to development that happens in the Brazil 
ian software livre movement is necessarily related to Java. Far from it. The fact is that 
Java was there from the start, guaranteeing freedom inside the government, even 
before the software livre discussion turned mainstream. This should not be ignored 
or downplayed. And while most of the world is creating a chasm between Java and 
software livre, in Brazil Java is effectively being used as a lever to push software livre 
to higher grounds. 

What to Do? 

It is clear that Java and software livre work together. By combining these different 
approaches to freedom, we can have more freedom, not less. But many still feel that 
Java is not open source and try to leave Java out of this fundamental discussion, to 
the detriment of all. 

There are many examples of initiatives to exclude Java as a development tool for 
FOSS projects, and even to exclude FOSS Java applications from FOSS events. I 
wonder how we can have a FOSS implementation of any standard if there s this kind 
of prejudice against standards that were not implemented as FOSS yet. Contrast this 
with the amount of effort put into providing drivers and even reverse engineering of 
proprietary patented software or protocols to establish links and integrate GNU/ 
Linux and Windows, for instance. For the FOSS community, the effort to create a 
JVM provides a great integration strategy. The more code you write in Java today, the 
more you are able to run your applications in both Windows and GNU/Linux sys 
tems. Consider also the possibility of running your application on the recently 
announced open source Solaris OS, and you have more choice and more freedom. 
It s interesting, though, that for the most part, to run a GNU/Linux system you usu 
ally have a binary, but closed, standard underneath it: the Intel processor. Java is also 
a binary standard, although it normally sits on top of the OS. It is amazing that the 
FOSS community can t seem to see how allowing one and excluding the other is like 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. 

The fact that many applications lots of them under FOSS licenses are written in 
Java means that more effort should be spent on having a 100% FOSS Java runtime 
available. Many people are working to enable this, but the general prejudice is still 
strong in the FOSS community, making it strong in the other direction from the Java 
community. These prejudices need to stop, and leaders from both camps need to come 
at terms and realize there s much to be gained from the joint pursue of freedom. 



What to Do? X 227 



We Are Getting There 

At a unique and historic meeting at the end of 2004, these two communities started 
to come together. Sponsored by Red Hat, the Free Runtime Summit joined compa 
nies and developers working toward a FOSS implementation of the J2SE standards, 
the last ones in the stack to have a complete open source implementation of Java. 
The meeting joined the leaders from the most important free Java projects the GNU 
Classpath, the GNU Java Compiler, and the Kaffe VM along with the JCP, the FSF, 
the OSI, the Apache Software Foundation, and the Soujava Java Users Group, and 
also representatives of several companies. The results of this important gathering are 
still to be seen, but it was discussed and agreed to move forward with the efforts of 
an implementation of the Java standards that have a FOSS license and that pass the 
compatibility tests. The meeting was a major step forward. For the first time, there s 
general agreement on the importance and viability of this implementation. This open 
collaboration and resolution of prejudices will prove very beneficial to both the Java 
and the FOSS communities. 

The path Brazil has taken going after freedom in its larger meaning, trying to bring 
together standards, multiplatform and software livre, to guarantee freedom of choice 
to developers, companies, and the government is showing its viability day by day. 
The possibilities are promising, and we re working hard to create the freedom we 
need to innovate, to generate technology, and to strengthen our sovereignty. The 
Freedom to choose our technological future and to collaborate with the world will be 
our reward for the effort. That s the freedom we want, and we ll fight for that. 

References 

http://www.gnu.org. 

http://www.gnu. org/philosophy . 

"Why Free Software is better than Open Source "; http://www.gnu.org/phtlosophv/ 
free-software-for-freedom. html. 

http://www.osi.org. 

http://www.jcp.org. 

Richard Stallman, "Free But Shackled The Java Trap"; http://www.gnu.org/ 
philosophy /Java-trap, html. 



228 * C How Much Freedom Do You Want? 







SECTION 2 



Beyond Open Source 
Collaboration and 
Community 



Section 2 moves beyond what we traditionally think of as open source and tackles the larger ques 
tions of the collaborative pattern, of which open source is but an instance. 

We learn in essays by O Reilly and Searls not just how open source is changing the surrounding 
technology landscape, but how the dynamics of that changing landscape are putting open source 
in a whole new context. Open source must adapt and evolve to continue to be relevant. 

Of greater significance than the changes within the technology sector are the other endeavors that 
have learned from open source. Any creative enterprise that would benefit from increased collabo 
ration can benefit from the lessons of open source. In essays by Jones, Hessel, and Sanger, we 
learn about some specific areas where open source principles are actively being applied. 

Finally, we conclude with several essays that grapple with the big question of what is the form and 
practice of a collaborative community generally. Some of these essays approach the question 
using examples of specific communities (Kim; Bates and Stone). Others look not just at specific 
communities, but at emergent patterns of cooperation (Shah; Weber). These emerging patterns, 
more than any specific technological innovation that open source might yield, are fundamentally 
changing the world around us. 





b CHAPTER 15 

Doc Searls 




Making a New World 



Open Sources was published in January 1999. That same month 1 became a full-time 
editor for Linux Journal, assigned to cover Linux in business. Over the next seven 
months, I also co-wrote (with Chris Locke, David Weinberger, and Rick Levine) The 
Cluetrain Manifesto, a rant that first took the form of a web site and later took the 
form of a book. Its subtitle was "The End of Business as Usual." 

Cluetrain, like much of what I wrote for Linux Journal at the time, argued against 
bubble-headed marketing at a time when bubble-headed investing in "Linux com 
panies" was growing to galactic dimensions. In August 1999, Red Hat had the larg 
est IPO run-up in stock market history. In December 1999, VA Linux (now VA 
Software) set a new record, which remains unbroken. In January 2000, Cluetrain 
hit the bookstores and became a business bestseller. The bubble began to pop on 
January 17, and within a few months nearly everybody in a "Linux business" 
(including Linux Journal) suffered consequences ranging from dire to fatal. All busi 
nesses, including Linux ones, still feel the after-effects. 

Yet the bubble was a red herring. It was off-topic in the extreme, because Linux was qui 
etly being put to use in businesses everywhere, along with a growing suite of other open 
source infrastructural building materials. Linux was never about the stock market, or 
even about business. It was about something else something that caused usage (espe 
cially in business) to grow regardless of whatever happened among commercial suppliers. 

Today the spotlight is on a new set of Linux business leaders: IBM, HP, Novell, Ora 
cle, Red Hat, and other large companies. We know they are leaders because they buy 



big booth space at LinuxWorld, pay employees to work on Linux code, make good 
products, sell to the growing market demand for Linux and open source goods, do 
good PR, and get lots of coverage in the press. 

No offense, but they re red herrings too. They matter a lot, but they re not what Linux is 
about. They re not what open source is about, either, because Linux and open source are 
demand-side developments. They are all what the demand side does to supply itself. 

Just like the environment where open source took root and grew: the Net. 

If designing and building the Internet had been left up to the usual suspects, it never 
would have happened. Networking would still be a private affair, a grace of large 
vendors, each operating their own separate and barely interoperable networks. For 
an example of what that would be like, consider instant messaging. IM is a network 
service that never found its way into the Internet suite (unlike, say, hypertext, file 
transfer, email, and domain names). The situation for IM is not much different today 
than it was back in the 1980s, when "online services" like CompuServe, AOL, and 
Prodigy each had their own incompatible email systems. Today Yahoo!, Microsoft, 
AOL, and Apple all remain committed to closed proprietary IM systems that run on 
the Net, but are not of the Net, meaning they contribute nothing to the Internet s 
open, free, shared, and ubiquitous infrastructure. They are "platforms" supporting 
closed silos that trap and hold dependent inhabitants. 

The platform and silo system is as old as computing. It s still with us, and won t go away 
quickly, if ever. But as a defining model for the software business, it is being replaced by 
a growing assortment of open standards and open source tools and building materials 
that together support far more business than they replace. Linux and its familiar LAMP 
suite (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP, Perl, Python, PostgreSQL, etc.) are the most obvi 
ous ones. SourceForge lists another 90,000, with dozens more added every day. 

Nearly all of these tools and building materials were created by the demand side of 
the marketplace, to solve practical problems, and to provide useful infrastructural 
support for similar activities. The free and open way they contribute to the world is 
good for business. Whole businesses and business categories, old and new, are sited 
on bedrock composed of open standards and open source components. Growth hori 
zons for these businesses and categories are unobstructed by dependencies on ven 
dors and their platforms. Their environment is the wide world of the Net, not the 
inside of some vendor s silo. In fact, all platforms and silos in the computer business 
now find themselves in a subordinate position to the Net. To survive they have to 
operate in the wide new world of the Net. 

That goes even for Microsoft, which built the largest and most widely used platforms 
and silos in computing history, with a monopoly in the most ubiquitous product cat 
egory of all: personal computing. 



232 X Making a New World 



Yet even Microsoft finds its vast monopoly, and all of its platforms and silos, forced 
to live in a new and larger world that: 

Nobody owns 

Everybody can use 

Anybody can improve 

In "World of Ends" (http://www.worldofends.com), David Weinberger (http://www. 
hyperorg.com/blogger) and I initialized those three principles as NEA. 

In the first two respects, this virtual world is like our physical one. Except for the patches 
of crust we call real estate, nobody owns the Earth or its atmosphere. And everybody can 
use the Earth s base infrastructural provisions: gravity, air, and filtered sunlight. 

Exceptions can be found, of course. For example, MySQL is owned. Yet, as infra- 
structural building material, it doesn t matter whether MySQL is owned or not, 
because everybody can use it and anybody can improve it. MySQL s ownership mat 
ters only to those that choose to have a commercial relationship with the company. 
In that respect, MySQL doesn t behave as a traditional "platform" vendor, trying to 
lock customers and third parties into a dependent role in a private environment. 
Instead, it behaves more like a provider of building material for a construction 
project. MySQL, like other open source components, is modular stuff. It s made to 
work inside a larger context a job, a design, an architecture, whatever where each 
component does its job and not much more than that. 

The list of open source building materials grows constantly. When I started writing 
for Linux Journal, there were a handful of familiar names: Linux, Apache, Sendmail, 
and Perl. That grew to become the LAMP suite (where the M represents MySQL and 
the P includes PHP and Python). Now the names dropped in a discussion of open 
source might also include Tomcat, Squid, Asterisk, JBoss, Eclipse, Jabber, ZeroConf, 
RSS, iPodder, or any of the 90,000+ projects on SourceForge alone. 

That s because NEA s third principle anybody can improve it gives humans the 
power to continue making this new world. Think of this principle as do-it-yourself 
geology. We don t just play God here. We get to do His job. 

The architecture of this world was first described in 1983 by J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, and 
D.D. Clark in End-to-End Arguments in System Design (http://www.hyperorg.com/blog). 
Fourteen years later, The Rise of the Stupid Network, by David Isenberg, delivered a death 
sentence to the conceits of network centralizers. The Stupid Network was an end-to-end 
argument against AT&T s cherished belief in The Intelligent Network. David wrote, "A 
powerful leading indicator of the Stupid Network will arrive when entrepreneurs who 
have no vested interest in maintaining telephone company assumptions begin to offer 
profitable, affordable, widely available data services." A prophesy now fulfilled. 



Craig Burton (http://www.craigburton.com) combines both ideas end-to-end and stupid 
by describing (http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/4158*) the Internet as a hollow sphere, 
composed entirely of ends: 

I see the Net as a world we might see as a bubble. A sphere. It s growing larger 
and larger, and yet inside, every point in that sphere is visible to every other 
one. That s the architecture of a sphere. Nothing stands between any two points. 
That s its virtue: it s empty in the middle. The distance between any two points 
is functionally zero, and not just because they can see each other, but because 
nothing interferes with operation between any two points. There s a word I like 
for what s going on here: terraform. It s the verb for creating a world. That s what 
we re making here: a new world. Now the question is, what are we going to do 
to cause planetary existence? How can we terraform this new world in a way 
that works for the world and not just ourselves? 

One current example is podcasting. The term first appeared in August 2004. When I 
wrote about it in IT Garage (an online sister to Linux Journal) in September 2004, a 
search for podcasts brought up 24 results on Google. Now the same search gets 
778,000 results. By the time you read this, the number will probably be in the millions. 

Podcasts are audio files distributed to subscribers audio players (mostly iPods) via Really 
Simple Syndication (RSS), an XML dialect designed to serve as a syndication format for 
weblogs. The prime movers behind podcasting are Adam Curry and Dave Winer. Adam 
is a veteran broadcast personality (best known as an early MTV VJ) and a serial entrepre 
neur. Dave is a programmer, writer, and businessman whose fingerprints are on XML- 
PvPC, SOAP, OPML, outlining, Hogging, and other useful innovations, including RSS. 

Podcasting grew rapidly after Adam created iPodder (http://ipodder.sourceforge.net), a 
script that automatically routes podcast feeds into iPods and other MP3 players, via 
computers. As a distribution system for audio (or any kind of media file), iPodder 
and its relatives are forming an infrastructural foundation for a whole new industry 
one in which anybody can participate. And, by providing a limitless supply of talent, 
material, and low-cost any-to-any distribution, podcasting also offers boundless new 
opportunities for broadcasting, cable, satellite TV and radio, the record business, and 
lots of other industries as well as to noncommercial institutions ranging from 
churches and civic organizations to public broadcasting and government. 

Note that podcasting became a hot category without the help of a large company. 
Instead, it began with the demand side supplying itself. 

Now watch for big companies to jump in, and for businesses of all sizes to start mak 
ing money. And watch for most of that money to be made because of podcasting s 
open standards and open source components, instead of with them. 

It will eventually become clear to everybody that far more money is being made because 
of open source than with open source. This is what we have to remember every time 



234 ^ Making a New World 



somebody asks, "How can you make money with (open source product)?" The answer 
is, "You don t make money with it. You make money because of it." 

The because of principle is old hat in mature business categories, but it s new to the 
software business. Too many of us still want to see "business models" for all kinds of 
goods that don t belong on the income sides of balance sheets. Would you ask your 
telephone what its business model is? How about your front porch? Your driveway? 
Your clothes? Those things may help us make money; but they are not how we make 
money. Well, the same goes for open source products. They are a means to an end. 
You make money because o/them, not with them. 

It s also easy to forget that the most original sources in this new world are not tech 
nologies, but talented and productive human beings. We all know reputation is tre 
mendously important in hacker culture, and that open source is required, literally, to 
substantiate reputations. It is less obvious that the same is true for every other talent 
that operates on the Net. Reputation grows fastest when the goods and services of 
creative minds are open to inspection, improvement, adoption, and reuse. 

Take the case of English Cut (http://www.englishcut.com), the weblog of Thomas 
Mahon, bespoke Saville Row tailor, London. As I write this, Mahon s blog is a cou 
ple of weeks old, and he already has a Technorati cosmos (collection of current 
inbound links) north of 200 (up from 100 yesterday), which is remarkable (http:// 
www.technorati.com/cosmos). Thomas Mahon is quickly becoming the most authori 
tative Saville Row tailor in the world not because he s a terrific tailor (which he 
surely is), but because he also operates in the public marketplace we call the World 
Wide Web. There he converses with customers and fellow mavens about fabrics, 
drafting, cutting patterns, the trade, and (of course) his advantages over competi 
tors. Thomas Mahon runs an open source business. Literally. 

Not surprisingly, he has already attracted all the business he can stand. Again, 
because of his blog. Not with it. 

Thomas was urged into blogging by one of his customers, Hugh MacLeod (http:// 
www.gapingvoid.com), a cartoonist and professional marketing iconoclast whose blog 
is Gapingvoid.com. Hugh took the free ideas delivered by The Cluetrain Manifesto, 
and leveraged them into HughTrain (http://www.gapingvoid.com/Moveable_Type/ 
archives/000823, html) , a collection of wisdom that adds substantially to the open 
source-savvy marketing canon. 

Thomas and Hugh are both referenced in this piece of wisdom (doc.weblogs.com/ 
discuss/msgReader$5489) from Mike Warot (bitgrid.biogspot.com), which appeared in 
the comments section of my own blog (doc.weblogs.com) this morning: 

I think that division of labor and specialization are the ultimate human skill set. 
I see the invention of blogs, wikis, and other online communication as the most 
recent additions to the toolbox. We re going to increasingly bestow rewards 



based on competence (as the Hughtrain and English Cut weblogs have done), 
but it won t be a direct reward. 

It s going to be especially interesting to watch how the online expression and 
validation of trust and competence evolve. Cory Doctorow hinted strongly at 
this with the concept of Whuffie. I ve seen, secondhand, how a friend of mine 
gets small but pervasive and persistent rewards, for having been the first to engi 
neer a simple, open source, file-transfer protocol. There s not big money in it, 
but had he tried to make it proprietary, it won t have flown, and something else 
would have taken its place. My opinion is he s responsible for enabling a big 
chunk of the PC revolution through many tangents. 

He invented something, gave it away (purely for the fun of it), and got some 
Whuffie in the long run. 

Scary thought: we re going to see Whuffie become quantified (and even perhaps 
monetized) at some point. We have to plan for that eventuality. 

This model will take the place of marketing for companies that are able to 
articulate and share their knowledge with others. I particularly find the 
English Cut weblog to be fascinating. I ve learned quite a bit about the cul 
ture and technology of well-made suits. Should I happen to work my way 
into wealth, I might even become a customer. It certainly has increased my 
appreciation of the value of a Bespoke. He s adding a lot of value from my 
perspective. 

Reputation matters. Authority matters. Google (perhaps the world s biggest example of 
how to make money because of open source) sorts search results by the PageRank 
(http://www.google.com/technology) system, which the company explains in this way: 

PageRank relies on the uniquely democratic nature of the Web by using its 
vast link structure as an indicator of an individual page s value. In essence, 
Google interprets a link from page A to page B as a vote, by page A, for page B. 
But, Google looks at more than the sheer volume of votes, or links a page 
receives; it also analyzes the page that casts the vote. Votes cast by pages that 
are themselves "important" weigh more heavily and help to make other pages 
"important." 

That importance is what Cory Doctorow called Whuffie (en.wihipedia.org/wihi/ 
Whuffie), in his book Down and out in The Magic Kingdom. By whatever name repu 
tation, authority, brand value, Whuffie we don t acquire it alone. Its value is 
bestowed by others. In fact, the same might be said for its substance. 

Several years ago I was talking with Tim O Reilly about the discomfort we both felt 
about treating information as a commodity. It seemed to us that information was some- 



236,* Making a New World 



thing more than, and quite different from, the communicable form of knowledge. It 
was not a commodity, exactly, and was insulted by the generality we call "content." 1 

Information, we observed, is derived from the verb inform, which is related to the 
verb form. To inform is not to "deliver information," but rather, to form the other 
party. If you tell me something I didn t know before, I am changed by that. If I 
believe you and value what you say, I have granted you authority, meaning I have 
given you the right to author what I know. Therefore, we are all authors of each other. 
This is a profoundly human condition in any case, but it is an especially important 
aspect of the open source value system. By forming each other, as we also form use 
ful software, we are making the world, not merely changing it. 

Stewart Brand provides a helpful framework for understanding that world, with this 
"Layers of Time" model of civilization, from The Long Now (http://www.Iongnow.org), 
as shown in Figure 15-1. 




Commerce 



Infrastructure 



Governance 



Culture 



Nature 
Figure 15-1. Brand s Layers of Time 

Look at this as a layered section of surface on Craig Burton s hollow sphere this 
"World of Ends" we call the Net. 

At the bottom we find the end-to-end nature of the Net. It s also where we find Richard 
M. Stallman, the GNU project, the Free Software Foundation (FSF), and hackers whose 



I had the same kind of trouble when I first started hearing everything one could communicate 
referred to as "content." I was a writer for most of my adult life, and suddenly I was a "content" 
provider. This seemed ludicrous to me. No writer was ever motivated by the thought that they 
were "producing content." Their products were articles, books, essays, columns, or (if we 
needed to be a bit more general), editorial. "I didn t start hearing about content until the 
container business felt threatened," John Perry Barlow said. 



interests are anchored in the nature of software, which they understand fundamentally 
to be free. 

When Richard M. Stallman writes "everyone will be able to obtain good system soft 
ware free, just like air," he s operating at the Nature level. He doesn t just believe soft 
ware ought to be free; he believes its nature is to be free. The unbending constancy of 
his beliefs has anchored free software, and then open source development, since the 
1980s. That s when the GNU tools and components, along with the Internet, began 
to grow and flourish. 

The open source movement, which grew on top of the free software movement, is 
most at home one layer up, in Culture. Since Culture supports the Governance, the 
open source community devotes a lot of energy and thought to the subject of licens 
ing. In fact, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) serves a kind of governance function, 
carefully approving open source licenses that fit its definition of open source. While 
Richard and the FSF, sitting down there at the Nature level, strongly advocate one 
license (the GPL or General Public License), the OSI has approved around 50 of 
them. Many of those licenses are authored by commercial entities with an interest in 
the governance that supports the infrastructure they put to use. 

In fact, it was an interest in supporting business that caused the open source move 
ment to break off of the free software movement. That break took place on February 8, 
1998, when Eric Raymond wrote "Goodbye, free software ; hello, open source " (http:// 
www. catb.org/%7eesr/open-sourcc.htmr). Here is where the Culture layer can clearly be 
seen moving faster, and breaking from, the Nature layer: 

After the Netscape announcement broke in January, I did a lot of thinking about 
the next phase the serious push to get "free software" accepted in the main 
stream corporate world. And I realized we have a serious problem with "free 
software" itself. 

Specifically, we have a problem with the term "free software" itself, not the con 
cept. I ve become convinced that the term has to go. 

The problem with it is twofold. First, it s confusing; the term "free" is very 
ambiguous (something the Free Software Foundation s propaganda has to wres 
tle with constantly). Does "free" mean "no money charged" or does it mean "free 
to be modified by anyone," or something else? 

Second, the term makes a lot of corporate types nervous. While this does not 
intrinsically bother me in the least, we now have a pragmatic interest in convert 
ing these people rather than thumbing our noses at them. There s now a chance 
that we can make serious gains in the mainstream business world without com 
promising our ideals and commitment to technical excellence so it s time to 
reposition. We need a new and better label. 



238 X Making a New World 



I brainstormed this with some Silicon Valley fans of Linux (including Larry 
Augustin of the Linux International board of directors) the day after my meet 
ing with Netscape (Feb. 5th). We kicked around and discarded several alterna 
tives, and we came up with a replacement label we all liked: "open source." 

We suggest that everywhere we as a culture have previously talked about "free 
software," the label should be changed to "open source." Open source software. 
The open source model. The open source culture. The Debian Open Source 
Guidelines. (In pitching this to the corporate world I m also going to be invok 
ing the idea of "peer review" a lot.) 

And, we should explain publicly the reason for the change. Linus Torvalds has 
been saying in "World Domination 101" that the open source culture needs to 
make a serious effort to take the desktop and engage the corporate mainstream. 
Of course he s right and this re-labeling, as Linus agrees, is part of the pro 
cess. It says we re willing to work with and co-opt the market for our own pur 
poses, instead of remaining stuck in a marginal, adversarial position. 

This re-labeling has since attracted a lot of support (and some opposition) in the 
hacker culture. Supporters include Linus himself, John "Maddog" Hall, Larry 
Augustin, Bruce Perens of Debian, and Phil Hughes of Linux Journal. Opposers 
include Richard Stallman, who initially flirted with the idea but now thinks the 
term "open source" isn t pure enough. 

Bruce Perens has applied to register "open source" as a trademark and hold it 
through Software in the Public Interest. The trademark conditions will be 
known as the "Open Source Definition," essentially the same as the Debian Free 
Software Guidelines. 

It s crunch time, people. The Netscape announcement changes everything. We ve 
broken out of the little corner we ve been in for twenty years. We re in a whole 
new game now, a bigger and more exciting one and one I think we can win. 

Seven years later, victory is all but complete. And not just for open source. While the 
free software movement has been, relatively speaking, a drag on the open source 
movement, the deep and abiding beliefs and commitments of free software advo 
cates have anchored both movements and have helped software identified by both 
labels succeed. 

Not coincidentally, the Culture on which this new world depends is hacker culture, 
about which Eric S. Raymond a founder of the OSI has written extensively (he 
edited both editions of The Hacker s Dictionary}. Both he and Bruce Perens, another 
leading open source figure, have purposefully advocated open source to business for 
many years. 

And although open source hackers tend to be more interested in business than free soft 
ware hackers, both want Governance and Infrastructure that support business but are 
not determined by business except when business works with the hacker community. 



Hence OSI s license-approval process. While the number of open source licenses has 
been a source of some debate (almost everybody would rather see fewer licenses), it is 
important to note that the relationship between these layers is not the issue. The last 
thing anybody in the free software or open source movements wants is for anybody at 
the Commerce level to reach down into Governance to control or restrict Infrastructure 
that everybody relies upon. Even though that s exactly why large companies, and whole 
industries, hire lobbyists. More about that issue shortly. 

Changing corporate culture to adapt to open source development methods is not 
easy. Dan Frye, who runs IBM s Linux development program, recently told me that 
IBM has worked hard to make its internal development efforts coordinate smoothly 
with Linux s. That way, when IBM "scratches its itches," the kernel patches that 
result have a high likelihood of acceptance. IBM has faith that its accepted patches 
are ones that are most likely to work for everybody and not just for IBM. This is a 
natural and positive way for infrastructure to grow. 

And grow it has. The selection of commodity open source building materials is now 
so complete that most businesses have no choice but to use those components or, 
in many cases, to recognize that IT personnel in their enterprises have been building 
their own open source "solutions" for some time. 

That realization can come as a shock. Open source infrastructure inside companies 
often (perhaps usually it s hard to tell) gets built without IT brass knowing about it. 
In many cases, internal open source development and use has had conditional 
approval by CIOs and CTOs. Whatever the course of open source growth, at a cer 
tain point a threshold is crossed, and companies suddenly know that open source is 
no longer the exception, but the rule. The result for IT is often something like "Oh 
God! Our sex has changed! What do we wear?" 

Several years ago, when I showed the diagram in Figure 15-1 (along with others we ll 
visit later) to Rob Glaser, founder and CEO of RealNetworks, he made a remarkable 
observation: that the Internet revolution rocked the business world because, for the 
first time in history, Infrastructure changed faster than Commerce. "It was like the 
rug got pulled out from under everybody," he said. 

On the one hand, this caused a great deal of excitement, some of which gassed up the 
dot-corn investment bubble. On the other hand, it caused a great deal of fear, some of 
which got lobbied into the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA). In the first case, 
commercial interests were enthused by the new Internet infrastructure but failed to 
understand its deeper causes and principles. But at least they did no harm to the 
Nature, Culture, or Governance that produce and support Infrastructure. Not so with 
the entertainment industry and the lawmakers it successfully lobbied for passage of 
the DMCA. The DMCA is a prime example of how Commerce can lead Governance to 
screw up Infrastructure. 



240 X Making a New World 



The DMCA was intended mostly to protect copyright holders from the ravages of 
Nature in a networked world where, as Richard Stallman put it in the GNU Mani 
festo (http://www.gnu.org/gnu/mani/esto.html), "Copying all or parts of a program is as 
natural to a programmer as breathing, and as productive. It ought to be as free." 

While its authors wanted the DMCA to protect their industries by limiting "piracy" 
(their word for illegal copying) of copyrighted works, in practice the DMCA has chilled 
free speech and scientific research, thwarted "fair use" (an established copyright per 
mission), slowed the protected industries adaptation to life in the networked market 
place, and crippled or prevented new business categories from emerging. 

The case of Internet radio is instructive. The DMCA defined broadcasting on the Net 
as "performance," and digital copies as "perfect," regardless of their fidelity. It 
required "webcasters" to negotiate royalties with the recording industry, through a 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) administered by the U.S. Copyright 
Office. Led by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the CARP 
instituted royalty requirements so labyrinthine, difficult, and costly to webcasters 
that it effectively prevented the industry it purported to regulate. Had it been 
imposed on over-the-air broadcasting at the dawn of that industry, it would have 
strangled that baby in the cradle too. 

One unintended consequence is podcasting. Today podcasters are growing in fertile mar 
kets that haven t been poisoned by the DMCA. "Podsafe music" (also known as "non- 
RIAA" music) is already a staple on podcasts. Once podcasting becomes sufficiently pop 
ular (and is perceived by business as something happening below the Fashion layer), look 
for the RIAA either to take advantage of it or to force leading new podcasting companies 
(or established broadcasting companies) to strike Faustian bargains with them, just so 
those companies can play RIAA-licensed music. Whatever happens, the DMCA s market 
poisons cripple or prevent far more business than it protects. 

The Commerce level is inherently proprietary (you can t have business without prop 
erty); but that doesn t need to be a problem for open source, or for anybody. That s 
because, in a mature and healthy industry, property claims are limited to each 
owner s own property. If you want to build platforms and silos, fine. Just don t 
expect to support whole categories, because there are lots of open and free infrastruc- 
tural building materials already doing that. 

The construction industry provides a good model for where we re going here. There are 
plenty of platforms and silos among construction materials and methods. For example, 
windows from Andersen, Eagle, and Marvin require their own branded replacement 
parts, or parts from "compatible" manufacturers. But since construction is a mature 
industry, with a countless variety of commodity materials made compatible by widely 
accepted standards, no one manufacturer can "own" the industry, or even a part of it, 
by popularizing a "platform" on which everybody else is required to build. It would be 
absurd to build a house on the "Weyerhaeuser platform" or the "Georgia-Pacific 






platform." Building materials are essentially modular. All your studs, joists, siding, wall- 
board, cinder block, roofing, flooring, lighting, and electrical materials are provided by 
manufacturers whose proprietary concerns generally don t extend beyond their own 
products and the purposes to which they are put. 

Open source is a natural quality of most construction. Materials and methods are 
open to inspection, and copying. If a builder finds a better way to put up shingles, 
hang a door, nail a joist, or pour a foundation, they don t keep it a secret. They share 
it, and the knowledge gets passed along from crew to crew. 

It s also true that many construction materials are full of patents and other intellectual 
property claims. Yet those claims are limited in scope by the modular nature of con 
struction standards and practices. For example, you may choose to use proprietary door 
latches from one manufacturer throughout your house. Those latches may contain 
inventions patented or licensed by the manufacturer. But that manufacturer wouldn t 
think of extending those claims to the doors that contain those latches or to the whole 
house. To do so would be worse than absurd; it would be self-defeating. 

It s not a coincidence that we already talk about software in terms of construction. 
We have "architectures," "builds," "designs," tools," "frameworks," "levels," "plat 
forms," "components," and "structures." We have "sites" with "addresses and "loca 
tions" that are often "under construction." 

The similarities between software and construction are so close in some ways that we 
can t help making sense of the former in terms of the latter. As cognitive science puts 
it, construction is a conceptual metaphor for software development and use. Lately 
George Lakoff (http://www.rocfendgeinstitute.org/people/Ia/20jfjf), the father of cognitive 
linguistics, has also done some borrowing from the same source. Instead of talking 
about "conceptual metaphors," he now talks about "frames" and "framing" (http:// 
vmw.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simplejmming). In Patterns of Software 
(Oxford, Paperbacks, 1996), Richard Gabriel says, "Habitability is the characteristic 
of source code that enables programmers coming to the code later in its life to under 
stand its construction and intentions and to change it comfortably and confidently." 
His ideal example is the New England farmhouse: 

The result is rambling, but each part is well suited to its needs, each part fits 
well with the others... The inhabitants are able to modify their environment 
because each part is built according to the familiar patterns of design, use and 
construction and because those patterns contain the seeds for piecemeal growth. 

Stewart Brand says the same kind of farmhouse is an ideal example of "vernacular" 
construction: 

What gets passed from building to building via builders and users is informal 
and casual and astute. At least it is when the surrounding culture is coherent 
enough to embrace generations of experience. 



242 X Making a New World 



Vernacular is a term borrowed since the 1850s by architectural historians from lin 
guists, who used it to mean the native language of a region. It means "common" in all 
three senses of the word widespread, "ordinary," and "beneath notice." 

In terms of architecture, vernacular buildings are seen as the opposite of whatever is 
"academic," "high style," or "polite." Vernacular is everything not designed by profes 
sional architects in other words, most of the world s buildings. Vernacular building 
traditions have the attention span to incorporate generational knowledge about long- 
term problems such as maintaining and growing a building over time. High-style 
architecture likes to solve old problems in new ways, which is a formula for disaster. 

Vernacular buildings evolve. As generations of new buildings imitate the best of 
mature buildings, they increase in sophistication while retaining simplicity. 

The opposite of vernacular is what Stewart calls "magazine" architecture: artistic, ide 
alized, expensive, and made to impress rather than to operate. Here s another differ 
ence, described by Henry Glassie: "If a pleasure-giving function predominates, it is 
called art; if a practical function predominates, it is called craft." 

It s hard to imagine anything more crafted and practical than a command-line inter 
face. That insight comes to us from Neal Stephenson, the novelist and hacker, in his 
book In the Beginning Was the Command Line (HarperCollins, 1999). Here s how he 
describes the difference between the hacker-built Unix and operating systems archi- 
tected in the magazine mode: 

The filesystems of Unix machines all have the same general structure. On your 
flimsy operating systems, you can create directories (folders) and give them 
names like Frodo or My Stuff and put them pretty much anywhere you like. But 
under Unix the highest level the root of the filesystem is always designated 
with the single character "/" and it always contains the same set of top-level 
directories: 

/usr 

/etc 

Nar 

/bin 

/proc 

/boot 

/home 

/root 

/sbin 

/dev 

/lib 

/tmp 



SCZ43 



And each of these directories typically has its own distinct structure of subdirec 
tories. Note the obsessive use of abbreviations and avoidance of capital letters; 
this is a system invented by people to whom repetitive stress disorder is what 
black lung is to miners. Long names get worn down to three-letter nubbins, like 
stones smoothed by a river. 

...It is this sort of acculturation that gives Unix hackers their confidence in the 
system, and the attitude of calm, unshakable, annoying superiority. . .Windows 95 
and Mac OS are products, contrived by engineers in the service of specific compa 
nies. Unix, by contrast, is not so much a product as it is a painstakingly compiled 
oral history of the hacker subculture. 

Is it any surprise that, in the long run (which we ve been in since long before and 
after Neal wrote Command Line), hacker culture has pushed up, like lava through 
cracks in the Earth, so much useful stuff to build on? 

Vernacular construction, with its valuing of craft over art, tends to produce what 
Stewart Brand calls "Low Road" buildings. These tend to be "low-visibility, low-rent, 
no-style." He adds, "Most of the world s work is done in Low Road buildings... and 
even in rich societies the most inventive creativity, especially youthful creativity, will 
be found in Low Road buildings, taking full advantage of the license to try things." 

Not coincidentally, Stewart s ideal Low Road building is MIT s late Building 20 (http:// 
www.eecs.mit.edu/building/20). Known as "The Magical Incubator," Building 20 was 
home to countless scientific advances: radar, microwave, spectroscopy, quantum 
mechanics, atomic and molecular beams, masers and lasers, atomic clocks, radio astron 
omy, linear particle acceleration, magnetron phasing, fiber optics, digital data transmis 
sion, and much more. More significant, for the purposes of the open source narrative, is 
what Stewart Brand reports here: "The Tech Model Railroad Club on the third floor, E 
Wing, was the source in the early 1960s of most of the first generation of computer 
hackers who set in motion a series of computer technology revolutions (still in 
progress)." 

The term hacker is older than Moore s law, older than Unix, older than the whole 
software industry. Hacking has also persisted as a comparatively stable culture, while 
countless commercial "solutions" and fashions (moving to the top level there) have 
come and gone. 

The construction industry makes a useful even ideal model for the software 
industry as it gradually matures because, while the software industry is a few decades 
old at best, construction is mature in the extreme. It might not be the oldest profes 
sion in the world, but it s probably the oldest industry. (Just ask the Masons.) It s also 
the largest industrial sector, with more than $3.5 trillion in revenues, worldwide. It 
understands and respects commodities (there s no fear and trembling about the 
"threat of commoditization"). It also finds plenty of ways to differentiate commodity 
products and make money with them. It understands the natural advantages and 

244 X Making a New World 



limits of patents and other intellectual property claims. It has lots of giant compa 
nies, but none that dominates like Microsoft does in personal computing, or like IBM 
used to do in mainframes. Nor does it have many (or any, as far as I know) large 
companies that make the 70-90% gross profit margins large companies in the soft 
ware industry made in the days when there was no Net, and large vendors had to 
make their own infrastructure. (Or, in parlance that becomes more antique by the 
day, "be a platform provider".) 

In fact, the ideals of modular and commoditized building materials have been around 
for a long time. Kim Polese, CEO of SpikeSource (disclosure: I m an advisor to the com 
pany), is an industry veteran who labored toward the destinations of open source long 
before the means for getting there began to show up. "We tried a lot of good ideas," she 
says, "back when suppliers ruled the world: object-oriented programming. C++, 
CORBA, COM. Yet even our standards were isolated environments; no less monolithic 
than any vendor s silo. Our ideas components, modularity, reusability would have to 
wait for an open worldwide ecosystem to emerge." 

So, we should stop and give credit where due to the vendors who worked in the mean 
time to build the proprietary infrastructures we call "platforms." Before the Net, and 
before a sufficient abundance of open source building materials appeared, there was 
often no choice. For some activities inside large enterprises, there still isn t much 
choice. If you re doing big-time Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or Business Pro 
cess Management (BPM), there are no open source solutions out there. Still, the same 
used to be true of Customer Resource Management (CRM) and office private branch 
exchanges (PBXs) to name two among many categories but now that s changing 
with SugarCRM (http://www.sugarcrm.com/home) and Asterisk (http://www.osterisfe.org). 

So, the platform and silo system is still with us; it s just moving up the Civilization 
stack to the Commerce layer. 

Smart software vendors who want to maintain their silos will still have to base them 
on free and open source infrastructure. That s what IBM is doing with Linux, which 
supports the company s proprietary DB2, Tivoli, and WebSphere products. It s what 
Apple did when it moved its whole silo from the decrepit Mac OS to Darwin, which 
is Appleized FreeBSD. And it s what Microsoft will do, eventually; but for now, we ll 
let that stand as prophesy. 

The offerings are often mixed, so it gets hard (or annoying) to say what is open 
source and what is not. For example, while Apple contributes generously to the 
FreeBSD kernel (as well as to Apache, KDE, GNU, and other open source develop 
ment communities), the OS X operating system Apple builds on BSD is highly pro 
prietary. So is its popular iTunes software. In fact, iPods, for all their appeal, are 
essentially hardware extensions of iTunes software. They are a silo. 



It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss Apple as a "proprietary" company. It is, but it 
also is not. Apple has an open source strategy. So do IBM, HP, Oracle, RealNetworks, 
Novell, Sun, SAP, and other large vendors that use open source strategies to support 
their proprietary offerings. All their strategies are different; but they are all based on an 
acceptance of open source as foundational infrastructure, on participation in open 
source development projects, and pm an appreciation for what open source provides to 
the world. 

As long as we insist on treating open source and proprietary as polar opposites, we 
won t understand how complementary they can often be. Nor if we are a company 
trying to succeed in a business world supported by open source will we be able to 
come up with a useful understanding of how open source supports business, much 
less a strategy for putting that support to use. 

For me, the wisest mind on this whole subject is Craig Burton. I first met Craig back 
in the 1980s, when he was one of the leading figures at Novell. As an old communi 
cations techie, I watched in amazement how thoroughly the networking vendors 
could screw up even a miraculously open standard like Ethernet. Even after IBM s PC 
became an industry standard, computer networking was a highly proprietary affair, 
in which customers faced baffling choices among local area networks (LANs) with 
names like DECnet, WangNet, OmniNet, Sytek, 3Com, Ungermann-Bass, Corvus, 
and IBM s Token Ring. There was thin and fat Ethernet, star and bus topologies, and 
a mess of noninteroperable standards and implementations, each based on what the 
trade called "pipes and protocols." Every vendor s set of pipes and protocols was a 
platform supporting a proprietary silo of products and services, sold exclusively to 
captive customers. Interoperability was a pie in the sky. 

That whole paradigm was blown up when Novell, led by Craig Burton and Judith 
Clarke (she later married Craig and became Judith Burton), literally changed the net 
working conversation. When I first began to follow Novell, NetWare was a Motorola 
68000-based file and print server. Craig brilliantly decided to move NetWare up a 
level, to become a Network Operating System (NOS) that worked independently 
both of hardware and of network pipes and protocols: essentially, as a networked 
filesystem for every PC, regardless of whose network connected those PCs. NetWare 
grew like wildfire. In the process, Craig and Novell reconceived networking as a set 
of services, and freed it from any notion of lower-level protocol and wiring depen 
dency. When Craig, Judith, and Jamie Lewis later founded The Burton Group, their 
first achievement was formalizing the "network services model," which prevails to 
this day. When I said earlier that 1M was not among the suite of standard Internet 
services, I was speaking in terms of that model. 

Not long after I started with Linux Journal, I interviewed Craig a number of times, 
looking to get his point of view, both on open source and on the prospects for Linux 
(http.y/www.searls.com/buron_inten/iew.html). He was greatly in favor of both, but he 
also had no patience with some of the rhetoric coming out of open source culture. 

246 X Making a New World 



For example, he took issue with the notion that open source and proprietary art oppo- 
sites. "There are collapsed distinctions here," he told me. "The opposite of open is 
not proprietary, but closed. The opposite of proprietary is not open, but public 
domain." If you "uncollapse" those distinctions, he said, and lay them out orthogo 
nally, you get The Burton Matrix (see Figure 15-2). 

Open 



Proprietary 



Public 
domain 



Closed 



Figure 15-2. The Burton Matrix 



Craig said that technical distinctions often collapse around moral sympathies. In the 
open source community, for example, "proprietary" and "closed" are considered bad, 
while "open" and "public domain" are considered good (see Figure 15-3). 



Open 



Proprietary 



Bad 



Good 



Public 
domain 



Closed 



Figure 15-3. Collapsed distinctions 



"However," he said, "if you remove morality as an issue, and spread out the two 
other distinctions that are collapsed, you have a good strategic framework for busi 
nesses to work with." To really take advantage of open source, he explained, you 
need to value ubiquity in your marketplace at least as much as you value scarcity in 
your product portfolio. In fact, your smartest move may be to take some of the prod 
ucts you re selling, and make them ubiquitous by moving them from proprietary/ 
closed to open/public domain literally, from scarcity to ubiquity (see Figure 15-4). 



Open 



Proprietary 



Ubiquity 



Infrastucture 



Public 

domain 



Commoditization 

i 
i 

Scarcity 

Closed 
Figure 15-4. Ubiquity creates infrastructure 

This is a form of commoditization (see Figure 15-5). 



Open 



Proprietary 



Ubiquity 



Public 
domain 



i 

i 
Scarcity 



Closed 
Figure 1S-S. The Open Source strategy: commoditize 

It s not the only one, of course. Most open source commodities are created from the 
start with the intention of putting them in the upper-right quadrant. But for busi 
nesses that want to create infrastructure and grow markets, this is one useful open 
source strategy. It s one of several a company can practice at the same time. 

In IBM s case, the company adopted Linux (helping make it more ubiquitous), while 
also open sourcing Eclipse, moving it into the upper-right quadrant. 

In Apple s case, the company open sourced nothing of its own, but used one of sev 
eral other strategies: creation of a new standard (Fire Wire), adoption of an existing 
standard for the purpose of ubiquitizing it (USB, WiFi, ZeroConf/Rendezvous, MP3), 
and appropriation of an already developed codebase to save itself a lot of R&D work 
(FreeBSD, KHTML). Meanwhile, Apple has kept QuickTime and its growing portfo 
lio of "i" applications on the proprietary side, even while opening them to free usage, 
essentially putting those in the upper-left quadrant. 

When Tim O Reilly had me show the Burton Matrix to Rob Glaser and Brian Behlendorf 
(Apache Foundation leader and founder/CTO of Collabnet), they helped me draw up 



248 X Making a New World 



the diagram shown in Figure 15-6 to explain how they were working together to open 
and ubiquitize many of the company s proprietary offerings (while also creating a devel 
opment community). 



Open 



Helix DNA-based apps 



Proprietary 



Helix source and APIs 
GNU tools 
Ogg Vorbis 



Patents and 
other IP 



Wi-fi Public 
domain 



Closed 



Figure 15-6. Real s strategy 

Real s strategy, Rob said, was to move as much as possible from the lower to the 
upper left, and from the upper left to the upper right. 

If we put the Burton Matrix beside the Long Now Foundation s "Layers of Time" model of 
Civilization, we see they have a common element: Infrastructure (see Figure 15-7). 

Civilization 



Proprietary 




Closed 



Figure 15-7. Time layers and the Burton Matrix 



longnow.org 



If we rock the Burton Matrix 45 degrees clockwise, superimpose it over the Civiliza 
tion diagram, and cut out all but Infrastructure and Commerce, we have Figure 15-8. 

Now we can start to see how the world ought to work (Figure 15-9). 

Open source Infrastructure supports Commerce while Commerce contributes to open 
source Infrastructure. 

We may or may not like what IBM, HP, Google, Apple, Sun, Oracle, Novell, and Red 
Hat build on the open source Infrastructure that supports them, but we have to 



Proprietary Closed 

Commerce 




Infrastructure 
Open Public 

domain 



Figure 1S-B. Matrix and layers merged 



Proprietary Closed 

\ Commerce 



Contribute 




Open lnfastructure Public 
domain 




Support 



Figure 15-9. How it oughta work 



respect the fact that all those companies contribute back to that Infrastructure. There 
is another word for this form of contribution (see Figure 15-10). 

Proprietary Commerce Closed 



Open Infrastructure Public 
domain 

Figure 15-10. Commoditization is contribution 

All of these examples, of course, pertain to technology companies. We don t see the 
same from Hollywood, which uses technology (including enormous quantities of 
Linux), but works against technology s interests, and with it the interests of the new 
world technology is busy creating (see Figure 15-11). 

Proprietary Commerce Closed 




Open Infrastructure Public 
domain 



Figure 15-11. How Hollywood sees it 



250 X Making a New World 



Unfortunately, there are a few technology companies that feel the same way. The 
most notable among these is SCO. Once a leading Unix vendor, SCO transformed 
itself into the sworn enemy of Linux and open source, first when it sued IBM, and 
later when it sued DaimlerChrysler and AutoZone. Regardless of the merits of SCO s 
cases (I think they are groundless, but that s not what matters here), the Fear, Uncer 
tainty, and Doubt (FUD) effects have been enormous and undeniable. 

It has never been easy to get IT personnel to talk about what they are up to in any 
case. It s not their job to speak for the company (that s up to PR and marketing), and 
they often don t want their bosses, competitors, or suppliers to know what they re 
doing with anything, including open source. But still, some would talk enough so 
that editors like me could pull together enough facts to tell a fair story. 

That changed with the SCO lawsuits against DaimlerChrysler and AutoZone. These 
suits had a highly adrenalizing effect on the legal departments of large companies. 
Formerly open channels of communication became tightly closed legal sphincters. 
For example, two out the four panelists for my Do-It-Yourself IT (DIY-IT) discussion 
at the Open Source Business Conference (OSBC) in April 2004 were no-shows. One 
was no mystery: the speaker showed up, but told me he wasn t allowed to speak. 
Although he wasn t allowed to give the reason, his expressions made the matter clear: 
the company didn t want anybody saying anything in public about Linux or open 
source. I didn t learn what happened to the other panelist, Phil Moore of Morgan 
Stanley, until later in the year, when he rose out of the audience during a panel dis 
cussion at the O Reilly Open Source Convention and spoke bluntly about what was 
actually going on. He began: 

I work for the 38th largest company in the world, Morgan Stanley. We have a 
billion dollar IT budget. And we use a little of everything. Unfortunately. Excuse 
me, a LOT of everything. The trend I ve seen in the last 10 years... is the expo 
nential growth in the variety and the depth and breadth of installation of open 
source software in our infrastructure.... What I m seeing is that in the infrastruc 
ture, the core infrastructure, open source is going to take over, leaps and 
bounds. ...I m predicting, right now, that by 2006 or 2007, we re going to be a 
90% Linux shop. 

At one point, Phil said, "We re still mostly a Solaris shop, but we are rapidly moving 
to Linux, though I m not supposed to talk about that, for fear of being sued by SCO." 
Then he turned to Matt Asay (the Novell executive who ran OSBC) and added, 
"Which is the reason why I couldn t go to your conference, the OSBC. I wasn t 
allowed to go." 

I ran those quotes, with Phil s permission, in my November 2004 column for Linux 
Journal. Phil no longer works at Morgan Stanley. He left voluntarily, but the fact that 
he s gone still speaks volumes. I want to thank him here for the honesty and courage it 






Xzsi 



took for him to say what he did. Same goes for ROml Lefkowitz (formerly) of AT&T 
Wireless, Roland Smith (formerly) of LSI Logic, Leon Chism of Orbitz, J.P. Ran- 
gaswami of Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, and the rest of the handful of executives 
in large IT organizations who have talked to me factually and fearlessly about how 
open source and Linux especially are being put to good use in their companies. 

Meanwhile, with a veil of silence over most IT departments, most of the publications 
covering IT are left with what comes easiest: writing about what vendors are doing. 
Or worse, treating open source projects as if they were vendors too. "Microsoft v. 
Linux: Who Will Win?" the headlines say. Again and again. 

It s a false fight, and it always has been. We re making a world here. There s a limit to 
how well you can live in it and still ignore the fact that it exists. And how it got here. 



252 X Making a New World 





b CHAPTER 16 

Tim O Reilly 




The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



In 1962, Thomas Kuhn published a groundbreaking book titled The Structure of Sci 
entific Revolutions. In it, he argued that the progress of science is not gradual, but 
rather (much as we now think of biological evolution), a kind of punctuated equilib 
rium, with moments of epochal change. When Copernicus explained the move 
ments of the planets by postulating that they moved around the sun rather than the 
Earth, and when Darwin introduced his ideas about the origin of species, they were 
doing more than just building on past discoveries, or explaining new experimental 
data. A truly profound scientific breakthrough, Kuhn notes, "is seldom or never just 
an increment to what is already known. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction 
of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary pro 
cess that is seldom completed by a single man and never overnight." 1 

Kuhn referred to these revolutionary processes in science as "paradigm shifts," a term 
that has now entered the language to describe any profound change in our frame of 
reference. 

Paradigm shifts occur from time to time in business as well as in science. And as with 
scientific revolutions, they are often hard fought, and the ideas underlying them not 
widely accepted until long after they were first introduced. What s more, they often 
have implications that go far beyond the insights of their creators. 



1 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (http://www.press.uchtcaeo.edu/cei-bin/hfs cei/ 
00/13220.ctl\ 7. 



2*253 



One such paradigm shift occurred with the introduction of the standardized architec 
ture of the IBM personal computer in 1981. In a huge departure from previous 
industry practice, IBM chose to build its computer from off-the-shelf components, 
and to open up its design for cloning by other manufacturers. As a result, the IBM 
personal computer architecture became the standard, over time displacing not only 
other personal computer designs, but also over the next two decades, minicomput 
ers and mainframes. 

However, the executives at IBM failed to understand the full consequences of their 
decision. At the time, IBM s market share in computers far exceeded Microsoft s 
dominance of the desktop operating system market today. Software was a small part 
of the computer industry, a necessary part of an integrated computer, often bundled 
rather than sold separately. Those independent software companies did exist were 
clearly satellite to their chosen hardware platform. So, when it came time to provide 
an operating system for the new machine, IBM decided to license it from a small 
company called Microsoft, giving away the right to resell the software to the small 
part of the market that IBM did not control. As cloned personal computers were built 
by thousands of manufacturers large and small, IBM lost its leadership in the new 
market. Software became the new sun that the industry revolved around; Microsoft, 
not IBM, became the most important company in the computer industry. 

But that s not the only lesson from this story. In the initial competition for leader 
ship of the personal computer market, companies vied to "enhance" the personal 
computer standard, adding support for new peripherals, faster buses, and other pro 
prietary technical innovations. Their executives, trained in the previous, hardware- 
dominated computer industry, acted on the lessons of the old paradigm. 

The most intransigent, such as Digital s Ken Olsen, derided the PC as a toy, and 
refused to enter the market until too late. But even pioneers like Compaq, whose ini 
tial success was driven by the introduction of "luggable" computers, the ancestor of 
today s laptop, were ultimately misled by old lessons that no longer applied in the 
new paradigm. It took an outsider, Michael Dell, who began his company selling 
mail-order PCs from a college dorm room, to realize that a standardized PC was a 
commodity, and that marketplace advantage came not from building a better PC, but 
from building one that was good enough, lowering the cost of production by 
embracing standards, and seeking advantage in areas such as marketing, distribu 
tion, and logistics. In the end, it was Dell, not IBM or Compaq, that became the larg 
est PC hardware vendor. 

Meanwhile, Intel, another company that made a bold bet on the new commodity 
platform, abandoned its memory chip business as indefensible and made a commit 
ment to be the more complex brains of the new design. The fact that most of the PCs 
built today bear an "Intel Inside" logo reminds us of the fact that even within a com 
modity architecture, there are opportunities for proprietary advantage. 

254 X The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



What does all this have to do with open source software, you might ask? 

My premise is that free and open source developers are in much the same position 
today that IBM was in 1981 when it changed the rules of the computer industry, but 
failed to understand the consequences of the change, allowing others to reap the ben 
efits. Most existing proprietary software vendors are no better off, playing by the old 
rules while the new rules are reshaping the industry around them. 

I have a simple test that I use in my talks to see if my audience of computer industry 
professionals is thinking with the old paradigm or the new. "How many of you use 
Linux?" I ask. Depending on the venue, 20% to 80% of the audience might raise 
their hands. "How many of you use Google?" Every hand in the room goes up. And 
the light begins to dawn. Every one of them uses Google s massive complex of 
100,000 Linux servers, but they were blinded to the answer by a mindset in which 
"the software you use" is defined as the software running on the computer in front of 
you. Most of the "killer apps" of the Internet, applications used by hundreds of mil 
lions of people, run on Linux or FreeBSD. But the operating system, as formerly 
defined, is to these applications only a component of a larger system. Their true plat 
form is the Internet. 

It is in studying these next-generation applications that we can begin to understand 
the true long-term significance of the open source paradigm shift. 

If open source pioneers are to benefit from the revolution we ve unleashed, we must 
look through the foreground elements of the free and open source movements, and 
understand more deeply both the causes and the consequences of the revolution. 

Artificial intelligence pioneer Ray Kurzweil once said, "I m an inventor. I became 
interested in long-term trends because an invention has to make sense in the world 
in which it is finished, not the world in which it is started." 2 

I find it useful to see open source as an expression of three deep, long-term trends: 

The commoditization of software 

Network-enabled collaboration 

Software customizability (software as a service) 

Long-term trends like these "three Cs," rather than the Free Software Manifesto or The 
Open Source Definition, should be the lens through which we understand the changes 
that are being unleashed. 



Ray Kurzweil, Speech at the Foresight Senior Associates Gathering (http:/Avww.feurzvveilai net/ 
artides/art0465.html?printabk=l\ April 2002. 



K x 255 



Software as Commodity 

In his essay, "Some Implications of Software Commodification," Dave Stutz writes: 

The word commodity is used today to represent fodder for industrial processes: 
things or substances that are found to be valuable as basic building blocks for 
many different purposes. Because of their very general value, they are typically 
used in large quantities and in many different ways. Commodities are always 
sourced by more than one producer, and consumers may substitute one pro 
ducer s product for another s with impunity. Because commodities are fungible 
in this way, they are defined by uniform quality standards to which they must 
conform. These quality standards help to avoid adulteration, and also facilitate 
quick and easy valuation, which in turn fosters productivity gains. 

Software commoditization has been driven by standards, in particular by the rise of 
communications-oriented systems such as the Internet, which depend on shared pro 
tocols, and define the interfaces and datatypes shared between cooperating compo 
nents rather than the internals of those components. Such systems necessarily con 
sist of replaceable parts. A web server such as Apache or Microsoft s IIS, or browsers 
such as Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, or Mozilla, are all easily swappable, 
because to function, they must implement the HTTP protocol and the HTML data 
format. Sendmail can be replaced by Exim or Postfix or Microsoft Exchange because 
all must support email exchange protocols such as SMTP, POP, and IMAP. Microsoft 
Outlook can easily be replaced by Eudora, or Pine, or Mozilla mail, or a web mail cli 
ent such as Yahoo! Mail for the same reason. 

(In this regard, it s worth noting that Unix, the system on which Linux is based, also 
has a communications-centric architecture. In The Unix Programming Environment, 
Kemighan and Pike eloquently describe how Unix programs should be written as 
small pieces designed to cooperate in "pipelines," reading and writing ASCII files 
rather than proprietary data formats. Eric Raymond gives a contemporary expression 
of this theme in his book, The Art of Unix Programming. ) 

Note that in a communications-centric environment with standard protocols, both 
proprietary and open source software become commodities. Microsoft s Internet 
Explorer web browser is just as much a commodity as the open source Apache Web 
Server, because both are constrained by the open standards of the Web. (If Microsoft 
had managed to gain dominant market share at both ends of the protocol pipeline 
between web browser and server, it would be another matter! See "How the Web was 
almost won" [http://salon.com/tech/feature/1999/ll/16/microsoft_servers/print.html] for 
my discussion of that subject. This example makes clear one of the important roles 
that open source does play in "keeping standards honest." This role is being recog 
nized by organizations like the W3C, which are increasingly reluctant to endorse 
standards that have only proprietary or patent-encumbered implementations.) 



256 * C The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



What s more, even software that starts out proprietary eventually becomes standard 
ized and ultimately commoditized. Dave Stutz eloquently describes this process in an 
essay titled "The Natural History of Software Platforms" (http://www.sjynthesist.net/ 
writing/so/tware_plat/orms. html) : 

It occurs through a hardening of the external shell presented by the platform 
over time. As a platform succeeds in the marketplace, its APIs, UI, feature-set, 
file formats, and customization interfaces ossify and become more and more dif 
ficult to change. (They may, in fact, ossify so far as to literally harden into hard 
ware appliances!) The process of ossification makes successful platforms easy 
targets for cloners, and cloning is what spells the beginning of the end for plat 
form profit margins. 

Consistent with this view, the cloning of Microsoft s Windows and Office franchises 
has been a major objective of the free and open source communities. In the past, 
Microsoft has been successful at rebuffing cloning attempts by continually revising 
APIs and file formats, but the writing is on the wall. Ubiquity drives standardization, 
and gratuitous innovation in defense of monopoly is rejected by users. 

What are some of the implications of software commoditization? One might be 
tempted to see only the devaluation of something that was once a locus of enormous 
value. Thus, Red Hat founder Bob Young once remarked, "My goal is to shrink the 
size of the operating system market." (Red Hat, however, aimed to own a large part 
of that smaller market!) Defenders of the status quo, such as Microsoft VP, Jim 
Allchin, have made statements such as "open source is an intellectual property 
destroyer," and paint a bleak picture in which a great industry is destroyed, with 
nothing to take its place. 

On the surface, Allchin appears to be right. Linux now generates tens of billions of dol 
lars in server hardware-related revenues, with the software revenues merely a rounding 
error. Despite Linux s emerging dominance in the server market, Red Hat, the largest 
Linux distribution company, has annual revenues of only $126 million, versus 
Microsoft s $32 billion. A huge amount of software value appears to have vaporized. 

But is it value or overhead? Open source advocates like to say they re not destroying 
actual value, but rather, are squeezing inefficiencies out of the system. When compe 
tition drives down prices, efficiency and average wealth levels go up. Firms unable to 
adapt to the new price levels undergo what the economist E.F. Schumpeter called 
"creative destruction," but what was "lost" returns manyfold as higher productivity 
and new opportunities. 

Microsoft benefited, along with consumers, from the last round of "creative destruc 
tion" as PC hardware was commoditized. This time around, Microsoft sees the com 
moditization of operating systems, databases, web servers and browsers, and related 
software as destructive to its core business. But that destruction has created the 



Software as Commodity * C 257 



opportunity for the killer applications of the Internet era: Yahoo!, Google, Amazon, 
and eBay to mention only a few are the beneficiaries. 

And so I prefer to take the view of Clayton Christensen, the author of The Innovator s 
Dilemma and The Innovator s Solution. In a recent article in Harvard Business Review, 
he articulates "the law of conservation of attractive profits" as follows: 

When attractive profits disappear at one stage in the value chain because a prod 
uct becomes modular and commoditized, the opportunity to earn attractive 
profits with proprietary products will usually emerge at an adjacent stage. 3 

We see Christensen s thesis clearly at work in the paradigm shifts I m discussing 
here. 4 Just as IBM s commoditization of the basic design of the personal computer 
led to opportunities for attractive profits "up the stack" in software, new fortunes are 
being made up the stack from the commodity open source software that underlies 
the Internet, in a new class of proprietary applications that I have elsewhere referred 
to as "info ware" (http://ww\v. oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/tim. html). 

Sites such as Google, Amazon, and salesforce.com provide the most serious chal 
lenge to the traditional understanding of free and open source software. Here are 
applications built on top of Linux, but they are fiercely proprietary. What s more, 
even when using and modifying software distributed under the most restrictive of 
free software licenses, the GPL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html), these sites are 
not constrained by any of its provisions, all of which are conditioned on the old para 
digm. The GPL s protections are triggered by the act of software distribution, yet 
web-based application vendors never distribute any software: it is simply performed 
on the Internet s global stage, delivered as a service rather than as a packaged soft 
ware application. 

But more importantly, even if these sites gave out their source code, users would not 
easily be able to create a full copy of the running application! The application is a 
dynamically updated database whose utility comes from its completeness and con 
currency and, in many cases, from the network effect of its participating users. 

(To be sure, there would be many benefits to users were some of Google s algo 
rithms public rather than secret, or Amazon s One-Click available to all, but the 
point remains: an instance of all of Google s source code would not give you Google, 
unless you were also able to build the capability to crawl and mirror the entire Web 
in the same way that Google does.) 



3 Clayton Christensen, Harvard Business Review, Feb. 2004 (http://www.tensilica.com/HBR_Jeb_04.pdf). 

4 I have been talking and writing about the paradigm shift for years, but until I heard Christensen 
speak at the Open Source Business Conference (http://www.osbc2004.com) in March 2004, 1 
hadn t heard his eloquent generalization of the economic principles at work in what I d been 
calling business paradigm shifts. I am indebted to Christensen and to Dave Stutz, whose recent 
writings on software commoditization have enriched my own views on the subject. 



258 ^ C The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



And the opportunities are not merely up the stack. There are huge proprietary 
opportunities hidden inside the system. Christensen notes: 

Attractive profits... move elsewhere in the value chain, often to subsystems from 
which the modular product is assembled. This is because it is improvements in 
the subsystems, rather than the modular product s architecture, that drives the 
assembler s ability to move upmarket towards more attractive profit margins. 
Hence, the subsystems become decommoditized and attractively profitable. 

We saw this pattern in the PC market with most PCs now bearing the brand "Intel 
Inside"; the Internet could just as easily be branded "Cisco Inside." 

But these "Intel Inside" business opportunities are not always obvious, nor are they 
necessarily in proprietary hardware or software. The open source Berkeley Internet 
Name Daemon (BIND) package used to run the Domain Name System (DNS) pro 
vides an important demonstration. 

The business model for most of the Internet s commodity software turned out not to 
be selling that software (despite shrinkwrapped offerings from vendors such as Net- 
Manage and Spry, now long gone), but in services based on that software. Most of 
those businesses the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), who essentially resell access 
to the TCP/IP protocol suite and to email and web servers turned out to be low- 
margin businesses. There was one notable exception. 

BIND is probably the single most mission-critical program on the Internet, yet its 
maintainer has scraped by for the past two decades on donations and consulting fees. 
Meanwhile, domain name registration an information service based on the soft 
ware became a business generating hundreds of millions of dollars a year, a virtual 
monopoly for Network Solutions, which was handed the business on government 
contract before anyone realized just how valuable it would be. The "Intel Inside" 
opportunity of the DNS was not a software opportunity at all, but the service of man 
aging the namespace used by the software. By a historical accident, the business 
model became separated from the software. 

That services based on software would be a dominant business model for open 
source software was recognized in The Cathedral &> the Bazaar, Eric Raymond s semi 
nal work on the movement. But in practice, most early open source entrepreneurs 
focused on services associated with the maintenance and support of the software, 
rather than true software as a service. (That is to say, software as a service is not ser 
vice in support of software, but software in support of user-facing services!) 

Dell gives us a final lesson for today s software industry. Much as the commoditiza- 
tion of PC hardware drove down IBM s outsize margins but vastly increased the size 
of the market, creating enormous value for users and vast opportunities for a new 
ecosystem of computer manufacturers for whom the lower margins of the PC still 



Software as Commodity * C 259 



made business sense, the commoditization of software will actually expand the soft 
ware market. And as Christensen notes, in this type of market, the drivers of success 
"become speed to market and the ability responsively and conveniently to give cus 
tomers exactly what they need, when they need it." 5 

Following this logic, I believe that the process of building custom distributions will 
emerge as one of the key competitive differentiators among Linux vendors. Much as a 
Dell must be an arbitrageur of the various contract manufacturers vying to produce 
fungible components at the lowest price, a Linux vendor will need to manage the ever- 
changing constellation of software suppliers whose asynchronous product releases pro 
vide the raw materials for Linux distributions. Companies like Debian founder Ian 
Murdock s Progeny Systems (http://progeny.com) already see this as the heart of their 
business, but even old-line Linux vendors such as SuSe and new entrants such as Sun 
tout their release engineering expertise as a competitive advantage. 6 

But even the most successful of these Linux distribution vendors will never achieve 
the revenues or profitability of today s software giants such as Microsoft or Oracle, 
unless they leverage some of the other lessons of history. As demonstrated by both 
the PC hardware market and the ISP industry (which, as noted earlier, is a service 
business built on the commodity protocols and applications of the Internet), com 
modity businesses are low margin for most of the players. Unless companies find 
value up the stack or through an "Intel Inside" opportunity, they must compete only 
through speed and responsiveness, and that s a challenging way to maintain a pric 
ing advantage in a commodity market. 

Early observers of the commodity nature of Linux, such as Red Hat s founder, Bob 
Young, believed that advantage was to be found in building a strong brand. That s 
certainly necessary, but it s not sufficient. It s even possible that contract manufactur 
ers such as Flextronix, which work behind the scenes as industry suppliers rather 
than branded customer-facing entities, may provide a better analogy than Dell for 
some Linux vendors. 

In conclusion, software itself is no longer the primary locus of value in the computer 
industry. The commoditization of software drives value to services enabled by that 
software. New business models are required. 

Network-Enabled Collaboration 

To understand the nature of competitive advantage in the new paradigm, we should 
look not to Linux, but to the Internet, which has already shown signs of how the 
open source story will play out. 



5 Clayton Christensen, Harvard Business Review, Feb. 2004 (http://www. tensilica.com/HBRjeb_04.pdf. 

6 From private communications with SuSe CTO, Juergen Geek, and Sun CTO, Greg 
Papadopoulos. 



260 * * The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



The most common version of the history of free software begins with Richard Stall- 
man s ethically motivated 1984 revolt against proprietary software. It is an appealing 
story centered on a charismatic figure, and leads straight into a narrative in which the 
license he wrote the GPL is the centerpiece. But like most open source advocates, 
who tell a broader story about building better software through transparency and 
code sharing, I prefer to start the history with the style of software development that 
was normal in the early computer industry and academia. Because software was not 
seen as the primary source of value, source code was freely shared throughout the 
early computer industry. 

The Unix software tradition provides a good example. Unix was developed at Bell 
Labs, and was shared freely with university software researchers, who contributed 
many of the utilities and features we take for granted today. The fact that Unix was 
provided under a license that later allowed AT&T to shut down the party when it 
decided it wanted to commercialize Unix, leading ultimately to the rise of BSD Unix 
and Linux as free alternatives, should not blind us to the fact that the early, collabo 
rative development preceded the adoption of an open source licensing model. Open 
source licensing began as an attempt to preserve a culture of sharing, and only later 
led to an expanded awareness of the value of that sharing. 

For the roots of open source in the Unix community, you can look to the research 
orientation of many of the original participants. As Bill Joy noted in his keynote at 
the O Reilly Open Source Convention in 1999, in science, you share your data so 
that other people can reproduce your results. And at Berkeley, he said, we thought of 
ourselves as computer scientists. 7 

But perhaps even more important was the fragmented nature of the early Unix hard 
ware market. With hundreds of competing computer architectures, the only way to 
distribute software was as source! No one had access to all the machines to produce 
the necessary binaries. (This demonstrates the aptness of another of Christensen s 
"laws," the law of conservation of modularity. Because PC hardware was standard 
ized and modular, it was possible to concentrate value and uniqueness in software. 
But because Unix hardware was unique and proprietary, software had to be made 
more open and modular.) 

This software source code exchange culture grew from its research beginnings, but it 
became the hallmark of a large segment of the software industry because of the rise of 
computer networking. 



I like to say that software enables speech between humans and computers. It is also the best way 
to talk about certain aspects of computer science, just as equations are the best ways to talk 
about problems in physics. If you follow this line of reasoning, you realize that many of the 
arguments for free speech apply to open source as well. How else do you tell someone how to 
talk with their computer other than by sharing the code you used to do so? The benefits of open 
source are analogous to the benefits brought by the free flow of ideas through other forms of 
information dissemination. 



Network-Enabled Collaboration X 261 



Much of the role of open source in the development of the Internet is well known: 
the most widely used TCP/IP protocol implementation was developed as part of Ber 
keley networking; BIND runs the DNS, without which none of the web sites we 
depend on would be reachable; Sendmail is the heart of the Internet email back 
bone; Apache is the dominant web server; Perl the dominant language for creating 
dynamic sites; and so on. 

Less often considered is the role of Usenet in mothering the Net we now know. 
Much of what drove public adoption of the Internet was in fact Usenet, that vast dis 
tributed bulletin board. You "signed up" for Usenet by finding a neighbor willing to 
give you a newsfeed. This was a true collaborative network, where mail and news 
were relayed from one cooperating site to another, often taking days to travel from 
one end of the Net to another. Hub sites formed an ad hoc backbone, but everything 
was voluntary. 

Rick Adams, who created UUnet, which was the first major commercial ISP, was a 
free software author (though he never subscribed to any of the free software ideals 
it was simply an expedient way to distribute software he wanted to use). He was the 
author of B News (at the time the dominant Usenet news server) as well as Serial Line 
IP (SLIP), the first implementation of TCP/IP for dial-up lines. But more importantly 
for the history of the Net, Rick was also the hostmaster of the world s largest Usenet 
hub. He realized that the voluntary Usenet was becoming unworkable and that peo 
ple would pay for reliable, well-connected access. UUnet started out as a nonprofit, 
and for several years, much more of its business was based on the earlier Unix-Unix 
Copy Protocol (UUCP) dial-up network than on TCP/IP. As the Internet caught on, 
UUNet and others like it helped bring the Internet to the masses. But at the end of 
the day, the commercial Internet industry started out of a need to provide infrastruc 
ture for the completely collaborative UUCPnet and Usenet. 

The UUCPnet and Usenet were used for email (the first killer app of the Internet), 
but also for software distribution and collaborative tech support. When Larry Wall 
(later famous as the author of Perl) introduced the patch program in 1984, the pon 
derous process of sending around nine-track tapes of source code was replaced by 
the transmission of "patches" editing scripts that update existing source files. Add 
in Richard Stallman s GNU C compiler (gcc), and early source code control systems 
like RCS (eventually replaced by CVS and now Subversion), and you had a situation 
where anyone could share and update free software. The early Usenet was as much a 
"Napster" for shared software as it was a place for conversation. 

The mechanisms that the early developers used to spread and support their work 
became the basis for a cultural phenomenon that reached far beyond the tech sector. 
The heart of that phenomenon was the use of wide area networking technology to con 
nect people around interests, rather than through geographical location or company 
affiliation. This was the beginning of a massive cultural shift that we re still seeing today. 

ZG2 ^ * The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



This cultural shift may have had its first flowering with open source software, but it 
is not intrinsically tied to the use of free and open source licenses and philosophies. 

In 1999, together with Brian Behlendorf of the Apache project, O Reilly founded a 
company called CollabNet to commercialize not the Apache product but the Apache 
process. Unlike many other OSS projects, Apache wasn t founded by a single vision 
ary developer but by a group of users who d been abandoned by their original "ven 
dor" (NCSA) and who agreed to work together to maintain a tool they depended on. 
Apache gives us lessons about intentional wide-area collaborative software develop 
ment that can be applied even by companies that haven t fully embraced open source 
licensing practices. For example, it is possible to apply open source collaborative 
principles inside a large company, even without the intention to release the resulting 
software to the outside world. 

While CollabNet is best known for hosting high-profile, corporate-sponsored, open 
source projects like OpenOffice.org (http://www.openoffice.org), its largest customer 
is actually HP s printer division, where CollabNet s SourceCast platform is used to 
help more than 3,000 internal developers share their code within the corporate 
firewall. Other customers use open source-inspired development practices to share 
code with their customers or business partners or to manage distributed world 
wide development teams. 

But an even more compelling story comes from that archetype of proprietary soft 
ware, Microsoft. Far too few people know the story of the origin of ASP. NET. As told 
to me by its creators, Mark Anders and Scott Guthrie, the two of them wanted to re- 
engineer Microsoft s ASP product to make it XML aware. They were told that doing 
so would break backward compatibility, and the decision was made to stick with the 
old architecture. But when Anders and Guthrie had a month between projects, they 
hacked up their vision anyway, just to see where it would go. Others within 
Microsoft heard about their work, found it useful, and adopted pieces of it. Some six 
or nine months later, they had a call from Bill Gates: "I d like to see your project." 

In short, one of Microsoft s flagship products was born as an internal "code fork," the 
result of two developers "scratching their own itch," and spread within Microsoft in 
much the same way as open source projects spread on the open Internet. It appears that 
open source is the "natural language" of a networked community. Given enough devel 
opers and a network to connect them, open source-style development behavior emerges. 

If you take the position that open source licensing is a means of encouraging Internet- 
enabled collaboration, and focus on the end rather than the means, you ll open a much 
larger tent. You ll see the threads that tie together not just traditional open source 
projects, but also collaborative "computing grid" projects like SETI@home (http:// 
setiathome.ssl.berkdey.edu), user reviews on Amazon.com, technologies like collabora 
tive filtering, new ideas about marketing such as those expressed in The Cluetrain Man 
ifesto (http://www.cluetrain.com/boofe.html), weblogs, and the way that Internet message 

Network-Enabled Collaboration * * 263 



boards can now move the stock market. What started out as a software development 
methodology is increasingly becoming a facet of every field, as network-enabled con 
versations become a principal carrier of new ideas. 

I m particularly struck by how collaboration is central to the success and differentia 
tion of the leading Internet applications. 

eBay is an obvious example almost the definition of a "network effects" business 
in which competitive advantage is gained from the critical mass of buyers and sell 
ers. New entrants into the auction business have a hard time competing, because 
there is no reason for either buyers or sellers to go to a second-tier player. 

Amazon is perhaps even more interesting. Unlike eBay, whose constellation of prod 
ucts is provided by its users and changes dynamically day to day, products identical to 
those Amazon sells are available from other vendors. Yet Amazon seems to enjoy an 
order-of-magnitude advantage over those other vendors. Why? Perhaps it is merely bet 
ter execution, better pricing, better service, and better branding. But one clear differen 
tiator is the superior way that Amazon has leveraged its user community. 

In my talks, I give a simple demonstration. I do a search for products in one of my 
publishing areas, JavaScript. On Amazon.com, the search produces a complex page 
with four main areas. On the top is a block showing the three "most popular" prod 
ucts. Down below is a longer search listing that allows the customer to list products 
by criteria such as best-selling, highest-rated, by price, or simply alphabetically. On 
the right and the left are user-generated "ListMania" lists. These lists allow customers 
to share their recommendations for other titles related to the given subject. 

The section labeled "most popular" might not jump out at first, but as a vendor who 
sells to Amazon.com, I know that it is the result of a complex, proprietary algorithm that 
combines not just sales but also the number and quality of user reviews, user recom 
mendations for alternative products, links from ListMania lists, "also bought" associa 
tions, and all the other things that Amazon refers to as the "flow" around products. 

The particular search that I like to demonstrate is usually topped by my own JavaScript: 
The Definitive Guide. The book has 192 reviews, averaging 4 l /2 stars. Those reviews are 
among the more than 10 million user reviews contributed by Amazon.com customers. 

Now contrast that with the #2 player in online books, Barnesandnoble.com. The top 
result is a book published by Barnes & Noble itself, and there s no evidence of user- 
supplied content. JavaScript: The Definitive Guide has only 18 comments, and the 
order-of-magnitude difference in user participation mirrors the order-of-magnitude 
difference in sales. 

Amazon doesn t have a natural network-effect advantage like eBay, but it has built one 
by architecting its site for user participation. Everything from user reviews, to alter 
nate product recommendations, to ListMania, to the Associates program that allows 
users to earn commissions for recommending books, encourages users to collaborate 

264* C The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



in enhancing the site. Amazon Web Services, introduced in 2001, takes the story even 
further, allowing users to build alternate interfaces and specialized shopping experi 
ences (as well as other unexpected applications) using Amazon s data and commerce 
engine as a back end. 

Amazon s distance from competitors and the security it enjoys as a market leader is 
driven by the value added by its users. If, as Eric Raymond said in The Cathedral & the 
Bazaar, one of the secrets of open source is "treating your users as co-developers," 
Amazon has learned this secret. But note that it s completely independent of open 
source licensing practices! We start to see that what has been presented as a rigidly 
constrained model for open source may consist of a bundle of competencies, not all of 
which will always be found together. 

Google makes a subtler case for the network-effect story. Google s initial innovation was 
the PageRank algorithm, which leverages the collective preferences of web users, 
expressed by their hyperlinks to sites, to produce better search results. In Google s case, 
the user participation is extrinsic to the company and its product, and so can be copied 
by competitors. If this analysis is correct, Google s long-term success will depend on 
finding additional ways to leverage user-created value as a key part of its offering. Ser 
vices such as orkut (http://www.orhut.com) and Gmail (https://gmailgoogle.com) suggest 
that this lesson is not lost on them. 

Now consider a counter-example. MapQuest is another pioneer that created an inno 
vative type of web application that almost every Internet user relies on. Yet the mar 
ket is shared fairly evenly among MapQuest (now owned by AOL), Maps.yahoo.com, 
and Maps.msn.com (powered by MapPoint). All three provide a commodity busi 
ness powered by standardized software and databases. None of them has made a 
concerted effort to leverage user-supplied content, or engage its users in building out 
the application. (Note also that all three are enabling an Intel Inside-style opportu 
nity for data suppliers such as NAVTEQ, now planning a multibillion-dollar IPO!) 

Customizability and Software-as-Service 

The last of my three Cs, customizability, is an essential concomitant of software as a 
service. It s especially important to highlight this aspect because it illustrates just why 
dynamically typed languages like Perl, Python, and PHP, so often denigrated by old- 
paradigm software developers as mere "scripting languages," are so important in 
today s software scene. 

As I wrote in my 1997 essay "Hardware, Software and Infoware": 

If you look at a large web site like Yahoo!, you ll see that behind the scenes, an 
army of administrators and programmers are continually rebuilding the prod 
uct. Dynamic content isn t just automatically generated, it is also often hand tai 
lored, typically using an array of quick and dirty scripting tools. 



Customizability and Software-as-Service * C 265 



The Architecture of Participation 

I ve come to use the phrase the architecture of participation to describe the nature 
of systems that are designed for user contribution. Larry Lessig s book, Code and 
Other Laws of Cyberspace (http://www.code-is-Iaw.org), which he characterizes as 
an extended meditation on Mitch Kapor s maxim, "architecture is politics," made 
the case that we need to pay attention to the architecture of systems if we want 
to understand their effects. 

I immediately thought of Kernighan and Pike s description of the Unix software 
tools philosophy (http://tim.oreilly.com/articles/paradigmshif t_0504.html). I also 
recalled an unpublished portion of the interview we did with Linus Torvalds to cre 
ate his essay for the 1998 book, Open Sources (http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/ 
opensources) . Linus too expressed a sense that architecture may be more important 
than source code. "I couldn t do what I did with Linux for Windows, even if I had 
the source code. The architecture just wouldn t support it." Too much of the Win 
dows source code consists of interdependent, tightly coupled layers for a single 
developer to drop in a replacement module. 

And of course, the Internet and the World Wide Web have this participatory archi 
tecture in spades. As outlined earlier in the section on software commoditization 
(http://tim.oreilly.com/articles/paradigmshift_0504.html\ a system designed around 
communications protocols is intrinsically designed for participation. Anyone can 
create a participating, first-class component. 

In addition, the IETF (http://www.ietf.org), the Internet standards process, has a 
great many similarities to an open source software project. The only substantial 
difference is that the lETF s output is a standards document rather than a code 
module. Especially in the early years, anyone could participate simply by joining 
a mailing list and having something to say, or by showing up at one of the three 
annual face-to-face meetings. Standards were decided by participating individu 
als, irrespective of their company affiliations. The very name for proposed Inter 
net standards, Request for Comment (RFCs), reflects the participatory design of 
the Net. Though commercial participation was welcomed and encouraged, com 
panies, like individuals, were expected to compete on the basis of their ideas and 
implementations, not their money or disproportional representation. The IETF 
approach is where open source and open standards meet. 



26B x * The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



And while there are successful open source projects like Sendmail, which are 
largely the creation of a single individual and have a monolithic architecture, 
those that have built large development communities have done so because they 
have a modular architecture that allows easy participation by independent or 
loosely coordinated developers. The use of Perl, for example, exploded along 
with CPAN (http://www.cpan.org), the Comprehensive Perl Archive Network, and 
Perl s module system, which allowed anyone to enhance the language with spe 
cialized functions, and make them available to other users. 

The Web, however, took the idea of participation to a new level, because it 
opened that participation not just to software developers but to all users of the 
system. 

It has always baffled and disappointed me that the open source community has 
not claimed the Web as one of its greatest success stories. If you asked most end 
users, they are most likely to associate the Web with proprietary clients such as 
Microsoft s Internet Explorer than with the revolutionary open source architec 
ture that made the Web possible. That s a PR failure! Tim Berners-Lee s original 
web implementation was not just open source, it was public domain. NCSA s 
web server and Mosaic browser were not technically open source, but source was 
freely available. While the move of the NCSA team to Netscape sought to take 
key parts of the web infrastructure to the proprietary side, and the Microsoft- 
Netscape battles made it appear that the Web was primarily a proprietary soft 
ware battleground, we should know better. Apache, the phoenix that grew from 
the NCSA server, kept the open vision alive, keeping the standards honest, and 
not succumbing to proprietary embrace-and-extend strategies. 

But even more significantly, HTML, the language of web pages, opened partici 
pation to ordinary users, not just software developers. The "View Source" menu 
item migrated from Tim Berners-Lee s original browser, to Mosaic, and then on 
to Netscape Navigator and even Microsoft s Internet Explorer. Though no one 
thinks of HTML as an open source technology, its openness was absolutely key 
to the explosive spread of the Web. Barriers to entry for "amateurs" were low, 
because anyone could look "over the shoulder" of anyone else producing a web 
page. Dynamic content created with interpreted languages continued the trend 
toward transparency. 

And more germane to my argument here, the fundamental architecture of hyper- 
linking ensures that the value of the Web is created by its users. 



Customizability and Software-as-Service 267 



It s worth noting an observation made by Clay Shirky in a talk at O Reilly s 2001 P2P 
and Web Services Conference (http://conferences.oreillynet.com/p2p) (now renamed 
the Emerging Technology Conference [http://conferences.oreillynet.com/et2003] ), 
titled "Listening to Napster." There are three ways to build a large database, said 
Clay. The first, demonstrated by Yahoo!, is to pay people to do it. The second, 
inspired by lessons from the open source community, is to get volunteers to perform 
the same task. The Open Directory Project (http://dmoz.org/about.html~), an open 
source Yahoo! competitor, is the result. (Wikipedia [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Main_Page] provides another example.) But Napster (http://www.napster.com) dem 
onstrates a third way. Because Napster set its defaults to automatically share any 
music that was downloaded, every user automatically helped to build the value of 
the shared database. 

This architectural insight may actually be more central to the success of open 
source than the more frequently cited appeal to volunteerism. The architectures 
of Linux, the Internet, and the World Wide Web are such that users pursuing 
their own "selfish" interests build collective value as an automatic byproduct. In 
other words, these technologies demonstrate some of the same network effect as 
eBay and Napster, simply through the way that they have been designed. 

These projects can be seen to have a natural architecture of participation. But as 
Amazon demonstrates, by consistent effort (as well as economic incentives such 
as the Associates program), it is possible to overlay such an architecture on a sys 
tem that would not normally seem to possess it. 



"We don t create content at Yahoo! We aggregate it," says Jeffrey Friedl, author of the 
book Mastering Regular Expressions and a full-time Perl programmer at Yahoo! "We 
have feeds from thousands of sources, each with its own format. We do massive 
amounts of feed processing to clean this stuff up or to find out where to put it on 
Yahoo!" For example, to link appropriate news stories to tickers at Finance. yahoo. 
com, Friedl needed to write a "name recognition" program able to search for more 
than 15,000 company names. Perl s ability to analyze free-form text with powerful 
regular expressions was what made that possible. 

Perl has been referred to as "the duct tape of the Internet," and like duct tape, dynamic 
languages like Perl are important to web sites like Yahoo! and Amazon for the same 
reason that duct tape is important not just to heating system repairmen but to anyone 
who wants to hold together a rapidly changing installation. Go to any lecture or stage 
play, and you ll see microphone cords and other wiring held down by duct tape. 

We re used to thinking of software as an artifact rather than a process. And to be sure, 
even in the new paradigm, there are software artifacts, programs, and commodity 



268 \ C The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



components that must be engineered to exacting specifications because they will be 
used again and again. But it is in the area of software that is not commoditized, the 
"glue" that ties together components, the scripts for managing data and machines, and 
all the areas that need frequent change or rapid prototyping, that dynamic languages 
shine. 

Sites like Google, Amazon, and eBay especially those reflecting the dynamic of user 
participation are not just products, they are processes. 

I like to tell people the story of the Mechanical Turk, a 1770 hoax that pretended to be 
a mechanical chess-playing machine. The secret, of course, was that a man was hidden 
inside. The Turk actually played a small role in the history of computing. When 
Charles Babbage played against the Turk in 1820 (and lost), he saw through the hoax, 
but was moved to wonder whether a true computing machine would be possible. 

Now, in an ironic circle, applications once more have people hidden inside them. 
Take a copy of Microsoft Word and a compatible computer, and it will still run 10 
years from now. But without the constant crawls to keep the search engine fresh, the 
constant product updates at an Amazon or eBay, the administrators who keep it all 
running, the editors and designers who integrate vendor- and user-supplied content 
into the interface, and in the case of some sites, even the warehouse staff who deliver 
the products, the Internet-era application no longer performs its function. 

This is truly not the software business as it was even a decade ago. Of course, there 
have always been enterprise software businesses with this characteristic. (American 
Airlines Sabre reservations system is an obvious example.) But only now have they 
become the dominant paradigm for new computer-related businesses. 

The first generation of any new technology is typically seen as an extension to the 
previous generations. And so, through the 1990s, most people experienced the Inter 
net as an extension or add-on to the personal computer. Email and web browsing 
were powerful add-ons, to be sure, and they gave added impetus to a personal com 
puter industry that was running out of steam. 

(Open source advocates can take ironic note of the fact that many of the most important 
features of Microsoft s new operating system releases since Windows 95 have been 
designed to emulate Internet functionality originally created by open source developers.) 

But now, we re starting to see the shape of a very different future. Napster brought us 
peer-to-peer file sharing, Seti@home introduced millions of people to the idea of dis 
tributed computation, and now web services are starting to make even huge data 
base-backed sites like Amazon and Google appear to act like components of an even 
larger system. Vendors such as IBM and HP bandy about phrases like computing on 
demand and pervasive computing. 

The boundaries between cell phones, wirelessly connected laptops, and even con 
sumer devices like the iPod and TiVO are all blurring. Each now gets a large part of its 

Customizability and Software-as-Service C 263 



value from software that resides elsewhere. Dave Stutz characterizes this as software 
above the level of a single device (http://www.s3/nthesist.net/wnting/onleavingms.html). 8 

Building the Internet Operating System 

I like to say that we re entering the stage where we will treat the Internet as if it were a 
single virtual computer. To do that, we need to create an Internet operating system. 

The large question before us is this: what kind of operating system is it going to be? 
The lesson of Microsoft is that if you leverage insight into a new paradigm, you will 
find the secret that will give you control over the industry, the "one ring to rule them 
all," so to speak. Contender after contender has set out to dethrone Microsoft and 
take that ring, only to fail. But the lesson of open source and the Internet is that we 
can build an operating system that is designed from the ground up as "small pieces 
loosely joined," with an architecture that makes it easy for anyone to participate in 
building the value of the system. 

The values of the free and open source community are an important part of its para 
digm. Just as the Copernican revolution was part of a broader social revolution that 
turned society away from hierarchy and received knowledge, and instead sparked a 
spirit of inquiry and knowledge sharing, open source is part of a communications 
revolution designed to maximize the free sharing of ideas expressed in code. 

But free software advocates go too far when they eschew any limits on sharing, and 
define the movement by adherence to a restrictive set of software licensing practices. 
The open source movement has made a concerted effort to be more inclusive. Eric 
Raymond describes The Open Source Definition (http://www.opensource.org/docs/ 
de/initton.php) as a "provocation to thought," a "social contract... and an invitation to 
join the network of those who adhere to it." 9 But even though the open source move 
ment is much more business friendly and supports the right of developers to choose 
nonfree licenses, it still uses the presence of software licenses that enforce sharing as 
its litmus test. 

The lessons of previous paradigm shifts show us a subtler and more powerful story 
than one that merely pits a gift culture against a monetary culture, and a community 
of sharers versus those who choose not to participate. Instead, we see a dynamic 
migration of value, in which things that were once kept for private advantage are 



Dave Stutz notes (in a private email response to an early draft of this piece), this software 
"includes not only what I call collective software that is aware of groups and individuals, but 
also software that is customized to its location on the network, and also software that is 
customized to a device or a virtualized hosting environment. These additional types of 
customization lead away from shrinkwrap software that runs on a single PC or PDA/ 
smartphone and toward personalized software that runs on the network and is delivered via 
many devices simultaneously." 
From a private email response from Eric Raymond to an earlier draft of this paper. 



270 X The Open Source Paradigm Shift 



now shared freely, and things that were once thought incidental become the locus of 
enormous value. It s easy for free and open source advocates to see this dynamic as a 
fall from grace, a hoarding of value that should be shared with all. But a historical 
view tells us that the commoditization of older technologies and the crystallization of 
value in new technologies is part of a process that advances the industry and creates 
more value for all. What is essential is to find a balance, in which we as an industry 
create more value than we capture as individual participants, enriching the com 
mons that allows for further development by others. 

I cannot say where things are going to end. But as Alan Kay once said, "The best way 
to predict the future is to invent it." 10 Where we go next is up to all of us. 

Conclusion 

The Open Source Definition and works such as The Cathedral & the Bazaar tried to 
codify the fundamental principles of open source. 

But as Kuhn notes, speaking of scientific pioneers who opened new fields of study: 

Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group 
of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, 
it was sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined 
group of practitioners to resolve. Achievements that share these two characteris 
tics, I shall refer to as "paradigms." 11 

In short, if it is sufficiently robust an innovation to qualify as a new paradigm, the 
open source story is far from over, and its lessons far from completely understood. 
Instead of thinking of open source only as a set of software licenses and associated 
software development practices, we do better to think of it as a field of scientific and 
economic inquiry, one with many historical precedents, and part of a broader social 
and economic story. We must understand the impact of such factors as standards 
and their effect on commoditization, system architecture and network effects, and 
the development practices associated with software as a service. We must study these 
factors when they appear in proprietary software as well as when they appear in tra 
ditional open source projects. We must understand the ways in which the means by 
which software is deployed change the way in which it is created and used. We must 
also see how the same principles that led to early source code sharing may impact 
other fields of collaborative activity. Only when we stop measuring open source by 
what activities are excluded from the definition, and begin to study its fellow travel 
ers on the road to the future, will we understand its true impact and be fully pre 
pared to embrace the new paradigm. 



10 Alan Kay, spoken at a 1971 internal Xerox planning meeting, as quoted at http://www.lisarein.com/ 
alankay/tour.html (http://www.lisarein.com/alankay/tour.html\ 

1 1 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (http://www. press, uchicaeo eduJcsi-bin/hfs en/ 
00/13220.ctl\ 10. 





b CHAPTER 17 

Pamela Jones 




Extending Open Source 
Principles Beyond Software 
Development 



It starts with an idea. 

Linus, for example, realized that if he put his kernel project online, people all around 
the world could work on it together, without having to be in the same building. They 
could quite literally write software in public that way, scattered around the world 
though they were. 

Understanding such simple things changes the world sometimes. 

But what about other areas? Is it possible to extend that same process to other kinds 
of work, or is it suitable only for software development? One thing can now be said 
for sure: legal research can be done that way. Groklaw is the proof of concept. But as 
I will explain, you need to tweak things just a bit. 

I ve done legal research for a living as a paralegal, and now I ve done it with the world 
as a Groklaw volunteer, and I am therefore in a position to make comparisons. I think 
any company involved in any legal dispute that touches on technology could profit 
from using the open source method to tap into the community s group knowledge 
pool. 

I m a good researcher, and I do excellent work, but I know without a doubt that the 
input from thousands of readers made a huge difference in what Groklaw was able to 
accomplish in digging up helpful information in the SCO litigation. 



How Did It Happen and How Does It Work? 

When I began, it was just 1 il ol me. I had read Slashdot enough to know that while 
there was a high level of technical knowledge in some of the site s readers, the level of 
legal knowledge was low. I also saw there was a hunger to understand the law. Techni 
cal information that could influence the outcome of a lawsuit was available there, but it 
was not reaching the attorneys. And legal information that could help techies know 
what to dig up and helpfully provide was not readily available to the FOSS community. 

At the beginning, I was trying to learn how to blog, because I had a job interview for 
a freelance assignment helping an attorney with his legal blog. You have to write 
something if you are blogging, so I decided to write about what I knew best, which is 
legal research. It felt private, like a diary, and I didn t think anyone would find what I 
was writing about or care much if they did. 

I wrote to the air, thinking no one would read it anyway, and I horsed around, finding 
funny graphics for as many of the entries as I could, but it was just for fun, just to learn. 
I eventually chose to focus on the SCO v. IBM case because it appealed to my sense of 
humor and stirred my hatred of injustice, and because I knew quite a bit about the GPL, 
as it happened, and I knew SCO was going to fail on that part of its claims. I was also 
quite confident that Linus was not going to infringe on anyone s code on purpose. So, 
every day I d add a little bit more to the story, as I saw news stories about the case and 
SCO s claims. I wrote as though I were talking with a good friend over dinner who 
asked me, "So, what s this SCO case all about? Is there any chance they could win?" 

I didn t dumb anything down, because I wasn t thinking about an audience anyway, 
and I went into the research I was finding as deeply as possible. It did occur to me 
that I might find some things that would be helpful to Linus and to IBM I figured 
IBM might have a service that scours the Net to find IBM-related stories but that 
was the extent of my ambition. I knew most attorneys don t know a lot about com 
puters or Linux or the GPL, and I knew a fair amount about them all, so I felt like I 
was throwing a message in a bottle out into the ocean, just hoping someone would 
find it and it would be useful. 

After a couple of months, I got an email from a stranger, asking if I could please 
make the graphics smaller, because he was in Europe on dial-up and the blog took 
forever to resolve. He sent me instructions on how to do it. 

Until that email, I had never bothered to read the stats on my site, even though Radio 
Userland, the software I started blogging with, provides them. I come from a family 
that has very little interest in computers, and I was used to people being emphati 
cally uninterested in things I find fascinating, I didn t expect even my mother to read 
my blog. So, when I got the email, I was floored. I wrote back that I didn t know any 
one was reading what I was writing, and he told me that lots of people read Groklaw, 
and that the community appreciated very much what I was doing. I was simply 
floored. I think I will remember that feeling until the day I die. 

274 * x Extending Open Source Principles Beyond Software Development 



I looked at the stats and found out hundreds of people were reading what I was writ 
ing, apparently regularly. I turned on comments and, little by little, information 
began to be offered, particularly when I would ask for it, which I did more and more. 
Radio Userland also has stats on where your readers come from, what web site they 
visited before clicking on your site, and what I saw from that was that my readership 
was consistently growing, it was all word of mouth at that time, and the caliber of 
reader was very high. It included a high number of lawyers and programmers and 
professors at universities, from all over the world. 

Finally came the idea. I had dug up some information about a Linux kernel author 
who made contributions to the kernel while an employee at Caldera, and when 
Slashdot put that article up on its site, the first time that had happened to Groklaw, 
the number of readers exploded. Even better, they had more information to offer. 
One would find an old press release, another an article from five years ago, another a 
speech by an executive, and so on. 

When I saw that start to happen, I created a Legal Links page (http://www.grofelaw.net/ 
staticpages/index.php?page=kgal-links\ with links to legal resources, and started point 
ing to articles explaining things like copyright and patent law, things readers needed 
to understand so as to know which article or which press release detail mattered. 

I realized then that Groklaw could be a bridge between the tech and the legal worlds, 
and that if I explained clearly how the court system works and what kind of evi 
dence is valuable in that context, the community would find it, add what they knew, 
and it could work. The necessary pieces were in place. And I suddenly but totally 
understood the power inherent in this process of open, group effort. It felt like try 
ing to ride a giant wave, as opposed to trying to turn on and then direct a stream of 
water in a particular direction. It had a life of its own, and my job was to try to fol 
low the flow, not control it. 

We found more and more. The readers built on each other s knowledge, and I 
learned that way too. My email level shot up also, as readers more and more began 
sending me tips and links and information. At the time, reporters were faithfully 
writing down every word the SCO folks spoke and reporting it as if it were all true, 
so I began reaching out to journalists. As we found information, I sent it to journal 
ists, and some, to their credit, responded; some immediately, others over time. 

Working as a Group 

The first group project, in the sense of planned action, was to help everyone know how 
to write to journalists and editors so as to get good results. The FOSS community is not 
a group of phonies, and they tend to speak their minds. Also, a lot of us geeks are not 
socially skilled, so sometimes journalists would tell me how offensive the email they got 
had been. So, I put up on Groklaw examples of good letters, letters that did not offend, 
and the point was well received, so much so that I had two journalists remark that they 
never got any flames or nasty email from Groklaw readers. 

Working as a Group J* 275 



At one point, we decided that someone should answer Darl McBride, CEO of SCO. 
He had written an open letter to the open source community. I asked if my readers 
felt like writing a response, and they did, so we worked on it online together, in the 
open. After all, his letter was addressed to us. Ideas would be left as comments, and 
then I d incorporate them into the letter and post the next version; Then readers 
would suggest tweaks and more data, which I d then incorporate and post the next 
version, until we were all satisfied. It took about two weeks. The Inquirer, which had 
been watching us create it, offered to post the letter and an accompanying collection 
of research supporting the points we had written on its web site. 

This was very helpful, because by then, so many comments were being placed on 
Groklaw hundreds more than any other site on Radio Userland that the software 
was struggling, and we were afraid that if we got any more traffic, we d simply melt 
off the Internet. That letter led to another growth spurt of Groklaw members, and at 
around that point, we simply had to move to larger quarters, and ibiblio graciously 
invited us on board after a Groklaw member wrote them to petition on our behalf. 

It was still the early days, back in the fall of 2003, and we hadn t yet attracted many 
trolls or astroturfers, which is why it all worked so well. We were a group of like- 
minded people, all striving toward a common goal. No one cared a bit about credit, only 
results, and it was refreshing, even if it was one of the hardest things I ve ever done. 

What did I learn? That there truly is wisdom in crowds, and that you can rely on 
someone in such a group thinking of everything you truly need. Also, that some 
body has to be willing to work harder than everyone else and be the final arbiter, or 
nothing ends up getting done. Later in Groklaw s development, there were other les 
sons to be learned. 

Dealing with the Disrupters 

As Groklaw became more popular and began winning recognition, along came the 
deliberate disrupters. I got my Ph.D. in trolls and astroturfer, you might say, so I ll 
share with you some things I learned in the University of Trolldom and Astroturfing, 
because it has a bearing on whether an open legal research project will succeed or fail. 

Here s what I know. Trolls are mean. I can t stress that enough. If they see you trying 
to go to the right, they push to the left. Then they place comments whining that you 
won t go to the left or insist you ought to be going left but are going right when you 
shouldn t be. It doesn t matter at all that you are correct in wanting to go to the right. 
It doesn t matter that it s your decision to make. It doesn t matter that they are inter 
fering with the work you ve set out to accomplish. They are spoilers, and the bigger 
the blotch they leave on your page, the better they like it. There is nothing to do with 
a troll but delete his comments when you are sure trolling is the purpose. If you are 
weak in the knees and can t bring yourself to do that, trolls will destroy your open 
group project. It s that simple and clear. They enjoy destroying what you want to do. 

Z7B X Extending Open Source Principles Beyond Software Development 



When the open source project is legal research, you also must expect that the side 
you are working against will show up. They won t be wearing an ID tag. They are 
essentially spies. Here s how you will know: they work harder than anyone at first, 
and when they think you are lulled, they try to destroy your reputation and maybe 
your life, if they have the resources to do so. The interval when they are helping, 
however, has one purpose only: to gather information to use against you later and to 
form relationships with your volunteers, so they can undermine from within. It s 
absolutely essential to identify and either eject or corral such individuals. I can t 
explain how to do this in great detail until after the SCO wars are over, but it s not 
impossible to do. Of course, you need a strong stomach and a bit of a tinfoil hat. 

I will give just one example. The very first such individual showed up when Groklaw 
was very new. He began by attacking Linux, then pretended to have an epiphany 
thanks to Groklaw, and then tried to stir my readers into unhelpful actions. For 
example, he suggested that everyone send Darl McBride certified letters protesting 
his actions. Certified letters. Right: SCO would have everyone s address. 

Another time, he suggested everyone go to court in Groklaw T-shirts and take PDAs 
and phones to record the session, which they could stream to Groklaw live. That, of 
course, would have been a problem. First, the T-shirts would have made partici 
pants look undignified, but it would also have made them easily identifiable. This 
was not helpful. And recording a court session is a violation of court rules. I could 
just see the headline, so I had to put the kibosh on that fast. I did so by deleting his 
comments. 

I know someone will put up a web site all about this now, but I don t care. You need 
to know that such things will happen, and you must be ruthless in making sure such 
individuals don t take over. They will try. Some will be fooled and will criticize you 
for stomping on the spy s ideas, which he will offer with so much mock sincerity, it 
isn t hard to comprehend how others accept it at face value. You can t explain pub 
licly that you researched the individual and are reasonably sure they are a spy, and 
you must just take your lumps. Let them put up web sites. In the end, what matters 
most is that they are isolated. 

Astroturfers are sometimes of that same mind, but usually they just want to steer the 
conversation their way. They don t want to be kicked off, so they are subtler. We 
have had a number of astroturfers. I call them the "I used to love Groklaw, but" 
crowd. Some of them look, at first, like spies. They work harder than anyone, take in 
all the info they can about you and how you work, and then diverging from the spy 
path they try to steer your project their way. If they fail, at some manufactured 
moment they publicly find fault with you and your work and loudly make their 
grievances known to the world, using your own web site and others to try to destroy 
your reputation. Sometimes they ll put up whole web sites about it. They re mean 
too, but it s just a job. Nothing personal. They just play-act the emotion. 



Dealing with the Disrupters ** 277 



All three groups will, sad to say, appeal to some of your readers. They deliberately 
manufacture issues they know will draw followers. If you leave their comments on 
your site, they will take over the conversation and readers will leave in disgust. If you 
moderate them away, they will loudly proclaim their love for freedom of speech, and 
some will join them, not realizing they are being played like violins. The purpose is 
to destroy your project and make sure it never succeeds. This is something that 
rarely happens in Linux kernel development, and in my experience it requires tweak 
ing the open source process just enough to keep getting your work done. 

Deciding what goes into the Linux kernel is a breeze in comparison to deciding whose 
ideas can be trusted in doing legal research. You must trust your instincts, and it is one 
of the most important reasons the majority can never rule when doing research. 

The Difference Between Doing Legal Research in Public and Writing 
Software in Public 

I mention all this because if you are doing legal research in public, sometimes you 
can t say in the open all you might say privately or if doing legal research for a firm. 
Parties are in litigation really don t want to show the other side their cards until trial, 
as you may have observed in the protracted discovery wars between IBM and SCO. 

You may have an idea for an avenue to research, for example, but you don t know 
what the result of your research might be. If it is negative, it might not be wise to 
present the news that you are researching this area until you know what you have 
found. Sometimes information that seems negative, upon deeper digging, turns out 
to be helpful, and you very much might want to wait to tell the world all about it. It 
isn t a matter of hiding information; it s more a question of timing and presentation. 

Someone in a legal research project has to know what to keep private and what to 
make public. There is a great deal at stake, and the outcome can be affected by the 
decisions you make. That simply never happens in developing the kernel. So as time 
went on, I built up a feel for whom I could trust in an inner circle of advisers, for 
both legal and technical research. No one person can do everything, so spreading out 
the responsibility is vital. 

I view the most beneficial structure for such work as a kind of pyramid, where any 
one is free to contribute at the bottom of the structure, but as the information moves 
up the chain, it finally has to go through one or a few at the top of the pyramid. In 
my experience, that person or persons must be able to say no and mean it, come 
what may. They must know enough about legal work to intelligently decide what 
should and should not be published and in which direction to take the work next. 
And they have to have thick skin, because criticism is sure to come from those who 
wish to turn the process upside down and have all decisions made by some kind of 
democratic vote. Linus doesn t even do things that way, but some will be sure he 
does and will try to make you follow such a setup. 

278 X Extending Open Source Principles Beyond Software Development 



Perhaps that works in other fields, but in my experience it doesn t in legal research. 
It probably would work beautifully if all the volunteers were lawyers, paralegals, and 
professors. Or it might work if your geek contingent didn t vote on legal issues, only 
tech issues. Otherwise, you are doomed, because it is hard for those who aren t legally 
trained to realize just how complex the law really is, and when they learn a little, they 
sometimes think they know enough to begin running the process. A little knowledge 
can actually be worse than none at all, especially when accompanied by a lack of humil 
ity. I could write three chapters on this subject, but I ll spare you. 

The reverse is true for me with tech decisions. I know I am not the expert there, so I 
never make those decisions. I trust reliable lieutenants to decide such things, and I 
listen to my readers very carefully. 

It s the same with deciding which stories to mention and which to ignore. Part of 
Groklaw s purpose is antiFUD, but there is so much of it, what do you cover? I ve 
learned to trust my readers opinions on this, and if I get a lot of email about a story, 
I know it matters, even if I didn t think so originally. So, there is a kind of group 
decision-making. 

In many ways, it s not unlike the kernel process, but there are elements of necessary 
secrecy in legal research that you don t have in programming. No one is likely to sue you 
for what you post about the kernel, but someone very well may over open legal research. 

For example, we tried a second public group project a summary page and the 
troll-astroturf contribution was so high, I was afraid of being sued, because they left 
outrageous comments that I frantically scurried to get rid of, and they presented 
ideas that while sounding superficially plausible were actually designed to take 
the work in a direction that would undermine the effectiveness. 

Eventually, we had to take the work private, which was not a huge problem, because 
by then I knew who was skilled at this kind of thing. Groklaw is a meritocracy. I 
leave the structure loose, so anyone can volunteer to do anything they feel like doing, 
but over time, I notice whose work is most useful, and others usually agree. 

Still, it s an unfortunate thing that we had to do that project behind the scenes, because 
we had to limit ourselves to only those we already knew, which is not desirable in an 
open project. The workaround I ve found is to do the fundamental work with known 
and trusted volunteers, and then post the results for comment and tweaking by the 
public at large. That keeps the door open to some brainiac newcomer, which you want, 
but it doesn t let spies and disrupters ruin things, which you don t want. 

Why and When It Works 

I don t think the process would work as well for a less, shall we say, inspiring case. 
Volunteers responded because they seriously cared about the outcome, not because 
they found learning to do legal research fascinating. I have gotten a lot of email about 

Why and When It Works ** 279 



enjoying the learning, actually, but I also know that SCO was an inspiration. For 
some, watching an attack on Linux is like watching someone kick Dorothy s dog, 
Toto: people get mad and want to do something about it. You don t get the same 
response in all cases or by paying people. There isn t enough money in the world to 
pay me for the amount of work I donated to Groklaw, the nights without sleep, the 
anxiety, or the jerks I had to deal with sometimes, if I may speak plainly. 

But it isn t by any means the only case I or my readers care about. Patents and stan 
dards also interest the FOSS community and should there eventually be a patent 
infringement attack on Linux or GNU/Linux, as I believe there will be, I know for 
sure that the community will react and be available to help. I hope and expect that 
Groklaw will be ready to be useful again, perhaps in doing prior-art searches, for 
example, which could definitely be done completely in the open, in contrast to the 
legal research in the SCO case. 

I also know that if a company had a tech issue and needed to tap into the Groklaw 
group mind, they could simply place the issue as a comment, and readers would tell 
them whatever they knew. The encouragement on Groklaw is that you provide either 
a URL or personal experience to back up the thoughts you ve expressed, so that any 
one can follow the thread and prove or disprove it. That is vital. It lets everyone 
know that what they comment about is important, that they must stand behind what 
they write and be responsible to be careful. 

The power of applying open source principals to legal research is real. I ve lived it, 
and I feel it. It worked because no one knows as much as all of us together. There is 
no law firm in the world that can afford to hire the numbers of researchers Groklaw 
made available. And a small group of trained paralegals would not have been able to 
find all the technical information that we at Groklaw found together. 

So the bottom line is this: as long as there is the heart and the will to do it, the open 
source process is effective in doing legal research. If you would like to experience it 
in action, come and join in the fun. 



Z80 * * Extending Open Source Principles Beyond Software Development 





b CHAPTER 1 

Andrew Hessel 




Open Source Biology 



Open source software (OSS) has played a central role in the growth of the Internet 
and increases in economic importance each year. It has rapidly changed the face of 
computing, with server side companies like Sun Microsystems, to end-user compa 
nies such as Adobe, to full platform/service companies like IBM incorporating open 
source into their offerings. With this success, open source is poised to diversify its 
influence. One experiment is open source biology (OSB), the idea that biological 
products such as drugs, vaccines, or pest-resistant crops, can be developed using 
open intellectual property (IP) models. 

Academic science, like open source, supports the belief that knowledge evolves best 
when ideas, data, and methods are freely shared, and each contributor can build on the 
works of others. Universities have housed and promoted scientific thought for more 
than 1,000 years, creating a public commons. In contrast, alchemy is the forerunner of 
modem business. Today, with academic research a valuable economic good, weighing 
the societal benefits of freeing or protecting IP is a pressing challenge. In no scientific 
discipline is this more important than biology, central to all living things. 

Commercial biotechnology was founded on the premise that strong IP protection was 
necessary. However, after nearly three decades, a sustainable industry has not yet been 
achieved. Public mistrust of the genetic technology persists. Now, with biology facing a 
paradigm shift, one where synthetic DNA will replace conventional manipulations, 
genetic engineering is converging with software engineering. OSB, guided by lessons 
from open software development, could result in a new, economically supportable 
route to biological products. 



The Rise of Modern Biotechnology 

The success of the Manhattan Project brought university research to national atten 
tion at the end of World War II. Recognizing the economic and defensive value of 
this work, the project s director, Vannevar Bush, produced a report for President 
Roosevelt titled "Science The Endless Frontier," encouraging greater federal sup 
port for public research. This document led to the creation of both the National Insti 
tutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), now the main 
agencies that support life science studies. 

Through the late 1960s, biological science was conducted almost exclusively within 
academia and had few ties to business. The commercial value of biology was unrec 
ognized. Drugs were chemicals and pharmaceutical innovation had stalled in the 
absence of new targets. Chemistry and engineering, not biology, represented the 
majority of industry partnerships. Where university-industry relationships did exist, 
activity was generally low. Technology transfer occurred primarily via corporations 
hiring university graduates or academic consultants. 

In the early 1970s, a new generation of life science companies began to appear, with 
some focused on developing DNA technologies. Although DNA was discovered in 
1953, it had remained a curiosity of chemists. The amino acids (the fundamental 
building blocks of proteins) corresponding to genetic code were not determined until 
1965, and few techniques existed to "read" or edit the chemical instructions. A 
breakthrough came in 1973 when biologists Stanley Cohen (Stanford) and Herbert 
Boyer (UCSF) developed a practical way to manipulate DNA constructs. Their 
method for recombinant DNA technology, published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences later that year, described how fragments of DNA could be 
directly cloned and expressed in other cells. 

With recombinant techniques, snippets of the molecule could be "cut" from one 
genome and "pasted" into the DNA of another with enzymatic tools. Common 
microbes like the gut bacterium Escherichia coli could be transformed into miniature 
factories, able to make biochemical products difficult or impossible to synthesize 
using standard chemistries. DNA created an efficient way to develop biologicals, 
including vaccines, viral components, or even complex proteins like hormones or 
antibodies. Heavily touted in the scientific and popular media, genetic engineering 
created great expectations for the future. 

News of this technology reached Neils Reimer, the director of Stanford University s pat 
enting and licensing efforts. Earlier, Reimer had developed a novel IP capture scheme 
intended to grow licensing revenues. Under his plan, IP was solicited proactively, with 
any resulting royalties split equally 0/3 each) between the submitting researcher, the 
researcher s department, and the university. With scientists benefiting directly, IP sub 
missions increased significantly. Pleased with the results, Stanford went on to create a 



2K ^ C Open Source Biology 



formal IP development service, the University Office of Technology Licensing, one of 
the first dedicated technology transfer offices in the country. 

Reimer recognized how attractive the new DNA technology would be to industry. 
Cohen gave his permission to proceed with a patent, but true to academic princi 
ples, disavowed any personal share of proceeds. Reimer s application to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) became the center of scientific and public 
controversy. Apart from the safety of genetic engineering, concerns included opposi 
tion to the patenting of a general research method, questions over the patentability of 
life forms and genes (eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty\ and how university commercial activities might threaten free inquiry. 
Complicating matters, government policies that addressed the ownership of inven 
tions made using federal funds were vague. 

Eventually, commercial interest outweighed safety and regulatory concerns, and U.S. 
patent 4,237,224 was granted to the two universities in December of 1980. Two 
other applications related to the technology, collectively known as the Cohen-Boyer 
recombinant DNA cloning patent, were also issued and describe some of the fundamen 
tal tools for the sciences of molecular biology and genetics. 

Commercial biotechnology began with a handshake deal. In 1975, venture capitalist 
Robert Swanson met Boyer at a bar near the UCSF campus. Over drinks, they formed a 
plan to create a company to sell gene-based medicines. They incorporated Genentech 
(Genetic Engineering Technology) the following year, with each making an initial invest 
ment of $500 in the firm. Two years later, the company had successfully cloned and 
expressed the gene for human insulin, a remarkable achievement for the day. When 
Genentech shares soared at IPO in 1980, they initiated a wave of speculative activity that 
carried another dozen biotechnology firms to the market over the next 24 months. 

The biotech boom quickly transformed the congenial, open world of biological 
research into a genetic gold rush. Overnight, academic scientists were thrust into the 
role of executives and businessmen. Naive, brash, and fueled by VC cash, they com 
peted against each other to identify and express medically important genes. Still 
skeptical of the technology, pharmaceutical companies watched from the sidelines as 
Genentech cemented its early lead, licensed insulin to Eli Lilly, and brought recombi 
nant Human Growth Hormone to market independently in 1985. In less than a 
decade, a credible threat to established chemistry-based pharmaceuticals had 
emerged from nowhere. 

In virgin commercial space, biotechnology grew rapidly, along with a host of support 
ive companies. Firms scrambled to identify and characterize new genes potential 
drug targets and a scarce, nonrenewable resource funneling millions into parallel 
research streams. With a new tool for dissecting cellular biochemistry that allowed the 
molecular basis of human disease and health to be explored with precision, academic 
research also flourished. Other genetic technologies soon followed in the wake of 

The Rise of Modern Biotechnology * C 283 



recombinant DNA, including polymerase chain reaction (PCR) a method of amplify 
ing minute amounts of DNA. The rate of innovation in life science moved closer to that 
of the semiconductor industry. 

New legislation was created to streamline the transfer of IP between the public and 
private domains. Significantly, the Bayh-Dole act of 1980, drafted to encourage pri 
vate investment for the commercial development of academic discoveries, allowed 
institutions to file patents on inventions resulting from federally funded research. 
Research became a new source of revenue for universities. Schools established or 
expanded technology transfer offices, which grew from 25 or 30 throughout the 
country in 1980 to more than 250 today, and began to actively seek commercially 
attractive ideas. Biology figured prominently in this search. According to recent sta 
tistics, currently 10 of the top 25 holders of U.S. DNA-based patents are universities, 
research institutions, or the U.S. government itself. 

How to best manage biotech IP was an open question. With gene sequences poten 
tially worth billions, and the validity of biotech patents untested, aggressive IP cap 
ture was encouraged, if only as a defensive measure. This position has been rein 
forced over time, and is now widely reflected in industry practices and statistics. 
According to a survey of biotech patenting trends published in the October 2004 
issue of Nature Biotechnology, only 42 DNA-based patents were approved by the 
USPTO in 1981; by 2001, this figure had swollen to 4,463 although numbers have 
fallen back to roughly 3,500 since this peak. The Biotechnology Industry Organiza 
tion (BIO) maintains that strong IP is essential not only to the success of biotechnol 
ogy companies, but also to their survival. 

Biotechnology delivered on its promise to bring new innovation and wealth. Today 
more than 200,000 people are employed directly by the industry, and companies 
have appeared to fill every technological and market niche. Biotechnology has led to 
many new medicines, diagnostics tools, and consumer products, including food, tex 
tiles, and enzymes. It has also stimulated new innovation in the traditional pharma 
ceutical and agricultural companies, all of which today incorporate biotechnologies 
into their research and development programs. 

Universities also participated in the prestige and economic rewards of biotech. Bio 
logical research has blossomed throughout the academic world. By helping the first 
biotech startups get their footing, universities have formed close relationships with 
these now-established firms. These alliances were seeded in part by the nonexclusive 
licensing of Cohen-Boyer methods, eventually leading to more than 400 companies 
purchasing rights. Licensing proved a rich source of university discretionary funds, 
with Cohen-Boyer alone returning about $250 million to UCSF and Stanford over 
the 17 years the patents remained in force. 



284 X Open Source Biology 



Intellectual Property and Growing Challenges 

Biotechnology now touches on virtually every facet of human culture and technologi 
cal achievement and is a rising economic force throughout the world. All Western 
countries (and many developing ones) have specifically targeted life science as an 
engine of long-term economic growth. The public and scientific expectation for what 
biotechnology can or will accomplish has yet to peak, in part because the technology 
is still relatively complex and confined to professional circles. 

Life science research has enjoyed healthy expansion within academia, supported in part 
by the N1H, whose annual budget increased from $3 billion in 1980 to over $27 billion 
in 2003. Reflecting this growth, the primary result of research scientific publications 
continues to mushroom. Pubmed, a journal database service maintained by the National 
Library of Medicine, adds 7,000 new science and medicine citations each week and now 
indexes more than 15 million listings from 18,000 journals. The volume of scientific 
data has driven scientists into increasingly fine specializations in an effort to remain cur 
rent with recent literature. 

The biotechnology industry has also enjoyed rapid expansion, fueled by pharmaceu 
tical research and development (R&D) spending that climbed from $1.5 billion in 
1980 to more than $20 billion in 2002. More than 1,450 companies now operate in 
the U.S.; those publicly traded have a market capitalization of about $300 billion. 
Industry revenues have increased from $11 billion in 1994 to almost $39 billion in 
2003, mainly from the sale of drugs a consumer market that continues to expand. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported in 2003 that prescription drug 
expenditures rose at an inflation-adjusted rate of 14.5% between 1997 and 2002 to 
surpass $160 billion annually, outpacing all other health spending categories. 

Yet, despite these strong results, biotechnology is not the picture of perfect health. In 
defiance of R&D spending trends, drug output has slowed over the last decade. 
Applications to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency responsible for 
evaluating new pharmaceuticals, fell from a high of 131 in 1996 to only 72 in 2003, 
while approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs) fell 60% over the same period, 
dropping from 53 to 21. Even with the growth observed in drug sales, the biotech 
nology industry as a whole remains in the red, recording $50 billion in losses since 
1994. The top 50 companies account for the bulk of the industry s market capitaliza 
tion and revenues. 

While research seems to be thriving, development in life science, a process exclusive to 
the commercial domain is struggling. Although often grouped together as "R&D," 
research and development are actually very different processes. Research tends to be rela 
tively unstructured and produces new observations, often summarized in scientific publi 
cations. It attracts free thinkers, explorers, and risk takers. In contrast, development 
attempts to transform a research discovery into a finished product, ready for sale. Drug 
development can take years to advance a molecule through the series of phased clinical 

Intellectual Property and Growing Challenges * C 285 



trials (ranging from I to III) meant to determine basic safety, dosages, and efficacy neces 
sary before seeking the FDA s approval for sale. Most drugs never exit this "pipeline." If 
they do, they enter an ongoing postmarket analysis (Phase IV) that in part monitors for 
rare or long-term effects. Development thus attracts careful, detail-oriented, process- 
driven individuals intent on minimizing risks. 

Pushing a drug through development requires massive investment and commitment. 
Wyeth R&D president, Robert Ruffolo Jr., estimated in 2003 that R&D charges now 
range between $1.2 to 1.4 billion, while others place this figure anywhere between 
$400 million and $800 million. There is no way to be sure of the true cost, as com 
panies closely guard these figures, which are used to justify new drug pricing. What 
ever the exact numbers, the cost of drug development continues to rise at about 12% 
to 14% each year, well in excess of inflation. Given finite financial resources, the 
increasing cost of developing a new drug is the main bottleneck between promising 
research and new therapeutics. Only a small fraction of research, public or private, 
will ever enter the development pipeline. 

IP practices contribute to this constriction. Only heavily protected molecules are likely 
to be backed by investors and developed. Competitive pressures have also fostered a 
secretive mindset and produced a mass of patent claims renowned for its complexity. 
This "thicket" impedes collaboration and materials transfer with other companies and 
universities, slowing R&D. IP sculpts the overall form of biotech companies. In an effort 
to reduce intellectual friction while retaining proprietary control, companies are driven 
to bring outside groups "in-house" through purchase or hire. In part, this has resulted in 
successive waves of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, consolidating the biotech 
and pharma industries to produce giant, global organizations. 

While sales and marketing efficiencies may result from consolidation, little proof that 
size only can yield R&D efficiencies remains scarce. Research cannot be mandated, at 
any price. Meanwhile, candidate drugs in development although selected with the 
utmost care may fail at any point in the pipeline. Given these risks, the ability to 
remain flexible and make unbiased decisions would seem crucial, but large R&D 
organizations can display considerable inertia and be hard to steer. Research may be 
slow to transfer to development, while failing projects in development may linger in 
the pipeline, burning cash. Industrial scientists also face intellectual isolation, with 
little exposure to ideas or peers outside company walls. Finding the right balance for 
successful research and development has been difficult for companies one factor in 
why life commercial R&D has yet to demonstrate any clear economies of scale. 

Meanwhile, expanding corporate bulk narrows the range of development choices that 
make economic sense. Large companies often set their sights on blockbusters mole 
cules with the potential to bring in $1 billion or more in annual sales. This makes the 
choice of what candidates to advance into development critical a multibillion-dollar, 
multiyear commitment with risks and rewards different for each molecule. Even FDA 
approval for sale does not eliminate risk exposure, since drugs can be withdrawn if 

286 ^ C Open Source Biology 



serious complications are discovered an outcome certain to produce a flurry of class 
action lawsuits. Accordingly, the industry lobbies that strong IP is necessary for compa 
nies to recoup R&D costs, have cash to expand R&D activities, and also accumulate 
defensive legal reserves. 

At the other end of the corporate spectrum, small biotech companies also struggle with 
IP. Nimble and highly motivated, most struggle to manage cash "burn" just to survive 
among the big industry players. They face not only high R&D costs, but also substan 
tial legal fees, as they work to create new products or technologies. With limited cash 
and only a small number of patents in their IP portfolios, they produce little competi 
tive pressure in the industry. Most remain speculative investments with almost no 
opportunity to independently market drugs. To persist, many companies form a symbi 
osis with big pharma, while others offer themselves as prey innovative fodder for 
those with the resources to consume them. 

Meanwhile, the richest and most plentiful source of low-cost innovation for compa 
nies academic research is fast drying up. Universities, while still friendly to commer 
cial interests, better understand the value of their IP and have become shrewd negotia 
tors. Technology transfer negotiations require more time and end up costing much 
more money. In response to these complications, deals and collaborations with individ 
ual researchers have fallen out of favor, in preference to comprehensive "blanket" alli 
ances. These sweeping arrangements, however, are much less attractive to the universi 
ties, particularly in the face of mounting reports of conflict of interest. The ideal 
economic balance for IP transfer from the public to private domain remains to be found. 

The present drug development paradigm thus appears to suffer from economic chal 
lenges that have yet to be solved. Perhaps the most worrisome of these problems is 
the industry s failure, despite great internal effort, to decrease drug development 
costs. Without a turnaround in this metric, no reversal of drug output or consumer 
pricing trends can result a mounting concern as Western society ages and demands 
more healthcare. Increasing tensions is the recall of several heavily marketed drugs 
that may have shown dangerous side effects even in early testing. Not only has this 
damaged consumer trust that companies will make safety the top priority, but it has 
also called in question the FDA s practices and relationship with industry. It has even 
forced a reevaluation of the financial risks and liabilities associated with large-market 
blockbuster drugs. 

Open Source Biology 

With present pharmacoeconomic trends unlikely to change in the immediate future, the 
path toward a sustainable drug industry remains as elusive. There is also a widening 
understanding that today s pharmaceutical companies focused on disease manage 
ment may not have consumers best interests in mind. Today there are few incentives 
for companies to improve any drug (at least until patent protection nears expiration) or 
to develop biological technologies that might lead to either prevention or cure. 

Open Source Biology " 2B7 



In this light, some have begun to openly question whether there are other viable 
paths to drug development. At the heart of alternative routes is IP management. 
Since the passage of Bayh-Dole, scientists have been presented with two options for 
sharing research: publication; or patent and license with optional publication. The 
latter choice, heavily favored for discovery with commercial potential, has resulted in 
the current biotechnology industry. The alternative open, unrestricted publica 
tion has never been seriously considered a path to commercial development in the 
life sciences. 

Now, open source, mainly used to develop computer software, has yielded strong 
evidence that open development may in fact be economically viable. OSS projects, 
including the Linux operating system and Apache Web Server, have become promi 
nent examples that open strategies can result in robust, commercial-grade offerings. 
Open source has also emerged as an economic force, resulting in the formation of 
new companies like Red Hat, or adding revenues to the top line of others, like Sun 
and IBM. This success has encouraged speculation that similar results could be pro 
duced in biological development, if OSB could be made to work. 

Recently, lawyers Stephen Maurer and Arti Rai and computational biologist Andrej 
Sali published a paper titled "Finding cures for tropical diseases: Is open source an 
answer?" to discuss how OSB might work. They suggest that OSB could organize 
many small research and development efforts toward the manufacture and testing of 
tropical disease drugs, reducing the final point-of-sale cost. Whether such a scheme 
would work in practice is unknown. However, there is no a priori reason why non- 
software products like drugs cannot be made using open source methods: it is not 
unreasonable that a community of open drug developers could produce open drugs. 
The unanswered question is whether, without IP, this development could be made 
economically sustainable enough to attract investors. 

Any R&D effort, drugs or software, will consume resources that have real dollar costs. 
OSS developments are economically sustainable in part because these costs are kept 
very low. Geographic location, time zones, and physical facilities are not factors. Simi 
larly, legal fees, product distribution costs, communication charges, and travel costs are 
also essentially zero. Few salaries are paid. OSS works because overhead is minimized 
while the aggregated value of donated developer time keeps growing over time. OSB 
faces a different economic reality. Any life sciences project, even an open source one, 
would come attached with physical constraints and very large costs. Laboratories are 
required. Millions of dollars of reagents, equipment, and testing are necessary. Realisti 
cally, before any OSB effort could yield a commercial product, the real dollar cost of 
biological R&D would need to be greatly reduced. 

The Internet is helping to do this. The Web has already dropped the direct cost of 
doing scientific research, while also encouraging IP freedom. It has become an impor 
tant repository for scientific information, much of it accessible openly and for free. 
Open access journal sites like the Public Library of Science (PLoS) and BioMedCentral 

288 * * Open Source Biology 



now deliver peer-reviewed articles online at no charge and without copyright restric 
tions. Databases of DNA sequence data, human variation data, and, more recently, clin 
ical trial results are available online. Sophisticated tools that link research datasets and 
support complex queries are beginning to appear. Science Commons, recently 
launched by the nonprofit Creative Commons, hopes to further interaction by making 
it easier for scientists, universities, and industries to share data and other IP. Overall, 
the Internet now allows most individuals, professionals or not, and even those in devel 
oping nations, free access to a wealth of high-quality scientific information. The main 
challenge for OSB to work, then, is to translate this research data into sustainable real- 
world open development projects. 

New development strategies are beginning to emerge. Although not strictly open 
source, the company One World Health appears to have found one successful path to 
reducing both IP and development charges. Based in San Francisco and billing itself 
as the first U.S. nonprofit pharmaceutical company, One World assembles donated 
IP, expertise, and funds to further therapeutic development for diseases common in 
the Third World. It is working on drugs for malaria, leishmaniasis, and Chagas dis 
ease (a parasitic disease that can lead to heart failure), among others, and expects to 
launch its first product in 2005. However, while One World s efforts are to be 
praised, its model is limited to drug molecules and markets not considered interest 
ing to its proprietary partners. 

The Biological Innovation for Open Society initiative (BIOS, http://www.bios.net), the 
brainchild of plant biologist Richard Jefferson, is also working to reduce the cost of 
biological development, and is willing to challenge proprietary groups to do so. 
Launched in 2004 and supported by a Rockefeller grant and technology from IBM, 
BIOS provides researchers with tools to share, manage, and navigate biotech IP, with 
an eye to facilitating open agricultural biotechnology. Keen on open source, Jeffer 
son intends to create a patent commons and seed it with a broad method that allows 
plant researchers, public or private, to sidestep proprietary gene transfer technolo 
gies that restrict genetically modified (GM) crop development. Crops created with 
this community IP would be more affordable by growers throughout the world and 
be easier to manage than proprietary offerings. Meanwhile, the open patent com 
mons would provide a defensive shield against proprietary challenges to their use. 

Yet neither of these development models resembles the archetype OSS project, with 
an online platform, simple IP structure, and low overhead. For this reason, support is 
being found for a simpler model, a direct way for open source biology to follow in 
the footsteps of open software. The idea is to treat DNA, the foundation of virtually 

everything biological, for what it already is widely recognized in biology to be a 

programming language. Virtually anything related to biology on this planet, living or 
not, can be reduced to this common denominator: a sequence of DNA bases that 
specifies its form and metabolism. DNA in a cell is no different from the Os and Is in 
a computer program. DNA is biological source code. 

Open Source Biology * C 289 



If OSS works, and DNA is software, don t reinvent: adapt. Allow genetic engineering to 
be done in the same way that software is engineered today, on computers with special 
ized software tools. In this way, OSB could closely parallel the strategies and, perhaps, 
realize the same advantages of open source software. Furthermore, since the DNA mol 
ecule can be a commercial product unto itself, and can direct biological synthesis of 
many bioproducts in vivo, circumventing the need for large production facilities, genet 
ics can shorten the distance between research and development considerably. Because 
of these features, DNA code holds great potential to make OSB a reality, and also the 
possibility of developing a wide range of open biological products economically. Today 
a new science called synthetic biology is allowing researchers to move beyond mere 
speculation of this potential to practically test these ideas in reality. 

Synthetic Biology and Genomic Programming 

Since 1972, genetic engineering has been performed using the Cohen-Boyer recom- 
binant techniques. These methods require DNA molecules to be extracted from cells 
and physically rearranged into new genetic designs a process not unlike writing a 
letter "ransom note" style. Done in the lab, proficiency in this work typically requires 
an advanced degree with practical experience, a lot of equipment and reagents, and 
considerable time. Even relatively mundane procedures can take experienced techni 
cians many months of tedious work, visible only by indirect methods. Compared to 
other modern engineering efforts for example, microprocessor, aircraft, or building 
design, today performed in computer environments genetic engineering remains a 
crude, manual process. 

The emergence of synthetic biology (SB) changes everything. Founded on automated 
chemistries that permit long-chain DNA to be synthesized de novo, SB is a platform of 
software tools used to design and test artificial DNA molecules. It is an output device 
for bioinformatic software, and provides scientists with a way to write DNA 
sequences, not just read and comprehend them. The technology greatly lowers the 
barriers to genomic work: anyone with access to a computer can effectively create or 
edit DNA with exquisite precision. Overall, by transforming DNA into a biological 
programming language, SB represents the biggest improvement in genetic technol 
ogy since Cohen-Boyer. It advances biological design into the digital age. 

More than just bringing new speed and convenience to genetics, SB brings genetic 
scientists an alternative to unrestricted publication or patent. It is a creative tool, one 
that both proprietary companies and academic researchers will use to design DNA 
code. However, the technology brings an opportunity to reevaluate how the result 
ant IP should be protected. Today patent is used almost exclusively for biotech IP, 
including gene sequences but synthetic biology makes new DNA designs into 
authored products like software. This type of IP is most often protected by copy 
right. Copyright would be inexpensive and easy to use, and would dovetail well with 
the application open source licenses, offering attractive IP benefits. However, with- 

290 C Open Source Biology 



out historical or legal precedent, there is no way to know how genetic copyrights 
would change R&D, or whether they would even be recognized as valid. 

With the close similarity to software programming, synthetic biology gives OSB mod 
eled after OSS a good chance of success. OSB could adapt the open source concepts, 
tools, licenses, and business models that already exist. Already, dozens of bioinfor- 
matic tools have been released under open source licenses, and software develop 
ment platforms like SourceForge and Tigris could be easily modified to support DNA 
codewriting. Overall, for OSB based on SB to produce biological products, it would 
need to overcome only two main obstacles. First, it would need to attract an open 
developer community. Second, the genetic programs developed in the digital domain 
would need to be made affordably testable in real-world laboratories. 

Open source synthetic biology will presumably find some support among genomic 
and bioinformatic scientists, many of whom currently release both data and tools 
openly on the Internet. However, Drew Endy, an assistant professor at MIT, is not 
taking any chances. He is actively seeding a new generation of biological program 
mers by teaching students how to build custom bacteria. Using presynthesized DNA 
dubbed "biobricks," or de novo code, Endy has created the biological equivalent of 
many electronic parts, including transistors, LEDs, and photosensors. Biobricks can 
be assembled in various ways to new create biological circuits, with bacterial cells the 
test breadboard. Biobricks form the foundation for MIT s multisite graduate student 
challenge, meant to encourage new synthetic designs and raise interest in synthetic 
techniques. The strategy is working: Endy s efforts have received wide attention in 
the technology press, and MIT s first conference on synthetics brought together more 
than 300 participants. 

Endy is also a strong supporter of OSB, placing the biobricks standard registry in the 
public domain, a move he hopes will encourage others to use the technology and to 
share their own components. There is concern that unless an open ideology can be 
fostered, researchers might choose to patent each individual component, making bio 
logical programming a legal quagmire. Already, synthetic switches to turn genes on 
and off have been patented. Engineers Rob Carlson and Roger Brent, also early 
adopters of synthetic technologies, have warned of choosing a proprietary path and 
slowing innovation. In a white paper sent to DARPA, the advanced research agency 
of the U.S. military and an early backer of synthetic development, the pair argued 
that the development of a public domain "kernel" in synthetic biology could avert the 
negative consequences of having knowledge useful to the design of living organisms 
held proprietary. They maintain that biology conducted in an open manner would 
be, like open software, "robust and adaptive, providing for a more secure economy 
and country." 

Great advantages could result if OSB can seed developer communities with keen 
interest in writing biological software. The sharing of genetic program designs openly 



Synthetic Biology and Genomic Programming * 291 



should quickly lead to novel designs. The ability to engineer life on a computer desk 
top, not in a laboratory, should dissolve interdisciplinary boundaries and bring many 
new ideas into the biological sciences. Importantly, it allows genomic projects to 
aggregate and organize large numbers of developers. Online genomic development 
communities could blossom into virtual R&D organizations that dwarf those even of 
big pharma, yet be far more sustainable, open, and empowered. With inclusive mem 
bership and open data, "hobbyist" researchers increasingly valuable contributors to 
astronomy, physics, and other sciences would also enjoy the opportunity to partici 
pate meaningfully in collaborative genetic projects. 

Meanwhile, the second obstacle to OSB producing a biological product, discovering 
inexpensive ways for genomic designs to be testable in the real world, is self-resolv 
ing. The per-base cost of long-chain DNA synthesis is dropping rapidly as commer 
cial DNA providers compete for research customers. Today constructs that are viral 
size can be produced affordably. If current trends continue, human genome-size con 
structs will be realistic, both technologically and financially, by 2010. The econom 
ics of making commercial products with synthetics should become more attractive 
over time, if we can just learn how to write good code. 

The Risk of Biological Hacking 

Open source synthetic biology could result in a broad base of genomic skills in soci 
ety and lead to low-cost gene-based commercial products. However, some people 
worry that convenient biological programming raises the chance that amateurs, hack 
ers, or even terrorists will use the same tools to develop malicious genetic designs, 
either on purpose or by accident. While in silica genetic experimentation arguably 
poses little risk (the information remains within the digital domain), gaining access to 
synthetic DNA, or the equipment to make synthetic DNA, is not difficult, even for 
private individuals. The equipment for a functional DNA lab can be bought on eBay 
and would fit in a basement, kitchen, or garage. With the complete genomes for doz 
ens of viruses publicly available including Ebola, Marsburg, and SARS a biologi 
cal incident involving a synthetic virus may be a matter of when, not if. The proof of 
concept has already been demonstrated: in 2002, researchers at SUNY Stony Brook 
assembled an infectious synthetic poliovims using mail-order DNA fragments. 

The threat of a carefully engineered bioweapon unlike anything found in nature is 
thus real and significant. A CIA document titled "The Darker Bioweapons Future" 
published in 2003 cites a panel of experts that note "the effects of some of these engi 
neered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man." This panel 
also noted that genomics is entering "an explosive growth phase" and that "the result 
ing wave of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, and widely 
available to the public that traditional intelligence means for monitoring WMD devel 
opment could prove inadequate." These warnings make clear that the consequences 



292 * C Open Source Biology 



of hacking DNA can be greater than those of hacking computer code. DNA pro 
grams, if they are chemically synthesized, will share physical reality with us. If 
released into the environment, the genetic information cannot be easily deleted or 
traced. Unwanted genetic distribution is already a problem in agricultural biotech 
nology, underscoring the fact that this is not a purely theoretical problem. Addition 
ally, unlike in the digital world, nature cannot be "rebooted" if we make a serious 
mistake or encounter unexpected problems. 

Yet, despite these concerns, synthetic DNA itself does not pose a new risk to society 
or the environment. Conventional laboratory methods of mutating and selecting 
organisms for enhanced pathogenicity have existed for decades, suggesting that those 
intent on using organisms for malicious purposes are probably already well equipped 
to do so. Genetic engineering is too powerful a technology to banish or outlaw, and it 
is already too late to suppress synthetic technologies: the underlying chemistries have 
been available for more than 20 years. Synthetic DNA will act mainly as an innova 
tive accelerant, affecting all biotechnological applications, positive or negative. With 
synthetic technologies, the appearance of designer pathogens tuned to defeat our 
immune systems will not appear overnight, but we can no longer risk being compla 
cent. For maximum safety, we need to broadly foster genetic awareness and skills in 
society, if only to better deal with rapidly evolving natural threats like SARS, Asian 
bird flu, or West Nile virus. 

This makes the decision of whether to support OSB a critical one that extends beyond 
IP or economics. OSB may prove necessary as a means to assimilate the body of genetic 
information as a whole, an inherent advantage unlikely to be matched by more focused 
proprietary groups. No one company has the resources to understand the full complex 
ity of DNA, the most difficult programming language for humans to comprehend. 
Because we didn t create the language or the computing environment, we must reverse 
engineer our understanding taking systems apart one organism at a time, one cell 
type at a time, and finally one gene at a time. Putting all this data together again to get 
the big picture is like making a giant jigsaw puzzle. It requires cooperation, not frag 
mentation, to get perspective. By this rationale, the use of open genomics may bring far 
greater safety and security to synthetics. It should minimize fundamental design errors 
while also maximizing the responsive capability to unexpected challenges, including 
natural and engineered threats. Open computer software is also widely regarded as 
being more secure and more adaptive to threats than proprietary offerings. 

Future Trends in Open Source Biology 

Synthetic DNA appears poised to stimulate a new wave of genomic innovation, one 
closely aligned to software and using similar programming concepts. The decision of 
whether to support OSB will have long-term ramifications on the environment, the econ 
omy, and human health. There are thousands of biological products that could be 
designed collaboratively and produced inexpensively using open source synthetic DNA 

Future Trends in Open Source Biology * * 293 



including vaccines, proteins, and gene therapies. If sufficient resources can be identified 
to bring these products to market without transferring them to proprietary interests for 
example, through open IP partnerships with generic drug manufacturers or HMOs, gov 
ernment loans, or the collection of personal donations the commercial sale of first-run 
therapeutics at generic prices could result, and not just for tropical medicines. 

While real-world data and experiences will have to be collected before any conclu 
sions can be drawn, the economics of open development may prove very attractive 
for synthetic genetics. Nature lends some support to this idea. DNA is openly shared 
in the physical world. The molecule is able to cross easily between species and is sur 
prisingly plastic even within species or individuals. Not only this, but the grammar 
and syntax of the genetic language have remained conserved across all species 
throughout evolution. Nature doesn t waste energy with needless complications. If 
has retained a common genetic language and supported free exchange because this 
was less expensive than any other alternative. 

If OSS proves any guide, synthetic DNA code will evolve fastest in the digital domain if 
allowed to be free. Efforts are underway in the scientific community so that a fair test of 
this idea can be made. Allies are being sought in government, law, finance, industry, 
and the general public to marshal support for open biological development projects. 
The idea is alluring to many people, in part because of the increasing awareness, use, 
and approval of open source software. Just as open software now provides individuals 
with greater software choice, OSB may one day offer individuals another source of safe 
and affordable gene-based technologies, therapeutics, and other bioproducts. 

While OSB may not be immediately attractive, and perhaps may even be threaten 
ing, to some biotechnology companies, the benefits may be very appealing to others, 
especially those with limited resources. Given how few biotechnology companies can 
successfully produce and market any product, the value of proprietary IP may be 
considerably overvalued in life science especially when sufficient R&D opportuni 
ties exist to prevent competitive overlaps. Companies may find that switching to 
open source allows them access to public information, institutions, and a scientific 
community usable or unapproachable by their closed peers. Open companies are 
able to exchange ideas or materials on core technologies easily, without threatening 
development within their particular specializations. 

In addition to encouraging and amassing shared biological innovation, the decision 
to support OSB could produce immediate cost savings or benefits. Researchers, 
whether in academia or open companies, would conserve valuable research time not 
writing patent applications, while retaining the ability to freely publish and profit 
(albeit nonexclusively) from their innovations. Open companies would reduce legal 
costs, freeing cash to further develop programs. Universities would also save money 
on IP maintenance while retaining the ability to commercialize life science innova 
tions. Meanwhile, government agencies involved in IP including the patent office, 

294 X Open Source Biology 



the FDA, and the courts could find their workloads easier to manage if open source 
use grows. This will be particularly important with biotechnology IP if, as expected, 
synthetic leads to an acceleration of research discovery. In any case, the use of patent 
and strong IP would still remain available as an option if deemed more appropriate. 

OSB could also appreciably shrink public distrust related to genetic development. 
The public is growing more aware of the issues that surround GM foods, genetic test 
ing, stem cell technologies, gene doping, and gene therapies. While OSB will not 
solve the differences of opinion that make these topics controversial, open source 
ensures that each individual has equal access to information and also a voice in what 
products or technologies are developed. Open developments succeed because there 
is a demand for the product and sufficient community support, be it skill or money, 
to bring them to market. This shifts the agenda away from proprietary interests 
toward the needs and demands of consumers a shift likely to be strongly sup 
ported by those requiring new drugs or therapeutics. 

OSB also fits nicely with emerging trends in health and medicine. Pharmaceutical 
development is expected to grow increasingly personalized in the future, drawing on 
recognition that individual variation genetic, environmental, and behavioral plays 
a large role in human health and disease. Pharmacogenomic efforts are underway to 
allow better disease appearance prediction (facilitating preventative steps or treat 
ments) and to determine how any particular patient will respond to a given drug. In 
time, therapies tailored to small patient subgroups, even individuals, will become 
favored although present economic trends do not support this direction. Unable to 
make large-market drugs sustainable, personalized medicine cannot be accom 
plished by today s drug industry. However, gene-based medicine offers a tantalizing 
solution: change the informational content of each drug, not the drug itself. With 
DNA-based treatments, or gene therapies, the chemical entity remains the same, 
while the biological effects it can produce in cells changes. DNA may prove an effi 
cient drug, inexpensive to make and modify, with a range of delivery options. 

Synthetic design software, connected to an open, integrated dataset, could quickly 
evolve to facilitate the fabrication of custom health solutions for small populations or 
individuals. This capability will likely bring about large changes to the way drugs are 
currently tested in clinical trials: customized drugs could be tested only on the indi 
viduals for whom they were designed, who would presumably be agreeable to their 
use. New medicines could be quickly delivered to those in need. Even without broad 
clinical trials, gene-based drugs should prove very safe and reliable as test data is 
accumulated. Flaws with a genetic design would be excluded by software from hap 
pening again, and any complications would naturally be isolated to very small patient 
populations. Open source personalized medicine could also bring some legal relief to 
drug companies. With an open, software-based drug development system, class 
action lawsuits against synthetic drug manufacturers would be highly unlikely except 
in cases of outright negligence or fraud. 

Future Trends in Open Source Biology * * 295 



In summary, the concept of OSB is highly compelling. Focusing collaborative ener 
gies on the rapid and inexpensive development, synthesis, and testing of innovative 
biological products is a commanding vision. The potential of open genomics, with 
countless applications in medicine, agriculture, and environmental protection, is 
enormous but so are the challenges to society. Familiar ideas and structures may 
need to be discarded before forward steps can be taken. Large changes in how scien 
tific information is shared, new drugs are designed and tested, and knowledge is pro 
tected are sure to come. As we advance toward this future, tapped into a vast global 
web of information, we may find ourselves worrying much less about the ownership 
of old ideas and more about how to generate the next new one. 



296 * C Open Source Biology 





b CHAPTER 19 

Eugene Kim 




Everything Is Known 



In Gabriel Garcia Marquez s epic novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude, Aureliano 
Buendia spends his days and nights in an old alchemical laboratory, isolated from the 
rest of the world, his nose buried in books. While Aureliano mostly keeps to himself 
and says little, he occasionally surprises members of his family or his small group of 
friends with a fact or insight they would have expected from someone more worldly. 
When they ask him how he could possibly have known about something, he 
responds simply, "Everything is known." 

It s a fascinating thesis, one that not only highlights our individual ignorance, but 
also suggests a different approach to pursuing knowledge. When we are faced with 
something that is new to us, we often forge ahead blindly, learning and creating as 
we go along. We usually call this process "innovation." Our use of this word sug 
gests that we place high value on uniqueness, on things we think have not happened 
before. However, how often are we qualified to determine whether something is 
new? How much do most of us know about our past or about the past of others? 
More importantly, if something is profound and relevant and significant, who cares if 
it s new? It s far more interesting if it s been discovered repeatedly in many different 
contexts. We should take note of important new ideas, but we should cherish ideas 
that prove their importance over and over again. 

Many people find the emergent, collaborative aspects of free and open source software 
fascinating and compelling. However, before we start labeling anything as "innovative," 
we ought to seek what is already known by examining emergent collaboration in other 



,07 

Z97 



contexts and by identifying recurring patterns there. If we can find patterns that occur 
over and over again in all these contexts, we can apply this knowledge to other areas. 
Simply put, these patterns can improve our ability to work together regardless of the 
domain, a skill on which the future of our world depends. 

This chapter examines two stories: the PACT compiler project in the mid-1950s 
the first collaborative software effort to transcend organizational boundaries and 
the recovery effort at the site of the World Trade Center following the tragedy on 
September 11, 2001. On the surface, these stories seem very different, but closer 
examination reveals several common patterns, patterns that are also found in suc 
cessful free and open source software projects. These patterns suggest principles for 
facilitating emergent collaboration in many different contexts, from software develop 
ment to grass-roots politics. 

The PACT Project 

If you examine open source projects closely, you will discover a deeply embedded 
culture of collaboration, a culture that is embodied in the community s tools and 
practices. Programmers gather in a variety of contexts, both physically (conferences, 
user group meetings, code sprints) and virtually (mailing lists, IRC channels). Their 
toolkits are stocked with software for sharing, documenting, and collectively author 
ing code. The very notion of reusable source code is an implicit invitation to collabo 
rate. Most programmers take this culture for granted, but these tools and norms did 
not always exist. They can be traced as far back as 1954, to an early collaborative 
compiler project known as PACT. 

The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s created a burgeoning aerospace indus 
try in Southern California, and the companies that emerged suffered from a common 
affliction: a lack of good programmers. Computers were barely a decade old at this 
point, and programming was difficult and expensive. The notion of sharing source 
code was laughable, partially because the notion of source code barely existed. There 
were no high-level programming languages. Most people wrote software in machine 
language, which meant that software written for one type of machine could not be 
transferred to another. Although some people wrote homegrown assemblers and 
interpreters to ease their programming burden, there were no standards, so code 
sharing was still impossible. Without high-level languages, programming was expen 
sive. Without the ability to share code, collaborating on software projects outside of 
one s organization was technically infeasible. 

To make matters worse, there were only about 1,000 programmers in the United 
States at the time (Campbell-Kelly, 193). As a result, companies regularly raided each 
other s talent, which led to greater secrecy within companies about their computer- 
related work and a general tightfistedness with their prized programmers. While the 
technical barriers to collaboration were large, the culture of secrecy was the biggest 
impediment. R. Blair Smith, an IBM salesman, observed this culture firsthand in the 

298 ^ C Everything Is Known 



early 1950s. He watched each of his customers struggle with the same expense and 
difficulty of developing software, and he decided that the overlap in effort was silly. 
If these companies would just set aside their differences and work together to sim 
plify programming for everyone, everyone would win. As obvious as this seemed to 
Smith, he was realistic. Collaboration made sense, but it wasn t going to happen 
unless the culture of secrecy shifted radically. 

Smith decided to throw a party. He invited all of his customers to dinner on November 
15, 1952, at the Santa Inez Inn in Santa Monica, California (Mapstone, 367). The 
evening did not begin well. His guests were not used to interacting with their competi 
tors, and the tension was thick. Smith decided something drastic was in order, so he 
decided to do something that neither he nor any of his IBM colleagues had ever done 
before. He bought drinks for his guests, compliments of IBM. Several rounds later, the 
tension had been replaced by good spirits, and the party began in earnest. 

Little was gained other than a new sense of camaraderie, consensus regarding a sec 
ond gathering, and the largest expense sheet Smith ever submitted to IBM. Smith 
stopped picking up the dinner and drinks tabs, but the meetings continued. The 
group was expanded, and a name was chosen the Digital Computers Association 
(DCA). Speakers were invited to discuss various technical topics, but the real value 
of the meetings stemmed from the camaraderie. The atmosphere was jovial and 
irreverent, and the predinner cocktails quickly became the most important aspect of 
the meeting. As with the first gathering, little of tangible value was accomplished. 
However, two important things did happen. First, the members made a tacit gentle 
man s agreement not to raid each other s programmers (Carlson, 66). Second, 
bringing people with similar interests from different companies together made them 
recognize the commonality of their computing problems and the possible benefits 
of intercompany collaboration. 

The first to test the possibility of these benefits were two DCA stalwarts, Jack Strong 
and Frank Wagner, both from North American Aviation. Concerned as always with 
the high cost of programming and the performance overhead of interpretive systems, 
Strong and Wagner wanted to explore automatic programming as a way of address 
ing these issues. On November 16, 1954, Strong and Wagner organized a meeting 
held at Douglas Aircraft Company s El Segundo plant (Melahn, 267). With represen 
tatives from five different companies North American Aviation, Douglas Aircraft 
Company, IBM, Ramo-Woolridge, and the RAND Corporation in attendance, 
Strong and Wagner proposed a cooperative effort to develop an automatic coding 
system for the IBM 701. The group agreed to establish two committees to undertake 
the project, the Policy Committee and the Working Committee, with each participat 
ing company committing one full-time representative to the project. Calling them 
selves Project for the Advancement of Coding Techniques, or PACT, the group 
decided to meet and work at the RAND Corporation, which was considered neutral 
territory among these competing interests. 

The PACT Project ^ * 289 



The working committee immediately ran into trouble with language and culture. 
Wesley Melahn, a participant from RAND, wrote, "People didn t really know their 
neighbors systems well enough to be able to talk about them intelligently, much less 
to understand the subtle pressures that made small points seem important enough to 
argue about" (Melahn, 268). Paul Armer, another important contributor, added: 

The members of the working committee of PACT spent several weeks in mutual 
education, because at first they had to overcome the "our way is best" attitude 
and also a serious language problem. That this mutual education led to mutual 
admiration and respect for other people s abilities is testified to by the final 
report of the PACT-I working committee. I quote from their Primary recommen 
dation: "The spirit of cooperation between member organizations and their rep 
resentatives during the formulating of PACT-I has been one of the most valu 
able resources to come from the project. It is essential that this spirit of 
cooperation continue with future project plans" (Armer, 125). 

The collaboration ultimately resulted in the first software developed cooperatively by 
employees of several different companies: a working compiler that went through two 
versions, PACT-I and PACT-II. The group also delivered a series of papers at the 
1955 Meeting of the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) in Philadelphia. 
More importantly, PACT was a watershed. As a standard compiler that many compa 
nies used, it removed the technical barrier to collaborating on software projects. 
PACT also demonstrated the feasibility of a cooperative coding project and affirmed 
the value of cooperation, transforming the culture of business computing and creat 
ing a climate conducive to further collaboration. 

Some of the similarities between PACT and today s free and open source projects are 
obvious. For example, neutral space is critical for encouraging emergent collaboration. 
R. Blair Smith s party would not have had the same effect had he worked for one of 
those aerospace firms rather than for IBM. Similarly, it was no accident that PACT par 
ticipants chose to meet at RAND. Neutral space manifests itself in a number of ways in 
free and open source projects. When Linus Torvalds, the creator of the wildly success 
ful Linux operating system, graduated from the University of Helsinki, he chose not to 
accept a job at one of the many emerging Linux distribution companies to maintain his 
neutrality. Although companies are not required to give up ownership of their code to 
make their software open source, many choose to transfer their copyright to neutral 
bodies, such as the Free Software Foundation and the Apache Software Foundation. 

For collaboration to emerge, there must be a culture of collaboration. Prior to PACT, 
that culture did not exist. Fostering it required many gatherings and a large drink 
bill, courtesy of IBM. Those gatherings did not result in concrete deliverables, but 
they helped establish shared understanding and shared language. The culture of col 
laboration within successful free and open source projects is so deeply engrained 
among their participants, it s often taken for granted. Projects that simply release 
source code under an open source license in the absence of this culture usually fail. 

300 ^ C Everything Is Known 



The World Trade Center Recovery Effort 

R. Blair Smith s dinner party in 1952 helped catalyze a shift in culture among the 
business computing community, but it still took two years before it manifested in a 
concrete project. The terrorist attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001 caused 
a far more immediate and visceral transformation. The collapse of the World Trade 
Center not only killed 3,000 people, it also brought fear and uncertainty to the entire 
United States. Nobody knew who was responsible, how it had happened, or worst of 
all, what to expect next. The only thing we knew was that there had been an attack 
and that our lives would never be the same. 

That was all the residents of New York needed to know. As soon as the towers col 
lapsed, those who were at the site began a concerted rescue and recovery effort. The 
impulse to help after such a horrific tragedy was not surprising, but the collaborative 
process that emerged from this initial impulse was remarkable. William Langewie- 
sche, a correspondent for The Atlantic, was on hand from the beginning, and in his 
book, American Ground, he described the intense motivation shared among those 
who participated in the recovery: 

Throughout the winter and into the spring the workers rarely forgot the original 
act of aggression, or the fact that nearly 3,000 people had died there, including 
the friends and relatives of some who were toiling in the debris. They were 
reminded of this constantly, not only by the frequent discovery of human 
remains, and the somber visits from grieving families, but also by the emotional 
response of America as a whole, and the powerful new iconography that was 
associated with the disaster these New York firemen as tragic heroes, these 
skeletal walls, these smoking ruins as America s hallowed ground. Whether cor 
rectly or not, the workers believed that an important piece of history was play 
ing out, and they wanted to participate in it often fervently, and past the point 
of fatigue. From the start that was the norm (Langewiesche, 9). 

The recovery effort consisted of two parts: recovering the remains of the dead, and 
restoring the site. This latter task was literally and figuratively enormous. Each tower 
had stood 110 stories high, almost a quarter of a mile each. The collapse had created a 1 . 
5-million-ton labyrinth of steel and concrete over 17 acres, with hazards hidden every 
where. The six-story-deep foundation and the entire New York subway system was in 
danger of being flooded by the Hudson River, thanks to a damaged subway tube and a 
fragile slurry wall protecting the foundation. Most dangerous of all was the under 
ground chiller plant, which had cooled all of the buildings and which the collapse had 
rendered inaccessible. The plant contained 168,000 gallons of freon, and nobody knew 
the status of that gas. If the freon containers had somehow survived the collapse and if 
the workers inadvertently damaged it in the recovery process, the gas would immedi 
ately escape, displacing the air and suffocating those working underground. Addition 
ally, if that gas caught fire, it would become a mustard gas-like chemical that would 
pose a threat to the entire city. As if navigating through the wreckage carefully for their 

The World Trade Center Recovery Effort X 301 



own safety and the safety of the city weren t enough, the workers also had to sift through 
it carefully for remains of the victims and for potential evidence that could shed light on 
the tragedy. 

Thousands of volunteers had converged onto the scene immediately following the 
attacks, looking to help in whatever way they could. However, those volunteers 
could do little, and after the first few days, the vast majority of them were turned 
away. The only volunteers who were allowed to stay were members of the Red Cross 
and Salvation Army who fed the workers. The recovery effort required expertise and 
plenty of heavy machinery. There were national and city plans for responding to 
disasters of all sorts, including terrorism, that prescribed the procedures and hierar 
chies for requisitioning the necessary resources. However, those organizational charts 
were scrapped, and the plans were never executed. Langewiesche explained: 

The problems that had to be solved were largely unprecedented. Action and 
invention were required on every level, often with no need or possibility of ask 
ing permission. As a result, within the vital new culture that grew up at the 
Trade Center site even the lowliest laborers and firemen were given power. 
Many of them rose to it, and some of them sank. Among those who gained the 
greatest influence were people without previous rank who discovered balance 
and ability within themselves, and who in turn were discovered by others 
(Langewiesche, 11). 

Kenneth Holden and Michael Burton, top officials of New York s Department of 
Design and Construction (DDC), quickly emerged as the leaders of the recovery 
effort. The afternoon following the collapse, the two met and started enlisting 
resources within the DDC to help with the rescue effort. Langewiesche wrote: 

Holden and Burton responded tactically, with no grand strategy in mind. At the 
police headquarters they discovered a telephone in a room off the temporary 
command center a chaotic hall filled with officials struggling to get orga 
nized and they began making calls. No one asked them to do this, or told 
them to stop. One of the deputy mayors there had formally been given the task 
of coordinating the construction response, but with little idea of how to pro 
ceed, he had so far done nothing at all. Holden and Burton themselves were 
operating blind, groping forward through the afternoon with only the vaguest 
concept of the realities on the ground. The DDC s previous experience with 
emergencies had been limited to a sinking EMS station in Brooklyn, caused by a 
water-main break, and a structural failure at Yankee Stadium, one week before 
baseball s opening day (Langewiesche, 88). 

The fire and police departments and other government agencies were also frantically 
coordinating their own efforts, with little communication between each group. It was 
clear that these groups could not continue working in isolation, and that a collabora 
tive process would be in order. However, the city decided to scrap its emergency 



302 X Everything Is Known 



response plan in favor of the process that was already emerging. At that point, the 
DDC had already bypassed the standard emergency response procedure, and Holden 
and Burton had already in many ways taken charge of the effort. The city made it 
official, giving the DDC, the fire department, and the police department joint control 
over the cleanup effort. 

As with the PACT project, neutral territory played an important role in defusing tra 
ditional politics and allowing new roles to emerge. Burton commandeered a kinder 
garten classroom at a nearby school and held twice-daily meetings there. Because of 
the urgency of their task, they did not keep minutes or write memos. Those meet 
ings were the primary nexus of communication, and everyone involved about 20 
government agencies and several contractors had representatives there. Recording 
devices were banned to encourage participants to voice their opinions freely. Accord 
ing to Langewiesche, "Some of the participants were accomplished people with 
impressive resumes, but within the inner world of the Trade Center site it hardly 
mattered what they had done before. However temporarily, there was a new social 
contract here, which everyone seemed to understand. All that counted about anyone 
was what that person could provide now" (Langewiesche, 113). 

The recovery effort was largely complete after six months, although it did not offi 
cially end until a few months later. The entire 1.5 million tons of wreckage had been 
properly examined and transported to a landfill on Staten Island. The site was no 
longer hazardous, and the city was ready to build something new. Incredibly, despite 
all of the dangers, not a single person died during the recovery process. 

Comparing the World Trade Center recovery to free and open source projects may 
seem far-fetched at first, but there are important similarities. For instance, most of 
the recovery effort workers were financially compensated, although the plan for 
doing so was not predetermined. Once the recovery process became apparent, city 
officials made sure the appropriate people were paid. Similarly, writing software 
requires tremendous expertise, and for a project to be sustainable, it must be able to 
retain its experts. With free and open source projects, the methods of compensation 
are not always explicit, nor are they always monetary, but they are there. 

The most evident pattern from the World Trade Center recovery was an orientation 
among participants toward action. In the free and open source software community, 
there is a common saying: "scratch your own itch." That attitude also pervaded the 
recovery effort. No one waited for instructions from above. People simply did what 
had to be done. At the same time, the recovery effort was not devoid of process. Not 
only were the participants action oriented, but they also were well coordinated, 
thanks to the twice-daily meetings and culture of openness. Similarly, successful free 
and open source projects employ effective and open lines of communication and 
coordination. 



The World Trade Center Recovery Effort X 303 



Facilitating Emergent Collaboration 

The similarities among PACT, the World Trade Center recovery, and free and open 
source projects reveal several important patterns and lessons for facilitating emer 
gent collaboration. I say facilitate, not create, because emergence implies an element 
of surprise and a lack of intention and control. Process and organization exist, but 
are not imposed. Patterns such as neutral territory create an environment that is per 
missive, not prescriptive, and participants who are action oriented thrive in these 
environments. 

The defining characteristic of the World Trade Center recovery was that action 
trumped everything else. The problem was constantly changing, and thus, the pro 
cess had to evolve as well. Asking for permission didn t make sense in this environ 
ment, because those on the ground understood the problem better than anyone 
holding traditional authority. City leaders recognized this and deliberately chose to 
rubber-stamp the process that emerged, instead of imposing a written plan that was 
clearly not suited to the problem. Similarly, PACT did not happen because the lead 
ers of the different companies came together and decided to collaborate on a project. 
PACT happened because those who would most benefit from collaboration the 
software developers began to trust each other and identified a common need. These 
same developers agreed on a representative governance model with a consensus- 
based decision-making approach. While not as freewheeling as the Trade Center 
recovery process, it still emphasized exploration by all of its members, and its lead 
ers were especially proactive. The PACT process had to be slower and more delibera 
tive by design, because the motivation to collaborate was nascent. Participants had to 
see collaboration work before they became comfortable with it, which meant that the 
process evolved slowly. 

Another prerequisite for emergent collaboration is an emphasis on open, effective 
communication. Effective communication begins with shared language. When the 
PACT project began, different participants had different understandings of the same 
words, and communication was rendered ineffective. Before the PACT participants 
could even start thinking about software, they had to understand each other s world 
views and language. Shared language was not an issue with the World Trade Center 
recovery. Everyone had a vivid picture of what had happened, and what needed to 
be done. However, while the recovery effort was highly individualistic, coordination 
was imperative, and hence, those twice-daily meetings among all participants were 
critical. Banning recording devices encouraged participants to express their feelings 
openly. Good communication is the hallmark of the best free and open source 
projects. Anyone may participant in a forum, and core participants respond to ques 
tions quickly. Active projects often summarize online discussion on a regular basis so 
that others can follow high- volume discussions without being overwhelmed. Most 
importantly, there is a shared language among those who participate, some of which 
is embodied in the various free and open source licenses. 

304 * C Everything Is Known 



All of these elements are necessary for collaboration to emerge, but they are not suffi 
cient. Culture is critical. The strong desire to collaborate among those who partici 
pated in the World Trade Center recovery was a direct result of its unique circum 
stances and scale. With PACT, the incentives and environment were not powerful 
enough to establish a culture of collaboration, and rightfully so. You cannot reason 
ably expect a software project to inspire the same emotion as an act of terror and the 
tragic loss of life. Instead, the instigators of PACT had to nurture that culture every 
step of the way, beginning by bringing the groups together to break bread and to dis 
cover commonalities for themselves. The seedlings of community camaraderie 
among those with shared interests and goals catalyzed a culture of collaboration, 
and every instance of successful collaboration further reinforced that culture. 

We have limited control over emergent collaboration, and we must adjust our expec 
tations accordingly. However, the patterns we discover by examining stories such as 
PACT and the World Trade Center recovery help us understand how we can facili 
tate emergent collaboration. These stories were very different, yet their commonali 
ties are striking, especially in light of what we already know about free and open 
source software development. Perhaps everything is not known, but we can learn 
much from knowing what is. The most important lesson is that the best way to 
understand collaboration is to collaborate. 

Acknowledgments 

Thanks to Chris Dent, H. Jessica Kim, and Mark Stone for their insightful comments. 

References 

Paul Armer, "SHARE A Eulogy to Cooperative Effort." Annals of the History of Com 
puting 2, no. 2, April 1980: 122-129. 

Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information 
Machine (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1996). 

Walter M. Carlson, "The Life and Times of the Digital Computers Association (DCA)." 
Annals of the History of Computing 18, no. 2, Summer 1996: 63-66. 

William Langewiesche, American Ground: Unbuilding the World Trade Center (New 
York, NY: North Point Press, 2002). 

Bobbi Mapstone and Morton I. Bernstein, "The Founding of SHARE: NCC 80 Pio 
neer Day." Annals of the History of Computing 2, no. 4, Fall 1980: 363-372. 

Wesley S. Melahn "A Description of a Cooperative Venture in the Production of an 
Automatic Coding System. "Journal of the ACM 3, Oct. 1956: 266-271. 



Acknowledgments * 305 





b CHAPTER 20 

Larry Sanger 




The Early History of Nupedia and 
Wikipedia: A Memoir 



An impassioned debate has been raging, particularly since about the summer of 
2004, concerning the merits of Wikipedia and the future of free online encyclope 
dias. This discussion has not benefited by much detailed, accurate consideration of 
the origins of Wikipedia and of its parent project, Nupedia. Yet those origins are cru 
cial to forming a proper judgment of the current state and best future direction of 
free encyclopedias. 

Wikipedia as it stands is a fantastic project; it has produced enormous amounts of 
content and thousands of excellent articles, and now, after just four years, it is get 
ting high-profile, international recognition as a new way of obtaining at least a rough 
and ready idea about many topics. Its surprising success may be attributed, briefly, to 
its free, open, and collaborative nature. 

This has been my attitude toward Wikipedia practically since its founding. But in late 
2004, I wrote an article critical of certain aspects of the Wikipedia project, "Why 
Wikipedia Must Jettison Its Anti-Elitism," 1 which occasioned much debate. I have 
also been quoted, as co-founder of Wikipedia, in many recent news articles about the 
project, making various other critical remarks. I am afraid I am getting an unde 
served reputation as someone who is opposed to everything Wikipedia stands for. 
This is completely incorrect. In fact, I am one of Wikipedia s strongest supporters. I 



1 Posted December 31, 2004, at http://www.feuro5hin.org/story/2004/J2/30/H2458/25. All URLs in 
this chapter were accessed April 5, 2005. 



am partly responsible for bringing it into the world (as I will explain), and I still love 
it and want only the best for it. But if a better job can be done, a better job should be 
done. Wikipedia has shown fantastic potential, and it is open content and so if the 
project has aspects which will keep it from being the maximally authoritative, broad, 
and deep reference that I believe it could be, I firmly believe that the world has the 
right to, and should, improve upon it. 

Wikipedia s predecessor, which I was also employed to organize, was Nupedia. 
Nupedia aimed to be a highly reliable, peer-reviewed resource that fully appreciated 
and employed the efforts of subject-area experts, as well as the general public. When 
the more free wheeling Wikipedia took off, Nupedia was left to wither. It might 
appear to have died of its own weight and complexity. But, as I will explain, it could 
have been redesigned and adapted it could have, as it were, "learned from its mis 
takes" and from Wikipedia s successes. Thousands of people who had signed up and 
who wanted to contribute to the Nupedia system were left disappointed. I believe 
this was unfortunate and unnecessary; I always wanted Nupedia and Wikipedia 
working together to be not only the world s largest but also the world s most reliable 
encyclopedia. I hope that this memoir will help to justify this stance. Hopefully, too, 
I will manage to persuade some people that collaboration between an expert project 
and a public project is the correct approach to the overall project of creating open 
content encyclopedias. 

I am not writing to request that Nupedia be resuscitated now, as nice as that would 
be. But I would like to tell the story of Nupedia and the first couple of years of Wiki 
pedia as I remember it. I present this as a memoir a personal view not as an 
authoritative history. The "overall project of creating open content encyclopedias" is 
something about which I have been writing since at least 2001. For example, in July 
2001, while still working on both Wikipedia and Nupedia, I wrote, "If some other 
open source project proves to be more competitive, then it should and will take the 
lead in creating a body of free encyclopedic knowledge." 2 Since Wikipedia is open 
content and hence may be reproduced and improved upon by anyone, I have always 
been cognizant that it might not end up being the only or best version. My personal 
devotion has always been to the ideal project as I have envisioned it, not necessarily 
to particular incarnations of Nupedia or Wikipedia; and I think this attitude is fully 
consistent with the (very positive) spirit of open source collaboration generally. 

This being said, let me also emphasize strongly that, throughout this discussion, I am 
not suggesting that Wikipedia needs to be replaced with something better. I do, how 
ever, think that it needs to be supplemented by a broader, more ambitious, and more 
inclusive vision of the overall project. 



2 "Britannica or Nupedia? The Future of Free Encyclopedias," posted July 25, 2001, at http:// 
www. kuro5hin.Org/story/2001/7/25/l 03 1 36/1 2 1 . 



308 ^ C The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 



Some Recent Press Reports 

This memoir seems all the more important to publish now because the early history 
of Nupedia and Wikipedia has been mischaracterized in the press recently. If there 
were only a few inaccuracies, which made no difference, I would be happy to leave 
well enough alone. But some of the mischaracterizations I ve seen do make a differ 
ence. They give the public the impression that Nupedia failed because it was run by 
snobbish experts whose standards were too high. As I will make clear, that is not cor 
rect. One might also gather from some reports that the idea for Wikipedia sprang 
fully grown from Jimmy Wales head. Jimmy, of course, deserves enormous credit for 
investing in and guiding Wikipedia. But a more refined idea of how Wikipedia origi 
nated and evolved is crucial to have, if one wants to appreciate fully why it works 
now, and why it has the policies that it does have. 

For example, in the November 1, 2004 issue of Newsweek, in "It s Like a Blog, But It s 
a Wiki," 3 reporter Brad Stone writes: 

[Jimmy] Wales first tried to rewrite the rules of the reference-book business five 
years ago with a free online encyclopedia called Nupedia. Anyone could submit 
articles, but they were vetted in a seven-step review process. After investing 
thousands of his own dollars and publishing only 24 articles, Wales reconsid 
ered. He scrapped the review process and began using a popular kind of online 
Web site called a "wiki," which allows its readers to change the content. 

This capsule history is, of course, very brief and so should be expected not to have 
every relevant detail. But some of the claims made here are not just vague, they are 
actually misleading, and so several clarifications are in order: 

The article makes it sound as if Jimmy were the only person making the relevant 
decisions. That is incorrect; the Nupedia system (indeed, seven steps) was estab 
lished via negotiation with Nupedia s volunteer Advisory Board, mostly Ph.D. 
volunteers, who served as editors and peer reviewers. I articulated our decisions 
in Nupedia s "Editorial Policy Guidelines." 4 Jimmy started and broadly autho 
rized it all, but as to the details, he really had little to do with them. 

Nupedia s Advisory Board might be surprised to learn that Jimmy "scrapped the 
review process." Jimmy was certainly disappointed with the process (as were 
many people), and he did not actively support it after 2001 or so. But in fairness 
to the people actually working on Nupedia, the fact is that work on Nupedia 
gradually petered out in 2001-2002. I in particular was stretched thin in 2001, 
I was both chief organizer of Wikipedia and editor in chief of Nupedia and my 



3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6298340/site/newsweek. 

4 A version of "Nupedia.com Editorial Policy Guidelines" from 2001 can be found at http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20010607080354/www.nupedia.com/policy.shtml. 



Some Recent Press Reports * 309 



own slowing work on Nupedia was obvious to all active Nupedia contributors. It 
might be better to say that Nupedia withered due to neglect which was largely 
due to a lack of sufficient funds for paid organizers which was as much due to 
the bursting of the Internet bubble as anything else. 

Also, to the best of my knowledge, the "thousands of his own dollars" invested in 
these projects were, if I am not very mistaken, the dollars of Bomis.com, which is 
jointly owned by three partners: Jimmy, Tim Shell, and Michael Davis. (The 
money for Wikipedia now comes from donations.) But again, Jimmy was the 
prime motivating force within Bomis. 

Moreover, Nupedia had fewer than 24 articles when Wikipedia launched, being 
not quite a year old at that time. The idea of adapting wiki technology to the task 
of building an encyclopedia was mine, and my main job in 2001 was managing 
and developing the community and the rules according to which Wikipedia was 
run. Jimmy s role, at first, was one of broad vision and oversight; this was the man 
agement style he preferred, at least as long as I was involved. But, again, credit goes 
to Jimmy alone for getting Bomis to invest in the project and for providing broad 
oversight of the fantastic and world-changing project of an open content, collabo- 
ratively built encyclopedia. Credit also of course goes to him for overseeing its 
development after I left, and guiding it to the success that it is today. 

A March 2005 Wired Magazine article by Daniel Pink also got a number of things 
wrong, despite being, in other respects, an excellent article: 5 

With Sanger as editor in chief, Nupedia essentially replicated the One Best Way 
model. He assembled a roster of academics to write articles. (Participants even 
had to fax in their degrees as proof of their expertise.) And he established a 
seven-stage process of editing, fact-checking, and peer review. "After 18 months 
and more than $250,000," Wales said, "we had 12 articles." 

Then an employee told Wales about Wiki software. On January 15, 2001, they 
launched a Wiki-fied version and within a month, they had 200 articles. In a 
year, they had 18, 000.... Sanger left the project in 2002. "In the Nupedia mode, 
there was room for an editor in chief," Wales says. "The Wiki model is too dis 
tributed for that." 

This too needs clarifications: 

The "roster of academics" (the aforementioned Nupedia Advisory Board) was not 
limited to academics; they were experts in their fields, in any case. Moreover, 
they were editors and peer reviewers; the general public was able to propose and 
write articles on subjects about which they had some knowledge. 6 



5 "The Book Stops Here," http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.03/wiki.html. 

6 Consult the 2001 assignment policy if you are interested: http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20010607080354/http://www.nupedia.com/policy.shtml#assignment. 



310 * C The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 



It is incorrect to say that participants had to fax their degrees as proof of their 
expertise; we did verify bona fides by matching the names and email addresses of 
editors and reviewers with a web page often, but not always, an academic web 
page. Indeed there was one (but only one) case that I recall in which I asked 
someone, who had no web page or any other easy way to prove who he was, to 
fax a degree. Verifying bona fides seemed like a good idea especially when ini 
tially building what was to be an academically respectable project. 

Again, I did not establish the editorial process alone; I had considerable assis 
tance (for which I am still grateful) from Nupedia s excellent Advisory Board. 

And as I wrote on July 25, 2001 for Kuro5hin, 7 Nupedia had "just over 20" arti 
cles not 12 after 18 months. We always suspected that we would wind up 
scrapping our first attempts to design an editorial system, and that we would 
learn a great deal from those first attempts; and that s essentially what hap 
pened. But Nupedia could have evolved, and would have, had we continued 
working on it. 

The second paragraph begins, "Then an employee told Wales about Wiki soft 
ware." I don t know how Jimmy first learned about wikis, but as I will explain, I 
proposed to him and to the Nupedia community at large that we start a wiki- 
based encyclopedia. 

The context of the line "Sanger left the project in 2002" particularly with Jimmy 
quoted as saying, "In the Nupedia mode there was room for an editor in chief 
makes it sound as if I were let go specifically because I was working only on Nupe 
dia and was no longer needed for that. In fact, I was working on Wikipedia far 
more at the time than Nupedia, and the reason for my departure from both 
projects was that Bomis was, like virtually all dot-corns, losing money. They could 
not afford to pay me; I was told that I was the last of several newer Bomis employ 
ees to be laid off on account of the tech recession. But Wikipedia indeed was able 
to continue on without me, and I agreed even at the time that Wikipedia could 
survive without me, and that it had become essentially "unmanageable." 

In view of such problematic reporting, considering the rather good chance that Wiki 
pedia will become historically important, and considering that the planners of related 
projects might find some value in this, I want to tell my story as I remember it. This 
memoir covers only the first few years of the project. I have followed the project 
fairly closely and with interest after my departure, but silently and from the sidelines. 

Nupedia 

I m going to begin with Nupedia. The origin of Wikipedia cannot be explained 
except in that context. Moreover, the Nupedia project itself was very worthwhile, 



7 "Britannica or Nupedia?" op. cit. 

Nupedia X 311 



and I think it might have been able to survive, as I will explain. Finally, some errors 
regarding Nupedia have been passed around although they are little more than 
unfounded rumors. It is unfortunate that the thousands of hours of excellent volun 
teer work done on Nupedia should be thus disrespected or grossly misunderstood. I 
personally will always be grateful to those initial contributors who believed in the 
project and our management, worked hard for a completely unproven idea, and laid 
the groundwork for the growing institution of open content projects. 

In 1999, Jimmy Wales wanted to start a free, collaborative encyclopedia. I knew him 
from several mailing lists back in the mid- 90s, and in fact we had already met in per 
son a couple of times. In January 2000, I emailed Jimmy and several other Internet 
acquaintances to get feedback on an idea for what was to be, essentially, a blog. (It 
was to be a successor to "Sanger and Shannon s Review of Y2K News Reports," a Y2K 
news summary that I first wrote and then edited.) To my great surprise, Jimmy 
replied to my email describing his idea of a free encyclopedia, and asking if I might 
be interested in leading the project. He was specifically interested in finding a philos 
opher to lead the project, he said. He made it a condition of my employment that I 
would finish my Ph.D. quickly (whereupon I would get a raise) which I did, in 
June 2000. I am still grateful for the extra incentive. I thought he would be a great 
boss, and indeed he was. 

To be clear, the idea of an open source, collaborative encyclopedia, open to contribu 
tion by ordinary people, was entirely Jimmy s, not mine, and the funding was entirely 
by Bomis. I was merely a grateful employee; I thought I was very lucky to have a job 
like that land in my lap. Of course, other people had had the idea; but it was Jimmy s 
fantastic foresight actually to invest in it. For this the world owes him a considerable 
debt. The actual development of this encyclopedia was the task he gave me to work on. 

I arrived in San Diego in early February 2000 to get to work. One of the first things I 
asked Jimmy was how free a rein I had in designing the project. What were my con 
straints, and in what areas was I free to exercise my own creativity? He replied, as I 
clearly recall, that most of the decisions should be mine; and in most respects, as a 
manager, Jimmy was indeed very hands-off. I spent the first month or so thinking 
very broadly about different possibilities. I wrote quite a bit (that writing is now all 
lost that will teach me not to back up my hard drives) and discussed quite a bit 
with both Jimmy and one of the other Bomis partners, Tim Shell. 

I maintained from the start that something really could not be a credible encyclopedia 
without oversight by experts. I reasoned that, if the project is open to all, it would 
require both management by experts and an unusually rigorous process. I now think I 
was right about the former requirement, but wrong about the latter, which was 
redundant; I think that the subsequent development of Wikipedia has borne out of 
this assessment. 



312 * C The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 



One of the first policies that Jimmy and I agreed upon was a "nonbias" or neutrality 
policy. I know 1 was extremely insistent upon it from the beginning, because neutral 
ity has been a hobbyhorse of mine for a very long time, and one of my guiding prin 
ciples in writing "Sanger s Review." Neutrality, we agreed, required that articles 
should not represent any one point of view on controversial subjects, but instead 
fairly represent all sides. We also agreed in rejecting an alternative that (for a time) 
Tim and some early Nupedians plugged for: the development, for each encyclopedia 
topic, of a series of different articles, each written from a different point of view. 

I believed, moreover, that a strongly collaborative and open project could not sur 
vive if its contributors were not "personally invested" in the project, and that this 
required some input and management by its users. It was very early on that I decided 
that Nupedia should have an Advisory Board editors, and peer reviewers, who 
would together agree to project policy and that the public should have a say in the 
formulation of policy. 

An early incarnation of Nupedia s Advisory Board was in place by summer of 2000 or 
so. It was made up of the project s highly qualified editors and reviewers, mostly Ph.D. 
professors but also a good many other highly experienced professionals. Eventually the 
Advisory Board agreed to an extremely rigorous seven-step system. A lot of the details 
of the Nupedia policy and processes were proposed by me, but then tweaked and elabo 
rated by others, and the policy was not published as project policy until we had a quo 
rum of editors and peer reviewers who could fully discuss and approve of a policy 
statement. Even so, our policy overlooked a fundamental problem. We should not have 
assumed that such a complex system could be navigated patiently by many volunteers. 

I spent significant time recruiting people for Nupedia, emailing new arrivals, posting 
to mailing lists, giving interviews, and so on. I had had some experience publicizing 
Internet projects when I worked on several philosophy discussion groups as a gradu 
ate student in the 1990s and I knew that getting many willing and active partici 
pants was difficult but important. I even had an administrative assistant for six 
months in 2000 and 2001, Liz Campeau, whose sole job was to recruit people to 
work on Nupedia and then Wikipedia. I think a large part of the reason Wikipedia 
got off the ground so quickly and so well is that it was started by Nupedians, who 
were then a very large base of people who wanted to work on an encyclopedia, and 
who had many definite ideas about how it should be done. Roughly 2,000 Nupedia 
members were subscribed to the general announcement list in January 2001 when 
Wikipedia launched. We operated the system initially using email and mailing lists, 
while planning and finalizing process details. That lasted from spring through fall 
2000. I think our first article ("atonality" by Christoph Hust), that made it entirely 
through the system, was published in June or July 2000. To move the system to a 
completely web-based one, there was, of course, a great deal of design and program 
ming to do. So in fall of 2000, I worked a lot with a programmer (Toan Vo) and the 



Nupedia X 313 



Bomis sysadmin (Jason Richey) to transfer the system from a clunky mailing list sys 
tem to the Web. But by the time the web-based system was ready it had become 
obvious to Jimmy and me that the seven-step editorial process would move too 
slowly, even when managed on the Web. But Magnus Manske later, in 2001, made 
some very nice additions to the Nupedia system. 

Some institutional traditions begin easily but die hard. Nupedia s Advisory Board was 
reluctant to seriously consider a simpler system, despite months of coexistence and 
uncomfortable comparison between Nupedia and Wikipedia. Nupedia editors and 
peer reviewers had a very strong commitment to rigor and reliability, as did I. More 
over, as Wikipedia became increasingly successful in 2001, Jimmy asked me to 
spend more and more time on it, which I did; Nupedia suffered from neglect. It 
wasn t until summer of 2001 that I was able to propose, get accepted, and install 
something we called the Nupedia Chalkboard. This was a wiki which was to be 
closely managed by Nupedia s staff. It offered both a simpler way to develop encyclo 
pedia articles for Nupedia, and a way to import articles from Wikipedia. Established 
practices are hard to break, and the Chalkboard went largely unused. The general 
public simply used Wikipedia if they wanted to write articles in a wiki format, while 
most Nupedia editors and peer reviewers were not persuaded that the Chalkboard 
was necessary or useful. 

By early winter 2001, Nupedia had published approved versions of only about 25 
articles, although there were dozens of draft articles at various stages in process. I 
was finally able to persuade the Advisory Board to move the system to a much sim 
pler two-step process, virtually identical to that used to run many academic journals: 
articles would be submitted to an editor; the editor would, if the article seemed good 
enough, forward it to a reviewer for acceptance or rejection; if accepted, the article 
would be posted. We also contemplated various ways of allowing public comment, 
moderation, and editing of posted articles. I believe this new, simpler system would 
have produced thousands of articles for Nupedia very quickly. The Nupedia commu 
nity was certainly interested and motivated. The Advisory Board was gradually 
accepting that the system s complexity was the main obstacle to getting more articles 
into and through the system. 

Unfortunately, Nupedia s new system arrived too late. This system should have been 
adopted in the winter of 2001-2002. At the same time, Wikipedia was demanding as 
much attention as I could give it, and I had little time to implement the new Nupe 
dia system. I am quite sure we could have started Nupedia in early 2002 had we 
made the time. But Bomis lost the ability to pay me and, newly unemployed, I did 
not have the time to lead Nupedia as a volunteer. I did not entirely lose hope on 
Nupedia, however. 



314 * * The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 



The Origins of Wikipedia 

In the fall of 2000, Jimmy and I were in agreement that Nupedia s slow productivity 
was probably going to be an ongoing problem and that there needed to be a way, 
moreover, in which ordinary, imcredentialed people could participate more easily. 
Uncredentialed people could (and did) participate in Nupedia, particularly as writers 
and copy editors, but it was challenging for most of them to get articles through the 
elaborate system. We had a huge pool of talent, motivated to work on an encyclope- 
dia but not motivated enough to work on Nupedia, going to waste. 

It was my job to solve these problems. I wrote multiple detailed proposals for a sim 
pler, more open editing system and I ran them by Jimmy. His reply to all of them 
was that it would require too much programming, and he couldn t afford to pay 
more high-priced programmers. In retrospect, of course, I realize that we could have 
found a way to enlist volunteers to develop the system. Jimmy and I both probably 
knew that at the time; unfortunately, we didn t pursue it. 

While I was thinking hard about how to create a more open system with minimal 
setup requirements, I had dinner with an old Internet friend of mine, Ben Kovitz. 
Ben had moved to town for a new job and we were out at a Pacific Beach Mexican 
restaurant, talking about jobs, tech stuff, and philosophy (Ben, Jimmy, and I all knew 
each other from those philosophy mailing lists on which we were active). Ben 
explained the idea of Ward Cunningham s WikiWikiWeb 8 to me. Instantly I was 
considering whether wiki would work as a more open and simple editorial system for 
a free, collaborative encyclopedia, and it seemed exactly right. The more I thought 
about it, without even having seen a wiki, the more it seemed obviously right. Imme 
diately I wrote a proposal unfortunately, lost now in which I said that this might 
solve the problem and that we ought to try it. Given that setting up a wiki would be 
very simple and would not require hiring a programmer, Jimmy could scarcely 
refuse. He liked the idea but was initially skeptical properly so, as I was, despite my 
excitement. 

Wiki advocates often point out 9 that Wikipedia is nonstandard as a wiki. This is 
partly because we began just with the very basic wiki concept and not so much of the 
culture. Wiki culture is very distinctive. Wiki pages can be started and edited by any 
one, but in Thread Mode 10 (as in "the thread of this discussion"), the dialogue 
becomes complex. In that case, or when consensus is reached, or when positions 
have hardened, it is considered a good idea to "refactor" 11 pages (a term borrowed 



8 For an introduction, see the "Welcome Visitors" page of WikiWikiWeb: http://www.c2.com/cgi/ 
wiki?Welcome Visitors. 

9 Usemod.com, a wiki about wikis, has many articles that introduce the old-fashioned idea about 
wikis. See "WikiPedia Is Not Typical," http://www.usemod.com/cgi-bin/mb.plPWifeiPediaIsNotTypicaI. 

10 "Thread Mode," http://www.c2.com/cgi/wifei7ThreadMode. 

1 1 "What Is Refactoring," http://www.c2.com/cgi/wifeiPWhat/sRe/actoring. 



The Origins of Wikipedia * 315 



from programming) i.e., to rewrite them, taking into account the highlights of the 
dialog. Then the dialog might be represented in "Document Mode." 12 Opinions are 
very welcome on a typical wiki. There are many other collective habits that make up 
typical wiki culture; these are only a few. 

However, I denied the necessity of organizing Wikipedia according to these precise 
principles. To be sure, a few other participants wanted Wikipedia to adopt wiki cul 
ture wholesale so that it would be "just another wiki," and they had some small influ 
ence over the direction of the project. Still, I viewed wiki software as simply a tool, a 
way to organize people who want to collaborate. I saw no necessity whatsoever to 
partake in all aspects of the idiosyncratic culture that happened to be associated with 
the advent of this very generally applicable tool, since we were engaged in a very spe 
cific sort of project with very specific requirements. This caused some consternation 
among some wiki advocates, who appeared to think that Wikipedia should, or inevi 
tably would, become just another wiki, somehow necessarily partaking of typical 
wiki culture. Ward Cunningham s prediction, 13 when Jimmy asked him whether 
wiki software "could successfully generate a useful encyclopedia," was: "Yes, but in 
the end it wouldn t be an encyclopedia. It would be a wiki." As I said in reply: "Wiki 
pedia has a totally different culture from this wiki, because it s pretty single-mind- 
edly aimed at creating an encyclopedia. It s already rather useful as an encyclopedia, 
and we expect it will only get better." 

Typical wiki culture aside, wiki software does encourage, but does not strictly require, 
extreme openness and decentralization: openness, since page changes are logged and 
publicly viewable, and pages may be further changed by anyone; and decentralization, 
because for work to be done, there is no need for a person or body to assign work, but 
rather, work can proceed as and when people want to do it. Wiki software also discour 
ages the exercise of authority, since work proceeds at will on any page, and on any 
large, active wiki it would be too much work for any single overseer or limited group of 
overseers to keep up. These all became features of Wikipedia. 

My initial idea was that the wiki would be set up as part of Nupedia; it was to be a 
way for the public to develop a stream of content that could be fed into the Nupedia 
process. I think I got some of the basic pages written how wikis work, what our 
general plan was, and so forth over the next few days. I wrote a general proposal 
for the Nupedia community, and the Nupedia wiki went live January 10. The first 
encyclopedia articles for what was to become Wikipedia were written then. It turned 
out, however, that a clear majority of the Nupedia Advisory Board wanted to have 
nothing to do with a wiki. Again, their commitment was to rigor and reliability, a 
concern I shared with them and continue to have. They evidently thought a wiki 



12 "Document Mode," http://www.c2.com/cgi/wifei7DocumentMode. 

13 "Wiki Pedia," http://www.c2.com/cgi/wifeiPWileiPedia. 



316 * * The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir 



could not resemble an encyclopedia at all, that it would be too informal and unstruc 
tured, as the original WikiWikiWeb was, to be associated with Nupedia. They of 
course were perfectly reasonable to doubt that it would turn into the fantastic source 
of content that it did. Who could reasonably guess that it would work? But it did 
work, and now the world knows better. 

Wikipedia s First Few Months 

We decided to relaunch the wiki under its own domain name. I came up with the 
name "Wikipedia," a silly name for what was at first a very silly project, and the 
newly independent project was launched at Wikipedia.com on January 15, 2001. It 
was a ".com" at first because, at the time, we were contemplating selling ads to pay 
for me, programmers, and servers. It was easy to deprecate ".com" in favor of ".org" 
in 2002, after Jimmy was able to assure users that Wikipedia would never run ads to 
support the project. 

I took it to be one of my main jobs to promote Wikipedia, and this resulted in a 
steady influx of new participants. I wrote on the Wikipedia announcement page Jan 
uary 24, "Wikipedia has definitely taken [on] a life of its own; new people are arriv 
ing every day and the project seems to be getting only more popular. Long live Wiki 
pedia!" By the end of January, we reportedly 14 had 600 articles; there were 1,300 in 
March, 2,300 in April, and 3,900 in May. Not only was the project growing steadily, 
but the rate of growth was also increasing. 

Wikipedia started with a handful of people, many from Nupedia. The influence of 
Nupedians was crucial early on. I think, especially, of the tireless Magnus Manske 
(who worked on the software for both projects), our resident stickler Ruth Ifcher, 
and the very smart poker-playing programmer Lee Daniel Crocker to name a few. 
All of these people, and several other Nupedia borrowings, had a good understand 
ing of the requirements of good encyclopedia articles, and they were intelligent, 
skilled writers. The direction that Wikipedia ought to go in seemed obvious to us all, 
in terms of what sort of content we wanted. But what we did not have worked out in 
advance was how the community should be organized, and (not surprisingly) that 
turned out to be the thorniest problem. Still, because the project started with these 
good people, and we were able to adopt, explain, and promote good habits and poli 
cies to newer people, the Nupedian roots of the project helped to develop a robust, 
functional, and successful community. As to project leadership or management, we 
began with me, Jimmy, and Tim Shell; Tim mostly stopped participating after the 
first few months. 



14 "Wikipedia: Size of Wikipedia," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size_of_Wikipedia. 

Wikipedia s First Few Months X 317 



The many rank-and-file users did the heavy lifting, and if there had not been a rea 
sonable consensus among them about what the project should look like, it just 
wouldn t have happened. In any collaborative project, it is the contributors who are 
responsible for the outcome. Those early adopters should feel proud of themselves, 
because they were essential in shaping a thing of beauty and usefulness. 

I recall saying casually, but repeatedly, in the project s first nine months or so, that 
experts and specialists should be given some particular respect when writing in their 
areas of expertise. They should be deferred to, I thought, unless there was some clear 
evidence of bias. In those first months, deference to expertise was a policy that at 
least I usually insisted upon, but not strongly or clearly enough. It was nearly a year 
after the project began that I finally articulated this view as a policy to consider. 15 
Perha